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Regional Perspectives

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Geneva, March 2004

Eden Cole, Timothy Donais and Philipp H. Fluri

In sum, the different frameworks working with policing assistance and reform in SEE has in some cases made significant progress. However, they could all be improved by a more holistic approach, rather than narrow programmes; further funding combined with a longer-time frame; an emphasis on altering perceptions of police services, which includes education of civil society, the political elite, as well as police officers; and working on improving local political willingness to reform.

Transparency, Accountability and Security Sector Reform in South East Europe: An Analysis of the Stability Pact Self-Assessment Studies

David M. Law

Transparency and accountability are the bread and butter of security sector reform. Unless they are adequately provided for, efforts undertaken to reform a national security sector can fall well short of the mark. Consider this (only partly) hypothetical situation. A country launches a major overhaul of its security sector. It adapts the structure and functions of its security sector jurisdictions to the strategic realities of the early 21st century. It tries to ensure that these jurisdictions work together seamlessly. It seeks to enhance the effectiveness of domestic agencies through effective cooperation on the regional and international level. At the same time, however, it keeps the public in the dark about the way resources are allocated. It conceals non-sensitive information about the activities of security sector actors with blanket references to 'need to know'. It treats discussion about security sector reform in regional and international bodies as its private fiefdom. It fails to provide for independent mechanisms, accountable to the electorate, whose responsibility it is to monitor and control the executive power in the exercise of its duties. Clearly, this country would have neglected to ensure that fundamental principles of transparency and accountability were being observed.

The studies on transparency and accountability that are contained in this volume provide valuable insights into the state of play of security sector reform in six transition countries. This article will review their findings from several vantage points. First, it will examine how the contributors approach the issues of transparency and accountability from a conceptual perspective. Then, these findings will be assessed against the situation on the ground in the six transition countries in question – and this in two steps. In the second section, the focus will be on the success stories of security sector reform. The third will be concerned with the critical areas where the reform effort has lagged behind and much more remains to be done. The final section will put forward some ideas on enhancing security sector transparency and accountability that may be useful in developing policy on the national, regional and international levels.

It goes almost without saying that the countries that are part of this study have been subject to very different circumstances since the systemic changes of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Two of the countries, Bulgaria and Romania, while facing very challenging transitions, have been spared civil war and foreign occupation; they possess, moreover, a nation-state history that stretches back uninterrupted to the 19th century. Their security sector reform effort has been underway for over a decade, notwithstanding the years lost to reform because of domestic infighting and stasis. They now stand poised to become NATO members in 2004 and perhaps EU members in 2007. Albania experienced a high degree of internal unrest during the 1990s that necessitated at one point the deployment of a contingent of international police. It shares with Romania the unenviable status of having been a kind of Eastern European Myanmar during the Cold War, with all the implications for the reform effort that has since ensued. Croatia and Macedonia have been marked in differing ways by the collapse of the erstwhile Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its subsequent descent into

civil war and ethnic violence. By virtue of a decision taken at the June 2003 meeting of the EU Council of Ministers in Greece, these two former Yugoslav republics as well as Albania have been confirmed as potential members. Moldova, for its part, continues to suffer, a decade after the *Wende*, under the burden of occupation and disagreement among key stakeholders about this young state's identity and sovereignty. Clearly, the specific circumstances of each country have weighed heavily on national approaches to security sector reform, and there is only so much generalisation to which one can resort in assessing how the process has evolved from country to country. Still, there are common aspects, and it is on these that this article will concentrate, at the same time as every attempt is made to take national particularities into account.

Self-assessments evaluation: conceptual perspectives

The conceptual development evident in the six contributions is impressive, and the basic approaches are very much in conformity. Transparency and accountability are generally understood by the contributors as operating in two closely inter-related but still distinct spheres. As concerns transparency, there is, first, the broader relationship between civil society – the public, the press and NGOs – and government and, second, the narrower relationship between the executive and the various organs – parliament and its committees, ombudsman-like bodies and auditing commissions – whose purpose it is to exercise oversight over both the policies of government and the resources that are engaged in their execution. For accountability, there is a similar dichotomy: the Albanian contribution refers to the ‘...obligation of government to explain and assume responsibility for its actions...’ as well as the ‘...financial accountability that pertains to budgeting and financial matters in general.’¹ But if there is an intimate interdependence between the two, notions of what constitutes transparency appear to be rather more developed than in the case of accountability. For example, the Bulgarian contributors provide a very useful synthesis of the reasons why security sector transparency is important, which are paraphrased below:

- transparency is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the informed and effective involvement of the public in security issues
- transparency is not a goal in itself but rather a vehicle for ensuring that a country's security sector works for the community it is supposed to serve
- transparency provides the best defence against corruption and the best guarantee against abuse of the popular interest
- transparency is of fundamental importance in ensuring effective civil-military relations and successful security sector reform
- transparency is a prime precondition for accession to NATO and the EU

1 Blendi Kajsii, ‘Transparency and Accountability in Governance’, in Philipp H. Fluri and Jan A. Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives Volume 1: Albania; Bulgaria; Croatia; A Self-Assessment Study*, (Belgrade: CCMR, 2003), p. 105.

- transparency is a key confidence-building instrument in the management of regional and international relations (an additional consideration – not mentioned explicitly in this contribution)²

The question of how to assess a country's level of political maturity is addressed in the Bulgarian contribution. Four areas for scrutiny are proposed:

- rule of law, or the existence of a system of generally respected laws and procedures
- judicial independence, or the existence of a system capable of impartially interpreting and adjudicating the law
- democratic responsibility, or the existence of a legislative branch of government that is capable of exercising effective oversight and control of the executive
- executive transparency and accountability, or the capacity of the executive to work transparently, accountably and effectively on behalf of the community that it has been elected to serve³

Another useful conceptual input is provided in the Macedonian contribution through its characterisation of civil society as having three critical roles in contributing to the accountability of the security sector:

...demanding change, monitoring functions and providing technical input. In its monitoring functions, civil society actors can engage the government on topics such as defence policy, defence expenditure, acquisitions, doctrine. Independent analyses made by civil society...are not only a challenge for the government, but should represent the {basis} for public debate about the most important security questions and provide useful input into the decision-making process. The civil sector can fulfil these functions at all levels (local, regional, national and international).⁴

The author also distinguishes between standards, agents and means of accountability. While on standards there is little comment in this or any of the other contributions, the question of agents is dealt with expansively (although one would note here that there is a tendency common to most of the contributions to focus on issues of defence reform and the ‘power ministries’ rather than the broad range of jurisdictions that make up the security sector community). It follows that the related question of inter-agency interaction receives short shrift. Means are also dealt with at some length in the contributions, distinctions being made between formal mechanisms such as the work of committees and the practice of parliamentary questions, on the one hand, and informal

2 Ralitza Mateeva, and Petya Dimitrova, ‘Transparency and Accountability: The ‘Necessary Evil’ For Bulgarian Security Sector Reform’, in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security*, Vol. 1, p. 261.

3 Ibid.

4 Zoran Ivanovski, ‘Transparency and Accountability’, in Philipp H. Fluri and Jan A. Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives Volume 2: FYROM Macedonia; Moldova; Romania; A Self-Assessment Study*, (Belgrade: CCMR, 2003), pp. 113-114.

aspects such as public debates, organisational culture, professional ethics and the like, on the other.⁵

This leads us to a further concept, namely the distinction between the formal organisation of the security sector and the dispositions for ensuring transparency and accountability, and how all this works in practice.⁶ This is a key theme for the next section. But first a general comment is in order. While the individual contributions offer many useful insights into security sector transparency and accountability, they also point to the need for a unified framework for analysis and assessment, one which is comprehensive in its approach and can call upon shared definitions and a common language, regionally and throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. This is a theme that I will turn to when addressing policy matters in the final section.

Self-assessments evaluation: success stories

To paraphrase an observation made in one article, if we use as a yardstick the means of measuring accountability and transparency that are traditionally practised in Western parliaments, and examine what parliamentarians have at their disposal, the formal mechanisms of transparency and accountability are 'largely in place.' Appropriate committees do for the most part exist. In the words of the Croatian expert:

the Committees can summon government officials and military officers and representatives of the security agencies to appear before them. Committee members and other parliament members can ask for relevant documents concerning defence and security affairs. The legislative instruments, executive means and judicial process ... [have been established] as ... constitutionally required.⁷

Descriptions of the situation in their respective countries by other contributors give similar grounds for confidence about the overall evolution of security sector reform. In the Macedonian contribution, for example, we can read of the considerable powers that have been given to parliament under the constitution.⁸ In the Moldovan contribution, the description of the matters that come under the purview of the country's highest security forum, the Supreme Council of Security, is far reaching - in certain respects further reaching than the powers that a similar body in a western country might dispose of⁹ (however it should be added that some Western countries lack altogether a body that gives overall direction and ensures the necessary coordination within the security sector). For the Bulgarian expert, '...there are well-established mechanisms that ensure accountability to the legislature and society in general as well as within the ministries...' Of particular interest here is the office of the Inspectorate General within

the Ministry of Defence which is dedicated to preventing expenditure abuses, rather than just '...registering and controlling them...',¹⁰ and to this end enjoys far-reaching powers to monitor budgetary, procurement and contract procedures. The Romanian assessment is also positive:

The adoption of key documents in the area of security and defence, the completion of the legal framework through the adoption of new laws, the preparation of periodic reports to the Parliament and the communication of information to the general public suggest a real impetus for increasing transparency and accountability.¹¹

The Albanian contribution is particularly upbeat about the way that defence reform has progressed:

...the military has been one of the most, if not the most, successful sectors in the reform process. The military has [done] more, with [fewer] resources at their disposal. This is not to say that there has not been abuse or mismanagement in the defence and military sector. Certainly such abuses have occurred, but it is also very certain that they have not been larger or more frequent than in other areas of governance. One could even go a step further and claim that there has been less mismanagement and corruption in the defence sector, especially on the part of the military, but that would be the topic for another paper.¹²

The tendency in the countries under consideration to create websites where key national documents are published in both the national language and English has also been a positive development, a practice that is important in terms of confidence-building both at home and abroad.

Much of the impetus for countries to take steps to enhance transparency and accountability has been generated by the prospect, now confirmed for two of the six countries in this study and a seemingly promising prospect for three others, of their accession to NATO membership over the short- to medium term, with EU membership appearing likely to follow. The Bulgarian contributors note that there has been a tendency in their country - no doubt paralleled in other transition states - to argue that a particular reform should be undertaken because '...NATO wants this, and this should be done in such and such a manner...', an approach that has been very successful because no one wants to argue against 'what NATO wants'.¹³

Membership in NATO and the EU has indeed acted as a catalyst for reform, facilitating security sector restructuring efforts that in the absence of the two institutions' enlargement programmes would have been much more difficult to generate. But what happens to the reform effort when membership has been secured? And how do countries deal with the varying approaches to security sector reform of NATO and the

5 Zoran Ivanovski, 'Transparency and Accountability', in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security*, Vol. 2, pp. 106.

6 Blendi Kajsii, 'Transparency and Accountability', in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security*, Vol. 1, p. 108.

7 Tatjana Čumpek, 'Transparency and Accountability in the Defence and Security Sectors', in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security*, Vol. 1, p. 421.

8 Zoran Ivanovski, 'Transparency and Accountability', in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security*, Vol. 2, p. 108.

9 Viorel Cibotaru, 'Transparency and Accountability', in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security*, Vol. 2, pp. 242-244.

10 Ralitz Mateeva, and Petya Dimitrova, 'Transparency and Accountability: The 'Necessary Evil' For Bulgarian Security Sector Reform', in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security*, Vol. 1, pp. 264-265.

11 Mihail E. Ionescu, 'Transparency and Accountability', in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security*, Vol. 2, p. 391.

12 Kajsii Blendi, 'Transparency and Accountability in Governance', in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security*, Vol. 1, p. 117.

13 Ralitz Mateeva, and Petya Dimitrova, 'Transparency and Accountability', p. 260.

EU? The next sections look at these and other issues on the more problematical side of the reform ledger.

Self-assessments evaluation: problem areas

As far as the contributing experts are concerned, notwithstanding the success stories of the last decade, progress has been disappointing in a number of areas and much more needs to be done. While the points of emphasis understandably differ from country to country, there are a number of concerns that would appear to be common to all countries participating in this survey. It would also seem that their preoccupations are largely representative of the post-communist transition countries as a whole.

A first problem area is constituted by the overall political environment conditioning transparency and accountability. First and foremost, there is the lingering Soviet legacy, which in the words of one contributor is one of '...conformity not initiative, control not delegation, compartmentalisation not cooperation, and secrecy not transparency'.¹⁴ Another input stresses that '... there is a distinct tradition from the Soviet past that restricts access to the entire process of taking important policy decisions'.¹⁵ The communist inheritance is indeed weighty and has left several security sector pathologies in its wake. One is the difficulty of mobilising social forces in a society that knew too much forced mobilisation under the *ancien régime* and underwent far-reaching fragmentation when it finally collapsed. Moreover, a populace that tends to be preoccupied with the challenges of economic survival will normally have little time and energy to worry about other issues. In a word, civil society remains chronically weak in these transition countries. Those on whose behalf transparency and accountability are supposed to be exercised are often too preoccupied with the economics of survival to embrace enthusiastically the politics of democratisation although much of the state of the economy ultimately depends on the integrity of the political system. The legacy has also left its imprint on the style of governance. Governments tend to be secretive, reluctant to divulge information, awkward in their dealings with the public and uncomfortable with public debate. Paternalistic governance and immature civil society tend to go hand in hand.

A related dilemma involves political parties in transition societies. While in the first part of the 1990s their numbers proliferated, the tendency in recent years has been one of consolidation. Yet their weakness as institutions remains. 'Many parliamentarians...' we are told 'comprehend 'exercising democracy' only as 'representing the interests of their political party rather than... those of 'the people'.¹⁶ Another contribution observes that political parties are '... still in the process of developing organisational structures and democratic decision-making processes'.¹⁷ It is no wonder, as a number of contributors point out, that under such circumstances political power tends to gravitate to the executive.

A further area of difficulty concerns the availability of qualified staff to support the security sector, whether this is for the executive, the various ministries with security

14 Tatjana Čumpek, 'Transparency and Accountability', p. 425.

15 Viorel Cibotaru, 'Transparency and Accountability', p. 240.

16 Tatjana Čumpek, 'Transparency and Accountability', p. 420.

17 Zoran Ivanovski, 'Transparency and Accountability' in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security*, Vol. 2, p. 110.

responsibilities, the relevant parliamentary committees, the media or non-governmental organisations. The problem is both qualitative and quantitative, with there being both too few civilians relative to uniformed personnel in the security sector and a general lack of expertise across professional backgrounds. One contribution recounts how when the defence committee of parliament '...reviews the budget or reports on the defence or security sector they rely on government expertise, the very expertise they have to pass judgement on'.¹⁸

Then there are a series of technical or practical problems in the operations of the security sector that detract from transparency and accountability. Here the reference is to such factors as a lack of definition of the roles of the executive, various ministries and parliament, or the absence of instruments to ensure that laws and decisions are effectively implemented.¹⁹ Similarly, our contributors are worried that procedures governing the reporting responsibilities of various sectors of government are not rigorous enough. This tends to encourage the practice dominant under the communist regime whereby public information was provided if, when and how it suited the Party. The Croatian contribution refers to a phenomenon called 'administrative silence' which hampers both 'vertical' and 'horizontal' transparency.²⁰ The role of parliamentary committees is also seen as being problematic. They are generally not strong enough to hold the executive accountable and they tend not to cooperate with one another in the exercise of their duties.

A fifth area of concern for our contributors is the tendency of foreign donors not to see security sector reform as a priority in their programme and funding decisions. As the threat of inter-state war has receded in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, so has interest in security sector reform on the part of donors. This may be a serious miscalculation. A security sector that is not transparent and accountable can reduce substantially a country's overall prospects for growth, development and stability.

Conclusion

This article will conclude with a few suggestions for the work of transition country experts on security sector reform as well as for those who support their efforts in developed countries.

To the experts from the six countries participating in this study, two observations would appear to be in order. The first is that the focus of their research on security sector transparency and accountability needs to be broadened. Although in some contributions, the security sector is defined in a suitably comprehensive way,²¹ there is a tendency in others to concentrate on the armed forces and to neglect, for example, customs officials and intelligence services, not to mention the role of the media and civil society.

18 Kajsia Blendi, 'Transparency and Accountability in Governance', in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security*, Vol. 1, p. 111.

19 Tatjana Čumpek, 'Transparency and Accountability', in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security*, Vol. 1, p. 422.

20 Ibid., pp. 424-425.

21 For example, see how the security sector is defined in Mihail Ionescu, 'Transparency and Accountability', in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security*, Vol. 2, p. 379.

Another issue that receives short shrift is the role of political parties. These constitute the primary vehicle for not only mobilising the public for election day but also for developing and articulating policy. No democracy – whether it be of the transition or consolidated variety – can function effectively with ineffectual political parties. If parties are weak, the legislative branch will be weak, and as many of the contributions point out, the executive will end up dominating the political scene. A related issue is how party electoral platforms come to fruition, and how electoral platforms end up being implemented, or not, post-elections. These are issues that the fledgling democracies of post-communist Europe should address as a matter of some urgency. Civil society needs to know whether a state-of-the-art piece of military machinery has been purchased because of kick-backs provided to the governing party or as a result of the governing party's assessment of what is considered to constitute national interest. For a government to be accountable there needs to be party financing mechanisms that are themselves transparent and which encourage political parties to make policy as a function of their analysis of the national, as opposed to the particular, interest.

Also receiving little attention in the contributions is the issue of corruption, which of course prospers where indices of transparency and accountability are low. Transparency International (TI) provides figures comparing national perceptions of levels of corruption in the public sector on the part of 'business people, country analysts and ordinary citizens'.²² The results for the five countries in this study that are covered by the TI report vary considerably: from a (low) score of 81 for Albania to a (high) score of 46 for Bulgaria. This is a substantial difference for a field that includes 102 countries. Moreover, it is not clear why there should be such a range of results. Could this be explained by the relative importance of the defence industry in different countries, an industry which TI asserts is one of the two areas (after that of public works and construction) most prone to corruption? Whatever the answer, this is a subject that drives to the heart of transparency and accountability, and more research needs to be done in this respect.

A second priority must be to use the opportunity for regional dialogue provided by the Stability Pact to develop a richer regional discourse on security sector reform issues and in particular their governance aspects. As pointed out above, the transition country studies reviewed in this article lack a common language and shared terms of reference. This is a matter of no little importance. For neighbours to have common concepts and vocabulary about security issues is stability enhancing; and transparency across all national security sectors has a confidence building effect at the regional and international levels. But more than that, regional dialogue can contribute to the cross-fertilisation of ideas. And here, the experts such as those who have contributed to this volume have much to offer.

For example, there is the idea of the Macedonian government to organise what one might call the Balkan equivalent of a 'town hall' meeting as way of enhancing public interest in security issues. 'Process 2002', organised just before NATO's Prague Summit, brought together all important stakeholders in the Macedonian security sector with the express purpose of not only reinforcing the dialogue among different juris-

dictions but also encouraging greater interest on the part of Macedonian society as a whole.²³

A second idea concerns the need to build on efforts undertaken in the 1990s to make available to government and civil society actors alike more information about what is going on in the security sector. As one contribution points out, there are ever increasing demands for more transparency.²⁴ One proposal put forward to deal with this is the creation of a central database for information about the security sector to facilitate the exchange of ideas and the development of policy.

However, while security sector transparency and accountability relies first and foremost on home-grown effort, western policy remains of crucial importance. As noted above, donor country priorities can play a large role in determining just how much attention is paid to security sector reform, and these priorities have changed to the disadvantage of the security sector as the threat of inter-state conflict has receded. If transition countries wish to correct this situation, they could help their cause by taking a common line in their discussions with donor countries. This is the kind of issue that might be addressed in the regional dialogue on security sector reform mentioned above.

Recommendations

Western policy will also be decisive in determining whether the training needs of Europe's fledgling democracies will be met. There remains an enormous requirement for training and educating security sector practitioners. More training needs to be offered, and it needs to be targeted to specific country and professional needs. There has to be a greater emphasis on building decision-making capacity in transition countries and to this end helping them restore their educational infrastructure and reconstitute their teaching capacity. This is fundamental to the prospects for greater security sector transparency and accountability.²⁵

Beyond that, it is surely true, as one expert has observed, that the Western example counts a very great deal in transition countries. And in several developed democracies, the example is not always a very inspiring one. Many of the problems addressed in this overview are not particular to transition democracies. For example, they can currently be seen in several western countries due to a lack of public interest in security issues and a tendency on the part of national government to be less than transparent. 'The higher the stakes, the lower the levels of transparency in governance' is an assertion that seems to be of general applicability in this context. In developed democracies, there has also been a tendency for power to gravitate to the executive (and

23 Zoran Ivanovski, 'Transparency and Accountability', in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security*, Vol. 2, p. 114. For the proceedings of this conference see Stevo Pendarovski, Kiril Neikov, Islam Jusufi (eds.), *Process 2002: Security in the Republic of Macedonia [ПРОЦЕС 2002: БЕЗБЕДНОСТА НА РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА]*, (Skopje: List for Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the Cabinet of the Republic of Macedonia, 2002) (In Macedonian).

24 Ralitz Mateeva, and Petya Dimitrova, 'Transparency and Accountability: The 'Necessary Evil' For Bulgarian Security Sector Reform', in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security*, Vol. 1, p. 266.

25 On this subject, see David Law and Philipp Fluri (eds.), 'Security Sector Expert Formation. The Challenges after 9/11', Philipp H. Fluri and David M. Law (eds.), *Security Sector Expert Formation – Achievements and Needs in South East Europe*, (Vienna: National Defence Academy, 2003).

22 See http://www.transparency.org/about/ti/annual_rep/ar-2002/tiar2002.pdf, p. 18, for the country rankings and p. 19 for the listing of sectors where corruption tends to thrive.

the judicial) branches at the expense of the legislative. Another parallel is found in the non-existence of key documents to orient the security sector. Some western countries lack a national security strategy. This is no longer the case of the countries participating in this survey, but the lack of such a document in one country until recently was found to undercut accountability, '...because without it parliament had no framework for monitoring the government's security sector activities.'²⁶ Expertise in security sector issues has been on the decline in many consolidated democracies owing to the budget compressions that followed the end of the Cold War. In addition, many face major problems when it comes to ensuring that key security sector actors are all 'on the same page' when planning for and reacting to security contingencies. The problems are not dissimilar, then, from those encountered in transition countries, even if their extent can vary considerably.

As pointed out above, the functioning of the committee system is one of the weaker links in the overall framework of transparency and accountability in the transition countries. Greater use might be made of the various fora for inter-parliamentary cooperation in an effort to help build stronger legislative capacity. The North Atlantic Parliament (NAP), for example, has gathered considerable expertise in working with the parliamentary staff of transition countries, acquainting them with western best practice and improving their skills. Perhaps the time has come to build on this experience by expanding the training activities for committee staff that are now offered.²⁷

Inter-parliamentary cooperation could also prove effective in strengthening transparency and accountability in another way. NAP member delegations could submit annual reports on security sector transparency and accountability for the critical review of its relevant committees, with their findings being officially and transparently communicated to the relevant national governments. A ranking system showing participating countries' strengths and weaknesses could act as a powerful incentive for making improvements.

There is also work to be done concerning the development of norms for transparency and accountability in the security sector. The OSCE made a major contribution in this regard in 1994 when it agreed to a Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. Almost ten years on, the time may have now come to update this effort to take into account the new security challenges that have emerged. This is a task that might profit by being initially addressed task by a consortium of non-governmental organisations specialised in security sector issues.

Last but certainly not least, there is the question of EU and NATO enlargement. These processes should provide a new impetus for moving towards common concepts, standards and practices for enhancing security sector transparency and accountability in the Euro-Atlantic area. For this to happen, however, three things will have to change. First, the EU and NATO will have to move beyond their traditionally narrow perspectives on security sector reform. The EU, for example, has tended to focus on issues that for the most part directly pertain to securing its new borders, while NATO has concentrated on defence reform. In fact, however, these are highly complementary matters that need to be approached as an integrated whole. Second, the EU and NATO will have to

overcome the reluctance of some of their members to give non-members a *droit de regard* over issues sometimes considered as coming under the purview of one but not the other institution. Finally, developed democracies in their ranks will have to realise that security sector reform is no longer only about what they do on behalf of other countries' security sectors. At the latest, with the advent of 9/11, the question of security sector reform has moved on to their agendas as well.²⁸ A coordinated EU-NATO approach to security sector reform would then bring benefits to the security sector reform efforts of both transition and consolidated democracies.

26 Tatjana Čumpek, 'Transparency and Accountability in the Defence and Security Sectors', in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defence and Security*, Vol. 1, p. 420.

27 A description of the training activities of the North Atlantic Parliament is available at its website, <http://www.naa.be>.

28 See, for example, David Law, 'Security Sector Reform Comes to Canada', *Connections*, Vol. 3, 2004, to be available at http://www.pfpconsortium.org/parser.cgi?file=/info-pages/pubs_en.htm (paper originally presented at the Centre for International Relations (CIR), Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, 6th June 2003).