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JANE'S DEFENCE DATA

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count on the luxury of time provided by Iraq's failure to counter the massive capability that was assembled over a period of five months. Timing of the counter offensive was left to the coalition. We also need to examine the implications of short warning time in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Lack of a 'spillover' effect or expansion of the crisis to the Mediterranean or other areas also is not necessarily a precedent for future crises. One need only consider the consequences in the Mediterranean had Israel become an active participant in the coalition offensive. The importance of air and sea lines of communication remaining free should not be discounted. A few well placed mines, a blocked Suez Canal, or active submarine opposition could have disrupted the vital logistics flow, which carried 90 per cent of the forces and logistics to the Gulf. It is also worth reiterating that NATO training and procedures developed over the years facilitated successful coalition co-ordination and integration.

'Southern Guard' was a good test of emerging concepts for NATO's new strategy of increased flexibility to deal with peace, crisis, and war. The multinationality in forces responding to the crisis symbolised unity and provided urgently needed assistance. NATO's response also demonstrated the value of force multipliers. The addition of a small amount of modern equipment (for example, AWACS, F-15s, Patriots, satellite communications sets, and so on) multiplied the effectiveness of existing defences. Mobility was achieved as large equipment (for example Hawk missile batteries) was shipped or flown to remote areas and quickly set up to bolster defences. Instead of the reinforcements being limited to two nations (for example, the US and Portugal as called for in traditional Southern Region planning), 14 nations contributed. Capable forces came from many areas of NATO to concentrate in a troubled spot. Both north to south inter-regional and west to east intra-regional flexibility was demonstrated, with forces tailored proportionately to the threat.

NATO's response to crisis also demonstrated the importance of

programmes to improve command, control and communications imperatives for future flexibility, mobility and multinationality. In the aftermath of the crisis, the Southern Region will concentrate on C³I improvements and a better capability to meet future crises. This requires new contingency planning, an exercise programme that replicates 'Southern Guard' and other potential crises, a new intelligence base, a system that can collect and disseminate tactical information, and personnel augmentations that will sustain headquarters operations through the ebb and flow of a prolonged crisis.

Force emphasis will also modify as 'Southern Guard' needs, such as tankers, outsized airlift, NBC equipment, mine hunters, portable satellite communications and air defence capability, are assessed. The time has come for a Standing Force Mediterranean with mine hunting and amphibious components to augment the traditional frigates and destroyers of the On-Call Force Mediterranean. The land, sea and air forces must be better linked together. We need an Ace Mobile Air Defence Force that comes with modern fighters, surface-to-air missiles, ballistic missile defence and the necessary connectivity with AWACS and radar systems. We also need modern precision weapons. As we modernise, we must exercise these capabilities to higher standards.

'Southern Guard' has demonstrated that NATO can react to the types of threats most likely to challenge its 16 nations in this decade. While we have much to do to improve our capability to act in the grey area between peace and all out war, the 'Southern Guard' experience demonstrated that the principle of deterrence through unity remains relevant. From August 1990 to March 1991, NATO was presented with a critical political-military test of its future relevance. In my view, NATO passed this important test. In retrospect, 'Southern Guard' could be viewed as a milestone in NATO's development and adjustment to new political and military realities of the 1990s.

The Alliance and Security in the Mediterranean and the Gulf Crisis

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The Stakes in the Gulf Crisis

In future years the Gulf crisis may be seen as having acted as a catalyst for new forms of co-operation in the Mediterranean. Be that as it may, it is already clear that the Gulf crisis has to an extent marked perceptions of Mediterranean security, and in a way, which regional crises on the southern periphery of the Alliance have seldom done before. Contiguous to the epicentre of the crisis, the Mediterranean ran a very real risk of becoming engulfed in the conflict, had it not been successfully contained. The intense degree of involvement exhibited by elites and populations in an arc of countries stretching from the Maghreb to south-west Asia was mirrored by the profound preoccupations the war gave rise to throughout the countries of the Mediterranean's northern littoral. Together, these sentiments demarcated the region as a security space in its own right, however diffuse it is otherwise in terms of Mediterranean states' levels of economic development, ethnic and religious make-up, political and social systems, allegiances and policy inclinations.

If the Gulf crisis was a signal event from a Mediterranean vantage point, it was no less so from other perspectives. The challenges which it threw up were several and serious. The Gulf crisis was:

- a challenge to the thesis that the religious communities touched by the conflict can co-exist and co-operate despite their

many differences, and that they are not condemned to an adversarial relationship.

- a challenge to the hopes for the creation of a new world order with the end of the Cold War between East and West, an order based on a more co-operative process of interstate reaction, fostered by a growing recognition of regional and global interdependencies which render war ever less attractive or meaningful as a means of resolving political conflicts.

- a challenge to the larger thesis of a fundamental transformation in the bases of state power, from a hierarchy dominated by military power to one resting on a new mix of economic and technological attributes.

- a challenge to the United Nations, and its revived promise as a global instrument of peace.

- a challenge to US status as world power, at a time when the USSR's ability to play a Super Power role has been sorely compromised.

- a challenge to US/European relations and the ability of the two sides, so often at odds with one another in the past in dealing with regional issues, to demonstrate solidarity when the chips were down.

- a challenge to NATO's ability to make an effective contribution to the containment and resolution of the crisis, notwithstanding its lying beyond the boundaries defined by NATO as necessitating collective military action in the event of aggression.

Thus, the Gulf crisis was in many respects a challenge to the entire management system of world affairs.

The Evolution of NATO's Role in Mediterranean Security

Consistent with the Washington Treaty, NATO's role in the crisis was indirect in its Gulf dimensions but direct in its Mediterranean dimensions. This role has a prehistory which is as old as the treaty itself. It has matured through several stages, the process being as often as not propelled by events of landmark proportions in the Alliance's development.

1949. In establishing the transatlantic security partnership, NATO's founding fathers unequivocally give it a Mediterranean dimension. Italy, the only country not to have an Atlantic coastline, is among the original twelve signatories. The Mediterranean Sea - forces, vessels or aircraft of the twelve signatories in or over it - is included within the area where an attack on one is to be considered as an attack on all. The territory of Algeria, at that time under French administration, is also included. (The relevant clauses of the treaty become inapplicable on Algeria's assumption of independence in 1962.)

1952. With the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty, the Alliance encompasses all European non-communist states of the Mediterranean with the exception of Spain, which joins NATO 30 years later.

1956. The Alliance is rocked for the first time by an out-of-area crisis arising in the Mediterranean - the first of some 16 serious out-of-area crises affecting the Alliance in the next 35 years, two-thirds of which originate in the Mediterranean or in flanking areas. This crisis spurs the allies to undertake a major review of the Alliance's non-military role (The Three Wise Men's Report), one of the results of this appraisal is the decision to strengthen the political consultative function of the Alliance in addressing developments outside the treaty area.

1967. In the wake of the Six Days' War and the build up of Soviet forces in the Mediterranean, and following the recommendation of the Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance, the Alliance establishes a distinct framework for inter-governmental consultations on the Mediterranean alongside the existing fora for consultations on regional developments in the Middle East and the Maghreb, Africa, Asia, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and Latin America, in which nations are represented by experts meeting in a non-governmental capacity.

1975. The Alliance caucus at the Helsinki talks concerning the establishment of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe agrees to create a special Mediterranean basket to discuss ecological and environmental problems in the region. At the opening plenary sessions of CSCE Mediterranean meetings, NNA States of the region are to be given an opportunity to make statements on a wide variety of Mediterranean issues.

1982. Under the impact of developments in Poland, Afghanistan, the Falklands and Libya, the Alliance recognises the legitimacy of Alliance members responding on a non-NATO basis, individually or collectively, to requests for assistance by third parties whose sovereignty and independence are threatened, and the importance of ensuring in such cases that sufficient capability remains within the treaty area to maintain deterrence and defence (Honn Summit Declaration and December Foreign Ministers' Meeting).

1986. In response to the emerging 'new thinking' in Soviet foreign policy, a review of the Alliance's regional groups on out-of-area developments reorients the focus of Mediterranean consultations. While the traditional monitoring and analysis of Soviet and related activities are maintained, greater importance is placed on the general developments in the area.

1989. At the 40th Anniversary Summit of NATO, the transition is made from looking at developments outside the treaty area as out-of-area, to placing them in the context of global challenges. Allied Heads of State and Government define a wide range of emerging risks, both military and non-military, to allied security as

matters for common concern, and therefore for consultations and, as appropriate, policy co-ordination. These comprise, in addition to regional conflicts, environmental problems, resource deprivation, economic disparities and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and destabilising conventional capabilities.

The allies commit themselves to working closely together in addressing these issues, in particular in the appropriate multilateral institutions and in collaboration with like-minded industrial democracies, but more generally in the broadest possible co-operation with other countries, including those of Central and Eastern Europe. The allies also undertake to redouble their efforts within the United Nations to strengthen its role in the settlement of conflicts and peace-keeping.

The new conflict potentials identified by NATO leaders and the new forms of co-operation which are espoused in dealing with them, figure prominently in the Gulf War crisis.

The Alliance's Role in the Gulf Crisis

NATO's role in the Gulf crisis - tragic in the failure to deter the aggression of 2 August, triumphant in the brilliant victory of the UN coalition - is a seemingly paradoxical one.

As an institution, NATO was not militarily involved in the Gulf conflict, and for a good reason. This was not a war between NATO and the Iraq of Saddam Hussein but a war between the latter and the international community, acting under the leadership of the United Nations. Moreover, as long as no hostile action was undertaken against NATO territory, Article V of the treaty foreseeing a joint obligation to undertake defensive action was not operable. By the same token, NATO was very much involved. The interests of all allies were clearly affected by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent events, and all the allies, both individually and as NATO members, had a common responsibility under the UN Charter, and particularly Resolution 678, to support the coalition forces in the Gulf. Acting on this responsibility, the Alliance played a vital role in support of the United Nations and all allies contributed, although to varying degrees.

At the heart of the Alliance's role was the consultative process. Through the duration of the crisis, the allies were engaged in an extensive exchange of information on all its aspects - political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and military.

In the political and diplomatic field, the allies discussed developments in the UN, implementation of sanctions, peace initiatives, demarches, positions of third countries, the situation of embassies, and foreign citizens in Kuwait and Iraq.

In the economic field, the co-opted bodies of the Alliance assessed the economic implications of the crisis, as well as the impact of the sanctions on the economies of Iraq, allied member states and other countries, and exchanged information on the provision of economic and financial assistance to countries most adversely affected.

In the humanitarian field, allies exchanged information on the needs which arose during the crisis for refugee transport and the provision of food and medical supplies, and acted as a clearing house for requests for assistance received from humanitarian organisations.

In the military field, allies kept one another abreast of their force deployments, and those of others into and within the theatre of crisis, as well as developments on the battlefield once hostilities had broken out.

The Alliance's consultative machinery thus ensured a timely Alliance-wide flow of information on all facets of the crisis. This could not have been accomplished through relying solely on bilateral channels. It had the effect of keeping all allies fully abreast of developments, and was essential in harmonising allies' views and policies. It ensured that their responses, however articulated - nationally, multinationally, within or outside the NATO context - were in line with the demands of the situation.

Particularly important in this connection was the use of the consultative framework to encourage close alignment between European and US positions on the complex political dimensions of the regional conflict issues which developments in the Gulf

brought to the fore. The importance of this aspect of the crisis for the successful implementation of the US resolutions should not be underestimated. That it did not come about automatically is underscored by the frictions in transatlantic relations which regional conflicts in the Mediterranean and flanking areas have often engendered in the past.

NATO's overall response can be seen from two different vantage points: first, activities carried out as a function of the allies' obligations under the Washington Treaty; second, activities carried out voluntarily outside the legal framework of the treaty. Under the first heading, five functions can be identified.

First, the Alliance fully backed the UN Resolutions, meeting twice at Ministerial level to discuss the crisis in depth and issuing, on 17 December 1990, a statement by allied Foreign Ministers to this effect. This support constituted a vital building block in the construction of the international consensus which coalesced around the Resolutions.

Second, the Alliance took a series of extraordinary measures to reinforce the defence of Turkey, which found itself directly adjacent to the crisis theatre and the target of hostile threats from the Iraqi leadership, and to protect allied forces in the Mediterranean. There were several aspects to this.


The air component of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, consisting of 90 planes, as well as air defence aircraft, was deployed to south-eastern Turkey. This took place against the background of a strong statement of support for Turkey in declarations made by the Alliance and, on its behalf, by NATO Secretary General Wörner.

Consistent with the commitment made in 1982, allies moved forces into the Mediterranean to compensate for those which other member states participating in the international coalition had released from their security responsibilities in the Mediterranean to assume tasks in the Gulf under UN auspices. Beyond that, additional measures were taken to reinforce the Alliance security posture in the Mediterranean. The mission of the NATO On-Call Force in the Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) was extended. Intelli-

gence and surveillance activities carried out by maritime patrol and NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft were increased. Additional escort and mine countermeasure vessels were deployed to ensure the safety of shipping and freedom of navigation. In addition, a number of bilateral actions were taken by individual allies in response to requests by the Turkish authorities and SACEUR. These involved the provision of frigates, destroyers and support ships, which co-operated or co-ordinated with NATO commands, and the deployment to Turkey of air defence aircraft and installations such as the Hawk and Patriot missiles. At the same time, NATO's Military and Infrastructure Committees authorised extra funds to upgrade information systems used in command and control functions.

A third feature of the Alliance's contribution was its role in channelling and providing allied support to those member countries participating in the UN coalition. This support took a number of forms. Rail transport, sealift and airlift facilities were made available to help transport troops and equipment. NATO bases were opened to allied aircraft transiting to the Gulf. Urgent shipments were made from Alliance holdings of material. A round-the-clock response system was in place for high priority repairs in support of forces deployed in the Gulf. Measures were taken through the NATO Central Europe Pipeline System and on an ad hoc basis to meet the considerably expanded requirements for jet fuel as a result of the dramatic increase in the number of aircraft using NATO Europe bases on their way to and from the Gulf. In addition, several allies made available, from their national holdings, assets ranging from NBC equipment and munitions to aircraft spares and secure voice communications.

A fourth aspect of the Alliance's contribution received relatively little notice but was nonetheless highly significant. Using the mechanism of regular diplomatic liaison with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe established following the decision of the London Summit of Heads of State and Government in July 1990, the Alliance maintained an open line of communication with their former Warsaw Pact adversaries. Information was



A German Fuchs chemical detection vehicle rolls past a row of German Air Force Alfa jets at Erhac Air Base, Turkey during Operation 'Southern Guard' (NATO photo)

shared and concerns were voiced, *inter alia*, about the effects of the Gulf crisis on the economies of Central and Eastern European countries. In general, the diplomatic liaison function acted as an important confidence-building measure at a time of considerable international tension.

Fifth, the Alliance maintained, throughout the crisis, a sufficiently strong security posture within the treaty area to encourage continuing stability on the European mainland.

This is not to suggest that there was any serious possibility that the allied involvement in, and with, the Gulf crisis might have been seized upon in an attempt to turn back the clock on East-West relations. At the same time, from the Autumn of 1990, a number of disturbing developments occurred in Soviet domestic and foreign policy: the Soviet attempt to circumvent the CFE Treaty, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's resignation, Moscow's last-hour effort to mediate in the Gulf crisis, apparently on behalf of Saddam Hussein, and the activities of reactionary forces in the Baltics.

Such developments underlined that continuation of the reform process in the Soviet Union could not be taken for granted and that the Soviet situation had to be addressed by the Alliance at the same time as it was naturally preoccupied by the Gulf crisis. We may never know exactly what impact, for example, the strong allied protest against the disturbing events in the Baltics last January had on Soviet decision-making. As it was, however, it could be argued that the signal the allies sent in this connection strengthened the pro-reform forces in the USSR at the expense of their opponents and was instrumental in keeping Soviet support for the UN resolutions on track.

Taken together, these five aspects of NATO's supporting role in the Gulf crisis set the stage for the furthest-reaching military engagement of allied countries outside the treaty area since the establishment of the Alliance. This, too, had various aspects.

Several allies provided vessels to police the UN economic embargo against Iraq. Fifty per cent of these vessels were contributed by the European allies, the WEU serving as a forum to co-ordinate their deployment in the Gulf and its access waters.

Twelve allies contributed forces to the international coalition. In addition to the nearly half a million US troops in the Gulf, the European allies supplied 62 000 troops, about 10 per cent of the total, and principally from the UK (30 000) and France (15 000). Italy and Canada contributed air assets which participated along with those of the US, UK and France in the air operation - either in the bombing campaign or in direct support for it. Moreover, over 20 ships from nine NATO countries, other than from the US, UK and France, were employed in various roles in the area of the Gulf, protecting coalition vessels or hunting mines. Overall, the allies contributed 145 ships and 1782 aircraft.

From a political perspective, the distinction between what was done by or through the Alliance within the treaty area, and what was done on a non-NATO basis outside the treaty area, is an important one. It is an expression of the solemn obligation under Article V of the treaty to defend collectively against aggression under specific circumstances, and the free choice of member states to co-operate under others. At the same time, it is an expression of the fundamentally defensive character of the Alliance as a security institution whose military actions are limited to its members' territory. In not jointly dispatching military forces to the Gulf, the allies demonstrated the continuing importance which they attach to this distinction.

From a practical perspective, the course and outcome of the Gulf crisis cannot be explained by considering in isolation what was done on a NATO basis and what was done on a non-NATO basis. Without the effective action of the international coalition, there was every likelihood that the Gulf War would have been extended to NATO territory and the Mediterranean theatre, in which case the Alliance as a whole would have been at war. Without the effective supporting action of the Alliance, the ability of the international coalition to carry out its mission would have been severely compromised, a development which would have had similar results.

This interplay between Alliance and extra-Alliance involvement went beyond the far-reaching complementarity of activities in the political, diplomatic, economic, military and humanitarian spheres which was manifest. There were also intangible factors at

work, spawned by over four decades of training and exercising together within the integrated military framework, and close consultations in dealing with a broad spectrum of non-military issues. The Gulf crisis highlighted the importance of common experience of this kind and the need to ensure that it is safeguarded in the interests of global security.

The Impact of the Gulf Crisis on the Alliance's Transformation and Implications for Mediterranean Security

In July 1990, Allied Heads of State and Government issued their London Declaration on a transformed Alliance, setting out guidelines for a far-reaching review of NATO's political and military strategy. This process is expected to be concluded at a further summit meeting later this year. The experience of the Gulf crisis will, of course, have a major impact on the Alliance's transformation and the future development of NATO policy.

First, the crisis underscored the indivisibility of the security of the Alliance's Southern Region members from that of the other allies, independently of their geographical location, whether it be in the Central Region, the Northern Region, or North America.

Had the Southern Region countries disassociated themselves from the positions and action of the other allies, it would have been impossible to contain the theatre of hostilities. Had the other allies disassociated themselves from the allied states which found themselves on, or just behind the frontline, the result would have been similar. In either case, what began and finished as a conflict in the Gulf would have become a broader conflict in the Mediterranean theatre, and very possibly beyond.

This interdependence of allied interests and the preparedness to draw common conclusions in response underline that any speculation that the end of the Cold War would mean a lessening of the importance of the Southern Region and a possible weakening of security ties between it and the Alliance's other regions is totally groundless. In fact, quite the opposite conclusion has been proved true.

Second, the heightened awareness of possible military threats from the Alliance's southern and south-eastern periphery which the Gulf conflict has fostered can be expected to have an important influence on the Alliance's future force planning and posture.

The London Declaration of Heads of State and Government set out guidelines for a fundamental reorganisation of the Alliance's integrated military forces. If the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe is implemented with Soviet forces leaving Europe as the treaty foresees, the Alliance's standing forces are to be reduced and the readiness of its active units scaled back. At the same time, these forces are to be made more mobile and versatile, with greater emphasis being put on the ability to reconstitute larger forces, if and as required. Additionally, the Alliance will continue to field both conventional and nuclear forces, but reliance on the latter will be diminished.

The experience of the Gulf War in no way calls into question these options. It does, however, accentuate the need for the Alliance's military reorganisation to take into account military contingencies which could arise beyond its southern reaches. This means that the numbers and readiness levels of NATO forces cannot be reduced to an extent which, while stabilising within a European context, might have the opposite effect in the extra-European context. Similarly, it puts an even greater premium on being able to reconstitute forces rapidly and to deploy them flexibly.

Consider in this respect the sheer size of the military machine which Iraq, a medium-sized country of less than twenty million people, was able to field at short notice, and the force levels which the international coalition had to assemble in an effort, first to persuade Iraq to reverse its aggression of 2 August by peaceful means, and second, when that did not succeed, to do so on the battlefield. Some seven months were at the coalition's disposal to

deploy these forces and make them combat ready. In a future crisis, such a lead time might not be available.

Arms control, to which the Alliance remains committed as a means of redimensioning military relationships and enhancing their stability and predictability, will be likewise affected. This is not to suppose that the allies will become involved in arms control negotiations with the states of the southern littoral of the Mediterranean as they have within the CSCE context. However, it does imply that the perspective from which future arms control agreements are negotiated in Europe will have to take fully into account military potentials in the South. Furthermore, it puts the onus on the allies to show leadership in broadly-based efforts to devise arms export control mechanisms which counteract the prospect of ever more weaponry, of ever more destructive power capable of being deployed over ever greater distances, entering the arsenals of countries on its southern perimeter. Iraq's resort to Scud weapons against Israel and Saudi Arabia, the concern that Baghdad had the capacity to arm them with chemical warheads, and the possible threat to allied targets which hung over the Gulf crisis, are a telling reminder in this respect.

Another lesson of the Gulf War which will impact on the Alliance's approach to arms control will be the absolute necessity of keeping the sea lanes of communication open during a crisis to ensure the rapid passage of men and material to the region concerned. This will reinforce the allies' long-standing caution towards any naval arms control initiatives which could play havoc with their ability to carry out rapid reinforcement in time of crisis, whether this be from North America to Europe or within Europe itself. To underscore this point, it should be borne in mind that one of the major contributors to the coalition sent from between 80 and 90 per cent of its forces to the Gulf by ship. (Fewer than 10 per cent of the vessels so used sailed under its flag.)

The Gulf experience should also tend to reinforce the Alliance's interest in developing the concept of multinational forces and drawing its Southern Region countries more fully into this form of co-operation. This would reflect the changed nature of their role post-Cold War, from being countries whose military role was largely - and not always correctly - considered to be a tributary of possible military contingencies along the traditional East-West dividing line in Central Europe, and bring it in line with new security realities. It would also facilitate allied co-operation in the Southern Region and more generally send a stronger signal of mutual solidarity, the overriding political message which the integrated military structure is designed to project.

Such developments could prompt objections to the effect that this might be unnecessarily destabilising for the relations between Southern Region countries and their partners in the larger Mediterranean region. In fact, quite the contrary is true. Greater integration of national defence resources is accompanied by enhanced multilateral political control over their use, a factor which can serve to reassure other nations of their strictly defensive purposes. The greater deterrent ability, which integrated forces represent, means not only more security for those engaged in them, but can also contribute to enhancing stability in a larger environment. Integrated forces have a further advantage in that they need not be directed at a potential threat from a particular country or region. Stand alone national forces are, in most cases, by their very nature only capable of projecting force over limited distances and in smaller theatres. Such a limited capability can thus be perceived as being potentially more threatening to one or the other regional actors than can be larger forces subject to the broader range of interests of those countries controlling their deployment.

Beyond such political benefits, there are also financial ones. Smaller standing forces can bring a reduction in defence costs in time. The far-reaching reorientation of NATO defence posture will however be anything but cost-free. New resources will be needed for modernisation, particularly of defence capabilities to deter and defend against missile attacks, the importance of which again was highlighted during the Gulf War. Such requirements have price tags which are often beyond the reach of national treasuries.

A third lesson of the Gulf crisis is that the importance of being able to manage crises in a way which ensures that hostilities are optimally managed and minimised, and, wherever possible, prevented altogether. The Gulf War cost the United States alone in

the vicinity of \$47 billion. Clearly, this is not the kind of expense which can be made lightly or regularly, not to mention the enormous human suffering and environmental destruction which can be wreaked by a conflict such as experienced in the Gulf.

Being able to project military readiness to counter aggressive intentions is an essential, but by no means the exclusive, prerequisite for crisis limitation and prevention. Indeed, in future the deterrent effect which can be marshalled by a joint ability to take economic, political and diplomatic measures to prevent crises will assume ever greater significance. Similarly, during the Gulf crisis, action of a non-military nature was as important to limiting the scope of aggression and de-escalating the conflict once it had broken out as were military measures. Without them, the parameters of the battlefield and the destruction wrought upon it would doubtless have assumed greater proportions.

A fourth feature that has been clearly on display, during and since the conflict bears out this last point. The Gulf crisis provided a chilling confirmation of the fact that as the threat of large-scale aggression against allied territory has waned, a new array of conflict potentials moved on to centre stage. As long as the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were deterred from undertaking aggressive action in Europe, it was unlikely that extra-European regional conflicts could burst their confines. The changes which have occurred since the mid-1980s in East-West relations have, however, created a considerably more fluid potential environment in which the traditional checks and balances produced by the East-West stand-off have lost their prophylactic effect.

These new conflict potentials are not 'totalitarian' as once was the spectre of a massive frontal attack launched by the Soviet Union. They can, however, provoke considerable instability and challenge vital allied interests long before they assume a classical threat in the military sense. They can, moreover, have their genesis in theatres which can be far removed from the Alliance's treaty boundaries. They are, because of this, more diffuse, more complex, and more multidimensional in nature at the same time as they are less static and less predictable than the undimensional threat of the Cold War period.

During the Gulf conflict, the Southern Region countries found themselves most immediately challenged by these new features of the security environment. Turkey found itself on the frontline, other Southern Region countries would have found themselves on the frontline if the Gulf War had spread westwards. All Southern Region countries are on the frontline in dealing with the continuing challenges before the region, post-conflict: the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the technology to deliver such weapons over long distances, the non-resolution of long-standing regional conflicts, the dangerous asymmetries in communal power-sharing within the region, deficiencies in democratic and economic development, environmental decay, and glaring imbalances in living standards. It is such insecurity factors which trigger destabilising movements of people across state borders. Left unchecked, they can sow the seeds of larger military conflict.

If the Southern Region countries are most directly confronted by the new conflict potentials which have emerged in the Mediterranean and flanking areas, their position is by no means unique within the Alliance. The characteristics of the post Cold War risk spectrum, as seen from a Mediterranean perspective, are equally relevant to the evolving situation in Central and Eastern Europe, a statement which in itself underlines that the Alliance's security perspective has by necessity evolved from being focused along an East-West axis to one which has no particular geographical fixation. In consequence, the allies are at one in re-gearing themselves from being prepared to ward off the ever imminent threat from the East which dominated its first four decades, to developing a multi-directional all-risks insurance coverage for any number of contingencies which could arise over the longer-term.

The fifth lesson to be drawn from the Gulf crisis is the extent to which various institutional responses were required to address the complexities of the crisis. In addition to the Alliance, the UN, the EC, the WEU and regional organisations in the Arab and Moslem worlds all had a role to play in the crisis. Some of these additional responses were clearly more important than others to the prosecution and outcome of the conflict, but each constituted an essential building block in the overall effort to deal with Iraq's aggression.

This underscores that one of the new realities of the emerging new world order is the sheer impracticality and impossibility of any one structure attempting to address the security demands of the 1990s and beyond in their geopolitical and functional dimensions. This is less an argument for realising the importance of any one institution than it is for working to ensure that each maximises its contribution in accordance with its own specificity. This in turn necessitates a broad common effort to promote the synergistic interaction of the various institutions involved. So it is in the institutional interface between regional organisations and the United Nations. So it is in the institutional interface between the Alliance and the European security dimension, and so it is as well in the interface between both of the latter and the institutions which embrace allies and neutral and non-aligned states in the Euro-Mediterranean theatre.

As the only functioning and most experienced security organisation on this institutional landscape, it is incumbent upon the Alliance to play a leading role in the moulding of new structural relationships. The Alliance must seek to ensure appropriate degrees of transparency and complementarity between its actions and objectives and those of the other institutions - whether it is a question of the United Nations, whose principles NATO is obliged to uphold by the terms of the Washington Treaty, the nascent European security architecture or regional groupings in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, whose membership is more limited.

This is particularly challenging as regards the relationship between the increasingly integrated Europe and the Alliance. The importance of giving effective form and content to European defence was highlighted by the events in the Gulf. The European contribution, while essential for the political prosecution of the crisis, was with a few important exceptions, militarily limited. Several countries found themselves not able to contribute more than they did because they lacked the military instruments. What should have ideally been a jointly led European-North American action turned out to be a US-led action, with the UK and France playing a secondary role, and the other European contributors a tertiary role.

Developing Europe's ability to respond, and preferably to deter, such crises in future, will take time, money, and huge portions of political will and skill. It will place great demands on the Alliance's ability to manage the transatlantic relationship in a way which preserves the ever necessary North American commitment to European security at the same time as the new European commitments to European security evolve.

Of course, as this process evolves there are bound to be some uncertainties and even frictions. However, as it does, the attractiveness, from both a political and financial standpoint, of North American-European security co-operation should increase. In particular, it should facilitate the Alliance's ability to deal with developments outside the treaty area. The enhanced solidarity which a more equitable transatlantic partnership will engender should furthermore strengthen the Alliance's crisis prevention role, at the same time as greater European integration reduces the political and military vulnerabilities traditionally felt by many European states when faced with the question of whether or not to assume security responsibilities beyond the Alliance's boundaries.

In the short term, at any rate, this is not likely to lead to a change in the existing consensus whereby military action outside the

treaty area is undertaken on a non-NATO basis. By the same token, however, there is likely to be a developing consensus on the need to make more readily available Alliance assets to allies which are involved outside the treaty area.

From the Alliance perspective, one of the most enduring contributions of the Gulf crisis may be to have introduced a greater sense of urgency into the inter-related tasks of restructuring relations between North Americans and Europeans in the Alliance and adapting shared security perspectives to new conditions. Effective progress in both areas is essential if the Mediterranean security challenges of this and future decades are to be met successfully, but so is the further development of institutional structures in the Mediterranean, and new patterns of co-operation between these structures and transatlantic and European fora.

The conceptual spadework on which these institutional arrangements can be built is well advanced. At their December 1990 meeting, allied foreign ministers unveiled the concept of interlocking institutions - the Alliance, the process of European integration, and the CSCE - each having its own purpose but each also complementing one another in fostering security and co-operation in the new Europe. The second concept developed by the foreign ministers is the importance of regional co-operation initiatives in enhancing democracy, prosperity and stability.

Neither position refers specifically to either all-Mediterranean or sub-regional Mediterranean structures or initiatives. Both open the door conceptually to possible expansion of the interlocking institution notion to embrace initiatives such as the project for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean, and the various regional structures which have proliferated in recent years. These bring together both allied and non-allied countries in a host of ventures such as Western Mediterranean Co-operation (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, together with the five countries of the Arab Maghreb Union, and Malta - with observer status), the Adriatic Initiative (Italy and Yugoslavia), Pentagone (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy and Yugoslavia), Balkan Co-operation (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia), and the recently launched Black Sea Economic Co-operation (Bulgaria, Romania, Soviet Union and Turkey).

The extent to which the functions and membership of each of these institutions intersect with those of the Alliance varies considerably. Common to all, however, are three characteristics. They are inspired by the successful experience of multilateral interaction of such institutions as the Alliance and the European Community. They rely on the environment of security and stability generated by the latter to progress towards their objectives. They are part of the process underway in Western Europe, greater Europe, and the larger western community whereby institutional responses are adapted and new forms of multilateral co-operation are sought to deal with the new realities which have emerged with the end of the Cold War.

*The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Political Affairs Directorate or NATO. This paper is based on remarks presented at the conference organised by the Department of International Studies, Faculty of Political Science and Sociology, Universidad Complutense, Madrid on the theme 'New Thinking in Mediterranean Defence and Security', 11-15 March 1991.

Europe and the Gulf Crisis - A Political Analysis

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The European political response to the Gulf crisis was as complex and multi-faceted as the crisis itself. The main source of diplomatic and political initiatives was the EPC process, involving the twelve member states of the EC. However, a closer examination of

the EPC performance demonstrates that individual political responses to Saddam Hussein's aggression shaped collective action. The nature of EPC, that is the co-ordination of policies, implies the previous existence of national lines of action. Therefore, na-