

# SOURCES AND AREAS OF FUTURE POSSIBLE CRISES IN EUROPE

Edited by

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ISBN 2-919989-01-4



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## Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention in a Historic Transition Period

*Albrecht von Müller and David Law*

Few would question that crisis management and conflict prevention have moved to the top of the security agenda since the end of the Cold War. Considerably less clear, however, is the nature of the changes which these tasks have undergone in the process of acquiring their new prominence.

During the Cold War, crisis management and conflict prevention had as their essential focus the containment of systemic contradiction between East and West. Although the two sides competed energetically with one another, they took pains to avoid a radical destabilization of their relations. The stakes were high, so high that their effect was itself prophylactic, and the number of crises in East-West relations which actually had to be managed was relatively limited. Crisis management and conflict prevention, as important as they were, tended to be subsumed as integral parts of the East-West environment, and to be downplayed as strategic disciplines in their own right.

In contrast, we now find ourselves in a period of historical upheaval characterized by rapid and sometimes totally unexpected structural metamorphosis. New patterns have emerged in the way states and societies act and evolve. The overall framework has been so radically altered that at times there is little point in applying the familiar approaches of the Cold War. It can on occasion be downright dangerous to do so, as efforts to address the situation in Yugoslavia and Somalia while relying on notions of peace-keeping developed and practised during the Cold War have underlined.

This paper will attempt to provide a systematic overview of the requirements of crisis management and conflict prevention in a period of historic transition. In particular, it will focus on the following four themes:

- characteristics and challenges of a historic transition period;
- the redimensioned security paradigm;
- rethinking approaches and procedures;
- computer think tools for crisis management and conflict prevention (the Integrated Crisis Management Instrument, or ICI).

### *Characteristics and challenges of a historic transition period*

History has always been made up of alternating phases of "plateau" and transition. A plateau phase is relatively stable; its phenomenological terrain is characterized by only marginal divergences from the norm. Knowledge correspondingly tends to have a relatively long shelf-life and a premium is placed on high-resolution detail. For political actors operating under these circumstances, the emphasis is on optimizing sub-systems rather than shaping the whole.

In a transition period, the situation is quite different. Whereas a plateau phase allows for the adjustment of deviations from the system norm early in their development, change in a transition phase has an *auto-reinforcing dynamic*. Other characteristics of a transition phase may be less apparent. Similar to what occurs to systems in the physical world, we observe

- a tendency towards *ever-increasing oscillation* in the behavior of individual components of a system; e.g., the zig-zagging foreign policy of the Clinton administration;
- a tendency for individual system components to have *ever-shorter life-cycles*, as, for example, is manifest in the decreasing political longevity of recent Japanese governments;
- a tendency towards *desynchronization* of individual system components and the concomitant destabilization of the macro-system ("hiccup effect"), as, for example, occurred in the collapse of the erstwhile German Democratic Republic;
- a tendency towards *macro-micro inversion*, a situation whereby the roles of the (normally dominant) macro-level and that of the micro-level are to a greater or lesser extent reversed as individual events assume greater importance owing to non-linear patterns of auto-reinforcement; for example, the snowball effect in Italy of the first major cases of political corruption which broke in 1992 and the role of behavior traditionally not viewed as malign or extraordinary in ultimately bringing down the constitutional order and party system.

These characteristics are germane to all transition periods, as exemplified by the fall of the Roman Empire and the French Revolution. The period of transition which we are currently living through is, however, fundamentally different from all those which have gone before in that, as modern industrial society has taken form, the key aggregates of economy and society have become incomparably complex and fragile.

How hyper-complex functional aggregates will in general react as they are subjected to the turbulence and stress of a historic transition period is an open question. Existing reserves of adaption and innovation may prove sufficient for dealing with the dramatic processes of change which are under way all around us. It is also possible, however, that they will not be a match for the inertia and distortion which currently characterize our states' political activity, and that the structural change so crucially required will be blocked by decisional delay and decay.

In this event, the likely consequence would be fractal disintegration, a process of systemic upheaval which moves through various subordinate levels of aggregation, ultimately provoking the collapse of the system as a whole. Disintegration is spurred by "local optimization traps" which emerge as lower levels of aggregation attempt to compensate for radical reduction in the coherence of the overall system. This has, however, the effect of dramatically increasing efficiency loss at the macro level and in turn accelerating systemic breakdown.

This can result in circumstances such as those that prevailed in Somalia prior to the UN intervention or, to take a more extreme case, the crescendo-like bestialization of human and social relations which has befallen the former Yugoslavia. The auto-reinforcing characteristic of local optimization traps which can be observed in such instances is fractal in nature, as it has the effect of propelling the disintegration of social systems through their various levels of aggregation at an ever-quickenning pace.

The central problem posed by plateau phases is the tendency for order to be transformed into oppression. This was clearly illustrated in the plateau phase of bipolar rivalry between East and West. The relationship between the two superpowers was marked by mutual concern that one side would dominate the other. In the case of the systemically weaker side, however, the struggle for supremacy went hand in hand with an unparalleled suppression of individual and collective freedoms and rights.

The central problem of a historical transition phase, in contrast, is the disintegration of ordering structures on all levels of aggregation. One is reminded of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse which for our purposes could be interpreted as symbolizing war, civil war, famine, pestilence and disease, and representing the implosion of four fundamental levels of aggregation, namely

- war as the fall of the international order;
- civil war as the collapse of community;
- famine as the disintegration of the system of production; and
- pestilence and disease as the breakdown of the self-regulating mechanisms of individual organisms.

It is no coincidence that the four horsemen ride together, one after the other. Within social and political systems in the throes of fractal disintegration, very similar phenomena are at work.

Plateau and transition phases thus place quite different demands on the decision-maker. In a plateau phase, the decision-maker can be compared with an oarsman who rows in relatively calm waters and who is called upon to concentrate his energies on building up maximum speed so as to move in a particular, predetermined direction. Coping with a historic transition phase is, on the other hand, akin to kayaking in rapids. This puts a premium on strategic timing and the ability to think beyond the next bend, or, in other words, to be able to draw conclusions from a complex array of individual observations about how a system's dynamics may be about to undergo radical change.

The dramatic events in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia - indeed, the situation of many countries around the globe - display the characteristics of fractal disintegration. To continue the boating metaphor, the high-performance row boat which did such brilliant service in the preceding plateau phase, allowing us to navigate safely past the challenge of East-West confrontation and threat of world war, has sprung a leak and is heading for the rocks. There is water rushing in at both ends, and the entire construction appears too unstable and inflexible to withstand the untraditional forms of turbulence on the river.

The characteristics and requirements of a historic transition phase are fundamentally different from those of a plateau phase. The table at the end of the paper provides an overview.

#### *The redimensioned security paradigm*

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was more than the hitherto dominant military threat which disappeared. Both developments were key components of a fundamental and irreversible transformation of the then prevailing international system, its structure and its dynamics.

The successor system is characterized by a rapid turnover of issues and actors and a redefinition of state and community identities and their competences, as well as a very high degree of systemic volatility and conflict potential. It is widely recognized that a fundamental change in the security paradigm has occurred. The process of rethinking and reshaping approaches to security has, however, hardly begun. As long as the necessary reorientation has not taken place, there is a risk that too many resources will be devoted to past threats and too few to the new challenges. Beyond that, there is a danger that, by pursuing traditional approaches, those kinds of threat patterns will be revived which had been rendered inoperative with the end of the Cold War.

	<b>Plateau phase</b>	<b>Transition phase</b>
<b>System Dynamics</b>	- continuous, "slow-flowing"	- discontinuous, turbulent
<b>Central Problem</b>	- optimization of sub-systems and establishment of control mechanisms	- shaping change and new societal structures
<b>Main Danger</b>	- transformation of order into oppression	- fractal disintegration processes
<b>Information Needs</b>	- detailed, high-resolution data - central importance of statistics - extended shelf-life of knowledge	- on-line information and non-stop monitoring - enhanced analytical requirements as weak signals predominate, whose significance depends on the larger environment - tendency towards information overload, putting premium on intelligent front-end data selection and synthesis
<b>Analytical Requirements</b>	- quantitative analysis, oriented towards extrapolation - network planning and simulation of key importance; mid- and long-term planning possible - research results lend themselves to modular structuring	- qualitative analysis, focusing on structural change - essential to identify structural and dynamic patterns reshaping environment and to think of alternative sequences of events - analysis tends to be layered like an onion skin, i.e. with clear distinction between long-term fundamental dynamics, mid-term behavioral patterns and current events
<b>Strategy Development</b>	- onus is on optimization of sub-systems - consolidation and expansion tend to determine strategies - great importance of high-resolution, precisely defined mid- and long-term strategies, as well as game-theory simulations of <i>ceteris paribus</i> conditions	- onus is on shaping complex transformation processes - bifurcation-oriented strategy design - development of "JIT" (just-in-time) strategies as an open process in parallel with information collection, analysis and decision-making
<b>Decision-Making Procedures</b>	- actors target hierarchical, stable, mid- and long-term allocation of competences - "minimum input, maximum output" considerations dominate - actors focus on (time-consuming) consensus-building and decision-making procedures	- actors must focus on online processing of last-minute information and external know-how - leitmotiv is "evolutionary fitness" and maximization of scope for "mid-course" correction - actors seek to evolve mid- and long-term strategies, permanently updated on the basis of continuous analysis of trends and transformation processes

The security challenges of this historical transition phase can be broken down into three categories:

- the residual but at the same time qualitatively different risks in the *East-West* theater;
- the increasingly challenging problems emerging in *North-South* relationships where growing asymmetries escalate potential for conflict proliferation and fusion; and
- the *global village* risks emanating from an ever more interdependent world, where risks and threats are common to North, South, East and West.

The future of East-West relations revolves around the consolidation of political and economic reform processes in the former Soviet Union and the other states of Central and Eastern Europe. The failure of this process cannot be excluded, even over the short term, but whether it will be a success is something we shall only know in one or two decades at best. Yet even in the event of success, significant asymmetries from region to region are inevitable, bringing in their wake mass population movements as well as competence and resource conflicts. These can prove particularly destabilizing in the former USSR, where political forces generally have little experience in crisis management but frequently easy access to the remnants of Soviet military power.

Against this background, the most important risks and threats which can emerge in the East-West relationship are the following:

- ethnic, religious and national (ERNA) conflicts capable of generating widespread destabilization;
- radicalization of political and social forces frustrated with the exacting challenges and unfulfilled promises of reform;
- resort to blackmail (both international and national) with weapons of mass destruction;
- proliferation of such weapons and the know-how to construct them; and
- significant westward-bound migration flows.

Of course, such risks are likely to take place, not in isolation but in combination with one another. Also to be considered are counter-intuitive phenomena, such as when interest in migration increases in tandem with socio-economic upturn, owing to the fact that there is greater information about the possibilities for migrating as well as improved conditions for doing so.

Such counter-intuitive phenomena can also be observed in the North-South interface. For example, we have witnessed how a successful act of humanitarian-inspired intervention by "northern" countries can exacerbate tensions in a "southern" country, owing to greater awareness of discrepancies in living standards. Here, the central dilemma is the perpetuation and, in many cases, the worsening of the problem of underdevelopment. This is because of the complex interaction of such exogenous and endogenous factors as disadvantageous terms for participating in the international economic system, an insufficiently qualified labour force and rampant corruption among local élites.

The key risks and threats which emerge in the North-South relationship are the following:

- mass migration to escape misery and poverty;
- intra- and inter-state conflicts, made more acute by arms flows;
- large-scale politico-religious extremist movements;
- externally guided pressure groups in industrialized countries;
- new forms of terrorism, including state terrorism.

Risk potentials and threat patterns of the third category spring from the ever-accelerating functional integration of international society. Such "global village" challenges include:

- scarcity of critical resources, raw materials and primary products;
- one-sided technological dependencies;
- destabilization of international financial markets;
- obstruction of international transit and trade flows;
- production of, and international trade in, drugs;
- environmental blackmail;
- accidents involving nuclear, chemical and biological technology;
- damage to, and destabilization of, the global climatic system;
- deterioration of the quality of air, land and water through emissions and immissions;
- disappearance of species and shrinkage of the gene pool;
- spread of infectious diseases.

In the years to come, the challenge will therefore by no means simply be to adjust our security thinking to the changes which have occurred in the East-West relationship, but to come to grips with a security agenda which is more diverse, both geographically and functionally. It will doubtlessly be equally demanding of our resources and our intellect. In particular, dealing with the redimensioned paradigm of post-Cold War security requires operationalization of the following notions:

First, the multidirectionality of security concerns, in comparison with the fixation on a particular player during the Cold War.

Second, the fact that it is the challenges themselves rather than borders which constitute the new frontlines.

Third, the increasing focus of security policy on intra-state as opposed to inter-state issues, and on sub-state and cross-border communities as security actors as opposed to integral countries.

Fourth, as the sense of imminent threat has dissipated, the growing need for preventive diplomacy and the concomitant explosion in opportunities for initiating, fostering and consolidating processes which lead to the formation of new structural patterns having a beneficial impact on the overall security environment.

Fifth, the continuing indispensability of a credible capability for self-protection, even as the military dimension of security policy has become relatively less predominant.

Sixth, the fact that security policy will therefore continue to rest on a complementary duality; (not unlike NATO's doctrine of deterrence/defense and dialogue/*détente* during the Cold War). This could be characterized as providing assistance for reconstruction and development at the same time as one provides for one's own self-protection.

Seventh, the markedly different relationship between the two *volets* of the new security *leitmotiv* relative to those of its predecessor. The non-military aspect of security can no longer be essentially politico-diplomatic (and to a much lesser extent economic) as during the Cold War; rather, it has to be truly multidimensional; and perforce at the forefront of the security effort.

Eighth, the need to transform our security focus from one of co-existence to one of co-evolution. This by no means signals the disappearance of potential for conflict. On the contrary, tensions will increase as functional interdependence grows, and with it the number

and degrees of interrelationships. Co-evolution requires, however, that development processes which are heterogeneous and asynchronistic have to be as positively interactive as possible.

Ninth, the fundamental change not only in the overall framework but also in the quality of the interplay between system actors. Their interests have become so multi-layered that conflict of interest on one layer can coincide with the existence of common interests on another. Conflicts are no less acute as a result, but the way in which they are articulated changes radically. The challenge is no longer simply how to deal with opposing interests but how to cope with an environment in which notions of amity and enmity need to be dealt with as part of a coherent whole.

Tenth, that in this historical transition phase which the world has now entered, big states and grand alliances will not necessarily enjoy the pronounced advantages they knew during the Cold War. Informational resources are gaining in importance on material might, flexible coalition-building on fixed structures, networking skills on political constancy. Small but shrewd states are therefore no longer at such a disadvantage *vis-à-vis* their bigger brothers. There are, of course, limits to what can be done with nimblefootedness and dexterity, and when intellect is challenged by a tank. Nevertheless, in an environment in which short-term optimization of interests dominates much of security decision-making, these are not insignificant assets.

#### *Rethinking approaches and procedures*

The working methods and procedures which are currently available as aids to decision-making in the security field are naturally tailored to the requirements of the East-West conflict. As we have seen, however, we now face qualitatively different tasks in all dimensions of security policy. This section will put forward some ideas on possible new approaches which could be taken in three areas in particular, namely, conflict party mediation, arms control, and well-armed forces' missions and requirements.

#### *1. Conflict Party Mediation*

##### *Quick Response Arbitration (QRA)*

In many conflict situations, the preparedness to use force and to take risks can be very pronounced in the initial phase of hostilities. Emotions can be high at this point, and there are inevitable asymmetries in the parties' perceptions of responsibility for conflict and its escalation. Moreover, the dynamics which govern crises in their initial phases tend to subject key players to ever-increasing time pressures at the same time as the risk factor they face is also growing exponentially.

Traditional means of conflict mediation are slow to be activated and long to deliberate. What is often required is a mechanism which can be established rapidly, as a matter of routine, and which is capable of reaching a judgment without delay. Juridical procedures need to be as speedy as possible if they are to be a match for fast-breaking political problems. This is not dissimilar to an interim legal order which, while provisional, is binding until succeeded by a fully-fledged judgment.

This approach can present belligerents with an alternative to using force and optimize third-party efforts to halt hostilities before the logic of violence assumes its own dynamics. Timely, compulsory arbitration before the outbreak of conflict, or while it is still in an initial phase, can defuse tensions and enhance opportunities for peaceful conflict settlement efforts. A

government disposed neither to resort to force nor to continue hostilities can be strengthened *vis-à-vis* those segments of its population which are otherwise inclined.

In a showdown over the rights of the Russian-speaking communities in the Baltic, for example, a quick-response arbitration could prove particularly useful. If the Russian-speakers were in a position to put their case before an internationally legitimized court required to reach a decision or make a provisional ruling within a one- to two-week period, then the prospects that the governments involved would respect its authority would be very good indeed. The newly emerging states involved are especially interested in being accepted as full members of the international community. Their dependence on international assistance and support provides fertile ground for encouraging them to accept international arbitration. Moreover, in violating international law or tolerating infringements upon it, an individual government can often be responding to grass-roots pressure rather than acting out of chauvinist tendencies. It can therefore be open to reconsidering its policies. Even in the case of Yugoslavia, it is not entirely implausible that an approach along these lines would have been successful in the pre- or early-conflict phase in defusing hostilities.

#### *Economic Measures for Rapid and Selective Impact (RSI)*

Sanctions are traditionally applied to a country as a whole. An alternative or complementary approach is to use sanctions to influence the behavior of a specific group within a country. For example, a political élite which has defied a UN resolution could be encouraged to reconsider its behavior by actions designed to lead to the devaluation of a currency or to exert pressure on its shareholdings. The objective is to take measures which are

- of quick impact,
- macrosociologically selective,
- difficult to circumvent,
- not an indiscriminant penalty for the man in the street,
- nor an invitation to a leadership to seek to exploit popular dissatisfaction with sanctions.

#### *Instant Transparency and Documentation (INSTAD)*

Modern technology can be useful in helping to protect human and minority rights in the more complex security setting of the post-Cold War period. A particularly promising approach could be to saturate conflict regions with video-to-satellite systems capable of direct transmission to CSCE or UN documentation and crisis management centers. This would ensure transparency where it was critically required and act as a check on the activities of death squads, by enhancing the effectiveness of war crime tribunals.

#### *Communication-oriented Conflict and Crisis Management (C<sup>3</sup>M)*

During the Cold War, crisis management focused on bringing effective influence to bear on small groups of high-level decision-makers. Active participation in the ERNA (ethnic, religious and national) conflicts of today and tomorrow can in contrast encompass large population groups. Communication techniques capable of shaping the behaviour of large social groups therefore assume greater importance in crisis management, for example,

- in the pre-crisis phase, the deployment of "information- and idea-bombs" capable of destroying distorted perceptions and disengaging blocked communication channels;

- in the phase of heightening tension, initiatives to counteract or strengthen trends in public and political opinion;
- in the phase of all-out conflict, time-critical information on developments in the theater of hostilities and guidance on conflict behavior.

### *Inforvention*

The decision to intervene militarily is generally received with great reservation and even resistance in most functioning democracies. This highlights the importance of developing approaches which maximize the effectiveness of pre- and non-military measures. One method is to take advantage of the technological discrepancies which normally exist between the conflict parties and those involved in trying to restore peace and order, by disseminating high-resolution, real-time information on the state of military play and the balance of forces. Informational intervention of this kind may have been of decisive importance in determining the outcome of the Gulf War. In general, there would seem to be substantial scope for inforvention techniques designed to alter perceptions of both military forces and civilians involved in a conflict and enhance the prospects for conflict suffocation and settlement.

## *2. New forms of arms control*

### *Common Defense Review (CDR)*

To destroy weaponry once it has been produced and procured is both complicated and expensive, as recent experience in implementing arms control agreements for various categories of weapons underlines. An alternative is to strive for a security dialogue in which parties aim to determine in advance the lowest possible level of armament at which stability can be secured. This could be particularly useful for the CIS states, certain regions of Central and Eastern Europe and large areas of the Third World. To support the effort to exert influence on military arsenals in the pre-acquisition rather than the post-acquisition phase, the provision of economic assistance could be made conditional on a successful CDR process.

### *Arms Control for Intra-national Security (ARCIS)*

Proliferation of ERNA conflicts after the Cold War accentuates the importance of equilibrium in the composition of a country's armed forces relative to its ethnic, religious or national make-up. Balance is also required in the military's deployment patterns and command structures.

Inter-state alliances must strive for equilibrium in the way their members are represented if they are to command allegiance and confidence. Similarly, the balanced composition of internal military structures can have a confidence-building impact within society as well as reduce both the risk of internal strife and the misuse of the military as an instrument of internal repression. Military and economic aid programs for developing and newly emerging countries can be designed to support ARCIS-like initiatives, for example, by encouraging fair representation in the training and education programs they sponsor.

### *Efficiency-oriented System for the Control of Arms Exports (EOS)*

Traditionally, the criteria for restricting arms sales have been extremely vague, not least because of the problems associated with dual-use technology. New efforts are required if the international flow of arms is to be subject to more effective control. These could be based on a mandatory analysis of a specific arms transfer for the following criteria:

- whether the arms in question contribute to regional stability,
- whether they foster the building of inter-state alliances as a filter against irrational behavior on the part of individual actors, and
- whether they expose supplier nations to unacceptable levels of risk.

### *Incentive-based Verification (IBV)*

One of the most daunting contemporary security challenges is the proliferation of weapons and technologies of mass destruction. Even with today's technology, there exist in the nuclear domain "portable" systems which escape detection by traditional methods of control and verification such as satellites, intelligence and on-the-spot inspection. Tracking bacteriological and chemical weapons is even more technologically challenging. Quantum leaps in the transfer of know-how and information can be expected to intensify these trends in the years ahead.

"Incentive-based Verification" takes a somewhat unconventional approach to the proliferation challenge. The core notion of IBV is to alter the comportment of actors in the security domain. Three approaches appear particularly promising:

First, in order to influence the behavior of governments, a state signing an arms control or non-proliferation agreement would be required to deposit a certain percentage of its annual GNP with the World Bank. Interest equivalent to market rates would accrue on the deposit and be reinvested to produce a growing capital base. If a state were found to be in violation of the agreement, it would forfeit the accumulated capital. Of key importance here is that the financial incentive to comply would grow yearly, and interest in non-compliance steadily decline.

Second, in order to influence the behavior of individuals, a prize would be established for any citizen of a signatory state reporting a treaty infringement. In addition to a generous cash award, the prize would give a "winner" and his family the right to a passport of a signatory country of their choice. (Penalties for those caught abusing the system by making false accusations would, of course, have to be suitably severe.)

Third, in order to influence the behavior of business actors, penalties would be legislated which rendered treaty-unfriendly activity so financially onerous that a potential accomplice to a treaty violation would feel more attracted by the prize for disclosure than by any remuneration from the business interest in question.

The advantages of IBV would be essentially threefold:

- there would be better prospects for detecting relatively small and inconspicuous objects which are very difficult to track with existing control and verification methods;
- control and verification would not only occur in well-organized democratic states but also in those states and regions where proliferation is most likely to occur; and
- at the same time, the approach would also be effective in influencing behavior within the business sector of highly developed countries where, as experience has recently shown, abuses can also take place.



### 3. *New missions and requirements for the armed forces*

#### *Early Deployable Peace-keeping Forces with Escalation Potential (EDP)*

Traditional forms of peace-keeping involve the deployment of forces once fighting has been initiated or has begun to subside. Nowadays, it is increasingly important to deploy peace-keeping forces not only quickly, but before hostilities have actually broken out. This is essential if potential belligerents are to be dissuaded from using force, and the resort to violence deterred. Such preventive intervention requires rapidly deployable armed forces with a reinforcement capability, and may necessitate the establishment of on-call contingents.

#### *Benign Intervention Technology (BIT)*

Technologies and weapon systems can now be imagined which could be militarily successful on the new battlefield at a manageable price and whose deployment would be likely to be less controversial than that of the hardware of the Cold War. Particularly promising are non-lethal systems which paralyze the opponent for a limited period of time. Privileged targets for such systems are:

- weapon-delivery systems and their launch platforms;
- depots, supply and logistics;
- infrastructure and environmental conditions;
- command and control systems; and
- the combat effectiveness of both regular and irregular troops.

A broad spectrum of new operational means already exists. In addition to such better-known devices as "directed-energy weapons" and electronic means for disrupting military action, the following appear especially promising:

- glue- and grease-like substances which can be deployed on roads, runways and tracks to effect a massive decrease in mobility;
- glue-like substances which in addition can neutralize sensitive weapon parts;
- acids and granulates capable of destroying rubber and plastics, as for example in tyres, gaskets and filters;
- aerosols which initiate corrosion processes capable of ageing weapons systems overnight and rendering them unusable;
- acoustic effects such as infrasound capable of temporarily putting soldiers out of action; and
- aerosols which can sedate, and therefore temporarily immobilize, weapons operators and combat troops.

#### *EuroLegion*

The construction and defense of a new international order requires a credible ability to threaten the engagement of armed force, and as necessary to deploy. All democracies encounter difficulties in convincing their citizens to take part in conflicts in or between foreign countries. This has become a particularly serious problem with the growing influence of electronic media on public opinion and decision-making. At the same time, it has become increasingly evident that the new world order so much aspired to cannot be achieved by relying exclusively on the hard-security techniques which played such a central role in the Cold War, and that new approaches are essential.

As concerns the European Union, the establishment of a European Foreign Legion could constitute one such approach. This would have several advantages:

- there would be no "national body-bags"; this would enhance the ability of democratic governments to make and implement decisions, and increase the credibility of military measures;
- ethical objections against troop deployments would be weakened, as the troops would be volunteers, conscious both of the significance and the danger of their engagement;
- recruitment would not pose a problem as all European countries, both East and West, have a high quotient of "risk-takers" prepared to volunteer (in most cases, enthusiastically) for such activity (to channel such risk-preparedness in this way could bring certain domestic benefits);
- the prospect of deployment of multinational troops would deny a belligerent élite the opportunity to rally the population around an anti-national or anti-colonialist slogan;
- it would also be materially much more effective than the forces that many individual European nations are now capable of deploying, and could lead to economies of scale;
- the composition of such a EuroLegion would not only relieve national governments of a difficult task but at the same time foster the development of a European identity in the domain of foreign, security and defense policy which is not only common but credible;
- as such, the EuroLegion would facilitate cooperation with the United States and other democracies in dealing with post-Cold War security.

#### *Computer think tools for crisis management and conflict prevention*

In tackling the new security agenda, decision-makers need the support of state-of-the-art methodological means. Security science, if it is to live up to the name, needs to embrace modern technology. In the final section of this paper, we explain the possibilities of computer software designed with this objective in mind.

The *Integrated Crisis Management Instrument (ICI)* is a package of think tools developed by the European Center of International Security to help policy planners and decision-makers understand, evaluate and respond to existing or emerging crisis situations. ICI does not provide any ready-made solutions or prescribe a specific analytical routine. It is a thinking aid and communication system for structuring problems and developing strategies, as well as for managing and retrieving information. It allows users to operationalize a multidimensional security concept integrating short-, mid- and long-term considerations. ICI lends itself both to stand-alone applications by an individual user or on-line deliberations by groups.


ICI thus assists those involved in preparing and executing decisions

- to *anticipate* potential conflicts and crises,
- to *analyze* their structures, actors and dynamics, and
- to *elaborate and assess* comprehensive strategies.

In addition to supporting crisis management, ICI can be used in training and education.

The ICI system consists of twelve tools organized into three blocks: *Early Warning*, *In-depth Analysis* and *Strategy Development*, as shown in the following diagram.

Chart: Overview of Integrated Crisis Management Instrument



### 1. Early Warning (EW)

#### Hotspot Scanning

The *Hotspot Scanning* tool allows for a three-dimensional representation of development trends in the evolution over time of a single phenomenon or individual dimensions of a phenomenon. Users identify and define a number of unfolding events or areas of concern (hotspots) on a time-scale of their choice. These are then combined to give a comparative overview of trends. The resulting graphic display replaces lengthy verbal *exposés* with highly condensed graphic information facilitating exposition and understanding.

#### Hotspot Description

*Hotspot Description* is a complement to *Hotspot Scanning*. Its purpose is to provide frequently updated, high-resolution information on potential or ongoing crisis situations. *Hotspot Description* offers a multi-layered, catchword-based information retrieval system which combines alphanumeric data with graphic displays.

#### Sequence Assessment

*Sequence Assessment* is a new methodological approach for assessing a potential chain of developments. It represents such a sequence by way of a probabilistically specified tree of

events. Different modes of operation are available. It is possible to highlight how a situation may be expected to evolve or how, retroactively, a specific result came into being. The tool is especially useful in identifying possible future trajectories of a crisis situation. Alternatively, it can be used to optimize clarity and logical transparency in the analysis of structurally complex issues and transformation processes.

#### Background Information

*Background Information* is a database with a retrieval and on-line editing function which complements the more frequently updated information available in *Hotspot Description*.

### 2. In-depth Analysis

#### Qualitative Analysis

In dealing with the complex interdependencies of a developing situation, it is necessary to have an understanding of its structure and dynamics. *Qualitative Analysis* supports this requirement by helping the user to elaborate a structural synopsis in graphic form. This can be enhanced with a pictorial representation of the ways in which the individual components influence and interact with one another.

#### Actors Assessment

As a complement to the preliminary analysis of the basic structure and dynamics of a developing situation, it is useful to have a general sense of the "mind set" of the actors involved. *Actors Assessment* supports this requirement by helping the user develop "cognitive maps" depicting basic motivations, key concerns and world views with a compact graphic display.

Obviously, no graphic scheme can capture in full the complexities of human thinking and feeling. Yet experience shows that cognitive mapping can improve general understanding of an opponent's behavioral pattern and motivations. In politically sensitive alliance relationships, it can also be useful in helping to define the factors motivating partners' and allies' decision-making, and to portray findings concisely and convincingly.

#### Dynamic Analysis

*Dynamic Analysis* assists the user in simulating the behavior of systems over time. Unlike standard approaches to systems analysis, it can be easily operationalized by individuals or groups without a software-engineering background. For instance, dependencies between components need not be expressed by mathematical expressions but can be defined by a sequence of mouse clicks along a two-dimensional coordinate system. Once components and their interrelationships are defined, the characteristics of the modelled system as they evolve over different time frameworks can be simulated.

#### Evolutionary Analysis

Structural changes are quintessential to the behavior and development of all social systems. *Evolutionary Analysis* attempts to overcome the limits of traditional systems analysis with a "macroscopic" approach to the long-term behavior of social systems.

*Evolutionary Analysis* allows the user to identify sub-sets of an overall evolutionary phase space which are characterized by both accessibility (i.e., viable trajectories) and internal consistency (i.e., systemic possibilities). It maps possible long-term macro-developments in a way which assists the user in identifying how processes of structural change and transition evolve.

The evolutionary tree, with its characteristic branchings, makes it possible to pinpoint the most important "attractor spaces" in the evolutionary process as well as the bifurcation points through which the system must move on its way to different attractors.

### 3. *Strategy Development*

#### *IGP Definition*

The function of *IGP Definition* is to elaborate an overview of one's own Interests, Goals and Priorities or those of other actors, as the critical first step in the development and analysis of strategy.

#### *Strategy Design*

*Strategy Design* provides a heuristic overview of the multiple dimensions for possible action in crisis management and crisis prevention. For this purpose, a three-dimensional classification scheme has been developed. On one coordinate, potential policy domains are represented. On the second coordinate, basic approaches for exerting influence are mapped, i.e. confronting an opponent with a *fait accompli*, creating positive and negative incentives, and convincing an opponent with superior arguments. On the third coordinate figure the various time horizons which can be relevant to the elaboration of strategy.

#### *Strategy Composition*

Following on from the *Strategy Design* tool, *Strategy Composition* offers a two-dimensional matrix in which various policy dimensions are correlated with a number of general or specific target areas. The intersection of each policy dimension and target area constitutes a strategy cell. The cells can be opened to reveal a thesaurus of options from which specific options can be selected and inserted into the overall strategy. In addition, new options can be defined and inserted. This makes it possible for the decision-maker to devise quickly a comprehensive strategy, or alternatively a menu of possible policy options. It can also be useful to check whether the crisis management teams engaged in dealing with a particular problem have identified all its relevant aspects.

In addition to helping achieve maximum comprehensiveness in a minimum of time, *Strategy Composition* assists the user in identifying mutually enhancing strategy alternatives as well as in isolating potential inconsistencies in policy.

#### *Strategy Evaluation*

*Strategy Evaluation* is the final support tool for the decision-making process. It correlates the strategic options under analysis with criteria which have been identified as relevant to strategy elaboration in a particular situation and which have been weighted accordingly. Based on specific performance ratings, it provides a condensed graphic synopsis of strategy profiles, individual comparisons and overall rankings. It facilitates the recombination of various options and their re-evaluation.

### *Conclusion*

Many of the considerations raised in this paper can by definition only be of a provisional nature. There can, however, be little doubt about certain key aspects of the present period, i.e., that

- the current historic transition phase differs qualitatively from the preceding plateau phase and calls for new forms of political action;
- in particular, the traditional security paradigm has been redimensioned with a number of significant repercussions for the way we conceptualize security issues;
- new approaches and procedures for dealing with security are therefore required; and finally,
- political decision-making, crisis management and conflict prevention have to take advantage of state-of-the-art advances in technology and methodology.

The auto-accelerating progress of modern science and technology makes possible an explosive expansion in the parameters of human activity. At the same time, the state of political decision-making - indeed, the developed countries' entire approach to democracy - remains archaic in comparison. Qualitative improvement, and therefore also modernization, of political decision-making is essential.

A vital precondition is a better understanding of the phenomena of structural transformation and, in particular, of transition phases in the life of complex social systems. The underlying characteristics of the dynamic processes at work must be conceptualized and shaped accordingly. Otherwise, there is a serious danger that we shall have to contend with fractal disintegration processes on a macro-political scale.

This task stands before decision-makers in all dimensions of policy-making. In the area of foreign, defense and security policy, however, it is particularly compelling. It is in this area that miscalculation and methodological deficiency are especially rampant, and that the price of error and failure can be particularly debilitating. Hence, it is no coincidence that the first think tools for the analysis and shaping of complex transition processes have been developed for the security field.

The central challenge of this historical phase is to overcome the disconnection between technological progress and political stasis. As scientific progress cannot be made retroactive, the only acceptable option is to engineer a quantitative leap in the techniques of decision-making. From the perspective of today, the task at hand may appear overwhelming but, as Horace advised: once begun, a task is easy - half the work is done.

(paper received in June 1994)