Practice Note: Security Sector Mapping¹

What is security sector mapping, and why is it useful?

Security sector mapping is a practical exercise. It helps training participants to visualise a country's security sector as a complex system of different actors and institutions. Mapping can be used to "break the ice" with participants who are not used to working with one another as well as to initiate a discussion about security roles and relationships that can provide them with a common point of reference. Mapping is also a very effective tool for assessing the state of a given security sector and supporting subsequent policy development. Finally, mapping encourages co-learning through the sharing of participants' knowledge and experience.

Mapping can also be used to explore the composition of sub-sectors of the security sector, such as the police or the police-courts-corrections complex or, as shown in figure 3, the actors involved in a donor country's activities on behalf of a partner country.

What are some of the different ways to do security sector mapping?

Mapping can be conducted in a number of ways. If participants are all from the same country, the exercise usually focuses on creating a national security sector map. If the course participants are from a limited number of different countries, in roughly equal numbers, participants can design their national maps in working groups and then compare their results in a plenary discussion. If the composition of the training group is highly heterogeneous, participants can develop a generic security sector map and use this as a platform to analyse the actors and institutions that make up the security sector in a particular country. Another approach is to have participants brainstorm all the relevant actors and institutions and then devise an appropriate structural framework.

With groups whose knowledge of security issues is weak, it may be advisable to precede the mapping exercise with an exchange on some fundamental questions, such as:

- What is security?
- Who is security for?
- Who provides security?
- How does one ensure that security is provided in an appropriate way?

How to map a country's security sector?

To illustrate how mapping works, the different stages that are involved in creating a map of security sector actors are described below. A methodology for the other approaches outlined above would be similar.

Step 1 (approximately fifteen minutes)

¹ This Practice Note on Security Sector Mapping has been developed by David Law, Senior Fellow in the Operations Division of the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and Senior SSR Advisor to DCAF's International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT). This practice note has been produced with the support of Katie Meline and Benjamin Buckland, DCAF Research Assistants.

The first step involves explaining how a generic security sector is structured, describing its key components and contrasting the functions of these components. There are a number of different ways of conceptualising the structure of the security sector. In the approach taken here, consideration is give to the following components or sub-sectors.

- 1. Executive authorities that direct and manage security providers and are otherwise involved in a country's security, in particular, the President, and /or the Prime Minister and the so-called power ministries.
- 2. Statutory security providers with a mandate from a representative authority, including: the military, the police, border guards, presidential guards, intelligence services, etc.
- 3. Legislative bodies that oversee the activities of the executive and of security providers, approve their budgets and develop relevant legislation.
- 4. Judicial institutions that interpret and uphold the constitution and the laws of the land.
- 5. Civil society actors that monitor the activities of the security forces and of those that manage and oversee them, support the development of government policy relevant to the security sector, inform the public and conduct training activities.
- 6. Non-statutory armed groups and formations: those who have the capacity to use force but who do not have a state mandate to do so.
- 7. Independent oversight agencies—ombudspersons, human rights commissions, auditing boards, and so forth—which, while financed by the government are not part of its executive, judicial or legislative branches, and usually only report to parliament.
- 8. External actors that exercise one or more of the above functions in a country's security sector.

Figure 1: A generic map of a national security sector

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Comment [12]: Ben, please fix this map so that it is in conformity with the one in the backgrounder

executive bodies

- the president and/or prime minister
- national security advisory bodies ٠
- the "power ministries" (defence, interior, foreign affairs) ٠
- the justice ministry ٠

non-statutory armed

formations

٠

٠

٠

armies

liberation and guerrilla

private bodyguard units,

companies and private

military companies (in

terrorist organisations

other non-state groups

with a capacity to use

political party militias

private security

most countries)

criminal groups

٠

- other ministries with a supporting role in security ٠ matters, e.g., transport, immigration, agriculture
- financial management bodies (finance ministries, ٠ budget offices, financial audit and planning units)
- other civilian executive authorities that direct, manage ٠ and oversee the security forces

Acutive

Judiciat

٠

٠

4

Legislature

Civil Societ

statutory/

non-

statutory

security

forces

external actors

intergovernmental

organisations

national donors

governmental

organisations

with/without a

international non-

private military and

security companies

legitimate stationing

foreign security forces

legislative bodies

parliament and select committees of parliament overseeing the security forces and security policy

statutory security services


- military
- police
- gendarmerie ٠
- presidential guards
- intelligence and security services, both military and civilian
- coast guards, border guards, customs authorities
- reserves and local security units
- civil defence forces, national guards, militias
- other security services with a state mandate to use force

civil society organisations

- media
- think tanks
- political parties in their capacity as generators of security policy
- the business community
- other non-governmental ٠ organisations involved in monitoring the security sector as well as developing policy advice, disseminating information and conducting educational

independent oversight agencies

- auditing boards ٠
- anti-corruption agencies ٠
- ombudspersons ٠
- procurement agencies ٠
- human rights commissions ٠



justice institutions

- the judiciary ٠
- the prison regime and its ٠ management
- criminal investigation and ٠ prosecution services
- civilian review boards and ٠ public complaints commissions
- customary and traditional ٠ justice systems
- other legal institutions that ٠ work to ensure that the constitution is respected, the rule of law supported and human rights safeguarded

Step 2 (thirty minutes)


In the second step, participants are divided into working groups and asked to identify the actors in one or more components of their security sector. For this purpose, each group is given a computer and uses a blank version of the security sector map (Figure 1) to record its results. Having participants fill in the blank map on a computer makes it possible to transfer group results quickly to a PowerPoint slide and allows all participants to view and discuss the results in real-time.

If a computer and beamer are not available, an alternative is to write up the results on a number of flip charts and post them together in a way that is visible to all participants.

Step 3 (ten minutes for each group's presentation and up to ten minutes for discussion of their results)

Usually, the mapping process will reveal gaps and discrepancies in the discussion groups' analysis and result in actors being moved from one component to another as participants come to understand more clearly their individual roles. This exercise is also likely to demonstrate that some actors can be seen as belonging to one or more components.





The following example shows the actors involved in a donor country's activities in Afghanistan. This map illustrates how a donor's involvement in SSR can be structured and the different channels through which it formulates and executes policy.

Figure 3: Mapping actors involved in Canada's activities in Afghanistan	 {	Comment [13]: Fix headings
	 {	Comment [I4]: Be, please fix map as per diagram

government departments in Canada

- the Prime Minister
- ministries (Defence, Foreign Affairs, CIDA, Justice, Public Safety, Finance)
- Correctional Service of Canada
- Ombudsperson
- The Afghanistan Task Force
- Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START)
- SSR Working Group

legislative bodies in Canada

 parliament and its special committee on Afghanistan

multilateral coordination Canadian statutory security mechanisms in forces in Afghanistan Afghanistan Canada Canadian Forces Joint Coordination and ٠ Royal Canadian Mounted Monitoring Board (JCMB) Police Law and Order Trust Fund **Canadian Border Services** for Afghanistan (LOFTA) Policy Action Group (PAG) & **Combined Security** ٠ Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Ighanista⁽ civil society organizations in Afghanistan NGOs involved in developing policy advice Canadian representation in and disseminating Afghanistan IGOs through which information embassy ٠ Canada delivers think tanks Joint Task Force-٠ programmes media (domestic and ٠ Afghanistan (JTF—AFG) international) NATO Kandahar Provincial ٠ academic institutions UN ٠ Reconstruction Team (PRT) the business community World Bank ٠ **Operation Mentor Liaison** ٠ IMF Team (OMLT) G7 Strategic Advisory Team-٠ OSCE ٠ Afghanistan (SAT—A) Canadian Afghan National ٠ Training Centre Detachment (CANTC Det.)

Step 4.

A possible fourth step is to use the completed graph as a backdrop for an exercise in which the key gaps in a given security sector are identified and debated. The following ten questions focusing on the key norms underpinning democratic security sector governance could be used to orient this discussion.

Table: Democratic governance of the security sector

- 1. Are the security forces capable of delivering security professionally and at a reasonable cost, and in a way that helps to promote justice for all individuals and groups in society?
- 2. Are the security providers overseen by, and accountable to, civilian and democratically-constituted authorities?
- 3. Are the security providers representative of the population?
- 4. Do the security providers operate transparently? Do the population and the parliament know what they need to know?
- 5. Are the state's security objectives and policies set out in a national security strategy defining tasks and responsibilities of components of the security sector?
- 6. Are the executive and civil management authorities in charge of the security forces capable of giving the security forces proper direction and management?
- 7. Are judicial institutions capable of interpreting and upholding the law, as it refers to both to the behaviour of security sector actors and more generally? Are they effectively accountable?
- 8. Do civil society bodies have a role in monitoring security sector performance, informing and educating the public, and supporting official policy development? Are they active and independent?
- 9. Are domestic security sector actors capable of interfacing smoothly with one another?
- **10.** Are domestic security sector actors well-integrated into regional and international security frameworks?