



**MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC**



# **Developing a Security Sector Reform (SSR) Concept for the United Nations**

**Proceedings of the Expert Workshop held in Bratislava, Slovakia on 7 July 2006**

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## Summary of Workshop Proceedings

The international community has gained significant experience in security sector reform (SSR), particularly as an element of its peacebuilding endeavours. Intergovernmental organisations have assumed an increasingly important role in shaping the SSR agenda. For many years now, the United Nations (UN) system has also been engaged in a wide range of SSR activities – though not necessarily under the label of SSR. What has been absent to date is a common, comprehensive and coordinated UN approach to SSR cutting across the entire peacebuilding spectrum and including longer-term social and economic development, with shared principles, objectives and guidelines for the development and implementation of UN support to SSR and clarity on roles and responsibilities across the UN system. There is, however, increasing interest within the UN system and strong calls from the field for such an approach, which would serve as a valuable orientation and planning tool for various UN institutions working on SSR and in related areas. UN Member States have also expressed interest in the development of a UN policy framework for SSR. In July 2005, for example, the Security Council addressed the question in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding. The subsequent statement by the Presidency acknowledged the need for more coherent approaches by the UN in addressing SSR issues.

It is against this background that Slovakia has decided to promote a debate on the UN's role in SSR in its capacity as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council during the period 2006-2007. In this context, the Slovak Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, with the support of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), organised an expert workshop in Bratislava on 7 July 2006. The meeting was attended by over one hundred delegates representing several national governments, UN institutions and regional organisations as well as non-governmental organisations involved in SSR. It marked the beginning of a series of discussions on the UN's approach to SSR with a view to preparing the basis for the ministerial meeting of the Security Council on this topic to be held in the course of Slovakia's presidency in early 2007. The key objective of the expert workshop was therefore to launch a broad discussion on the role of SSR within the UN system in order to increase understanding of the issue as such and to explore options for developing a UN policy framework for SSR while drawing on the experience of other intergovernmental organisations wherever applicable.

There was widespread consensus among participants that the UN should develop a comprehensive approach to SSR, including general principles and guidelines which, however, would have to be tailored to specific country and regional contexts. Given its global mandate, universal reach and international legitimacy, the UN was also seen as the preferred strategic coordinator of international efforts to support SSR, though it was observed that the rather limited capacity of the UN system in this area had to be taken into account. Furthermore, participants emphasised the importance of a comprehensive UN approach to SSR being based on the experience of SSR-implementing countries and regional organisations, as well as the conceptual work already carried out by other international actors. It was suggested that follow-on discussions should concentrate on these issues, which are briefly discussed in the final section of this report. This report provides a summary of the main points of the presentations and discussions at the workshop, which concentrated on three broad topics: (1) approaches of intergovernmental organisations to SSR, (2) UN approaches to SSR and (3) the development of a UN SSR concept.

## 1. INTERGOVERNMENTAL APPROACHES TO SSR<sup>1</sup>

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**Intergovernmental organisations** are playing an ever increasing role in designing and implementing SSR programmes. The approaches of intergovernmental organisations to SSR tend to vary broadly as a function of whether they bring a development, security or governance perspective to SSR; whether their geographical focus is global, regional or sub-regional; whether they concentrate on field activities or norm development; and the specific country context that they focus on. Most intergovernmental organisations are focused on only a part of the entire security sector and are not active in addressing SSR in all the contexts in which it can be required. Despite the variance in the origins and applications of the SSR activities of intergovernmental organisations, they all face a number of common challenges: for example, the need to have an overarching SSR concept and robust implementation guidelines, the need to ensure that their human and material resources are organised to support the cross-cutting nature of SSR programmes, the need for effective and synergistic cooperation among the various actors sponsoring SSR, and the need to ensure that SSR activities are carried out in a transparent and accountable manner. To date, two intergovernmental organisations – the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD DAC) and the European Union (EU) – have developed, or are in the process of developing, comprehensive policy frameworks to guide their various SSR activities. Other intergovernmental organisations, such as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have a long record of assisting member and partner states in certain dimensions of SSR.

For the **OECD DAC**, SSR represents an effective framework for understanding the linkages among the various actors involved in delivering security and for ensuring that the security sector is accountable and efficient. It is also seen as a tool for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. For these reasons, the OECD DAC was involved in developing guidelines for SSR in 2004, which are now being followed-up by an effort to develop an implementation framework on SSR (IF-SSR). Some of the key issues in the implementation guidelines are the following: SSR is not just a technical process, but also a highly political one; local ownership has to be seen as the point of departure for SSR; and finally that context is everything, whereby the needs of a post-conflict environment can be radically different from those of other contexts. The IF-SSR recognises that it is important to translate these and other principles into usable advice for those working in the field.

Over the past year, the **EU** has been involved in conceptualising its approach to SSR. Both the European Council and the European Commission have developed SSR concepts and have recently jointly drafted an EU-wide SSR document. This reflects the realisation that security and development are interdependent, and that every effort needs to be made to ensure that this is reflected in the practical work carried out by the Council and the Commission. The EU intends to be pragmatic in its approach, relying in large part on the norm-setting work of the OECD. It also intends to be flexible in its approach. SSR activities will be either carried out by the Council or Commission separately, or by both acting in unison. As the EU turns to the implementation of its new concept, it will face a number of challenges. There are still relatively few within the EU who are aware of the SSR concept and its implications, in

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<sup>1</sup> For an overview see background paper on “Intergovernmental Approaches to Security Sector Reform (SSR)” prepared by DCAF for the workshop.

particular, the need to take a holistic approach in programme design and implementation. Finally, the EU will need to implement long-term training in the area of SSR.

The **OSCE** is an ideal partner for the UN's SSR activities. SSR has a strong conflict prevention dimension, which is an important part of the OSCE's work. While the OSCE has no SSR concept proper, its 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security contains a number of key concepts and principles of relevance to SSR. Through the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, the organisation has access to the parliaments of 56 member states, including their defence committees, and can therefore play an important role in building legislative oversight capacity. Finally, the OSCE conducts a broad range of SSR-related activities in the field, including in post-conflict theatres where issues such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), small arms and light weapons (SALW), border management and rule of law are of utmost importance. The OSCE should consider launching a stock-taking of its various SSR activities with a view to developing its own SSR approach.

The SSR activities of **NATO** take place under the Partnership Action Program for Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB). This is the latest in a series of outreach activities that NATO has been involved with in the post-Communist part of the Euro-Atlantic area for fifteen years now. PAP-DIB focuses on practical issues such as building capacity in the defence sector for personnel management and budgeting issues, and addressing the consequences of reform. Through these activities, NATO has learned that development and security are inter-linked and that it is essential to hold ministries of defence to high standards of transparency and accountability. Another lesson is that there is always a disparity or 'disconnect' between ambitions and resources. NATO should also consider a stock-taking of its SSR activities, as has been suggested for the OSCE.

The **AU** and **ECOWAS** are the two intergovernmental organisations in Africa which, while not having yet developed a coherent SSR concept, have adopted mechanisms and instruments which aim to promote democratic governance of the security sector and have begun to engage in activities which come under the ambit of SSR. The ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security and its Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance are two key instruments of ECOWAS that could be useful in elaborating a sub-regional SSR concept. The Common African Defence and Security Policy of the AU provides the overarching framework for a continental African SSR doctrine that would be derived from a UN SSR concept.

## **2. UNITED NATIONS APPROACHES TO SSR<sup>2</sup>**

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Of the intergovernmental organisations involved in SSR, the UN is best placed to assist states in improving capacity and governance of the security sector through the promotion of a holistic SSR agenda. For this to happen, the UN should develop a common understanding of SSR – including a system-wide SSR policy or concept that would guide future UN SSR programmes and projects in a coherent, consistent and sustainable way. Although the UN has not developed a common SSR policy framework so far, SSR is very much on the agenda of the **UN system**. Given its broad definition and multi-purpose nature, SSR cuts across a wide

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<sup>2</sup> For an overview see background paper on “UN Approaches to Security Sector Reform (SSR)”, prepared by DCAF for the workshop.

range of UN policy areas from peace and security to development, human rights and the rule of law. There is a strong consensus that SSR is central to post-conflict recovery. An increasing number of UN institutions are involved in one or another aspect of SSR. The UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are the two key actors involved in operational SSR activities (see below). Various UN institutions such as the Security Council repeatedly refer to SSR, but rarely define it. The ambiguity that this creates is likely to undermine UN output. In recent years, SSR and related activities supported by the UN system have increased both in number and scope – though without these activities necessarily being attributed to the SSR concept. There is a certain bias in favour of justice and police reform, as well as towards SSR-related activities in post-conflict settings. There is a strong case for broadening the UN SSR agenda, particularly as concerns activities relating to defence capacity-building and the enhancement of civil management and oversight of the security sector.

**DPKO**, which prepares and manages UN peacekeeping operations, is faced with loud calls from the field for a “roadmap” for SSR activities carried out by integrated missions. Though the UN has been involved in SSR for some time, no standards or guidelines exist, and only a few mandates explicitly refer to SSR activities. It remains very much an ad hoc activity for UN missions, though one of increasing importance. SSR has particular relevance for DPKO because it represents an exit strategy for peacekeepers: only once a viable security sector has been established can a troop withdrawal be considered. Nonetheless, in view of the lifespan of a typical peacekeeping mission, it would not be possible to undertake a long-term, locally owned SSR process, but only to initiate reform and build the framework for local ownership. For a UN SSR concept to be relevant for post-conflict environments, it needs to be modest about what can be achieved in a particular time frame, especially as concerns local ownership. It also needs to focus on short-term security requirements, the engagement of armed non-state actors, the establishment of a framework for DDR (which, in turn, shapes possibilities for SSR), operational capacity-building for security actors and the development of specialised technical expertise that can be used by field missions. Even with a comprehensive UN approach, it is necessary to keep in mind that UN capacity in the area of SSR is very much limited. In terms of international coordination of SSR assistance, the most that the UN could offer is to serve as a small hub at the centre of strong spokes of regional and bilateral effort.

**UNDP** has developed its own programmatic approach to SSR (“Justice and Security Sector Reform” / JSSR) and has done a significant amount of operational work in certain dimensions of SSR (e.g., community policing, police reform, security reviews, parliamentary oversight of the security sector, etc.), though not across the entire spectrum. SSR-related activities supported by the UNDP are part of a broader context that has a special focus on governance. From a UNDP perspective, there is a need for strategic coordination of UN SSR efforts. The development of a comprehensive UN approach to SSR would be an important step in this direction. There are encouraging developments in this regard, including the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), joint DPKO/UNDP efforts on SSR stock-taking and the UN system’s development of a common approach on DDR, an area of activity which is closely related to SSR in post-conflict environments. There are a number of challenges that a common UN SSR concept must take into consideration: integrating the views and approaches of different epistemic communities (development, security, governance); finding a lead actor and developing capacity within the UN for defence sector reform; building management capacity across the whole security sector (e.g., procurement, assets, human resources, logistics); developing a strategy for the engagement of armed non-state actors which, in post-conflict environments, may be the key security providers for a significant portion of the



population; ensuring sustainability and thus long-term funding of SSR assistance; establishing the UN as a strategic coordinator of international efforts concerning SSR. Finally, it is necessary to bear in mind that concepts do not implement themselves but require skilled and committed people capable of turning theory into practice.

In **Kosovo**, **UNDP** is currently involved in an Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR). This is a process with extensive international support and with complex issues of transparency and legitimacy, and as such may provide valuable lessons for similar initiatives elsewhere. The UNDP is carrying out this programme on the basis of voluntary contributions, which has had the effect of facilitating work with the bilateral donors involved. The programme brings together the international community and local civil society, relying on a range of intergovernmental organisations and far-reaching cooperation among local bodies involved in internal security. The ISSR is proceeding through eight stages, and it is expected that a blueprint for the future security institutions of Kosovo will have been produced by the end of the year. The ISSR focuses on such security dimensions as the need for an emergency response capacity and the ability to defend Kosovo's territory. The OSCE has played a vital role in support of the ISSR in the area of awareness building through a programme aimed at informing citizens at the municipal level of the stakes involved in the ISSR and the its ongoing progress.

Neither the United Nations Office for West Africa (**UNOWA**) nor the Economic Community of West African States (**ECOWAS**) has articulated a SSR concept for West Africa. SSR initiatives have, however, been taken by both organisations that can form the point of departure for the sub-region's contribution to the evolution of an SSR concept for the United Nations. In particular, the conference on "Security Sector Reform, Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in West Africa", which was convened by UNOWA on 22-23 November 2004, was a crucial step in facilitating a regional debate among key stakeholders on the reform of the security sector as a way of enhancing peace and contributing to the prevention of conflict in West Africa. A UN SSR concept could encourage West African States to enhance their currently weak focus on the concept. In this context, it would be useful to hold a joint regional roundtable on the development of a UN SSR concept in West Africa with ECOWAS, the most relevant regional actor, playing a key role.

### **3. DEVELOPING A SSR CONCEPT FOR THE UN**

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**Learning from the experience of SSR-implementing countries.** It is obvious that a UN SSR concept must emerge from a conversation that involves more than just donor states. Because local ownership is so important for SSR to succeed, the relevance and applicability of a UN SSR concept would depend on the extent to which it is based on and accommodates the views and experience of the SSR-implementing countries, mainly in the developing world. As emphasised in the keynote speech by the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, "there is no doubt that while addressing the topic further, we need to take fully into account the experience of countries that have undergone or are undergoing SSR; otherwise we risk creating artificial models that would ignore realities on the ground and actual needs of recipient countries". Exploring the experiences of SSR-implementing countries may be a useful point of departure for the discussion of specific aspects of SSR in the UN context. In such an endeavor, cases should be drawn from different world regions, though with a certain emphasis on Sub-Saharan Africa. They should also represent different reform contexts (e.g., conflict prevention, post-conflict peacebuilding, political and economic transition).

**Learning from regional experiences in and approaches to SSR.** More often than not, SSR efforts undertaken by one country are threatened by developments in neighbouring countries. On the other hand, geographical proximity can facilitate the sharing of experience, lessons-learned processes and coordination among states. Regional cooperative approaches tend to create a more conducive environment for the implementation of SSR, while regional conflicts tend to weaken them. The relevance of the regional dimension of SSR is clearly illustrated by developments in sub-regions such as the Western Balkans and in West Africa. As already mentioned, intergovernmental organisations – many of them regional and sub-regional organisations – have assumed an increasingly active role in shaping the SSR agenda. Given the importance that the UN Charter accords to regional organisations in the maintenance of global peace and security, the development of a comprehensive UN framework for SSR should draw on their experience, approaches and mechanisms whenever appropriate. At the same time, a comprehensive UN SSR policy could facilitate the development of conceptual guidance and operational capacity for regional actors in SSR. As noted by the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs in his keynote speech, “given the irreplaceable role of regional organisations in promoting global peace and security and the need to tackle SSR from a regional angle, it would be worthwhile, if not necessary, to apply their expertise and practical experience in shaping universal understanding of SSR in the UN and *vice versa*”. Looking into specific regional approaches to SSR and exploring options for closer interaction between the UN and regional organisations in promoting SSR may be a useful second step in deepening the discussion on specific aspects of SSR in the UN context.

**Drawing on and expanding existing SSR concepts.** Concerning the conceptualisation of SSR, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. In its own SSR policy development, the UN should draw on the conceptual work already carried out by other international actors, particularly OECD DAC. However, these existing concepts tend to focus on donor coordination and have therefore to be adapted to the specific needs of the UN system taking into account experiences of SSR-implementing countries and approaches of regional organisations. Given the UN’s predominant role in the maintenance of global peace and security, a UN policy framework for SSR should necessarily be global in scope but, at the same time, give special attention to the distinct features of SSR in post-conflict contexts, including the role of peace agreements (and UNSC mandates based on them) in shaping SSR; the interface between SSR and peacekeeping operations; the engagement of armed non-state actors in security sector governance; capacity-building for national security institutions; and the relationship between SSR and DDR, as well as other SSR-related activities. In this context, the Security Council seems to be the most appropriate place to launch a broad debate on a UN policy framework for SSR. This should, however, include all relevant actors of the UN system involved in SSR.

A number of points identified at the workshop could help guide further discussion on the development of a UN policy framework for SSR:

- importance of developing general SSR principles and guidelines, which can be tailored to specific country and regional contexts, given that the point of departure and reform trajectory may differ substantively from one SSR-implementing country to another;
- need to take a human security approach when analysing the security sector in a given environment as a precondition for setting priorities and developing the narrower range of activities that are necessary;

- importance of ensuring local ownership, keeping in mind that not all situations are conducive to making local ownership the point of departure; in some post-conflict environments it may not be possible, or it may even be counterproductive, for local elites to assume early ownership of the SSR process;
- need to simultaneously address the role of armed non-state actors and informal security institutions in post-conflict SSR while building governmental capacity to provide security to the people in an accountable way;
- importance of coordination among intergovernmental organisations (and other international actors) involved in SSR assistance, which is clearly vital but often remains poor in practice, whether because mandates of international actors cover SSR only partially or because other actors are reluctant to coordinate; and
- importance for the credibility of SSR that mature democracies also embrace the need to review and, as necessary, reform their security sectors.

In developing a UN policy framework for SSR, a number of choices will have to be made, for example:

- whether there should be a comprehensive UN SSR concept covering all relevant policy areas or whether there should be a number of more focused SSR concepts that cover specific policy areas such as conflict prevention, post-conflict peacebuilding and development assistance;
- whether one UN entity should take the lead in developing a policy framework for UN support to SSR (e.g., UNSC, PBC, DPA, DPKO, UNDP), whether an inter-agency coordinating mechanism should be established or whether each UN agency should develop its own SSR policy (i.e., DPKO on defence and police sector reform in integrated missions, UNDP on SSR in conflict prevention and crisis recovery, DPA and/or PBSO on SSR in the framework of peacebuilding, UNIFEM on gender approaches to SSR, etc.);
- whether a “global” UN SSR policy framework should be developed or whether there should be concepts for specific regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa; and
- whether the UN should try to meet increasing demands for it to play the role of a strategic coordinator of international SSR assistance or whether its role should be more modest considering its limited capacity in this area.



# **INTRODUCTORY STATEMENTS**



**Ján Kubiš**  
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

Ladies and Gentlemen, Excellencies, Dear Friends,

At the outset of this workshop, please let me welcome you in Bratislava and wish you a fruitful and productive day. It is my pleasure to meet our overseas participants in particular, many of whom had to travel a long way to contribute to our deliberations. My special thanks go to Ambassador Winkler and Dr. Hänggi from Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, whose personal dedication and high level of professionalism made this workshop possible.

Looking at the impressive list of speakers and participants, I am convinced that we will enjoy a very inspiring and stimulating debate on an important topic that is rightly drawing attention of the whole international community. And I hope that results of this workshop will encourage further discussions on security sector reform within the UN system, which would pave the way for a more comprehensive security sector reform policy framework.

It is also a great pleasure for me to have the opportunity to address this forum in my new capacity as the Foreign Minister of Slovakia. In fact, this is my first appearance at an event of this kind as a minister. I am also pleased to address you also as a former Secretary General of the OSCE and Special Representative of the EU in the Central Asia. I do not need to stress that I have been dealing with issues related to security sector reform (SSR) almost on daily basis. Thanks to my on-hand experience I belong to those who are convinced that SSR deserves growing support from a variety of international actors, including in the development assistance, security cooperation and democracy promotion fields. I also think that there is a growing consensus that we could and should reach a common understanding on a single system-wide approach on SSR within the UN and among all interested international players, including the EU, OECD, OSCE, African Union, ECOWAS, World Bank, NATO and others.

Our decision to actively promote a debate on SSR in our capacity as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council resulted from an in-depth analysis of the current state of affairs in this prominent body. We were encouraged to do so also by a recognition of the limited ability of the UN Security Council and other UN bodies to facilitate more effectively and efficiently a sustainable post-conflict reconstruction. At the beginning we were primarily inspired by our own transformation experience. Later on we also saw a growing need to address SSR within the UN as the key factor for stabilizing crisis regions and assisting them to embark on a sustainable development trajectory. Our six-month experience in the UN Security Council proved that this choice was correct and timely.

Dealing directly with situations in Timor-Leste, Haiti, Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi, Afghanistan or Iraq, we can now acknowledge without any doubt that successful SSR is the key precondition for the success of any peacekeeping operation and for long-term stability. International peacekeeping operations are typically deployed in post-conflict situations in which the capacity of state institutions to provide security functions is often absent. Peacekeepers as a rule replace or assist national authorities in providing security functions while simultaneously assisting local authorities to restore the state's monopoly of the use of force, rebuild security institutions and reform the

state's security system. Hence, many in the UN and other international organizations are beginning to understand the significance of SSR, as security is a prerequisite to building up a democratic society and sustainable peace after a conflict has ended. The international community is starting to comprehend the need for a holistic approach built around SSR; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); transitional justice; the rule of law; and good governance. However, the level of this understanding differs from organization to organization and country to country. Many questions still remain unanswered. As highlighted in one of the discussion papers prepared by DCAF for this workshop, we need more clarity on numerous issues, including on whether we should focus on the development of a system-wide UN SSR concept or rather concepts for specific entities of the UN system; whether we should continue to develop a "global" UN SSR policy framework or rather concepts for specific regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and, of course, how the UN Security Council can contribute to the development of a UN SSR concept.

At the same time, we have to admit that, although the UN has already undertaken many SSR-related activities, it still has no mandate, capacities or resources to address SSR in a comprehensive way, which would involve aspects such as coordination among stakeholders, filling operational gaps and institutional building. They are many challenges to the effective implementation of SSR, including limited funding, lack of coordination and insufficient planning for SSR during the early stages of post-conflict operations. It needs to be stressed, though, that UN bodies are increasingly making reference to the usefulness of the SSR concept and that the UN has been actively providing support to SSR for many years. The concept is not new; on the other hand, there is a growing demand for a broad discussion with a view to promoting better understanding of the topic and developing a coherent framework.

We now understand that success or failure of state building clearly depends on governments' ability to rebuild effective national armies, create security forces for guarding borders and build effective and accountable police forces for the protection of human rights, security and a secure investment environment. Re-establishing peace means not only the cessation of hostilities but also promoting political, human and economic development. I am convinced that the majority of us agree that investing in security can cost a lot, but it pays off. I also hope that within the international community there is an emerging consensus about the global nature of SSR-related activities, which are central to post-conflict reconstruction in all conflict regions, including in Sub-Saharan Africa. SSR is not about donor states or organizations imposing Western values; it is first and foremost about creating an environment that can ensure sustainable peace, security and development.

We do need, however, to move forward and formalise this concurrence of views into a common action to make UN measures to address SSR more structured and comprehensive. Recent events in Timor-Leste have demonstrated that SSR should be addressed systematically and that a holistic plan of action should clearly define the role of UN agencies and other actors. Lessons learned from the management of conflicts in Africa indicate that SSR concerns not only militaries, police, intelligence services and transitional justice systems, but also civil society, media, private sector and traditional authorities, who should be drawn into the process. It is evident, for instance, that if we neglect the problem of unemployed youth in Sierra Leone or former combatants in DRC, the whole peace process in these countries could be soon in danger. There is no doubt that as we continue to address this topic we need to take fully into account the experience of countries that have undergone or are undergoing SSR; otherwise we risk creating artificial models that would ignore the realities on the ground and the actual needs of recipient countries.



Our pledge to facilitate UN discussions on developing a comprehensive UN SSR framework came in the middle of very lively discussions on the issue within the UN and other multilateral organizations. Last summer the President of the UN Security Council made a statement on behalf of the Council emphasizing that SSR is an essential element of the stabilization process in any post-conflict environment and acknowledging the need to pay adequate attention to SSR in the future, drawing on best practices that have been developed in the area. The UN Secretariat is currently involved in establishing a Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory, which *inter alia* covers UN capacities in the area of SSR. In December 2005, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1645 on the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission, whose mandate is to propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery as well as to develop best practices on issues that require extensive collaboration between political, military, humanitarian and development actors. I have no doubt that common understanding on the future guidance of SSR programmes could be a significant contribution to the work of the Commission. In fact, lack of a consistent approach towards SSR was among the strongest arguments in favour of the PBC. On the other hand, it would be beneficial, if the PBC, once it starts to deal with country cases, contributes by assessing the lessons learned also to the development of a SSR concept. In addition, it should provide a platform for integration of different actors and approaches.

Other international organizations also contribute to shaping and implementing the SSR concept. SSR is very high on the EU agenda. The recently published "*Concept for European Community Support for SSR*" represents a clearer and integrated EU policy framework for engaging in SSR. The OECD in its well-known guidelines for SSR stresses a holistic approach to SSR and points to the link between security and development as it underlines that SSR is a key component of the broader "human security agenda". Other organizations such as NATO, OSCE, World Bank, African Union, ECOWAS or UNDP are also increasingly involved in security-related activities in post-conflict development and work on their own SSR concepts. Given the irreplaceable role of regional organizations in promoting global peace and security and the need to tackle SSR from a regional angle, it would be worthwhile, if not necessary, to apply their expertise and practical experience in shaping universal understanding of SSR in the UN and *vice versa*. However, we still need to look at what the UN can learn from other intergovernmental organizations, particularly regional organizations such as ECOWAS and the OSCE. We should also discuss the experience of both donor and recipient countries as well as non-governmental organizations involved in SSR activities and assess the conceptual work of other international actors in this field, notably the OECD and EU.

In conclusion, let me admit that we fully appreciate that developing a SSR policy within the UN is a challenge that will take much more time than our two-year membership in the UN Security Council. Following this workshop, after summer recess, we plan to hold a series of roundtables in New York devoted to discussion of specific aspects of SSR with the overall aim to prepare sufficient background material for the ministerial meeting of the UN Security Council on this topic in course of our presidency in February or March 2007. Obviously, we are going to keep our feet on the ground and not expect miracles. Nevertheless, we believe that promoting discussion of SSR is an avenue worth exploring further.

The victims of conflicts and those suffering the long-term misery of bad governance, corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability deserve better results from the international community, in particular more efficient and effective implementation

of SSR programmes and reconstruction of functioning states after conflicts. Let's spare no effort in meeting their expectations. The Outcome Document from last year's summit in New York commits us *inter alia* to helping states build the capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assist those countries that are at risk of conflict, as well as those in which conflict has already broken out. Developing and implementing a comprehensive SSR framework is the right step toward increasing our capacity to honour these obligations.

Many thanks for your attention.

**Tomáš Valášek**  
Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic

Your Excellencies, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my pleasure to welcome you in Bratislava on behalf of the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic. Today's workshop is the first in a series of discussions aimed at developing a comprehensive UN concept on Security Sector Reform. I don't need to tell this audience that there is no single universal model of the security sector because each region and each country has a different starting point and different needs. There are, however, a few universally valid guiding principles, and central among them is the presence in the military of a professional and well-educated officer corps, thoroughly steeped in ethics and in leadership skills. I mention it because today, the two Slovak military academies, both located in Liptovský Mikuláš in beautiful central Slovakia, inaugurate a new class of such officers, who will be the backbone of the modern, professional Slovak military. The graduation ceremony is therefore an important step in the continued reform of Slovak Armed Forces. Sadly, the downside for us is that the Defence Minister is not with us today as he is personally chairing the ceremonies. As he indicated at the conference yesterday evening, he wishes the participants much success and sends his message, which I will deliver on his behalf.

In too many countries of this world, an unreformed security sector impedes stability, peace and development. Security personnel, the very guardians and custodians of stability, too often fall short of the expectations laid on them or, worse, become a liability instead. Security sector reform – the process of building an effective, accountable and responsible security force – therefore becomes an indispensable tool of both conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization. It is Slovakia's honour and, at the same time, great responsibility to use our upcoming presidency of the UN Security Council to help make the United Nations, the world's leading authority in conflict prevention, conflict management and sustainable development efforts, a more effective actor in security sector reform as well.

In doing so, we plan to build on the deep and broad body of experience already vested in the United Nations. Whether it is in Africa or elsewhere, it is to the United Nations that people look for expertise and leadership with security sector reform. Through years of experience, the many agencies of and associated with the UN have built up considerable know-how, which will be the subject of our discussions today. It will also, logically and necessarily, serve as the starting point for future deliberations on ways to strengthen UN's role in security sector reform.

It goes without saying that for every conflict prevention or resolution measure, general principles must be tailored for specific security contexts. Security sector reform is a process. The starting point – what we reform from – and the end point – what we reform toward – depend on the needs and the abilities of the individual region. History, development, politics, economics and social realities on the ground – all these various factors shape the substance of SSR in different regions of the world. Our ambition is to add to the discussions on SSR to date by charting the many different faces reform assumes in different parts of the planet and to provide guidance on how to best channel our future efforts depending on the lessons-learned and the specifics of each individual target state. Our hope is nothing less than to

empower the UN to act more quickly, effectively and efficiently in security sector reform. That, in a nutshell, is the main value added of the Slovak initiative.

Allow me to touch briefly on the specific value the Ministry of Defence adds to our efforts. Slovakia has gone a long way from a state trapped on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain to the vibrant democracy that it is today, with an active civil society, a functioning market economy and a history of peaceful political change, the last round of which, as all of you no doubt noted already, occurred only a few days ago. Early on in this transition, Slovakia recognised the need for the reform of our own security sector. Through years of effort and thanks, in no small measure, to help from our friends, we successfully transformed a Warsaw-pact military into a modern, accountable and effective security force that it is now.

Today, Slovakia exports its know-how in security sector reform to countries that need it as much as we did those ten or fifteen years ago. Our experience is fresh, it is broad and – as we are finding out – it is also in demand. Today, the Defence Ministry's experts travel around the world, advising young democracies in South Caucasus, Western Balkans and elsewhere on how to learn from our successes and how to avoid our mistakes. We advise on Ukraine's defence sector reform and train Ukrainian junior staff officers in the Partnership for Peace training centre in northern Slovakia. In Afghanistan, our officers train the Afghan armed forces, and the list goes on.

We do not assume that our experience is universal and clearly some of it would be of relatively limited use in other parts of the world. The UN's brief is truly global and our national experience as such is only one stone in the larger mosaic of the security sector reform debate that we are launching today. However, we do stand ready to contribute our experience where it is needed for the UN to form a broad picture of SSR in its various forms and, naturally, the Ministry of Defence will continue to provide its expert advice where it is relevant and where it is demanded.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Last but perhaps most importantly, let me express our gratitude for your willingness to personally contribute to our discussions today. Your involvement is an absolutely indispensable part of our efforts to advance and to hone our thinking on the role of the UN in incorporating security sector reform in its architecture, its projects and its cooperation with other international organizations, states and NGOs. We are at the very beginning of this process; therefore, it is our hope to continue this dialogue and to develop our thinking on this issue throughout the year. Your opinion, expertise and experience are not only welcome but highly appreciated.

Once again, thank you for coming, and I hope you have a fruitful debate and a pleasant stay in Bratislava.

Thank you.

# **THEMATIC PRESENTATIONS**



# Who's Who Intergovernmentally in SSR?

David M. Law  
DCAF

SSR programmes tend to be driven by external actors. These comprise national governments in their capacity as development donors; non-governmental organisations, whether local, national, regional or global in their origins or range of activity; private military and security companies; and regional and global intergovernmental organisations, the focus of this paper.

Intergovernmental organisations have assumed increasingly important responsibilities in shaping the SSR agenda. They have played a central role in designing and delivering programmes for reform in several countries, and a number of them have developed, or are in the process of developing, policy frameworks to guide their various SSR activities.

There is a broad range of intergovernmental organisations whose activities fall under the rubric of SSR. Accordingly, the concept has been shaped by a variety of policy experiences.

These organisations

- tend to approach SSR from either a development (e.g., World Bank), security (e.g., NATO) or democratic governance perspective (e.g., Council of Europe);
- have a global (e.g., UNDP, UNDPKO, World Bank), regional (e.g., African Union) or sub-regional focus (e.g., ECOWAS);
- may be active in field activities such as capacity building and technical assistance (e.g., Stability Pact), norm development (e.g., OECD) or both (e.g., OSCE); and
- may concentrate on SSR in different country contexts: developing, transition, post-conflict and developed.

*Table 1. Typology of IGO Involvement in SSR*

|                          |                  |              |              |
|--------------------------|------------------|--------------|--------------|
| <i>thematic approach</i> | development      | security     | governance   |
| <i>geographic focus</i>  | global           | regional     | sub-regional |
| <i>instruments</i>       | field activities | norm-setting | both         |
| <i>country contexts</i>  | developing       | transition   | developed    |

Some international organisations, such as the EU and the UN, bring together all or almost all of the elements mentioned above. Most intergovernmental organisations deal only with developing and/or transition countries, which in some cases are also post-conflict environments. Some international organisations are also concerned with SSR in developed countries, but there are as yet no SSR programmes explicitly elaborated for mature democracies.

The fact that SSR has been shaped by a variety of policy experiences has a number of implications. Intergovernmental organisations can be active in a range of SSR activities, but may not recognise these as forming part of the SSR agenda, either because of a lack of familiarity with the concept and/or the absence of an overarching framework for their SSR programmes. SSR definitions and approaches can vary considerably from organisation to organisation; for example, the OECD uses the term *security system reform* while the UNDP prefers *justice and security sector reform*, reflecting the specific concerns of individual organisations. Until very recently, intergovernmental organisations focusing on security and development had little contact with one another, despite the fact that in the 1990s they found themselves increasingly involved in the same countries and regions. Within individual organisations, the material, administrative and personnel resources required for SSR activities may not be organised in a way that is conducive to pursuing the holistic approach that is at its core.

In view of these considerations, intergovernmental organisations face several challenges in shaping and implementing their SSR agendas.

One challenge is to elaborate a SSR concept that effectively gives an overarching framework and orientation to the range of SSR activities in which the intergovernmental organisation is involved. This is essential if SSR programmes are to be conceived and implemented in a comprehensive manner.

Second, if such policy frameworks are to be effective they need to be supported by robust implementation guidelines. These should be based on an in-depth understanding of how SSR has been approached in different country and regional environments. Additionally implementation guidelines should consider which policies have worked well in different contexts and settings and why some policies have been more successful than others.

Third, in order to carry out effective SSR activities, international organisations may have to review the way the human and material resources at their disposal are organised, as well as their internal procedures. The cross-cutting nature of SSR programmes may necessitate bringing together expertise from various departments, some of which may not be accustomed to working together. Financial instruments available to international organisations may have to be consolidated to ensure that sufficient resources can be brought to bear. Different skill sets, greater multi-disciplinary experience and new kinds of managerial, sector and country expertise may also be required for SSR work. This can have repercussions for recruitment and training policies.

Fourth, it is necessary to ensure that intergovernmental organisations can work synergistically together, both in the field and at home. In addition they need to be able to collaborate effectively with other entities engaged in SSR, for example, the national governments and non-governmental actors mentioned above. Such multi-actor involvement puts a premium on effective cross-jurisdictional communication, coordination and cooperation. To overcome



inefficiencies caused by compartmentalisation of responsibilities and to instil a sense of joint-stakeholdership of programmes, innovative approaches may be required. International organisations may need to take inspiration from the "joined-up government" approaches practiced by a number of national governments, whereby ministries of defence, foreign affairs and development come together to implement SSR.

Finally, international organisations have a responsibility to ensure that their SSR activities are carried out in a transparent and accountable manner. This can be particularly challenging where oversight is weak or only indirectly exercised by member states. Demonstrating openness and responsiveness to stakeholders is critically important for the overall legitimacy and credibility of SSR programmes.

The following table gives the SSR profile of the major intergovernmental actors playing a role in SSR.

**Table 2. Main Features of IGO Involvement in SSR**

| <b>Intergovernmental Organisation</b>          | <b>SSR Focus</b>   | <b>Geographical Scope</b>                  | <b>Country Contexts</b>  |
|--|--|--|--|
| <i>AU</i>                                      | Norm development   | Regional/<br>Africa                        | Developing, post-conflict  |
| <i>Council of Europe</i>                       | Capacity-building and technical assistance<br>Norm development | Regional/<br>Europe                        | Post-conflict, transition  |
| <i>ECOWAS</i>                                  | Norm development   | Regional/<br>West Africa                   | Developing, post-conflict  |
| <i>EU</i>                                      | Capacity-building and technical assistance<br>Norm development | Global                                     | Developing, post-conflict, transition; developed through members' ESDP activities                          |
| <i>NATO</i>                                    | Capacity-building and technical assistance<br>Norm development | Regional/<br>Euro-Atlantic                 | Developing, post-conflict, transition; developed countries as concerns defence reform                      |
| <i>OECD DAC</i>                                | Norm and policy development                                    | Global                                     | Developing, post-conflict, transition  |
| <i>OSCE</i>                                    | Capacity-building and technical assistance<br>Norm development | Regional/<br>Euro-Atlantic &<br>Euro-Asian | Developing, post-conflict, transition; developed countries as concerns norm development and implementation |
| <i>Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe</i> | Capacity-building & technical assistance                       | Regional/<br>Western Balkans               | Post-conflict, transition  |
| <i>UN &amp; agencies</i>                       | Capacity-building & technical assistance                       | Global                                     | Developing, post-conflict, transition  |
| <i>World Bank</i>                              | Capacity-building & technical assistance                       | Global                                     | Developing, post-conflict, transition  |



# OECD Approach to Security Sector Reform

Graham Thompson  
OECD DAC

## 1. Security System Reform

Security sector reform is a tool for conflict prevention and peacebuilding requiring a developmental approach and whole-of-government/organisation engagement.

## 2. The DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC)

The CPDC is the international forum that brings together conflict prevention and peacebuilding experts from bilateral and multilateral development agencies, including the UN system, EC, IMF and World Bank.

Experts meet to define and develop common approaches to help prevent conflict and support peace. The CPDC is a subsidiary group of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of bilateral and multilateral donors and has a Security System Reform Task Team.

## 3. Major CPDC Instruments and Main Policy Documents

*The DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance endorsed by Development Ministers and Agency Heads (2004):*

- highlight the importance of partner-country led, integrated reform of security systems with support from donor governments or organisations through cooperation among development and security communities;
- support developing countries in providing security to their people and help stabilise fragile, conflict-affected states; and
- provide basic principles for a people-centred approach to achieving the *democratic governance* of the security system.

The DAC Guidelines *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (2001)* have guided work in this field for nearly half of a decade.

## 4. Why is security and justice important?

Security and justice is fundamental to reducing poverty, protecting human rights and supporting sustainable development.

The poor themselves identify security as a priority concern and suffer most from a poorly governed, unaccountable and incapable security sector.

We need both security and development – not a trade-off of one against the other.

Security for whom? The security of states and the security of people are not the same thing but are mutually dependant. This underlines the importance of access to justice.

Insecurity in one country can have a significant impact on neighbouring countries and beyond.

## **5. The Security & Development See-saw**

“Development is the indispensable foundation for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously. It is the key to meeting almost every level of threat.”

*Report of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2005*

“Security is an all-encompassing condition in which citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights...Stability and development are regarding as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing ”

*South African Defence White Paper 1996*

## **6. Conflict Prevention is Better than a Cure: Why Tools like SSR are Needed**

Cost of Conflict: A World Bank study has estimated that the benefit of averting a typical civil war is \$54 billion.

Return to Conflict: there is a significant chance that a country that has suffered a conflict will revert into conflict within a ten-year period.

Low Income Countries are fifteen times more likely to enter into conflict than OECD countries.

A recent UK Study (by Bradford University) estimated that \$1 spent on conflict prevention saved \$4 in post-conflict reconstruction.

## **7. Security System Reform**

As articulated by the DAC, SSR covers three inter-related challenges facing all states:

- developing a clear institutional framework for the provision of security and justice that integrates security, justice and development policy and includes all relevant actors;
- strengthening the governance of security and justice institutions and ensuring that they are accountable to civil authorities; and
- building professional security and justice institutions capable of upholding the rule of law and providing timely access to justice.

## **8. Security and Justice System Family Tree**

The security system includes the police, justice and penal sectors, as well as the military and mechanisms for internal-external and parliamentary oversight.

## **9. Overcoming the current deficit regarding operational strategies for SSR**

The DAC is developing an Implementation Framework on Security System Reform (IF-SSR) to:

- operationalise *DAC Guidelines on SSR and Governance*;
- help guide, co-ordinate, align, monitor and evaluate donor SSR field activities and provide advice/good practice/experience on preparing the ground (politics!), assessment, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and sector specifics;
- respond to the clear need for greater coherence in the international community and between bilateral and multilateral organisations;

Currently, it is planned to test the IF-SSR in 2007-8 as a potential co-ordination mechanism between bilateral and multilateral agencies in the field.

## **10. Key Issues to be Addressed in Improving Donor Support for SSR**

- SSR is a political process requiring a developmental approach supported by technical inputs.
- Local ownership must be the point of departure.
- Context is everything.
- SSR requires whole of government coherence.
- Although it is discussed at the strategic/conceptual level, SSR is supported at the tactical level in the field.
- It is necessary to prepare technical advisers with political, developmental and contextual sensitivity and understanding.
- The complexity of SSR demands more comprehensive assessments and improved approaches to monitoring and evaluation.
- There is a need for improved donor coordination/harmonisation.

## **11. Post-conflict Environment**

- role of peace agreements
- peace support operations
- DDR
- transitional justice
- sequencing (stabilisation or development)
- SALW programmes

## **12. Mainstreaming SSR into other Development and Security Processes**

*Key message:* Security and justice should be viewed as public goods and treated as a service delivery issue. Work with non-state actors is crucial.

- Include SSR in:
  - PRSPs / National Development Strategies
  - UN Integrated Mission Planning Frameworks
  - TRM's
  - Public Expenditure Reviews
  - Public Sector Reforms
  - Mainstream in & with Governance and Rule of Law Communities

## **13. Issues to Consider for Next Generation of SSR Missions and UN Links**

- Ensuring coherence between short-term needs (securing the peace) and long-term engagement (ensuring accountability).
  - The UN should strive for coherence across its various instruments/agencies including DPKO, UNDP, DPA, etc. and develop an institutional policy to support field level operations.
  - Greater coherence is needed in OECD governments (i.e. defence development, diplomatic, intelligence, commercial interests).
  - Greater linkages between SSR, PSO, DDR, TJ and SALW are key.
  - The integration of SSR into peace agreements can help to effectively deal with one of the root causes of conflict.
- The UNSC could consider an overarching strategy for SSR a a key tool for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

## **14. Useful Web Links**

DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC)  
[www.oecd.org/dac/conflict](http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict)

DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance  
[www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/ssr](http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/ssr)

DAC Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict  
[www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/preventionguidelines](http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/preventionguidelines)

DAC Fragile States Group (FSG)  
[www.oecd.org/dac/fragilestates](http://www.oecd.org/dac/fragilestates)

# Lessons Learned from the Field

Lamberto Zannier  
OSCE

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to begin by thanking the organisers of this event for the opportunity to address its participants on behalf of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC). I consider it an honour and a privilege to be here today and I am glad to be able to share with you the OSCE's experience on this important subject. The audience I am addressing today is quite familiar with this issue, which makes my task both easier and more difficult at the same time.

The OSCE is involved extensively in Security Sector Reform (SSR) activities in the field, mainly through its eighteen field operations. The nature of this engagement varies depending on the operation. In some cases, it is the result of division of roles among international organizations operating in a post-conflict environment, for instance, in Bosnia-Herzegovina or FYRoM. In other cases, our initiatives were driven mainly by the needs and the requests of the host states, which decided to benefit from the substantial *acquis* of the organization in the politico-military field and from its expertise in areas such as policing or border management.

While there is no single OSCE umbrella concept on SSR, over the years the organization has developed a number of commonly shared principles and concepts which, taken together, provide sufficiently firm guidance for the development of activities of assistance on the ground. These include, in the first instance, the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, which codifies *inter alia* the principle of democratic control over military and internal security forces. There are also a number of other relevant documents. The decision on an OSCE common Concept for Border Security and Management adopted at the Ljubljana Ministerial Council last December has given us firm ground on which to base our future activities of assistance in the field of border management, security and cross-border cooperation. The many documents and decisions regarding SALW and conventional ammunition have created a very precise framework for activities of assistance in this respect. The internal debates on various police assistance programmes have resulted in several tailor-made assistance activities that take into account the specific requirements of individual participating states. Lastly, the various mandates for our field operations set out clear parameters for their engagement in SSR activities.

## **Spreading normative concepts: the role of the Code of Conduct**

The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security is one of the most important normative documents adopted by OSCE-participating states since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. It should be seen as the key OSCE contribution to developing a concept for security sector reform. The key areas covered by the document include:

- respect for and adherence to existing UN and OSCE principles reaffirmed in the Code, such as the concept of comprehensive security, the sovereign equality of all states and

- commitments to arms control, disarmament and confidence and security-building measures;
- consolidating efforts to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms;
  - developing legislation and procedures governing the democratic control of armed forces both in peacetime and in war;
  - exercising democratic political (parliamentary) oversight through the constitutionally established authority and institutions not only on the military but also on internal security and paramilitary forces;
  - modifying internal regulations for the use of armed forces, including the principle of parliamentary approval of all types of missions to which armed forces or internal security forces might be assigned;
  - developing and exercising procedures for stationing armed forces on the territory of other states;
  - providing military information to the public, as well as creating procedures for public access to the information related to the armed forces or internal security forces;
  - ensuring that defence policies and military doctrines are consistent with international law; and
  - ensuring the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of armed forces personnel.

The political changes that occurred in the OSCE area pose an additional challenge for participating states in reforming their security sector. Guidance in reforming the security sector of states is needed, particularly during periods of transition. Civilian oversight has an even more special significance today than ever before. In this context, the Code of Conduct is regarded as an effective tool in promoting democratic control of armed and security forces. However, in the absence of a monitoring mechanism, interpretation and implementation of the Code is a matter for national governments. It is very difficult for the OSCE as a whole to become involved in judgements about whether or not individual participating states are fulfilling their obligations as laid down in the Code.

Regional and national seminars and workshops have proven to be a useful tool for promoting the objectives of the Code of Conduct in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans. These events were a part of a CPC project implemented in 2002-2003 jointly with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly aimed at promoting the parliamentary oversight of the military. In fact, working with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is an excellent way to promote awareness among legislators.

Beyond the Code, the OSCE comprehensive concept of security encompassing the politico-military, human, economic and environmental dimensions has proven to be a very good basis for the development of concrete and coherent sets of policies addressing SSR. The activities conducted by OSCE field operations best reflect this co-operative, comprehensive approach.

### **Putting the Concepts into Practice: the Experience of OSCE Field Operations**

Common to new and old threats alike is that bad governance, especially in the security sector, tends to exacerbate insecurity whereas good governance generally makes threats more manageable. Reforms of the security sector implemented by the OSCE field missions therefore go well beyond defence reform with the aim to integrate the entire security sector



into a web of well-functioning democratic institutions.<sup>3</sup> The OSCE traditionally has pursued a holistic, governance-oriented approach as supported by the OECD/DAC, aiming to strengthen the capacity of security actors and their internal governance.

Let me give you a few examples:

*Building capable and professional security forces:*

- In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the OSCE has provided assistance in reforming the country's defence structures. As a result of this assistance, the authorities have introduced a new doctrine of command and control, established a modern intelligence service and enhanced the capacity of parliament for democratic control.
- The OSCE is assisting police reform in Albania, Croatia, FYROM, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro and Serbia and has police assistance activities or programmes in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan. Special emphasis is given to developing community policing skills, particularly in South-East Europe. For example, the Kosovo Police Service School trains officers in the practices and principles of democratic policing and human rights, including modern techniques to deal with domestic violence, awareness in human trafficking and community policing. Many of the instructors are local KPS officers who themselves went through the training course. To create a sustainable police service, the officers were instructed on supervision and management techniques.

*Supporting disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration:*

Examples of OSCE activities range from surplus weapon collection and safe storage programmes to stockpile management training for security forces. These include, for instance:

- Programmes addressing SALW and conventional ammunitions in Belarus and mine action in Tajikistan.
- Destruction or processing of highly toxic "Mélange" missile fuel in Armenia, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.
- Support to the Ukrainian government in its efforts to professionalise its armed forces. The Project Co-ordinator, together with NATO, initiated activities aimed at reintegrating former military personnel into civilian life, providing the necessary job skills for the transition.
- Similarly, in Moldova, the mission is currently in discussions with the Moldovan authorities concerning military conversion and the reintegration of military personnel into civilian life as part of a wider programme of defence reform. In an interesting development, the Moldovans have said that they would be ready to accept Transdniestrian personnel in the same programme, though the actual launching of the programme could still take some time.

*Border issues:*

The OSCE carries out a wide array of activities aimed at strengthening the capacities of border guards. The recently adopted OSCE Concept on Border Security and Management codifies the potential OSCE engagement in this area.

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<sup>3</sup> The OECD defines SSR as building "legitimate and accountable systems of security to prevent violent conflict". See the DAC Reference Document, 2004. Accordingly, SSR includes issues such as promoting transparency, the rule of law, accountability and public information on security issues, and reinforcing legislative capacity for adequate democratic oversight.

- Following the closure of the ambitious yet successful Border Monitoring Operation in Georgia, the OSCE has developed a Georgian Border Guard Capacity-Building Programme. Before the end of this year, the GBG will move to a fully contracted service. Conscription will be ended and the current annual number of 1,500 conscript Border Guards will be replaced by 400 long-term, contracted professionals.
- In South East Europe, in the framework of the EU CARDS project, the OSCE helped to train border police, e.g., in pre-screening asylum seekers and migrants (in cooperation with UNHCR and IOM). Cross-border workshops involved participants from throughout the South-East European region.<sup>4</sup>
- In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the OSCE assisted the Ministry of Interior with the basic training of the border police by contributing to curriculum development and the creation of practical training exercises and by developing the capacity of the Ministry's training team. The new border police is expected to cooperate and develop long-term relationships with local communities along the border, which is an important part of effective border management and security in general.
- In Kyrgyzstan the OSCE Centre implements projects to prevent tensions in border areas related to the use of land, water or disputes between residents and border guards through mediation, dialogue and negotiation processes in partnership with local NGOs.
- In Uzbekistan and in Turkmenistan, several hundred State Border and State Customs Service officials underwent basic training on border management and its operational aspects (document fraud, procedures for interdicting illicit trafficking of arms and drugs).

*Rule of law:*

The rule of law is at the foundation of the conflict-prevention role at the core of the OSCE mandate. Establishing the rule of law requires not just law enforcement capacity- and institution-building, but comparable and synchronised improvements across the entire criminal justice sector. The new paradigm requires shifting priority attention to crime prevention rather than detection, since protecting a person from becoming a victim of crime represents the ultimate effort to protect a basic human right.

- The OSCE supports "confidence building" processes in Kyrgyzstan since the March 2005 events, facilitating a dialogue process between law enforcement bodies and the population after both confronted each other during the events. The Centre in Bishkek also organised initiatives such as school visits of police officers or open-door events at the police stations. This allowed the police to resume its work and patrol again in uniform, as well as some discussions about human rights to be conducted.
- In South-East Europe the OSCE has facilitated inter-state cooperation on war crimes proceedings and meetings among judges, prosecutors and government officials. Supported by OSCE missions, countries of the region continue to take encouraging steps toward inter-state judicial cooperation on war crimes trials, including prosecutorial cooperation. OSCE efforts also aim at strengthening the judicial sector in each of the mission host countries.
- The Belgian Chairmanship has made combating organised crime one of their priorities for their term.

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<sup>4</sup> Serbia and Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo/Serbia and Montenegro, Montenegro/Serbia and Montenegro and Greece.

## **The OSCE's Concept of Regional Security Cooperation**

Many of the European security challenges are interconnected and carry regional implications, e.g., trafficking, small arms proliferation, organised crime, etc. A trans-boundary, co-operative way, therefore, is the most effective means of tackling them.

OSCE field operations co-ordinate with one another and other organizations to support regional initiatives in key areas such as trans-border cooperation and human security (in the area of refugee return).

In a very practical sense, SSR is an opportunity to make national security systems compatible with one another and more effective in addressing threats and challenges of a regional nature. Small arms proliferation is an example of a problem that is best addressed in a regional context.

## **Challenges**

Strengthening democratic governance in the security sector is a highly political activity and cannot be addressed by technical assistance alone. Activities in this field require a profound understanding of the situation in the partner country (political relationships among key actors, how and why decisions are made, incentives and resistances to change). This creates a number of challenges for external actors offering assistance in SSR. In addition, direct support options are often limited in practice due to restrictive mandates, legislation or long-standing practices of many support actors. Restrictions of this kind make partnerships among external actors ever more necessary if partner countries are to be supported purposefully in their reform efforts.

## **Cooperation with international partners**

With this in mind, the OSCE has further developed a close interaction with other international actors engaged in this field. Cooperation between the OSCE and the various UN agencies (UNHCR in Kyrgyzstan, UNDP through the ENVSEC programme in the Caucasus or the MOU on the implementation of SALW-related projects) has become increasingly intensive over the last few years. The OSCE mission in Kosovo is structurally part of the UN mission as its institution-building pillar. This is conducive to close co-ordination of policy and tasks through mechanisms such as working groups, task forces and regular board meetings.

The OSCE works closely with the European Union on issues such as judicial reform, police reform, democratization, institution building, human rights and refugee return especially in SEE, but increasingly also in other regions. On many of these issues also our interaction with the Council of Europe has become more operational. The development of integrated border management strategies in the SEE region has been an area of intense cooperation with both the EU and NATO as well as with the Stability Pact, e.g., within the Ohrid Process on border security and management.

Cooperation with NATO continues to focus *inter alia* on supporting SSR and governance, as well as security provision by NATO for OSCE operations.

## Working principles – tried and tested

In conclusion, based on the OSCE work on security sector reform, I would set out the following policy recommendations:

1. First, a *clear vision of reform goals* is crucial in keeping reforms on track. In the security field, the OSCE politico-military commitments should be kept in mind in determining those goals.
2. Second, *political will* is essential. Countries cannot wait for external actors to make the decision for change for them, but need to have the courage and political will to make an effort themselves.
3. Third, the interconnections of reforms are best accommodated within a *comprehensive approach* to security. This applies especially to the security field, where military-technical reforms need to be connected to overall security sector reform. The OSCE offers a suitable framework that may help to structure thinking about how to address diverse security challenges through integrated reform processes.
4. Fourth, maintaining a strong *field presence* has proven essential when assisting in the implementation of reform goals. Reforms in the security sector, which touch on politically sensitive values and institutions of sovereignty, require especially trustful relationships that cannot be built quickly or at a distance.
5. Fifth, *flexible planning and operations* are necessary. Assistance policies need to adapt quickly to new roles and tasks as the demand for them arises on the ground.
6. Finally, *coordination among international actors themselves* crucially affects and determines the quality of inter-state security cooperation.

From an OSCE perspective, these are some basic requirements for successful security cooperation, which I look forward to discussing with you further in this session.

Thank you for your attention.

# UN Approaches to SSR – an Overview

Heiner Hänggi  
DCAF

The purpose of this presentation is to give an overview of current approaches of the United Nations (UN) to security sector reform (SSR). This is a rather under-researched topic to say the least. My remarks are therefore preliminary and tentative in nature. I will touch upon three points:

- the UN policy framework relevant to SSR,
- UN actors involved in SSR and
- areas of UN support to SSR.

Before doing so, let me briefly underline five key features of SSR that we have to keep in mind when talking about this relatively new concept.

## Security Sector Reform (SSR) – Key Features

First, the SSR agenda favours a *holistic approach*. Not only does it cover the military dimension of security but also non-military ones. It provides a framework for defence reform as well as reforms in other parts of the security sector such as the police and judicial institutions. Furthermore, it links measures aimed at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the security forces to overriding concerns of good governance. Consequently, reforms aimed solely at modernising and professionalising the security forces, and thereby increasing their capacity without ensuring their democratic accountability, are not consistent with the SSR concept. Finally, SSR is a holistic concept because it includes civil society actors and armed non-state actors as component parts of the security sector.

Second, SSR is a *normative concept*. As already mentioned, SSR is aimed not only at increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the security forces, but also at improving the governance of the security sector as a whole in accordance with democratic standards.

Third, SSR is a *multi-purpose* concept, reflecting a wide range of rationales for reform. The growing relevance of the SSR concept is driven by the understanding that an unreformed security sector represents a decisive obstacle to the promotion of sustainable development, democracy and, last but not least, peace and security. These cross-sectoral or multi-purpose characteristics make the SSR approach both innovative and promising while at the same time rendering it highly demanding in terms of conceptualisation and implementation.

Fourth, SSR is *context-specific*. In principle, each country engaged in SSR constitutes a special case and hence a different reform context. Consequently, the way SSR is approached and implemented very much depends on whether a country finds itself in a long-term democratisation process, in transition from war to peace or in a post-conflict setting. Another important contextual factor is the regional security environment, where regional organisations can play an important role as a facilitator of reforms in general and SSR in particular.

Finally, SSR is a long-term undertaking and requires substantial resources. Consequently, SSR tends to be externally assisted. This necessarily results in tensions between external donors and local stakeholders. Finding a balance between international good practice in this area and domestic political cultures is a key requirement for successful SSR. At the same time, one has to be aware that this *inherent tension* between external assistance and local ownership is not amenable to easy solutions.

### **UN Policy Framework Relevant to SSR**

The SSR concept cuts across major international and domestic policy areas, ranging from peace and security to economic and social development, human rights, rule of law and democratisation. This can also be observed in the case of the United Nations, which does not come as a surprise given the UN's broad and global mandate.

Certainly, UN policies focusing on maintaining and promoting peace are most closely concerned with SSR. This applies particularly to peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, which are the UN's major policy and operational areas for supporting SSR. Take, for example, complex peacekeeping operations which increasingly have explicit or implicit responsibilities in SSR, particularly in the areas of police reform. Or take, for example, post-conflict peacebuilding. The centrality of SSR in post-conflict stabilisation and recovery is increasingly acknowledged within the UN system – including by the UN Security Council, which emphasised in July 2005 that SSR was an essential element of any stabilisation process in post-conflict environments. UNDP's work in the area of justice and security sector reform with special emphasis on conflict prevention and recovery is another case in point.

Disarmament is another policy area relevant to SSR as evidenced by the importance of DDR – disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants – in many transition and post-conflict countries. The UN's efforts to stop the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) and in humanitarian demining are two additional examples of SSR-relevant activities in the context of disarmament. As noted by the UNSC, DDR, small arms and mine action are all closely related to SSR, particularly in post-conflict settings.

While policies focusing on maintaining and promoting peace are most closely concerned with SSR, policies related to the broader development agenda, the protection of human rights and the promotion of the rule of law and democracy are also SSR-relevant areas for the UN. This holds particularly true for development cooperation where UNDP plays a key role in promoting the SSR agenda. Furthermore, SSR is increasingly seen as an important issue from a gender perspective, particularly concerning the protection of women from violence and their participation in security sector institutions and policy formation.

### **UN Actors Involved in SSR**

UN institutions involved in SSR are already quite numerous, and it seems that their number is increasing. Take the UN Security Council, which has already expressed itself on the centrality of SSR for post-conflict peacebuilding. Also, the Security Council often calls for SSR and related activities in its resolutions concerning field missions but generally abstains from defining SSR in detail. Explicit SSR language can be found in mandates concerning MONUC,

UNMIL and UNAMA. The Security Council is a key body to be taken into account when thinking about developing a SSR concept for the UN.

The General Assembly and ECOSOC have been involved in SSR matters only marginally so far. The General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has been discussing SSR issues for a few years. In its most recent report, the Committee requested the Secretariat "to conduct a process of joint policymaking on SSR best practices" similar to the one undertaken on DDR. ECOSOC, on the other hand, does not have a direct mandate for SSR, but it does take up SSR through its Ad Hoc Group on African countries emerging from conflict. Also, INSTRAW, the training and research institute for the advancement of women established by ECOSOC, runs a "gender and security sector reform" programme.

Concrete SSR and related activities are carried out by a number of departments and offices of the UN Secretariat as well as by UN Programmes and Funds. As time does not permit me to go into details, I would just like to mention that DPKO and UNDP are the key actors in this regard. For more information, please refer to the two presentations that will follow as well as to the relevant DCAF background paper prepared for this workshop.

### **Areas of UN Support to SSR**

Finally, I would like to touch upon the key areas of UN support to SSR. There are, of course, various ways of differentiating between distinct areas of support to SSR. One way is to differentiate between:

- capacity-building activities to support security actors;
- activities aimed at enhancing democratic governance of the security sector; and
- SSR-related activities, particularly in post-conflict environments.

No systematic and comprehensive mapping of UN SSR activities has been carried out so far. However, some trends can be identified based on initial desk research DCAF conducted in view of the background paper previously mentioned. Accordingly, it seems that in recent years SSR activities have increased both in number and scope – though without these activities necessarily being attributed to the SSR concept.

It is probably safe to say that UN SSR activities in the framework of peace operations tend to privilege internal security sector capacity-building, particularly in the areas of justice and police reform, over activities aimed at improving security sector governance. In general, UN actors show a certain preference for SSR-related activities such as DDR, tackling the problem of child soldiers, curbing the proliferation of small arms, mine action and the establishment of the rule of law and transitional justice after conflict. Activities aimed at strengthening civil management and oversight mechanisms appear to be so few in number that no conclusive statement can be made except that UN support for parliamentary capacity-building and civil society empowerment is usually general in nature and rarely geared to the security sector. This may be an area where UN bodies could become more actively involved in SSR in the future.

## **Conclusion**

Let me conclude by saying that, although the UN has not developed a common and comprehensive SSR policy framework to date, SSR is very much on the agenda of the UN system.

First, given its broad definition and multi-purpose nature, the SSR concept cuts across a wide range of UN policy areas – from peace and security to development, human rights and the rule of law. There appears to be a strong consensus evolving within the UN system that SSR is central to post-conflict recovery.

Second, an increasing number of UN institutions are involved in one or another aspect of SSR. Various actors and agencies repeatedly refer to SSR or are supporting SSR but rarely define it. This seems to call for the development of a system-wide UN SSR concept, as difficult as this may be to achieve.

Third, in recent years, SSR and related activities supported by the UN system have increased both in number and scope. There is a certain bias in favour of justice and police reform, as well toward SSR-related activities in post-conflict settings. Here, there is certainly room for improvement in the sense that UN actors should strengthen their support for SSR activities relating to military and defence capacity-building as well as to the enhancement of civil management and oversight of the security sector.

Of the intergovernmental organisations involved in SSR, the UN is best placed to assist states in improving capacity and governance of the security sector through the promotion of a holistic SSR agenda. For this to happen, the UN should develop a common understanding of SSR – including a system-wide SSR policy or concept that would guide future UN SSR programmes and projects in a coherent, consistent and sustainable way.



# SSR and Democratic Consolidation

**Ben Slay**  
**UNDP**

Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure for me to participate in this very important meeting sponsored by the Government of Slovakia and the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control over Armed Forces (DCAF).

I would like to begin my remarks by extending greetings from Ms. Kathleen Cravero, Director of UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, who very much regrets her inability to participate in this very important meeting. I would also like to extend greetings from Mr. Kalman Mizsei, Director of UNDP's Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), who like all of us cares deeply about issues of human security and security sector reform (SSR) in this region.

As someone who has worked closely with the Government of Slovakia during the past five years to assist in Slovakia's transition from recipient to provider of development assistance, I congratulate the Government of Slovakia for using its Security Council tenure to help the UN to more clearly articulate its views on critical issues of security sector reform. As the director of UNDP's Bratislava Regional Centre, which hosts some 150 United Nations staff and which is working with DCAF to facilitate security sector reform in CIS countries,<sup>5</sup> I can confirm the importance of these issues in the field work undertaken by UNDP country offices in this area.

In order to better link conceptual issues associated with SSR to field perspectives on SSR, I would suggest the consideration of four key concepts:

- links between development and security;
- the external (donor-driven) versus domestic dimensions of SSR;
- the different characteristics of SSR in post-conflict and other countries; and
- the role of UN versus other actors in promoting SSR.

While international organisations recognise that development and security are public goods worthy of support, they also treat development and security as different things, both conceptually and in terms of their organisation structures. This separation reflects in part the historical legacies of the Cold War, when NATO governments conceptualised their relationships with the "Second World" in terms of security paradigms, and with the "Third World" in terms of development paradigms. The breakdown of this distinction that came with the end of the Cold War then gave rise to other separations. Security was most often linked to crisis prevention and the ensuing immediate post-crisis recovery; development was seen as

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<sup>5</sup> The publication *Democratising Security in Transition States* is one result of this partnership. It is available at [http://europeandcis.undp.org/?menu=p\\_cms/show&content\\_id=FA6ED584-F203-1EE9-B801763FDED0CFF6](http://europeandcis.undp.org/?menu=p_cms/show&content_id=FA6ED584-F203-1EE9-B801763FDED0CFF6).

relevant for countries not touched by conflict or for post-crisis countries long after the most pressing conflict-related issues had been solved.

The recent past has shown such distinctions between security and development to be neither accurate nor particularly helpful. As the Secretary General's *In Larger Freedom* report (2004)<sup>6</sup> points out, security and development are simply two sides of the same coin. Building on the work of UNDP's 1994 *New Dimensions in Human Development and Human Security* human development report,<sup>7</sup> *In Larger Freedom* shows that concerns about terrorism, national security and human security are shared by rich and poor countries alike. For middle- and low-income countries, at least minimal levels of human security – particularly in terms of post-conflict threats from small arms and light weapons, but also protection against socio-economic vulnerability and social exclusion – are preconditions for sustainable human development. Economic growth and human development are likewise extremely effective methods for preventing conflict, terrorism, and other threats to human and national security. This is why organisations like UNDP see SSR as compatible with, if not intrinsic to, our development mandate.

The other three dimensions of SSR mentioned above – its external (donor-driven) versus domestic dimensions, the different characteristics of SSR in post-conflict and non-post conflict countries and the role of UN versus other actors in promoting SSR – can perhaps be best understood historically with reference to the waves of democratic transition and consolidation that have affected the developing and post-communist world since the 1970s.<sup>8</sup> Originally limited to Southern Europe (e.g., Greece, Spain, Portugal) during the 1970s, these trends spread to Latin America in the 1980s as authoritarian *juntas* and populist strongmen gave way to multi-party electoral democracies. The collapse of the Soviet political system and its derivatives in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the 1990s marked another democratisation wave, one felt also in Southern Africa (with the end of apartheid) and East Asia (e.g., South Korea).

These political transitions were exceptionally diverse, with some of the most rapid and sustained progress occurring in the Central European countries (like Slovakia) that joined NATO and the European Union. Still, these democratic consolidation waves generally shared three common features worthy of emphasis in this context: (i) rapid and significant progress in establishing democratic control over security services;<sup>9</sup> (ii) parliaments, independent media, and civil society groups play critical roles, first in reforming security sectors and then in their subsequent oversight; and (iii) progress in SSR, as well as democratic consolidation as a whole, has been much less robust in countries that were touched by conflict.

These characteristics point to strong correlations between successful SSR cases, democratic consolidation, and the advent of conflict – positive in the former case, negative in the latter. That is, prospects for subjecting security services to democratic control are much better when SSR is part of a broader recasting of political institutions involving deeper changes in relationships between legislatures and executives, states and civil societies, and

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<sup>6</sup> Available at <http://www.unausa.org/atf/cf/{49C555AC-20C8-4B43-8483-2D4C1808E4E}/largerfreedom.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> Available at <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1994/en/>.

<sup>8</sup> See, for example, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986).

<sup>9</sup> The same can generally be said about civilian control over militaries. In the post-communist world, the fact that military institutions had generally been subordinated to the civilian authorities (i.e., the communist parties) in the pre-transition period made the continuation of this control relatively straightforward. Some post-communist countries that have experienced significant military conflicts since 1990s may constitute exceptions to this trend.

rulers and the ruled. When they are not accompanied by deeper changes, stand-alone SSR efforts are unlikely to succeed on their own. Likewise, by increasing the legitimacy of, resources available to and perceived importance of security services, conflict may significantly weaken prospects for successful SSR, even in otherwise democratising countries.

If correct, these correlations have three broad implications. First, countries undergoing profound democratic transitions are likely to “own” SSR; external support or pressures in such circumstances may be much less important (or even unnecessary). By contrast, elites in countries with spottier democratic credentials may place a smaller value on SSR *per se*. While weaker national ownership may increase the importance of external support or pressures, it may also significantly reduce the international community’s influence.

Second, since security services in post-conflict countries are likely to receive strong support from at least some important social/political/ethnic groups, the emergence of true “national ownership” of SSR in post-conflict countries would seem less likely.<sup>10</sup>

Third, since UN agencies have not generally played leading roles in democratic transitions, it is unrealistic to expect UN agencies to be the sole (or even main) actors facilitating SSR. Instead, history indicates that it is parliaments, independent media and civil society groups – supplemented by the courageous work of such international NGOs as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch – who do the heavy lifting when it comes to SSR. UN agencies might therefore be most effective in providing technical assistance, particularly in ensuring that SSR efforts in a given country are informed by best international practice.

In a nutshell, a cursory glance at experience from the field to date suggests that governments and their international partners seeking to bring meaningful change to the management and accountability of security services should keep a few simple rules in mind:

- ***Don’t do SSR as a stand-alone undertaking.*** SSR is most successful when part of broader (successful) efforts at democratisation and political reform.
- ***Don’t do SSR by yourself.*** Find like-minded allies, particularly in the NGO sector (both domestic and foreign), the independent media and in parliament.
- ***The regional context matters.*** Successful cases of SSR in Central Europe in the 1990s, as in Latin America in the 1980s, occurred in regions swept by democratising trends. Trans-national alliances among reformers can make the “infection of democracy” contagious across borders.
- ***Don’t have great hopes for SSR in post-conflict countries.*** Reform efforts and international assistance in such countries should instead be focused on more pressing relief, recovery, and community and area-based development problems.

Thank you very much for your attention.

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<sup>10</sup> In the limiting case, it may be unrealistic to expect broad “national ownership” of reforms that are perceived as being introduced at gunpoint by occupying powers.



# **Experience with SSR in Kosovo**

**Frode Mauring**  
**UNDP**

Chairman, good afternoon Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have been asked to speak to you today regarding the UN framework for security sector reform. I think it is important to begin by underlining the significance of someone representing the UN's Development Programme addressing this issue. Without security, there can be no development – a minimum level of security must exist in order for UNDP to deliver outputs in areas like governance, poverty reduction and environmental protection. In this sense, security is a precondition for development. Furthermore, security in its broadest sense is also itself an output of development work in that every effort made by an agency like UNDP advances the basic security of all people: their freedom from want and fear. Therefore Security Sector Reform is very much part of the development agenda.

Given that no over-arching concept of security sector reform has been adopted by the UN system, speaking of any “UN framework” is problematic. To a certain extent, the UN approach has been to “let a thousand flowers bloom,” to coin a phrase, and indeed the UN continues to struggle with a basic definition of what the term “security sector” entails. I would be pleased to share with you the experience of one UN agency, UNDP, in a particular post-conflict transitional context – Kosovo.

UNDP's approach to date in different countries around the world has been to situate security sector reform firmly within the human development context.

In Kosovo, UNDP has assumed a leading role through the Internal Security Sector Review process (ISSR). It is with some degree of pride that I am able to report that this process has been able to facilitate a relatively high level of institutional buy-in, transparency and public legitimacy, and I believe there are lessons to be learned from our experience by UNDP country offices and by the UN system more generally, but also by other SSR actors.

Where security sector reviews have been conducted in the past, they have been traditionally limited either in scope or methodology. In Northern Ireland, for instance, an international commission led by former British politician and future European commissioner Christopher Patten looked only at the issue of policing. A review process in Liberia was more comprehensive, but utilised a private US security firm for implementation and lacked both transparency and public ownership.

The ISSR project was formulated by the British Government's Security Sector Development Advisory Team and is influenced by the British take on security sector reform. Building on the sometimes painful experiences of security sector reform elsewhere, ISSR is characterised by its broad view and systematic efforts to reach out to citizens and communities as much as possible.

The nature of UNDP is such that it is based on voluntary contributions and also accepts project cost-sharing with donors. In the case of ISSR, more than half of the funding is from three bilateral donors.

From the outset, the process has been a collaborative initiative involving civil society, Kosovo's Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) and the international community. By creating a mixed team of Kosovar and international experts, it was ensured that local knowledge would match international expertise within the ISSR Secretariat. On top of this, while the secretariat is institutionally part of UNDP Kosovo, its Secretariat sits within the Prime Minister's Office of Public Safety ensuring local ownership. Similarly, ISSR research has involved inter-agency cooperation at an unprecedented scale, including the PISG, the UN Mission in Kosovo, the OSCE and civil society organisations including DCAF.

The ISSR process is divided into eight separate stages. The first two stages were to identify the internal and external threats and the strategic environment of Kosovo. These two stages were undertaken by DCAF and a local partner, KIPRED, and established the primary threats which Kosovo faces from a holistic ground-up perspective. Working together, DCAF and KIPRED were able to generate a meaningful baseline upon which the ISSR process could build. Stages 3, 4 and 5 of the process see the ISSR team assessing different parts of the Kosovo security architecture, conducting a gap analysis and identifying the needs and priorities that the Kosovo government will face in the post-status period. The ISSR team is drawing on the Copenhagen Criteria for EU integration and NATO standards as benchmarks for their recommendations. However, the most important benchmarks for the team's work are the views of the people of Kosovo.

An extensive outreach and consultation process runs parallel to ISSR's other activities. This may be the most innovative element of the project. ISSR utilises a wide range of mechanisms to engage the general public, including opinion polling, bill-boards, TV adverts, a telephone hotline and an interactive website. The OSCE through its municipal teams has supported ISSR consultations in every municipality within Kosovo. An ISSR-branded bus is currently touring Kosovo recording, both on video and in writing, the views of the general population. There have also been a series of radio and TV debates which cover security-related issues which are primarily intended to inform the population of the issues that the ISSR teams is addressing. All the information gathered will feed straight into the final ISSR report.

What has come out of ISSR is an unexpectedly complex understanding of the terms "security" and "security sector." Security sector reform tends to look at police, emergency preparedness and response, and territorial integrity. ISSR has taken the approach of examining a more citizen-centred conception of security. Time and again, when asked the people of Kosovo have told the ISSR team that the gravest threat to their security is not men in uniforms, but widespread unemployment.

Concerns about the poor economic situation and service delivery top the public's list of causes of insecurity. Defining the proper role of the police and the courts is crucial, but so is underlining the need for economic security and confidence in institutions. This emphasises my initial point that security sector reform must be understood within a broader development agenda, as both a precursor to and integral aspect of other poverty alleviation initiatives. In other words: it is both what you want to reform and what you want to factor in.

ISSR will deliver its recommendations to Kosovo's Assembly toward the end of this year. The recommendations are likely to include a blueprint for Kosovo's future security architecture, including management arrangements and the shape of a Kosovo defence force, as well as policy proposals for security providers and the social sphere. Already, we are seeing the emergence in Kosovo of new institutions reflecting readiness for the post-status period, like the Community Security Council that is formulating quick impact projects on employment and livelihoods for community stabilisation, as well as more traditional security concerns. Those challenges will play a commanding role in shaping Kosovo's future security landscape, and I believe ISSR's final recommendations will point the way toward effectively addressing them.

At the end I would say that the strong international administration still in place in Kosovo is a mixed blessing with many actors desiring to give their blueprint of SSR. Invariably that complicates rather than facilitates. At the end of the day, reform has to be the result of a holistic, multi-sectoral approach with an extensive consultative process with strong local ownership. UNDP in the field is well-placed to facilitate such an SSR process.





# Security Sector Reform in West Africa

André Nikwigize  
UNOWA

## 1. Outline

- West Africa: Economic and Political Overview
- Security Sector Reform and Challenges
- A New Agenda for the SSR in West Africa
- Conclusion

## 2. West Africa: Economic and Political Overview

- Population: 300 million inhabitants in 2005, of which more than 225 million (75%) are under 30 years-old. In 2020, it is estimated that 430 million inhabitants will be living in West Africa.
- Average population growth of 2.5%
- Fertility rate of 6.5 children per woman
- Economic growth of 5% per annum
- Political situation: For more than a decade and a half, the internal situation in most countries in West Africa has become increasingly volatile.
- On a positive note, peace is emerging progressively in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
- The situation in Cote-d'Ivoire is still not stable.
- Cross-border insecurity is of great concern.
- Several factors constitute threats to security: high unemployment, particularly among the youth, corruption, especially in the security forces, bad governance, weak economic performance.

## 3. Security Sector Actors

Institutions directly in charge of national security and law and order enforcement:

- National security: armed forces, including the army, the navy and the air forces
- Public order: the police, gendarmerie, intelligence services
- Paramilitary missions: customs, coastguards, border guards, reserve forces, civil defence forces

Institutions that, by their functions, are closely associated with the security sector:

- The administration of justice: prisons, courts, penitentiary centres
- The oversight of the security sector: parliamentary commissions, etc.
- The management of the security forces: ministerial departments such as defence
- The financing of the security sector: ministries of finance, budgeting affairs

#### **4. Security Sector Reform (SSR) is crucial to the building of a viable environment for peace, security and development in West Africa**

#### **5. Challenges of Armed and Security Forces in West Africa**

- Increasing deterioration of state institutions
- Continuous weakening of political authority
- Bad governance and corruption
- Perversion of military power
- Increasing deterioration of economic conditions
- Youth unemployment



#### **INSECURITY FOR STATES AND CITIZENS**

- Consequences:
  - Violent military seizures of power: West Africa has the highest rate of violent military seizures of power on the continent and the highest number of mutinies and alleged coup attempts
  - Wars and armed conflicts: leading to the involvement of armed forces in illicit and criminal activities: arms and drug trafficking, smuggling of natural resources, extortion at roadblocks, money laundering and banditry

SSR becomes a key contributing factor to conflict prevention, post-conflict recovery and peace-building.

The mission of the Security Council of July 2003 to West Africa (S/2003/688) recalls that “in each country which has been a source of instability in the subregion in recent years, the issue of the reform of the security sector is of paramount importance”.

#### **6. A New Agenda for the SSR in West Africa**

##### **A. Military reform**

- Organizing and modernizing armies and military forces (downsizing, equipment, ICT upgrading)
- Defining roles and assignments of various stakeholders
- Involve security forces in peace-building and humanitarian activities

##### **B. Addressing security issues through poverty reduction strategy papers**

- The issue of the well-being of security forces and improvement of their social conditions should be part of the reform: salary adjustments, constructing schools for military forces, fighting criminal activities
- Other areas identified by ECOWAS include: combating HIV/AIDS epidemics in West African Armed and Security Forces (WAASF), SSR and the administration of justice, SSR and the fight against criminal activities, conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Guinea Bissau, building on consensus and keeping SSR promises.

#### C. Involving development partners in the process

- Raising awareness among the donor community on the need to include security forces in poverty reduction and development strategies. Several times, armed and security forces have expressed their frustration with the fact that they are excluded from official development aid.
- Developing a dialogue with security forces on challenges of peace and security. It has been noted that processes relating to SSR do not involve the concerned parties.
- Defining capacity-building programmes for security forces through seminars, workshops, etc.

#### D. Building stronger and accountable political institutions and trust between security forces and the civil society

- Improve governance and fight corruption
- Build democratic states
- Establish confidence and trust between civil administration and security forces and maintain dialogue on issues of national interest

### **7. Conclusion**

While addressing the issue of Security Sector Reform it will be necessary to define a more pragmatic approach that targets the professionalism and modernization of security forces, but also builds confidence and trust between civil administration and security forces. Finally, the reform should address issues which are beyond purely military concerns and strive for constructive changes in the well-being of military and security forces.



## **CONCLUDING REMARKS**



## **Tomáš Valášek**

Acting Director, Department of Defence Policy, International Relations and Legislation, Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic

What I would like to do now is approach the question of UN Security Council's role in SSR from a distance, so to speak. I would like to ask what, on the basis of the presentations we heard today, are the general shortcomings in the international community's SSR efforts to date? Second, what can be done to strengthen the UN's role in general? And third, what about the specific role of the UN Security Council?

### **1) What are some of the general shortcomings in the international community's SSR efforts to date?**

David Law, in his presentation on the international organizations' role in SSR, put his finger on an interesting problem. Few organizations involved in SSR actually realise they are doing security sector reform. It reminds me of a quote by an unnamed US Senator, who, when asked what makes a particular television programme indecent, replied "I know indecency when I see it." Well, with SSR we seem to have the exact opposite problem – quite a few people and organizations are looking right at SSR, doing it on a daily basis, without necessarily recognizing their work as a part of SSR. That clearly is not a desirable state of affairs. Unless SSR forms a cohesive whole in our thinking it is impossible to coordinate between the international organizations, to properly sequence the various components of security sector reform or to fund SSR coherently.

That state of the affairs is changing – Christophe Deherre spoke to us eloquently about how the European Union is increasingly thinking of SSR as a separate, new tool for conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization, one based in large part on the work already being done but nevertheless a separate issue, presumably, to be planned, financed and implemented as such. Kelvin Ong mentioned similar work being done at UNDP with respect to the UN's DDR activities.

One other potential problem jumped out at me – when talking about SSR as a concept, we must take great care to distinguish between the different contexts in which reform might be undertaken. Context is all important – it dictates which areas of SSR we focus on as a priority, it dictates what kind of relationship the external actors form with the authorities of the target state – if any government, indeed, exists – and so on and so on. Context is indeed everything, and at least three very different types of environment come to mind – a post-communist, transitional situation; a failing or struggling state, and a failed state, most often after a conflict. Each model requires a different approach. To take just one example, the issue of ownership, which came up on several occasions today. Building a sense of ownership over SSR in the target country's government will be crucial in the post-communist model, where one is likely to deal with strong governments and strong militaries. It will be frankly less of an issue in post-conflict situations where no functioning governments may exist – to instil a sense of ownership one needs a government first that can assume that ownership, and as David Harland pointed out in his presentation, the UN often finds itself reforming the security sector in countries with no clearly identifiable authority or where the only authorities around may be the ones responsible for creating the conflict in the first place – ownership, in these

cases, simply cannot become our priority. It conclusion – we need to think of SSR as a unique concept but one that assumes many different forms, and as we, the Slovak government, proceed with our project we may want to think of defining the different models more clearly, distinguishing between the contexts.

## **2) What are some of the specific ways in which the UN can strengthen its own SSR activities?**

Here we have an excellent paper and presentation by Heiner Hänggi to fall back on, in which he described in great detail the various aspects of SSR-related work currently under way at the UN. The one obvious conclusion I drew from the presentation is that there is an awful lot going on, in fact, so much that, as Mr. Hänggi pointed out, the UN is probably the only organization which can deliver, with its own human resources, just about every aspect of what together we consider security sector reform. The sheer number of activities and actors involved in SSR at the UN brings the words “embarrassment of riches” to mind, although not necessarily in the financial sense.

The challenge is not necessarily to do more in the field but to do what is already being done in a more coherent, coordinated manner, and I am referring here not just to coordination between UN and other actors but often coordination between the agencies of the UN itself. We’ve already witnessed, in the third panel, a very useful interaction between two key UN actors on SSR, namely the Peacekeeping Department and UNDP, which attested to considerable degree of if not cooperation than at least some common thinking on SSR. I’ll be somewhat provocative here and pose the obvious question: does the organizational structure of the United Nations do service to its SSR duties? Or would the United Nations’ work on SSR be strengthened if there was a dedicated agency for security sector reform, tasked with overseeing the implementation of the SSR concept, when there is one?

Lastly, the third point brings me directly to the last set of questions concerning the role of the UN Security Council itself.

### **What next**

As we continue to develop our thinking on an SSR Concept, it is important we move from a descriptive mode to a prescriptive one, from exploring the depth and breadth of the SSR initiatives under way toward actually thinking about how to streamline and strengthen all the valuable work taking place on SSR at the UN or elsewhere.

What should the Concept contain? First, a master catalogue of capabilities, a sort of “who does what” grouped by the different activities that contribute to SSR: disarmament, demilitarization, reintegration, democratization, capacity-building. This work is already being done; the two papers presented to us form an excellent basis for such a catalogue, so this work would not necessarily be too time-consuming.

The second part of the future concept is far more intellectually challenging. With your permission, I’ll engage in a bit of “pie in the sky thinking” so please indulge me; the hope is to inspire a good question and answer session to close the panel before we move to conclusions.



The brunt of the possible concept could consist of self-contained scenarios covering the most common types of situations in which SSR tends to be implemented. The idea is that we need to stop thinking about the various activities under the SSR umbrella as only loosely related, as though they were trains running on parallel tracks. There is a logic and a sequence to them; in a post-conflict scenario demilitarization of remaining combatants must logically come before capacity building, and capacity-building will most likely start before civil control is introduced over those capacities. The sequence matters. These scenarios could also establish links between the various steps taken in the context of SSR and the likely consequences of those steps to avoid unintended consequences. To give just one idea, let me use our own national example.

The last question I'd like to pose to the audience is: who will an SSC Concept be addressed to? It would clearly be done by the UN. Slovakia plans to use its upcoming UNSC chairmanship to advance the issue of developing a security sector reform concept. But should it also be done solely for the UN as the banner behind me declares or should the ambition be to build a wider, more universally applicable set of principles and scenarios? If it's the latter, the concept would have to incorporate lessons of other international organizations as well, its brief would be much broader.

These are the questions that I wanted to pose.



## **Ambassador Peter Burian**

Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations in New York

I would like to offer some brief and incoherent personal remarks and observations rather than conclusions of the discussion.

1. A comprehensive approach to SSR is needed for simple reason: If an SSR programme is not balanced in all of its aspects, the entire process can be jeopardised and the financial and human resources and efforts will be wasted when country relapses back to conflict.
2. UN Security Council will play an instrumental role in providing a proper mandate for peacekeeping operations. This mandate should include SSR aspects and envisage the involvement of existing UN agencies and coordination between all shareholders and UN agencies to assure a comprehensive and streamlined SSR process.
3. In this respect, a holistic approach seems to be indispensable. Unlike any other actor, the UN is in a position to be a trusted partner without any vested interests. Being a universal organization, the UN should assume role of strategic coordinator.
4. SSR concept should be realistic based on a step-by-step approach, starting with small and achievable projects and building on the progress achieved. The identification of practical solutions for complex problems is needed. We should build on what already exists.
5. Another important requirement is local ownership and involvement of regional and sub-regional organizations. Involvement of all stakeholders both domestic and international and coordination of their efforts on a country level could be done through creation of an international consortium. This should reflect the country-specific situation, including the level of ownership that the state administration is able to assume. UN field missions should play a key role as SSR coordinators.
6. Long-term resources for financing are one of the main stumbling blocks of SSR. The idea of using the peacekeeping budget to shoulder some of the cost of launching the programmes or to elaborate the needs assessment might work at early stages of SSR programmes. For the sustainability of SSR programmes to be ensured, long-term financial guarantees are needed.
7. The establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission should be used to streamline the efforts of all stakeholders in this endeavour.

Last but not least, the UN Security Council should conduct a profound discussion on a comprehensive concept for SSR with the aim of adopting guiding principles for SSR that might be reflected in the mandates of future peacekeeping operations.

The final product of this discussion should be a formal decision in a form of UN Security Council presidential statement or better a resolution that would provide guidance for UN involvement in SSR activities with the aim of stabilizing the post-conflict situation and help preventing relapse to the conflict.

Slovakia will further explore the opinions of the UN membership through a series of roundtables on SSR in New York to define possible ways to reach consensus on addressing this problem in the Security Council.

We will also consider the possibility of organizing a seminar in Africa in partnership with a country or sub-regional organization in 2007.

# **BACKGROUND PAPERS AND DOCUMENTS**



# United Nations Approaches to Security Sector Reform

Paper prepared by DCAF<sup>11</sup>

## I. INTRODUCTION

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Since the late 1990s, the concept of security sector reform (SSR) has increasingly shaped international programmes for development assistance, democracy promotion, security cooperation and post-conflict peacebuilding. SSR is driven by the understanding that a poorly governed and unreformed security sector represents a decisive obstacle to the promotion of sustainable development, democracy, peace and security. Thus, SSR is aimed at developing an affordable, effective and efficient security apparatus, i.e., one that is able to provide security to the state and its people within a framework of civilian oversight and democratic accountability. Addressing both capacity and governance dimensions of security provision is the uncontested core of security sector reform though, in practical terms, SSR varies substantially according to the specific reform context.

The international community has gained significant experience in SSR, particularly as an element of its peacebuilding endeavours. Intergovernmental organisations have assumed an increasingly important role in shaping the SSR agenda (for an overview see the separate background paper prepared by DCAF that follows this paper). For many years now, the UN system has also been engaged in a wide range of SSR activities – though not necessarily under the label of “security sector reform”. These include support to police reform; reform of judicial and correction systems; and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. They also include assistance in the areas of civil management, parliamentary oversight and the civil society empowerment in security sector governance. All of these tasks are necessary elements of an effective SSR assistance strategy. What has been absent to date is a common, comprehensive and coordinated UN approach to SSR cutting across the entire peacebuilding spectrum and including longer-term development, with shared principles, objectives and guidelines for the development and implementation of UN support to SSR and clarity on roles and responsibilities across the UN system.

There is, however, increasing interest within the UN system and strong calls from the field for such an approach, which would serve as a valuable orientation and planning tool to various UN institutions working on SSR and in related areas. UN Member States have also expressed interest in the development of a comprehensive UN policy framework for SSR. In July 2005, the Security Council addressed the question in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding and the subsequent statement by the Presidency acknowledged the need for more coherent approaches by the United Nations and the international community in addressing SSR issues and for adequate attention to be accorded to SSR in the future, drawing on best practices in the area. The annual report of the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, adopted in February 2006, acknowledged the significance of SSR in

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<sup>11</sup> This document has been prepared by DCAF to provide background information for participants at the Bratislava meeting. It is a preliminary draft based on initial desk research. Readers are invited to consider this document as work in progress and are encouraged to bring any corrections or additions to the attention of Heiner Hänggi at [h.haenggi@dcaf.ch](mailto:h.haenggi@dcaf.ch) and Jonas Hagmann at [j.hagmann@dcaf.ch](mailto:j.hagmann@dcaf.ch).

peacekeeping and requested the Secretariat to conduct “a process of joint policymaking on security sector reform best practices”. The UN Secretariat is currently involved in establishing a Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory which, in its first section, covers UN capacities in the area of security sector reform. Finally, the Security Council is scheduled to discuss SSR during the Slovak Presidency in February 2007. All this demonstrates that SSR is very much on the agenda of the UN system.

The purpose of this paper is to inform the evolving discussion on the UN’s role in SSR by taking a broad overview of current UN approaches to security sector reform. Following a brief introduction of the SSR concept, this paper will first touch upon existing UN policy frameworks that are relevant to SSR. It will then review institutional actors within the UN system engaged in SSR activities. This is followed by the development of a tentative profile of UN SSR activities. The paper ends by summarizing key findings and raises a number of questions for further discussion.

## **II. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR)**

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There is no generally accepted definition of what the security sector comprises or what security sector reform entails. Nonetheless, there appears to be a certain convergence on the definitions put forward by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Accordingly, the **security sector** – or the **security system** as it is referred to by the DAC – can be defined as all the state institutions and other entities with a role in ensuring the security of the state *and* its people. These include:

- *Core security actors including law enforcement institutions*: armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services; coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units.
- *Security management and oversight bodies*: parliament/legislature and legislative select committees; government/the executive, including ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; national security advisory bodies; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies; and civil society actors, including the media, academia and NGOs.
- *Justice institutions*: justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; the judiciary (courts and tribunals); implementation justice services (bailiffs and ushers), other customary and traditional justice systems; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; etc.
- *Non-statutory security forces*: liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private body-guard units; private security companies; political party militias.

This definition suggests that the security system shares many of the characteristics of other service delivery systems. As UN Secretary General Kofi Annan noted in 1999, the security sector “should be subject to the same standards of efficiency, equity and accountability as any other [public] service”. While the security sector shares many features with public service more generally, it has unique characteristics as a result of the central role that the use of force plays in this sector.



**Security sector/system reform** means – again according to the DAC definition – transforming the security sector/system, which includes all these actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and thus contributing to a well functioning security framework.

Thus, the SSR agenda favours a holistic approach in a double sense – firstly, by integrating all those partial reforms such as defence reform, intelligence reform, police reform and justice reform, which in the past were generally seen and conducted as separate efforts; and secondly, by linking measures aimed at increasing efficiency and effectiveness of security forces to overriding concerns of democratic governance. Consequently, reforms aimed solely at modernising and professionalising the security forces and thereby increasing their capacity without ensuring their democratic accountability, are not consistent with the SSR concept. As noted by the DAC in one of its reports on SSR, there is a danger that traditional security-related programmes be simply re-labelled as SSR without a serious review of their contents to ensure that they support a governance-oriented approach to the security sector. By definition, SSR-related activities must be aimed at improving the governance of the security sector. In this respect, civilian control and parliamentary oversight are considered key aspects of SSR.

Given its scope and complexity, the SSR concept spans a wide array of activities from political dialogue, policy and legal advice, training programmes, to technical and financial assistance. Three major categories of reform activities can be distinguished:

- First, activities aimed at restructuring the security apparatus and the development of capability related to its core operational tasks (capacity dimension). These SSR activities include partial reforms such as reform of the armed forces and intelligence, police reform and reform of other law enforcement agencies such as customs, justice reform, prison reform, etc. From a security governance perspective, this category must also include activities aimed at engaging and integrating non-state armed actors into the state security apparatus.
- Second, activities aimed at strengthening civilian management and oversight of the security apparatus (governance dimension). These SSR activities include reforms of the civil management bodies, particularly the relevant ministries, president/prime minister's offices, national security advisory bodies and the like, as well as civil oversight mechanisms such as parliament, parliamentary committees, human rights commissions, ombudsmen, etc. From a security sector governance perspective, this category must include capacity building in favour of civil society groups that seek to contribute to the creation of an informed public that is sensitised to security issues.
- Third, specific SSR-related activities aimed at addressing the legacies of conflict (post-conflict dimension). These include activities in the area of DDR, with particular attention to child soldiers, small arms and light weapons (SALW), mine action, transitional justice, protection of vulnerable groups and women's empowerment in peacebuilding.

Extension of Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligibility to the area of security, as agreed by the OECD DAC in 2005, means that a wider spectrum of SSR and SSR-related activities can be financed by development cooperation funds than before. This encompasses the following six items of relevance to SSR programming:

- management of security expenditures through improved civilian oversight and democratic control;
- enhancing civil society's role in the security system;
- supporting legislation for preventing the recruitment of child soldiers;
- security system reform to improve democratic governance and civilian control;
- civilian activities for peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict resolution; and
- controlling, preventing and reducing the proliferation of SALW.

In practical terms, SSR varies according to the specific reform context. There is general agreement that no common model of SSR exists and that, in principle, each country engaged in SSR constitutes a special case and hence a different reform context. However, for analytical purposes, broad SSR contexts may be distinguished, such as countries in long-term democratisation and development processes; countries in transition; conflict or immediate post-conflict countries; and countries in a post-conflict environment. A comprehensive reform process is most easily achieved where a country has embarked on a process of long-term democratisation and development, as well as in those post-conflict states in which local stakeholders show an interest in engaging in SSR and international peace operations offer a basis for reconstruction and sustainable development. In many other cases, however, it can be considerably more difficult to carry out SSR activities. In particular, this applies to countries in ongoing violent conflict or early post-conflict, as well as to authoritarian regimes and so-called illiberal democracies where the will to reform is lacking.

What all contexts have in common, however, is that SSR tends to be assisted by external actors. International actors are increasingly involved in supporting SSR processes, particularly regional and global intergovernmental organisations (for an overview see separate background paper prepared by DCAF). In most cases, external (development and security) actors tend to initiate SSR programmes, fund them to a large extent and often provide the bulk of expertise needed for implementing these programmes. Where local will for reform is lacking, external actors often facilitate SSR programmes by means of political incentives or even pressure. In all reform contexts, there are tensions between external assistance and local ownership of SSR. Finding a balance between international good practice in this area and domestic political culture of reforming states is a *conditio sine qua non* for successful SSR, though, at the same time, this tension is inherent to the SSR concept itself and thus not amenable to easy solutions. International actors providing support to SSR, including the UN, have to take this into account.

### **III. UN POLICY FRAMEWORK**

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The UN's broad and global mandate covers all major policy areas in international relations ranging from peace and security to economic and social development, human rights and rule of law. Security sector reform, which is a broad notion, cuts across most of these policy areas. While policies focusing on maintaining and promoting peace are the activities most obviously related to security sector reform, policies related to the broader development agenda, the protection of human rights and the promotion of the rule of law and democracy are also highly important areas for SSR support. This section briefly introduces the most important current UN policies and strategies that are relevant to SSR.

## **Peace and Security**

The primary purpose of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace and security. For this purpose the Charter institutes a collective security system and sets out multilateral disarmament and arms limitation agendas. However, the collective security system could not prevent every outbreak of violence, as has been increasingly observed in the post-Cold War period at the sub-state level. As such, the UN has often been called upon to become operationally involved in conflicts across all stages of the conflict continuum from prevention through peacemaking, peacekeeping to post-conflict peacebuilding. The UN's experience since the end of the Cold War, marked by internal rather than inter-state wars, has led it to focus as never before on a broad range of peacebuilding tasks. In this process, SSR has increasingly become recognised as a key component of the various related UN policy frameworks for peace and security. This section will focus on three of them: (1) peacekeeping; (2) post-conflict peacebuilding and (3) disarmament.

*Peacekeeping.* UN peacekeeping operations are a crucial instrument at the disposal of the international community to advance peace and security. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of peacekeeping operations has dramatically increased, reflecting the end of the East-West blockade of the Security Council and the rise of mostly internal armed conflicts. Peacekeeping operations increased in number and expanded in scope, although this latter evolution was not strictly linear (e.g., the 1960-1964 mission to Congo is considered more complex than e.g., the 1974 mandate for the Cypriot interposition force). If the tasks of classic peacekeeping missions were primarily maintenance of ceasefires and separation of forces, the mandates of complex and multi-dimensional operations, deployed on the basis of comprehensive peace agreements, are characterised by an ever-widening spectrum of tasks which may include – apart from the creation of a secure environment – the provision of humanitarian assistance, DDR of former combatants, mine action, resettlement of refugees, promotion of law and order, monitoring human rights, holding of elections, execution of administrative functions in place of dysfunctional state structures and coordinating support for economic reconstruction. While complex peace operations do not generally have a mandate with regard to SSR, increasingly such missions have explicit (e.g., MONUC in the DRC since 2003, UNMIL in Liberia and UNAMA in Afghanistan since 2005) or implicit responsibilities in this area. These responsibilities concentrate on the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of national law enforcement agencies. Police components of peace operations have increasingly been engaged in advising, mentoring and training national police, border guards and corrections services. Specialised support to defence reform is almost non-existent in peace operations while governance-related activities such as conducting security sector reviews or setting up civil management institutions are still rather marginal. However, a number of SSR-related activities in post-conflict settings such as DDR, mine action, SALW collection and general rule of law tasks are carried out in the context of complex peace operations.

*Post-conflict peacebuilding.* Post-conflict peacebuilding has become one of the primary concerns in current world politics. International actors have in recent years begun to prioritise and mainstream peacebuilding in their external policies. This has recently been evidenced by the decision of the UN to reinforce its peacebuilding capacity, namely by creating a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) – an intergovernmental advisory body whose main purpose is to improve the coordination among relevant actors. Post-conflict peacebuilding is viewed as a multidimensional process of transformation from war to peace comprising three equally important and mutually reinforcing dimensions: the security dimension, the political

dimension and the socio-economic dimension. SSR clearly falls into the first category together with SSR-related activities such as DDR, mine action and control of weapons (particularly SALW). However, given the centrality of its governance dimension, security sector reform must also be viewed as being part of the political dimension of peacebuilding, which includes, among others, tasks such as democratic consolidation, human rights protection, rule of law and transitional justice. The centrality of SSR in peacebuilding and its close linkages with SSR-related activities such as DDR, rule of law and transitional justice is increasingly acknowledged within the UN system. UNDP's "Justice and Security Sector Reform" (JSSR) programmatic approach issued in 2003 is a case in point. More recently, the UN Security Council emphasised that SSR was an essential element of any stabilisation process in post-conflict environments and underlined that SSR was inextricably linked with the promotion of rule of law, transitional justice and DDR, among others.

*Disarmament.* Under the title of disarmament, the UN has traditionally given highest priority to reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons, destroying chemical weapons and strengthening the prohibition against biological weapons – all of which are considered as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). With the proliferation of "new wars", however, the international community has begun to consider more closely the issue of "small" conventional weapons such as SALW and antipersonnel landmines. While the mine ban treaty of 1997 (Ottawa Convention) was drawn up outside the UN system, a number of UN agencies are heavily engaged in mine-related activities such as mine clearance, mine awareness and risk-reduction education, victim assistance, advocacy and stockpile destruction. Since the uncontrolled spread of illicit small arms impacts many aspects of the UN's work – from children to health to refugees to development – a mechanism called "Coordinating Action on Small Arms" (CASA) was put into place in 1998 to guarantee that the UN system addressed the many facets of small arms control in a coordinated manner. International efforts to address the small arms issue are carried out within the UN system as evidenced by the negotiations on the international instrument on tracking illicit SALW. Apart from the small arms and landmines issues, DDR also has a disarmament dimension. As noted by the UNSC, all three issues together are closely related to SSR, particularly in post-conflict settings. While a UN SSR concept is still lacking, there are quite elaborate policy frameworks that guide UN action in the areas of SALW, landmines and DDR.

### **Economic and Social Development**

At the foundation of the work of the UN lies a broad concept of peace that includes not only the desire to hinder the occurrence of war, but also to improve human rights and foster long-term development. This broad concept of peace recognises expressly that particular conditions must be created under which peace and international security can be better and more permanently maintained. Therefore, next to the promotion of peace and security and human rights protection, activities in the socio-economic and development areas constitute a third major complex of duties for the UN. The UN and its specialised agencies are an important pillar of multilateral development cooperation. Since the 1990s, the UN has provided a platform for formulating and promoting key new developmental objectives on the international agenda through a series of global conferences. It has articulated the need to incorporate issues such as the advancement of women, rights of children and good governance into the development paradigm. At their Millenium Summit in 2000, member states adopted a set of wide-ranging Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), supported by a

series of specific, attainable targets, including the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women.

There is a growing consensus throughout the UN system and beyond that security is a precondition for development and that security is not sustainable without development. It is in the context of this increasingly accepted “security-development nexus” that SSR has entered the development agenda. Within the UN, the Development Programme is the most active body engaged in support to SSR across the broad peacebuilding spectrum – from conflict prevention to post-conflict recovery. UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) has developed the most explicit programmatic approach to SSR in the UN system to date with an emphasis on the non-military aspects of SSR (“Justice and Security Sector Reform”), while its Bureau for Development Policy (BDP) approaches SSR from a democratic governance perspective focusing on parliamentary development and access to justice and human rights. Furthermore, SSR is increasingly seen as an important issue from a gender perspective, particularly concerning the protection and participation of women in security sector institutions and policies. There is a clear interest in linking activities related to the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security with ongoing efforts to conceptualise SSR in a UN context.

### **Human Rights, Rule of Law and Democratisation**

*Human Rights and Rule of Law.* One of the great achievements of the United Nations is the creation of a comprehensive body of human rights law, including political and civil rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. A number of international special protection agreements have arisen from this core human rights focus, including (beyond the Civil and Social Pacts of 1966) agreements against torture, on the rights of children and on the elimination of discrimination and all forms of violence against women. It has also established mechanisms to promote and protect these rights and to assist governments in carrying out their responsibilities. The creation of the Human Rights Council in the context of the recent UN reforms is the latest achievement in the UN’s policy of human rights protection. So far, SSR has not been a component part of the UN’s human rights protection policy although there are strong linkages particularly in the areas of judicial process and rule of law after conflict. Concerning judicial process, the UN has developed standards and codes that serve as models for national legislation on issues such as the treatment of prisoners, the use of firearms by police, the conduct of law enforcement officials and the independence of the judiciary. The OHCHR provides technical assistance for human rights training for various actors of the security sector including law enforcement officers, prison officials and the military. Concerning the restoration of the rule of law, there has been a strong demand from UN transitional administrations and field missions for policy guidance, particularly on transitional justice issues. In response to this demand, the OHCHR has developed policy tools that address prosecution of perpetrators, the establishment of truth commissions and the vetting and monitoring of legal systems. On the policy level, in 2005, the UNSC emphasised that SSR is inextricably linked with the promotion of the rule of law and transitional justice.

*Democratisation.* The word “democracy” does not appear in the UN Charter, nor is democracy a precondition for UN membership. Yet, since the end of the Cold War the UN has increasingly become involved in democracy promotion, particularly in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding. Numerous UN documents now explicitly make reference to “democracy”. Although the UN recognises the difficulty of authoritatively defining

democracy in detail, electoral democracy is propagated as the basic governance template for all nations to follow. Democratic governance has become a component part of the UN development agenda. The creation of the UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF) in the context of the recent UN reforms is only the latest testimony of the increasing appreciation that promoting democracy is a key purpose of the United Nations. Within the UN system, DPA (with its Electoral Assistance Unit), UNDP and UNDEF are the key actors in democracy promotion. There are important conceptual linkages between democracy promotion and SSR given the latter's inherent governance dimension. However, on the policy level, SSR has not been part of the UN's democracy promotion agenda. On the ground, the engagement of some multidimensional peacekeeping missions in assisting in strengthening executive oversight of the security sector may be considered a contribution to democratic governance. Most relevant in this context are contributions by UNDP through BCPR's JSSR programme which stresses the role of civilian oversight and democratic accountability of security institutions and BDP's legislative oversight programme which increasingly covers the security sector as well.

#### **IV. UN ACTORS INVOLVED IN SSR**

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The UN's broad and global mandate is implemented by a substantive number of organs, agencies and associated organisations including six principal organs, fourteen departments of the Secretariat, fourteen programmes and funds, fifteen specialised agencies, five research and training entities, three major regional offices and numerous related organisations and commissions. This section looks at those bodies of the UN system which are involved in SSR in the areas of policy planning, agenda setting and operational implementation. In so doing it (1) reviews the principal organs which provide strategic guidance to SSR activities, (2) maps the Secretariat's contribution to SSR and (3) discusses the inputs provided by specialised and associated programmes, funds and agencies.

##### **Principal Organs (I): Overview**

##### **Security Council**

The Security Council consists of fifteen UN member states, five of which are permanent veto powers and ten of which are elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. Decisions are made by the affirmative vote of nine members, which in the case of substantive matters must include the five permanent members. Under the UN Charter, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has the authority to qualify situations as threats to peace and to decide on the nature and duration of measures taken in response. Among others, these measures include active mediation of conflicts, setting-up of standing and ad hoc committees and expert panels, imposition of sanctions and deployments of civilian and/or military missions. All measures are decided by Security Council resolutions, yet only binding resolutions based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter can authorise coercive responses. Committees, field missions and also the newly established Peacebuilding Commission are subsidiary organs of the Security Council, although the latter is under joint control with the General Assembly and also works closely with ECOSOC. Committees are generally established to monitor or study specific sanctions regimes. Ulterior sub-organs include the UN Verification and Inspection Commission, the

Compensation Commission, the ICTY and the ICTR. There is a direct reporting line with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

#### *Understanding of SSR*

The Council emphasises in *Presidential Statement S/PRST/2005/30 (12 July 2005)* that SSR is an essential element of any stabilisation process in post-conflict environments, and underlines that it is inextricably linked with promotion of the rule of law, transitional justice, DDR and the protection of civilians. In so doing, the Security Council acknowledges a need for more preparation, more resources and better coordinated approaches to SSR both within the UN and among the wider international community. In the same document, the Security Council also stresses the need to seriously consider the promotion of the rule of law and transitional justice, DDR and SSR but also their inter-linkages and resource requirements when the mandates for UN field operations are laid down. As in this statement, the Security Council often calls for SSR in its resolutions but generally abstains from defining SSR in detail. For instance, Resolution 1623 (13 September 2005) merely stresses the importance of “security sector reform including the reconstitution of the National Army and Police” in the case of Afghanistan. Resolution 1565 (2 October 2004) on the UN mission in DR Congo (MONUC) does not define SSR in detail, either, although it explicitly addresses the democratic governance component of SSR. This resolution defines the mandate of MONUC as “to take forward security sector reform...including the integration of national defence and internal security forces together with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and the training and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms”. In contrast and as an exception to the Security Council’s usual practice, Resolution 1509 (19 September 2003) on UNMIL in Liberia outlines an SSR mandate in particular detail, calling for “Support for Security Reform:...to assist the transitional government in monitoring and restructuring the police force, consistent with democratic policing,...in the formation of a new and restructured Liberian military in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations and interested States.”

#### *SSR activities*

The Security Council defines the SSR components of its field missions. Practical SSR activities are then operationalised by those field missions, which are subordinate organs of the Security Council. In recent years SSR components have been increasingly regularly introduced into mission mandates. What is more, the Security Council’s Peacebuilding Commission has an implicit SSR agenda. One of the resolutions establishing its mandate, Security Council Resolution 1645 (20 December 2005), declares that its main purposes should include proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery, focusing attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and supporting the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development.

#### *SSR-related documents*

- Security Council Resolution 1645 (20 December 2005) on the Peacebuilding Commission
- Security Council Resolution 1623 (13 September 2005) on UNAMA (Afghanistan)
- Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2005/30 (12 July 2005)
- Security Council Resolution 1565 (1 October 2004) on MONUC (DRC)
- Security Council Resolution 1509 (19 September 2003) on UNMIL (Liberia)

## **General Assembly**

The General Assembly is the UN's main deliberative organ. It is composed of all member states, each of which has one vote. Decisions require a simple majority except for new admissions and issues of peace and security. Its tasks are to discuss questions relating to peace and security, to develop international law and to promote human rights and international collaboration in the economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields. The Assembly also elects non-permanent Security Council members, proposes a candidate Secretary-General to the Security Council and elects, together with the Council, judges to the International Court of Justice. The Assembly meets annually or upon request of the Security Council. It features six committees which support the Assembly's work and a host of special and advisory committees. It also has direct reporting lines with a series of important organisations and agencies such as UNDP, UNCTAD, UNDCP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, the Disarmament Commission and the International Law Commission.

### *Understanding of SSR and SSR activities*

The General Assembly does not define SSR but establishes its centrality to UN operations. A first use of SSR language is found in the *Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Report A57 767* (28 March 2003), which sees SSR as interrelated with DDR and the strengthening of the rule of law, and in addition encourages DPKO's Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit to develop recommendations for the application of SSR best practices in ongoing and future field missions. *Report A59 19* (1 March 2005) describes SSR as "an essential element of any country stabilization process", stating that SSR must go beyond issues of the armed forces and the security and stability of the State, but must also address wider security issues relating to policing and rule of law, among others. The latest *Report A60 19* (22 March 2006) requests the Secretariat "to conduct a process of joint policymaking on security sector reform best practices" similar to the one undertaken on DDR.

### *SSR-related documents*

- Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Report A60 19 (22 March 2006)
- Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Report A59 19 (1 March 2005)
- Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Report A57 767 (28 March 2003)

## **Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)**

ECOSOC is the principal forum and coordinating organ for the economic and social work of the UN's fourteen specialised agencies, ten functional commissions (statistics, population and development, social development, human rights, status of women, narcotic drugs, crime prevention and criminal justice, science and technology, sustainable development, forum on forests) and five regional commissions. It has reporting lines to eleven UN funds and programmes and works closely with the Peacebuilding Commission to ensure the international community and donors maintain interest in a post-conflict country even after it has dropped from the headlines. ECOSOC has the authority to make or initiate studies and reports on all issues of economic, social or cultural life. With this broad mandate, ECOSOC absorbs over 70% of the UN budget.

### *Understanding of SSR and SSR-related activities*

ECOSOC has no direct mandate on SSR, yet it does take up SSR via the country reports of its *Ad Hoc Group on African Countries Emerging From Conflict* and the United Nations



International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW). The Ad Hoc Group was established by ECOSOC Resolution 2002/12 (12 April 2002). The Group's mandate includes assessing humanitarian and economic needs and preparing long-term support programmes that aim at the integration of relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development into a comprehensive approach to peace and stability. Currently, the group features advisory sub-groups on Guinea-Bissau and Burundi. The 2005 *Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi* qualifies SSR as critical, putting it into context with DDR and the reduction of small arms and light weaponry. INSTRAW was established by ECOSOC in 1976 as a follow-up to the 1975 World Conference of the International Women's Year held in Mexico City. Its executive board is elected by and reports to ECOSOC. INSTRAW features a "gender and security sector reform program" which aims at "ensuring the right to security for women, marginalised men, girls and boys as well as to create a just, democratic and effective security sector". To this end, INSTRAW conducts research, provides training, disseminates information and distils best practices on this particular linkage in cooperation with specialised agencies such as UNIFEM.

#### *SSR-related documents*

- INSTRAW Gender and Security Sector Reform Factsheet (2006)
- Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi (2005)

### **Secretariat**

The Secretariat – consisting of 8,900 international staff working in fourteen departments and offices, as well as three major regional offices – carries out the diverse day-to-day work of the organisation. It services the other principal organs of the United Nations and administers the programmes and policies laid down by them. At its head is the Secretary-General, who is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council for a five-year, renewable term. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has discussed SSR in different press announcements, stating that "[t]rue reform of the security sector requires...a broad approach. The end-result must be a viable army and police force, as well as judicial institutions that serve the interest of the people and international standards." He also repeatedly characterised SSR as a central element of post-conflict peacebuilding. Other high UN officials have also underlined the centrality of SSR on various recent occasions. The Special Advisors for West Africa for instance explicitly called on the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to democratise security sectors, and the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping called for increased SSR coherence and capabilities. The following section discusses the approaches of those departments most closely involved in SSR.

#### *SSR-related documents*

- United Nations Secretary General Press Release "Secretary-General's statement to the Sudan Donors' Conference" (11 April 2005)
- United Nations Secretary General Press Release "Need to strengthen SSR in West Africa" (12 January 2005)
- Special Advisor on West Africa 'A New Dawn for Africa' (14 January 2003)

## **Principal organs (II): Secretariat**

### **Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)**

DPKO – directed by an Under-Secretary General (USG) – prepares and manages UN peacekeeping operations. It maintains contact with the Security Council, troop contributors, financial donors and warring factions and integrates the UN system’s contributions to peacekeeping. DPKO also provides support on military, police, mine action, logistical and administrative issues to other UN political and peacebuilding missions.

#### *Understanding of SSR*

DPKO does not define SSR. However, its head affirmed the concept’s centrality in a 2005 speech to the Security Council. In this speech, SSR is established as central to post-conflict peacebuilding and linked to DDR as well as to the rule of law and transitional justice. SSR approaches are qualified as often being disjointed and requiring coordination and increased capabilities at the UN. An internal DPKO study of 2005 requested by the USG discusses the role of the UN in defence reform in the broader context of SSR, drawing on the OECD DAC concept.

#### *SSR activities*

The Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS) has primary responsibility for strategic policy issues in DPKO and is a lead advisor on SSR-related activities such as DDR and criminal justice (Criminal Law and Judiciary Advisory Unit). PBPS assists in the planning, conduct and management of UN peacekeeping operations by learning from past experiences and problems, developing operational policy material and transferring best practices back to ongoing and upcoming missions. PBPS has recently commissioned an external study on “SSR and peace operations” drawing on field missions, particularly those in Timor Leste and Kosovo. The Military Division assists in military contingency planning, as well as determining and generating the kind of force necessary for the fulfilment of the mandate. Thus, the Military Division is responsible for generating the forces necessary for eventual DDR and SSR mandates. There have been only very few missions to date with an explicit or implicit mandate in defence reform (e.g., DRC, Liberia, Timor Leste), while specialised defence reform capacity is almost non-existent. Discussions within DPKO on the creation of a UN Defence Reform Advisory Capability have not produced tangible results to date. The Police Division is the only DPKO entity directly involved in SSR, since its mandate is to provide strategic guidance to the police component of peace operations, which perform law enforcement functions in host countries or provide direct or indirect support to the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of national law enforcement agencies (police, border guards and corrections services) as part of capacity-building mandates (e.g., DRC, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste). The initial operating capability of the Standing Police Capacity (SPC), which will be launched in early 2007, may also include SSR-related tasks in which peace missions are involved.

#### *SSR-related documents*

- Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Remarks to the Open Meeting of the Security Council on “Maintenance of International Peace and Security – The Role of the Security Council in Humanitarian Crises: Challenges; Lessons Learned; the Way Ahead”, United Nations Security Council document S/PV.5225 (12 July 2005)
- Mandates of peace missions mentioned above

## **Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA)**

DDA promotes disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons such as land mines and small arms. DDA engages in norm-setting through the General Assembly's First Committee, the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and other bodies, fostering preventive disarmament measures such as confidence building on military matters. DDA also supports DDR programmes in post-conflict contexts. DDA is headed by an Under-Secretary General and operates a Regional Disarmament Branch with three regional offices.

### *Understanding of SSR and SSR-related activities*

DDA itself does not define SSR explicitly although it makes the case, via the bias of General Assembly Resolution A59 119 (23 June 2004) on the relationship between disarmament and development, that security sectors “must be accountable, affordable, appropriate and transparent”. However, DDA has a strong agenda on SSR-related activities such as DDR, mine action and small arms. DDR activities are carried out by the Regional Disarmament Branch. This branch and its regional offices in Togo (UNREC), Nepal (RCPD) and Peru (UNLiREC) advise and promote the implementation of disarmament and arms control norms at regional and sub-regional levels, monitoring and analysing disarmament developments and trends and assisting a number of regional and sub-regional operational implementation programmes. On mine action, DDA works closely with the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which is the focal point for mine action within the United Nations to consolidate existing legal norms, mine clearance and victim assistance. DDA is the UN focal point for two important conventions on landmines, the 1997 Mine-Ban Convention and 1996 Amended Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, which focuses specifically on landmines and booby-traps. DDA is also responsible for the collection and circulation of small arms-relevant information such as national reports and national legislation on small arms, and for planning and supporting practical UN disarmament measures. In particular, DDA supports the implementation of the *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (July 2001)*, a multilateral small arms programme of action, by studying the potential of international instruments to mark and trace small arms. Two of the three regional disarmament centres are carrying out core SSR tasks apart from the engagement in SSR-related activities such as DDR, small arms and landmines. The Lomé-based UNREC played a key role in developing the draft Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in Africa which is currently under consideration by the African Union (AU) and has inspired ECOWAS to draw up a similar code for West Africa. Jointly with the Department for Political Affairs (DPA) and other UN entities, the Lima-based UNLiREC was involved in a series of initiatives aimed at improving security sector governance in Latin America.

### *SSR-related documents*

- General Assembly Resolution A60 97 (8 December 2005): Assistance to Mine Action
- Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy (2005)
- General Assembly Resolution A59 119 (23 June 2004): The relationship between disarmament and development in the current international context

- Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (July 2001)

### **Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)**

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has been established as a department of the Secretariat by General Assembly Resolution 48/141 (7 January 1994). OHCHR is mandated to promote and protect all rights established in the *Charter of the United Nations* and in the various international human rights laws and treaties. The mandate includes preventing human rights violations, securing respect for all human rights, promoting international cooperation to protect human rights, coordinating related activities throughout the United Nations, and strengthening and streamlining the United Nations system as regards human rights.

#### *SSR-related activities*

As the central UN human rights body, OHCHR plays a vital role in keeping security actors accountable to international human rights law. To do so, OHCHR works with governments, national institutions, civil society, regional and international organizations but also the wider United Nations system to develop and strengthen capacities for the promotion and protection of human rights, particularly at the national level. The OHCHR has a programme of technical assistance that focuses on human rights training for legislators, judges, lawyers, law enforcement officers, prison officials and the military. Furthermore, OHCHR provides expert advice and training on human rights standards to all personnel in peace operations, including the military and police components. In the context of post-conflict peacebuilding, the OHCHR has developed a series of policy tools on the rule of law and transitional justice that address prosecution of perpetrators for crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the establishment of truth commissions and the vetting and monitoring of legal systems established after the end of hostilities.

### **Other departments and offices of the secretariat**

A series of other UN departments and offices work on SSR-related issues. Among those, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) features an explicit SSR agenda in the context of its role as lead agency in peacebuilding and democracy promotion. DPA plays a central role in coordinating the UN Executive Committee on Peace and Security, a high-level body for interagency and interdepartmental coordination. It provides guidance to DPA-led peacebuilding operations some of which are mandated to perform specific tasks relating to SSR particularly in the area of law enforcement institutions (e.g., Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Tajikistan, Somalia, UNOWA). DPA has also been involved in a series of initiatives aimed at improving security sector governance in Latin America. As one part of its multi-faceted support for building democracy, DPA has been supporting and participating in the process of holding International Conferences of New or Restored Democracies (ICNRD) – an intergovernmental process which aims to share experiences in democratization and to promote good governance. Some of these conferences also addressed issues related to SSR. Furthermore, through ICNRD, DPA established a link between SSR and the collection of small arms in its Palestine programme report.

Also, Security Council Resolution 1645 (20 December 2005) requested the Secretary-General to establish a Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) within his Executive Office. This latter Office would assist and support the Peacebuilding Commission by gathering and processing information on peacebuilding-related UN in-country planning activities by analysing the progress made by UN field missions towards short and medium-term recovery goals, and by developing and disseminating best practices with respect to cross-cutting peacebuilding issues, which could potentially include SSR. In this context it is noteworthy that the broad SSR agenda is covered by the first eight (out of 25) sectors of the UN Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory prepared by the Executive Office of the Secretary General.

Finally, the Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also works on SSR-related activities through its mandate to fight illicit drugs, international crime and terrorism. Established in 1997, UNODC has 500 staff members operating at headquarters in Vienna and in 21 field offices. This office assists states in the ratification and implementation of related international treaties and the development of national legislation, and conducts field-based technical cooperation projects that enhance the technical capacity of national law enforcement agencies to counteract illicit drugs trafficking, cross-border organised crime and terrorism.

#### *SSR-related documents*

- Security Council Resolution 1645 (20 December 2005)
- Briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Security Council Opening Meeting, 20 October 2005
- Office on Drugs and Crime Activities Report (20 January 2003)

### **Programmes and Funds, Specialised Agencies**

#### **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**

UNDP is the coordinating development agency within the UN. It is devoted to sustainable human development as an essential component of poverty reduction. UNDP is the primary distributor of UN funds for development. It is headed by an Administrator and has 166 country offices. A major current activity of UNDP is to monitor and coordinate the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000.

#### *Understanding of SSR*

UNDP holds that human development, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, security sector reform and justice are interdependent. The UNDP, through its Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), was the first international organisation to implement the SSR concept in its field activities. In the document entitled *Justice and Security Sector Reform: BCPR's Programmatic Approach* (2002), BCPR introduced the "Justice and Security Sector Reform" (JSSR) concept, the objective of which is to strengthen the ability of the sector as a whole and each of its individual parts to provide an accountable, equitable and rights-respecting public service. The work of the Bureau for Development Policy (BDP), in the framework of its democratic governance approach, concentrates on two issues relevant to SSR: parliamentary development and access to justice and human rights. Furthermore, the UNDP-sponsored *2002 Human Development Report* identifies effective civilian control over the military and other security forces as one of six key norms of democratic governance, makes a strong connection between efforts to democratise security, the prevention of conflict and peacebuilding, and

underlines the importance of democratic control of the military, police and other security forces for human development and security.

#### *SSR-related activities*

UNDP runs significant SSR-related programmes in the areas of police reform, community policing, judicial reform, transitional justice and parliamentary oversight of the security sector with a strong emphasis on justice-related programmes. Traditionally, UNDP has not been involved in defence-related matters. However, in some rare cases, UNDP has been engaged in military reform (e.g., Argentina, Bosnia, Nicaragua, Peru). Its experiences in military restructuring are rather marginal and include, among others, policy dialogues on national defence reform and developing white books on defence matters. In contrast, UNDP's extensive experience in the area of police reform includes building up national administrative bodies or advising the national senior police management (e.g., Kosovo, Haiti, Timor Leste, Mozambique, Guatemala). It also conducts some activities related to strengthening civilian management and oversight mechanisms including internal security reviews (e.g., Kosovo), institutional reforms of the ministry of defence (e.g., Serbia and Montenegro), parliamentary capacity-building (e.g., regional programme for CIS countries) and civil society empowerment (e.g., Guatemala). However, the majority of UNDP engagement in SSR falls into the category of SSR-related activities in post-conflict contexts, ranging from DDR and combating the proliferation of illicit small arms and mine action to the reestablishment of rule of law and transitional justice.

#### *SSR-related documents*

- JSSR Programmatic Approach for Crisis and Post-Conflict Situations (2003)
- Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice. A Crisis Post-Conflict Programmatic Approach (March 2003)
- UNDP Human Development Report: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (2002)
- BCPR Justice and Security Sector Reform: BCPR's Programmatic Approach (2002)

### **United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)**

The United Nations Development Fund for Women is a specialised sub-unit of UNDP that provides financial and technical assistance to projects aimed at improving gender equality. General Assembly Resolution 31/133 (16 December 1976) set up UNIFEM with the aim of reducing women's poverty and exclusion, ending violence against women, reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS among women and girls, and supporting women's leadership in governance and post-conflict reconstruction. In parallel, UNIFEM derives its mandate from a series of international agreements such as the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women* (1979) and the *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action or the Millennium Declaration and Millennium Development Goals* (1995).

#### *SSR-related activities*

Security Council Resolution 1325 (31 October 2000) in particular recognises not only that war impacts women differently, but also reaffirms the need to increase the role of women in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution in particular. As such, women are understood to play a key leadership role in the political governance of a country. UNIFEM provides support to SSR-related activities, including mechanisms of justice and national reconciliation which train women to adequately respond to crimes against women,

the development of common indicators for early warning taking into account women and gender issues, the design of strategies to ensure women's participation in DDR and support to women's participation in post-conflict elections and reconstruction.

*SSR-related documents*

- Security Council Resolution 1325 (31 October 2000) on women, peace and security

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**

UNICEF's mandate is "to advocate for the protection of children's rights, to help meet their basic needs and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential". The Fund's commitment to protecting children from violence, exploitation and abuse is an integral component of protecting their rights to survival, growth and development. UNICEF's responses draw on the *1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)* and numerous international human rights agreements. The CRC is the most widely ratified human rights treaty, setting out a range of provisions that encompass civil rights and freedoms, family environment, basic health and welfare, education, leisure and cultural activities, and special protection measures.

*SSR-related activities*

UNICEF advocates the creation of a protective environment for children in partnership with governmental and non-governmental partners. National child protection systems, protective social practices and children's own empowerment coupled with good oversight and monitoring are among the elements of a protective environment that enables countries, communities and families to prevent and respond to violence, exploitation and abuse. Security Council Resolution 1612 (26 July 2005) acknowledged the "initiatives taken by UNICEF and other United Nations entities to gather information on the recruitment and use of child soldiers in violation of applicable international law and on other violations and abuses committed against children in situations of armed conflict". The resolution calls upon the Secretary General to implement a monitoring and reporting mechanism. The first country report was presented to the Security Council and its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict in June 2006 and concerned the Democratic Republic of Congo. Information used in this report was based on monitoring by MONUC child protection advisers and staff of the UNICEF child protection programme in conjunction with civil society actors. Some of UNICEF's activities referred to in the report included: assistance to internally displaced persons through a rapid response mechanism co-managed with OCHA; the current operational framework for children's DDR, developed under the leadership of UNICEF and adopted by the DRC's Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Reinsertion in July 2004; emergency educational support to displaced schoolchildren and assistance to schools that had been attacked; and training of police, military and the judiciary.

*SSR-related documents*

- General Assembly Resolution 44/25 (20 November 1989): Convention on the Rights of the Child
- Security Council Resolution 1612 (26 July 2005)
- Secretary-General Report 2004/251 (25 March 2004) on children and armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo

## V. AREAS OF UN SUPPORT TO SSR

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Areas of UN support to SSR can be differentiated between capacity-building activities, activities aimed at promoting democratic security sector governance and SSR-related activities, each of which are subject to different rationales. This section tentatively lists types of contributions made by the UN to each of these areas, illustrating these predominantly with reference to field mission activities. To this end, it draws on UN resolutions, policy statements and field mission reports.

### **Security Sector Capacity-Building Activities**

Capacity-building activities aim to improve a country's physical 'security output': its ability to ensure the safety of the state, its citizens and inhabitants against acts of violence and coercion. Examples of such activities include technical assistance to the judiciary and corrections institutions, the restructuring and equipment of the police, border guards and the armed forces, or support to national security policy-making by government branches. In post-conflict situations, capacity-building efforts may serve as quick-impact instruments by rapidly increasing security in strategic locations. Beyond shorter and mid-term peace support operations, long-term projects such as those implemented by UNDP are crucial to address structural capacity-building aspects. The UN is involved in the following capacity-building activities:

*Justice sector including corrections.* Assistance to the justice sector includes all those programmes that improve the justice sector's output, for instance, via training in case handling, professional training or upgrades of the judiciary's physical infrastructure.

Examples of UN assistance:

- The UNDP Democratic Governance Group features a justice reform policy agenda. It implements corresponding programmes in Brazil.
- UNMIL in Liberia trains legal personnel and corrections staff in, for instance, case flow management. By the same token, UNMIL works to improve the judiciary's physical infrastructure.
- UNAMA in Afghanistan is engaged in capacity building and the enhancement of judiciary communication.
- The UN Transitional Administration in Cambodia conducted justice sector reform.
- As a counter-example, the absence of judicial reform was sorely missed in UN missions to Haiti. Arguably, the focus on the restructuring of the police was too strong in these missions to the detriment of the judiciary. A lesson learned from these missions was that law enforcement needs to be understood as a triad, including not only the police but also the judiciary and correction services.

*Law enforcement forces.* The restructuring and equipping of law enforcement forces refers to programmes which transfer skills in areas such as administration, human rights, forensics or democratic policing to the police and border guards. It also includes programmes to upgrade their equipment.

Examples of UN assistance:



- UNDP has been engaged in setting up police administration capacities, such as the police administration of Kosovo.
- Police recruitment and training in human rights, investigation techniques and democratic policing were conducted through programmes in El Salvador, Haiti, Mozambique and Cambodia.
- In DRC and Liberia, MONUC and UNMIL have assisted in the restructuring and training of police forces; in the case of MONUC, police reform is one of two component parts of an overarching SSR programme.
- UN civilian police units have been deployed to many locations with the aim to provide for the direct safety of citizens from local crime and violence.
- In Liberia, there was a special case of restructuring and reforming border security services. There, the Forestry Services have the twofold mandate of administering and controlling logging while at the same time securing state borders. *Security Council Expert Panel Report 745* (7 December 2005) made the point that Liberian insecurity was particularly linked to the exploitation of primary commodities such as timber. Consequently, the Forestry Services were identified as highly corrupt. The Government was thus asked to reform the Services and improve its accountability. Subsequent to the Expert Panel report, Security Council Resolution 1647 (30 December 2005) called on the UN Mission to Liberia to patrol jointly with the forestry services. The aim of this call was to simultaneously enhance border security and foster the democratic accountability of the border guards.

*Armed forces.* Capacity-building efforts in the realm of armed forces include the creation of an integrated national force, train-the-trainer programmes, the initiation of a national dialogue on security policy and reviews and updates of national security policy. UN experiences in reforming the military components of the security sector are relatively recent. The restructuring of armed forces is recurrently implemented by individual UN member states on a bilateral basis such as, for example, the United States in the case of Liberia.

Examples of UN assistance:

- In DRC, MONUC supports the creation of a new, integrated national army (FARDC) in conjunction with a DDR programme.
- In Bosnia, UNDP is part of the Defence Reform Commission and the Working Group on the Destruction of Ammunitions and Small Arms.
- Subsequent to a UNDP programme in Honduras, the Honduran Ministry of Defence entered into cooperation with the armed forces of Argentina, establishing cooperation mechanisms in the areas of education, budget management and pension fund system management.

### **Security Sector Governance Activities**

Security sector governance activities include those measures which aim at improving democratic control over the security sector. Such activities focus on governance providers and include measures such as the reinforcement of civil society and the media, the improvement of legislators' competence on security affairs and defence budgeting, and assistance to security sector-related legal drafting. Security sector governance efforts aim at instituting an accountable, representative and thus sustainable security sector. In post-conflict contexts, security sector governance efforts are practical instruments for inclusion and national reconciliation.

*Civilian management and oversight.* Efforts here include programmes that enhance the capacity of civilian control over the security sector in general.

Examples of UN assistance:

- UNDP launched an initiative to reform the auditing system of the armed forces in Honduras.
- UNDP initiated a financial transparency initiative in Serbia as regards budgeting in the security sector.
- Also in Serbia, UNDP supported building the capacity of civilian officials in the Ministry of Defence with a view to providing proper civilian oversight of the armed forces.
- On a more general level, the promotion and holding of national elections by the UN often – but not always – helped to install civilian leaders in the highest offices.

*Legislation and legislative oversight.* This includes assistance to parliamentarians for the drafting of laws regulating different components of the security sector.

Examples of UN assistance:

- In his *Report 2004/251* (25 March 2004), the Secretary-General's Special Representative to Congo called on the authorities to draft a new law on the organisation of the armed forces.
- The rule of law programme of UNMIL in Liberia states that its aim is to “pursue legislative reforms related to security agencies”.
- In October 2005 the UNDP Regional Centre for Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) organised, in collaboration with DCAF, a parliamentary roundtable on security sector oversight, which represents UNDP's first initiative on parliamentary oversight of the security sector and constitutes a starting point for regional and national-level programming in the CIS region.

*Public oversight.* Public oversight refers to those activities aimed at strengthening non-parliamentary civilian oversight over the security sector, such as the media and civil society.

Examples of UN assistance:

- UNDP is engaged in launching a national policy dialogue on defence reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- UNDP seeks to improve civil society oversight of the security sector in Peru.
- In Argentina, UNDP was involved in a project aiming at building consensus for a national agenda on defence.

### **SSR-Related Activities**

Various SSR-related activities are supportive of the areas listed above. They include specialised regimes, which aim at limiting the adverse effects of armed conflict on specific groups and the recurrence of armed conflict itself. SSR-related activities include the protection of vulnerable groups such as women or children that are abused as soldiers, the regulation of certain weapons such as small arms and landmines, and broader efforts aimed at post-conflict peacebuilding such as DDR and transitional justice.

Examples of UN assistance:

#### *Small arms and light weapons*

- UNDP is engaged in the collection and destruction of small arms in locations such as Bosnia, Brazil and Palestine.
- The Security Council helps to limit the flow of small arms to conflict zones by imposing arms embargoes, for instance in Resolution 1493 (28 July 2003) referring to DRC or Resolution 1267 (12 October 1999) on Afghanistan; by authorizing field missions to collect and destroy small arms, for instance, in Resolution 1533 (12 March 2004) on MONUC; or by establishing Expert Panels which monitor and study the proliferation of small arms.

#### *Mine action*

- The UN Mine Action Service develops standards on activities such as mine detection, mine clearance, destroying or disposing of landmines, and providing mine-risk education.
- UNMAS managed a rapid expansion of mine action in Sudan following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005.
- DPKO is responsible for integrating mine action into peacekeeping and chairs the interagency coordination group on mine action (IACG-MA).
- UNDP supports the development of national and local mine action capacity, and promotes coordination between mine action and the broader development community in its field operations.

#### *DDR*

- Setting-up and operation of cantonment sites, demobilisation of ex-combatants (so-called 'brassage') by UN missions in Liberia, the Solomon Islands and Cambodia.
- DPKO proposes technical guidelines and best practices for DDR.
- MONUC in Congo provided advice to the Congolese Government on DDR since the passage of Security Council Resolution 1565 (1 October 2004).
- An important role of the UN is also to mobilise international resources for all of the aspects and activities mentioned here. In the case of resource mobilization for DDR in Liberia, see for instance Security Council Resolution 1071 (30 August 1996).

#### *Child soldiers*

- The mandate and operations of UNICEF
- The staff of MONUC in Congo includes experts on child soldiers since *Security Council Resolution 1355 (15 June 2002)*.

#### *Protection of women*

- Numerous efforts to counter trafficking in human beings, especially the trafficking of women in the Balkans.
- The UN is engaged in gender mainstreaming in its own operations. There is a regulation which criminalises the engagement of UN troops in trafficking and abuses of women, and there is a DPKO policy paper which seeks to enhance the role of women in mine action, DDR and SSR. Furthermore, INSTRAW features a gender and security sector reform programme that conducts research, provides training, disseminates information, and distils best practices on the topic.

- UNIFEM supported women’s participation in peace negotiations through training local women and lobbying in Darfur, Burundi, DRC and Somalia.
- In Rwanda, the UN supported the participation of women in drafting a new constitution and playing an active role in peace-building and reconciliation.
- In Albania, UNIFEM provided assistance to local women in organising weapons collection processes.
- In the Solomon Islands, UNIFEM has used gender-sensitive indicators to assess the perceptions of local women and men of a range of security issues. Surveys collected sex-disaggregated data on perceptions such as “safety for men to walk around the community” or “safety for women to walk around the community” and include security issues likely to particularly affect women, including rape and domestic abuse.

*Transitional justice*

- UN installed and administers international criminal courts on conflicts in Yugoslavia, Rwanda or Sierra Leone.
- Security Council Resolution 1468 (20 March 2003) called on Congo to set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

## **VI. CONCLUSION**

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Although the UN has not developed a common SSR policy framework so far, SSR is very much on the agenda of the UN system. Given its broad definition, SSR cuts across a wide range of UN policy areas from peace and security, to development, human rights and the rule of law. There is a strong consensus that SSR is central to post-conflict recovery. An increasing number of UN institutions is involved in one or other aspect of SSR – often without being aware of this fact. Various actors and agencies repeatedly refer to SSR, but rarely define it. The ambiguity that this creates is likely to undermine UN output. In recent years, SSR-related activities have increased both in number and in scope – though without these activities being necessarily attributed to the SSR concept. UN SSR activities in the framework of peace operations tend to privilege internal security sector capacity-building, particularly in the areas of justice and police reform, over activities aimed at improving security sector governance. In general, UN actors show a certain preference for SSR-related activities such as DDR, tackling the problem of child soldiers, curbing the proliferation of small arms, mine action and the establishment of the rule of law and transitional justice after conflict. Activities aimed at strengthening civil management and oversight mechanisms appear to be so few in number that no conclusive statement can be made except that UN support for parliamentary capacity-building and civil society empowerment is usually general in nature and rarely geared to the security sector.

Of the intergovernmental organisations involved in SSR, the UN is best placed to assist states in improving capacity and governance of the security sector through the promotion of a holistic SSR agenda. However, there is no common understanding, much less a comprehensive policy framework, that would guide UN SSR programmes and projects in a coherent, consistent and sustainable way. In that vein, the topic should be addressed further in order to stimulate a broad discussion on the role of security sector reform in the UN context with a view to increasing the understanding of the issue and suggesting possible options for the development of a holistic and coherent approach – an approach which would accord

greater importance to SSR activities relating to military and defence capacity-building as well as to the enhancement of civil management and oversight of the security sector.

The following questions may help to inform the evolving debate and facilitate further discussion:

- What lessons in SSR policy development do other intergovernmental actors supporting SSR offer – particularly those which have developed an overarching SSR policy framework such as the OECD DAC and the EU?
- What can the UN learn from SSR activities of intergovernmental organisations, particularly regional organisations which have not (yet) developed an overarching SSR policy framework, such as is the case of ECOWAS and OSCE?
- To what extent are the experiences to date of bilateral donors, recipient countries and non-governmental organisations (NGO) involved in SSR relevant for the development of a UN SSR policy framework?
- To what extent should the UN base its own SSR policy development on the conceptual work already carried out by other international actors, particularly OECD DAC?
- Should focus be on the development of a system-wide UN SSR concept and/or SSR concepts for specific entities of the UN system such as DPKO, PBC, UNDP, etc.?
- Should focus be on the development of a UN SSR concept covering all policy areas and/or SSR concepts that cover specific policy areas such as peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding, development assistance, gender issues, etc.?
- Should focus be on the development of a comprehensive SSR approach and/or approaches to specific dimensions of SSR such as defence reform, reform of law enforcement bodies, parliamentary oversight of the security sector, etc.?
- Should focus be on the development of a “global” UN SSR policy framework and/or concepts for specific regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa?
- Should one UN entity take the lead on developing a policy framework for UN support to SSR (e.g., UNSC, PBC, DPA, DPKO, UNDP) or should rather an inter-agency coordinating mechanism be established?
- How could and should the UNSC contribute to the development of a UN SSR concept?



# Intergovernmental Approaches to Security Sector Reform

Paper prepared by DCAF<sup>12</sup>

## I. INTRODUCTION

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SSR programmes tend to be driven by external actors. These comprise national governments in their capacity as development donors; non-governmental organisations, whether local, national, regional or global in their origins or range of activity; private military and security companies; and regional and global intergovernmental organisations, the focus of this paper.

Intergovernmental organisations have assumed an increasingly important role in shaping the SSR agenda. They have played a central role in designing and delivering programmes for reform in several countries, and a number of them have developed, or are in the process of developing, policy frameworks to guide their various SSR activities.

This document reviews the approaches of intergovernmental organisations with a significant role in this field except for those of the UN and its agencies, whose SSR activities are dealt with comprehensively in a separate background paper drafted by DCAF.

This document is divided into four parts. Following this introduction, the second section describes the main features of intergovernmental organisations' involvement in SSR. The third section offers a table illustrating the SSR activities of these organisations. The fourth section provides a brief profile of each organisation in the table.

## II. INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS' INVOLVEMENT IN SSR

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There is a broad range of intergovernmental organisations whose activities fall under the rubric of SSR. Accordingly, the concept has been shaped by a variety of policy experiences. These organisations

- tend to approach SSR from either a development (e.g., World Bank), security (e.g., NATO) or democratic governance perspective (e.g., Council of Europe),
- have a global (e.g., World Bank), regional (e.g., African Union) or sub-regional focus (e.g., ECOWAS),
- may be active in field activities such as capacity building and technical assistance (e.g., Stability Pact), norm development (e.g., OECD), or both (e.g., OSCE), and

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<sup>12</sup> This document has been prepared by DCAF to provide background information for participants at the Bratislava meeting. It draws substantially on information available on the websites of the intergovernmental organisations whose SSR approaches are reviewed here. As this information may not always be comprehensive or current, readers are invited to consider this document as work in progress and are encouraged to bring any corrections or additions to the attention of David Law at [d.law@dcaf.ch](mailto:d.law@dcaf.ch).

- may concentrate on SSR in different country contexts: developing, transition, post-conflict and developed.

Some international organisations, such as the EU and the UN, bring together all or almost all of the elements mentioned above. Most intergovernmental organisations deal only with developing and/or transition countries, which in some cases are also post-conflict environments. Some international organisations are also concerned with SSR in developed countries, but there are as yet no SSR programmes explicitly elaborated for mature democracies.

The fact that SSR has been shaped by a variety of policy experiences has a number of implications. Intergovernmental organisations can be active in a range of SSR activities, but may not recognise these as being part of the SSR agenda, either because of a lack of familiarity with the concept and/or the absence of an overarching framework for their SSR programmes. SSR definitions and approaches can vary considerably from organisation to organisation; for example, the OECD uses the term *security system reform* while the UNDP prefers *justice and security sector reform*, reflecting the specific concerns of individual organisations. Until very recently, intergovernmental organisations focusing on security and development had little contact with one another, notwithstanding the fact that in the 1990s they found themselves increasingly involved in the same countries and regions. Within individual organisations, the material, administrative and personnel resources required for SSR activities may not be organised in away that is conducive to pursuing the holistic approach that is at its core.

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In view of these considerations, intergovernmental organisations face several challenges in shaping and implementing their SSR agendas.

One challenge is to elaborate a SSR concept that effectively gives an overarching framework and orientation to the range of SSR activities in which the intergovernmental organisation is involved. This is essential if SSR programmes are to be conceived and implemented in a comprehensive manner.

Second, if such policy frameworks are to be effective they need to be supported by robust implementation guidelines. These should be based on an in-depth understanding of how SSR has been approached in different country and regional environments and in different contexts, which policies have worked well in these different settings, which less so and why.

Third, in order to carry out effective SSR activities, international organisations may have to review the way the human and material resources at their disposal are organised as well as their internal procedures. The cross-cutting nature of SSR programmes may make it necessary to bring together expertise from various departments, some of which may not be accustomed to working together. Financial instruments available to international organisations may have to be consolidated to ensure that sufficient resources can be brought to bear. Different skill sets, greater multi-disciplinary experience and new kinds of managerial, sector and country expertise may also be required for SSR work. This can have repercussions for recruitment and training policies.



Fourth, it is necessary to ensure that intergovernmental organisations can work synergistically together, both in the field and at home, as well as with other entities engaged in SSR, for example, with the national governments and non-governmental actors mentioned above. Such multi-actor involvement puts a premium on effective cross-jurisdictional communication, coordination and cooperation. To overcome inefficiencies caused by compartmentalisation of responsibilities and to instil a sense of joint stakeholdership of programmes, innovative approaches may be required. International organisations may need to take inspiration from the "joined up government" approaches practiced by a number of national governments, whereby ministries of defence, foreign affairs and development come together to implement SSR.

Finally, international organisations have a responsibility to ensure that their SSR activities are carried out in a transparent and accountable manner. This can be particularly challenging where oversight is weak or only indirectly exercised by member states. Demonstrating openness and responsiveness to stakeholders is of fundamental importance to the overall legitimacy and credibility of SSR programmes – critical factors in determining their prospects for success.

### III. MAIN FEATURES OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED IN SSR

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| <b>Intergovernmental Organisation</b>          | <b>SSR Focus</b>   | <b>Geographical Scope</b>                  | <b>Country Contexts</b>  |
|--|--|--|--|
| <i>AU</i>                                      | Norm development   | Regional/<br>Africa                        | Developing, post-conflict  |
| <i>Council of Europe</i>                       | Capacity-building and technical assistance<br>Norm development | Regional/<br>Europe                        | Post-conflict, transition  |
| <i>ECOWAS</i>                                  | Norm development   | Regional/<br>West Africa                   | Developing, post-conflict  |
| <i>EU</i>                                      | Capacity-building and technical assistance<br>Norm development | Global                                     | Developing, post-conflict, transition; developed through members' ESDP activities                          |
| <i>NATO</i>                                    | Capacity-building and technical assistance<br>Norm development | Regional/<br>Euro-Atlantic                 | Developing, post-conflict, transition; developed countries as concerns defence reform                      |
| <i>OECD DAC</i>                                | Norm and policy development                                    | Global                                     | Developing, post-conflict, transition  |
| <i>OSCE</i>                                    | Capacity-building and technical assistance<br>Norm development | Regional/<br>Euro-Atlantic &<br>Euro-Asian | Developing, post-conflict, transition; developed countries as concerns norm development and implementation |
| <i>Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe</i> | Capacity-building & technical assistance                       | Regional/<br>Western Balkans               | Post-conflict, transition  |
| <i>World Bank</i>                              | Capacity-building & technical assistance                       | Global                                     | Developing, post-conflict, transition  |

## **IV. PROFILES OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED IN SSR**

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### **AFRICAN UNION (AU)**

#### **General**

The African Union is an international organisation consisting of 53 African member states. Founded in July 2002 in South Africa, the AU was formed as a successor to the African Economic Community (AEC) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The purpose of the organisation is to help secure democracy, human rights and a sustainable economy, especially by bringing an end to intra-African conflict and creating an effective common market.

#### **Understanding of SSR**

The organization does not have a SSR concept, but its multidisciplinary approach points to the possibility that it may eventually develop a broad SSR concept and agenda.

*The Declaration on the Framework for an Organization of African Unity (OAU)* includes the following elements of importance to SSR:

- Rejection of unconstitutional changes of government
- Agreement on elements of a Framework of Action for an OAU (now AU) response to unconstitutional changes of government
- Framework of Action provides a set of common principles for democratic governance, definition of unconstitutional change, measures and actions to be taken in response to such change as well as an implementing mechanism

The *Constitutive Act* of the African Union stipulates the following:

- Principles of the Act include ‘condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments’
- ‘Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union’

#### **SSR-related documents**

*Declaration on the Framework for an Organization of African Unity (OAU), Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government*, Lome, July 2000, AHG/Decl. 5, XXXVI/(AHG/Dec. 150 XXXVI)

African Union, *Constitutive Act*, Lome, July 2000

## **COUNCIL OF EUROPE**

### **General**

The Council of Europe, created in 1949, has 46 member states. The main focus of the organisation is democratic security, protection of human and minority rights, and promotion of parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Council of Europe was the first European organization to accept the Central and Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries as members. The organisation is active in assisting the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in carrying out and consolidating political, legal and constitutional reform in parallel with efforts to establish a market economy.

### **Understanding of SSR**

The Council of Europe does not have a SSR concept, but resolutions of its Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) have established important norms concerning the democratic control of armed forces in member states.

The basis for the Council of Europe's SSR activities was established in 1993 when the member states set new goals for the organisation as a guarantor of democratic security, seeing this as an essential complement to military security and a pre-requisite for stability and peace.

The Council of Europe's Recommendation 1402 (1999) refers to "control of internal security services in Council of Europe member States [*sic*]".

The most important norm-setting document of the Council of Europe in the field of SSR is a Recommendation on the "Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Member States", adopted by PACE in 2005.

### **SSR activities**

The Council of Europe plays an important role in norm development and standard setting through the European Court of Human Rights and the various conventions and treaties agreed by its members.

The Council of Europe's SSR-related field activities concentrate on the following areas:

- Police accountability and human rights
- Democratisation
- Institutional reform
- Justice reform
- Organised crime, corruption and terrorism
- Civil society, media

### **SSR-related documents**

Recommendation 1402 on *Control of internal security services in Council of Europe member states*, 26 April 1999

*The Code of Police Ethics, 2001*

Recommendation 1713 on *Democratic oversight of the security sector in member states*, 23 June 2005

## **ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS)**

### **General**

The ECOWAS is a regional group created by sixteen West African countries in 1975. Its main mission was originally to promote the economic integration of its member states, but it has gradually developed activities in the security field as well.

The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is a West African multilateral armed force established by the ECOWAS. The ECOMOG is not a standing army, but a formal arrangement for separate armies to work together.

The ECOWAS also has a Defence and Security Commission (DSC) that comprises chiefs of defence staff and a Committee of police chiefs.

### **Understanding of SSR**

Various activities of the ECOWAS in the area of conflict prevention and management may eventually form the basis of a comprehensive SSR approach.

### **SSR activities**

In 2004, the ECOWAS participated in a workshop in Dakar that developed project proposals on SSR for West African countries.

In 2005, ECOWAS member states started working on a Code of Conduct (inspired by the OSCE Code of Conduct) for their region with the support of DCAF. The ECOWAS Parliament and DCAF have also signed an MOU on the preparation of a Western African version of the IPU-DCAF Handbook on Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector.

### **SSR-related documents**

ECOWAS, *Declaration of Political Principles*, 1991

*ECOWAS Treaty*, 1993

*The Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security*, December 1999

*The Dakar Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance*, 2001

ECOWAS, *Declaration on a Sub-Regional Approach to Peace and Security*, 2003

## **EUROPEAN UNION (EU)**

### **General**

The EU, created in 1957 by virtue of the Treaty of Rome, is an economic and political union of 25 member states committed to pursuing an ‘ever closer union’.

### **Understanding of SSR**

The EU made reference to “the legal accountability of police, military and secret services” in its *Resolution on the Communication from the Commission Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Union*.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003 underlines the importance of SSR in improving the EU’s capabilities for peace support activities and in achieving its strategic objectives in third countries.

The Council of the European Union in its *EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform* (November 2005) underlines the importance of SSR in “...putting fragile states back on their feet,...enhancing good governance, fostering democracy and promoting local and regional stability”.

*A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform* developed by the Commission of the European Communities (May 2006) holds that SSR “is an important part of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and democratisation and contributes to sustainable development. SSR concerns reform of both the bodies which provide security to citizens and the state institutions responsible for management and oversight of those bodies”.

### **SSR activities**

The EU is potentially the most important resource provider for SSR programmes. Both the Commission and the Council are major players in SSR. The Commission’s SSR activities derive from its Conflict Prevention programmes for developing countries, its mandate for justice and home affairs (by virtue of which it addresses public security issues in member states) and its responsibility for the EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood programmes, which involve it in SSR activities in potential member countries and neighbouring states. The Council’s activities concern measures to enhance the EU members states’ capacity to prevent, manage and stabilise conflict situations as well as to provide for their own security.

The Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament *A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform* (2006) defines the following areas of SSR support in which the EC has primarily been engaged:

1. *Civil Management Bodies* (including support to executive branches of government concerning planning and execution, security policy development and personnel management of SSR bodies)

2. *Civil Oversight Mechanisms* (including support to legislatures in their exercise of democratic and civilian control, and to civil society organisations in their capacity-building and watchdog functions)
3. *Justice reform* (including support to justice ministries, institutions belonging to the judiciary and penal system, human rights commissions, ombudsman functions, etc.)
4. *Law enforcement* (including support to police or other law enforcement agencies such as border guards, customs police, etc.)
5. *Armed Forces* (limited support in the areas of training and certain aspects of army integration)
6. *Support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of former combatants and efforts to address the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons*
7. *Regional Capacity Building*

*Some examples of projects*

- Justice reform, law enforcement and civil management programmes (Africa, Western Balkans, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, South and East Mediterranean and the Middle East)
- Civilian oversight mechanisms (Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Central Asia)
- Public financial management reforms (ACP group of states)
- Police reform (Western Balkans, Latin America, South and East Mediterranean and the Middle East)
- Military aspects of SSR (EUFOR RD Congo)
- EU SSR mission (DRC)
- DDR (Angola, Burundi, Guatemala)
- European Police College (CEPOL)
- Borders and migration management (Western Balkans, South and East Mediterranean and the Middle East, Asia)

**SSR-related documents**

*The European Community Communication on Conflict Prevention*, 2001

*European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World (ESS)*, December 2003

*The Commission Communication on Governance and Development*, 2003

Commission of the European Communities, *European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)*, Strategy Paper, May 2004

*The European Consensus on Development*, December 2005

Council of the European Union, *EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)*, November 2005

Commission of the European Communities, *A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, May 2006

## **NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION (NATO)**

### **General**

NATO, created in 1949 as a defence alliance of Western democracies, is now a military and political organisation with 26 member states. NATO has established partnership relations with 20 countries through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme.

### **Understanding of SSR**

NATO does not have an official SSR concept agreed by its member states; however, it has developed an operational understanding of SSR that it uses in its programming activities in partner countries: see, for example, the Decalogue of norms developed for the *Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB)* programmes (<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b040607e.htm>).

Defence reform and SSR are mentioned in some NATO Partnership programmes documents as necessary requirements to prepare countries in transition for eventual membership in Euro-Atlantic organisations and participation in peace support operations.

NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme lists "ensuring democratic control of defence forces" as one of its five objectives. PfP also promotes transparency in national defence planning.

The Membership Action Plan (MAP) for aspirant NATO members includes detailed requirements for membership. These include settling any international, ethnic or external territorial disputes by peaceful means; demonstrating a commitment to the rule of law and human rights; establishing democratic control of their armed forces; and promoting stability and well-being through economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility. In addition, the country must have the ability to contribute to collective defence and to the Alliance's new missions.

The NATO Partnership Work Programme for 2000-2001 includes democratic governance of the security sector among its activities and makes reference to the OSCE Code of Conduct. The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism links terrorism and SSR. The Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building promotes democratic and civilian control of defence institutions in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

### **SSR activities**

Programmes within the NATO cooperation and partnership frameworks focus on the following areas:

- Democratic control of armed forces
- Parliamentary oversight of defence budgets

- Democratic governance of the security sector
- Defence reform

### **SSR-related documents**

*Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document, 1994*

*Study on NATO Enlargement, September 1995*

*Membership Action Plan, April 1999*

*Partnership Work Programme for 2000-2001*

*Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB), 7 June 2004*

## **ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD)**

### **General**

The OECD, founded in 1961, comprises 30 member countries sharing a commitment to democratic government and market economy. The organisation has relationships with some 70 non-member countries. The OECD's SSR agenda focuses on developing and transition countries and is developed by its Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

In March 2005, as a result of a review of the activities in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding that can be counted as *official development assistance* or ODA, the DAC agreed that technical cooperation and civilian support for the following items of relevance to SSR programming can be included: management of security expenditure; enhancing civil society's role in the security system; supporting legislation for preventing the recruitment of child soldiers, improving democratic governance and civilian control; civilian activities for peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict resolution; and control of the proliferation of SALW (OECD, *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: What Counts as ODA?*, 2005).

### **Understanding of SSR**

The OECD believes that a functional security sector is a precondition for effective conflict prevention, poverty reduction and development.

The OECD uses the term 'Security System Reform', explaining the use of this term in the following way: "Some donors use the term security sector reform, but this had led to confusion about whether this pertains only to the armed forces ("the security sector") or to the whole system of actors working on security-related issues. The DAC has therefore chosen the term "security system reform" to describe this policy agenda".

The OECD defines SSR as "the transformation of the 'security system' – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of



good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework” (*The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*, 2001).

Security system reform “seeks to increase the ability of partner countries to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance and the rule of law”. “SSR is a key component of the broader “human security” agenda” (OECD, *Security System Reform and Governance. DAC Guidelines*, 2005).

### **SSR activities**

DAC has been working on the development of the SSR concept since the late 1990s. In 1997, it carried out a review of DAC members’ approaches to dealing with military issues, which linked a number of security issues to development concerns. The DAC then developed a conceptual framework for security assistance entitled “Security Issues and Development Cooperation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence.” This subsequently led to the incorporation of key security concepts into *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*, 2001. Security issues are also addressed in *The DAC Guidelines: Poverty Reduction*, 2001.

In 2004, the DAC approved a key document related to SSR entitled *Security Sector Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice. DAC Guidelines*. This document advances a holistic (whole-of-government) approach to SSR and emphasises the nexus between security and development. The guidelines constitute the only internationally agreed document on SSR to date. In 2005, the OECD commissioned a new study entitled *Implementation Framework for Security System Reform (IF-SSR)*. The study develops implementation steps for each security sector component based on several case studies and best practice.

### **SSR-related documents**

OECD, 'Security Issues and Development Cooperation: A Conceptual Framework For Enhancing Policy Coherence', *Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation Papers, The DAC Journal*, vol.2, no.3, 2001

OECD, *Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*, 2001

OECD, *Security System Reform and Governance – DAC Guidelines and Reference Series*, 2005

OECD, *Implementation Framework for Security System Reform (IF-SSR)* (forthcoming)

## **ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE)**

### **General**

The OSCE, which began in 1975 as the CSCE, a forum for East and West to address security issues in Europe, was transformed into a permanent security organization at the Budapest Summit in 1994. The OSCE has 55 participating states.

## **Understanding of SSR**

The OSCE has not developed a SSR concept; however, it conducts many SSR-related field activities.

The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994), adopted as a 'politically binding' instrument, contains a number of innovative positions on the democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces, as well as of intelligence services and the police. It links the behaviour of security actors within a country to its external security relationships and considers their effective oversight and democratic control to be an indispensable element of stability and security.

## **SSR activities**

In addition to its important role in norm development, the OSCE has a number of SSR-related field activities in the following areas:

- Democratic control of armed forces
- Arms control
- SALW
- Border management
- Combating terrorism
- Conflict prevention
- Military reform
- Policing and police reform
- Human rights
- Democratisation
- Media, civil society building
- Crisis management
- Post-conflict rehabilitation

## **SSR-related documents**

*The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, 1994*

*OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, November 2000*

## **STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE (STABILITY PACT)**

### **General**

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, created on 10 June 1999 at the EU's initiative, marked an effort on the part of the international community to replace the then prevailing reactive crisis intervention approach in South Eastern Europe with a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy. In the founding document, more than 40 partner countries and organisations undertook to strengthen the countries of South Eastern Europe "in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region".

The Stability Pact has three working tables. Working Table III deals with questions of both internal and external security (fighting organised crime and corruption, migration and integrated border management, SALW and defence reform, in particular defence conversion). Its objective is to support the establishment of a stable security environment in the region and to promote regional cooperation in fighting organised crime and corruption and in dealing with migration issues. It is divided into two sub-tables. The first one deals with Justice and Home Affairs, and the second one with Defence and Security Sector Reform issues.

### **Understanding of SSR**

The Stability Pact does not have a SSR concept; it relies in its activities on the concepts and programming principles developed by donor countries and organisations.

### **SSR activities**

The Stability Pact is involved in the Ohrid Process on Border Security and Management, has launched a police forum initiative and has other field activities in the following areas:

- Police training and reform
- Post-conflict reconstruction
- Demobilisation and retraining
- Defence conversion
- Justice, home affairs and migration
- Organised crime, corruption and terrorism
- Cooperation on defence and military issues
- Border management and security
- Police training
- SSR inventory

#### *Some examples of projects*

- The Ohrid Process on Border Security and Management (a joint effort by the five countries of the Western Balkan region, as well as the EU, the OSCE, NATO and the Stability Pact).
- The Police Forum initiative
- The Organised Crime Initiative (SPOC)
- The Defence Conversion and Security Sector Reform Initiative (with RACVIAC)
- The Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative (DPPI)
- Security Sector Reform in South Eastern Europe: An Inventory of Initiatives

### **SSR-related documents**

*Common Platform of the Ohrid Regional Conference on Border Security and Management, May 2003*

*The Way Forward Document, the Ohrid Regional Conference on Border Security and Management, May 2003*

## **WORLD BANK**

### **General**

The World Bank, established in 1946, is an international development agency providing loans, advice and other services to over 100 countries. It is owned and operated by its 180 member countries. Its funds are raised through world markets and contributions from member governments. Its divisions include the International Bank for Reconstruction & Development, The International Development Association, The International Finance Corporation, The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. The World Bank seeks “to reduce poverty and improve living standards through sustainable growth and investment in people.”

### **Understanding of SSR**

While by virtue of its Charter, the WB has no security role, the organisation has become increasingly involved in security-related issues that have an impact on development, such as security expenditure and post-conflict reconstruction.

As regards security expenditures, the Bank traditionally focused on how resources spent on the armed forces might detract from other types of social investment. Today, the Bank recognises the provision of security as being crucial for economic development. It continues, however, to be concerned about the impact of the lack of proper scrutiny of such expenditure on its efficiency. As such, the Bank increasingly approaches the issue from the good governance perspective. In operational terms, the appropriateness of military expenditure is an issue in the context of Public Expenditure Reviews.

In the area of post-conflict reconstruction demobilisation and reintegration, the Bank developed a comprehensive framework in 1997. In addition to the promotion of economic recovery, the evaluation of social sector needs, support for institutional capacity building and the revitalization of local communities and restoration of social capital, its approach includes specific efforts to support mine action, demobilise and reintegrate ex-combatants, and reintegrate displaced populations. The Bank's Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit has also been involved in taking stock of various demobilisation and reintegration programmes with a view to developing ‘best practices’ for future activities.

### **SSR activities**

The World Bank plays an aid-coordination role by managing multi-donor trust funds (for example, in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, West Bank and Gaza, etc.) and operates a Post-Conflict Fund for countries recovering from conflict.

#### *Some examples of projects*

- Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in countries such as Cambodia, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Rwanda; and the reintegration of displaced populations in Azerbaijan, Liberia and Rwanda
- Mine action programmes in Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Croatia, Sri Lanka and Ethiopia, using the Bank’s Operational Guidelines for Financing Landmine Clearance

**SSR-related documents**

World Bank, *Operational Guidelines for Financing Landmine Clearance*, 1998

World Bank, *Assistance to Post-conflict Countries and the HIPC Framework*, April 2001

World Bank, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 2003

World Bank, *Legal and Judicial Reform: Strategic Directions*, Legal Vice Presidency, 2003

World Bank, *Legal Services for the Poor. Best Practice Handbook*, 2003

World Bank, *Initiatives in legal and judicial reform*, 2004

World Bank, *World Development Report 2006*, 2005

World Bank CPR, *Conflict Analysis Framework*, April 2005



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# **Key Messages and Preliminary Findings from the Implementation Framework on Security System Reform (IF-SSR)**

*July 2006*

## **OECD DAC Network on Conflict Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC)**

### **I. Progress on the SSR Agenda**

1. Recent work by the DAC has focused on the challenge of insecurity and conflict as a barrier to political, economic and social development and the positive role that the integrated reform of a country's security system can play in stabilising fragile, conflict-prone or conflict-affected states. The publication of *DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance*, approved by Development Ministers and Agency Heads in 2004, is now widely recognized as the international point of reference on SSR policy.

2. The DAC SSR Guidelines provided donors with a new direction and understanding of the security development nexus and developed basic principles for SSR (see Annex 1). It also led donors to question how their programmes were designed, implemented and evaluated. The Guidelines challenged donors to consider how a developmental approach to SSR could best utilise resources from across government agencies and how coherence could be better ensured through the development of an operational framework for SSR implementation.

3. The Implementation Framework for Security System Reform (IF-SSR *forthcoming*) was developed with these challenges in mind. It is designed to translate DAC SSR Guidelines into more operational guidance for practitioners. The IF-SSR represents the platform for what some practitioners are calling the third generation of SSR<sup>13</sup>. The recognition that the traditional concept of security has been redefined to include not only state stability and the security of nations but also the safety, well-being and freedom from fear of their people, requires that a new approach to SSR. This generation of SSR efforts need to ensure a balance between the political/governance aspects of security system reforms and the technical/capacity requirements to enhance the delivery of justice and security.

4. The Implementation Framework for Security System Reform (IF-SSR) is being developed through a two-year consultative process with field-based SSR practitioners and policy makers. The process is bringing together the development community with their

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<sup>13</sup> The first generation of SSR is viewed as encompassing the transformation that occurred within the military establishment of post-Cold War Warsaw Pact Countries. The focus at that stage was on issues of military expenditures and downsizing. The second generation of SSR can be defined as the period where a conceptual framework and understanding of SSR was developed to include other security and justice institutions and viewed security not only in state or military terms. The 2004 DAC Guidelines played a significant role in this phase.

military, intelligence, police, prisons, civil society, judicial and customs services colleagues to ensure that the IF-SSR incorporates knowledge on the political and technical nature of SSR and to build the necessary linkages across the security system. The IF-SSR, currently in draft form, is being translated into an operational guide and targets personnel from donor agencies and government departments involved in supporting SSR. This paper provides an insight into the main messages and preliminary findings emanating from this process.

## II. Current gaps in SSR implementation

5. The IF-SSR process has identified some of the current short-comings in SSR implementation.

- SSR is still discussed at the conceptual level in Headquarters and delivered and funded at the tactical level in the field. Overcoming this strategic gap between headquarters and field operations is one of the main objectives of the IF-SSR. As this is a relatively new field, the process of developing the IF-SSR also focused on building a common understanding of the concept among donor and partner country practitioners, a key need identified by many in the country surveys conducted for the SSR Guidelines in 2004.
- Donor governments often utilise serving police, military, prison and judiciary officers as part of their engagement in post-conflict and peace building SSR programmes. While these officers have technical expertise in their specific sectors, more guidance is required for those being deployed to have a better understanding of: (i) the political nature of security reforms; and (ii) the governance and technical needs – including how to link reform across the security and justice system. In addition, many have never been involved in development activities or an institutional reform process and may require specific guidance on: how to identify potential entry-points; and how to assess needs, design and manage support programmes. Donor governments and development agencies engaged in supporting SSR are responsible for ensuring that their technical experts have the necessary skills to work in a particular context and that the right mix of expertise is present in programme teams on the ground.
- Programme officers in the field and in HQ could benefit from a stronger understanding of the technical as well as the political issues related to SSR. The implementation of SSR programmes is increasingly being subcontracted to private companies, as a result programme officers need to have an in-depth understanding of SSR processes and sector-specific reform needs, so as to provide direction to, and ensure adequate oversight of, subcontractors. Similarly, private contractors may not be aware of donor policies or how a developmental approach to SSR changes key aspects of SSR programming.
- As the international community moves from *ad hoc, often short-term* projects to a more strategic form of SSR engagement, there is a need to develop more sophisticated and comprehensive approaches to undertaking assessments. Assessments should result in the design of realistic and focused programmes that support partner countries to address the security and justice needs of all citizens. Such an assessment tool must recognise the inherent complexities in engaging on security and justice reforms and view democratic governance as an overarching framework for reform processes. An assessment tool that informs the design of programmes must also be supported by an effective approach to monitoring and evaluation which considers indicators around supply, process, outputs and, most importantly, outcomes. As the objective of SSR is to support the delivery of security and justice to all communities: this must be the



basis for evaluating the success or possible problems with a given programme. In measuring impact upon citizens, it will be important to recognise that perception is often as important as reality. Therefore, monitoring and evaluation should take into account citizens' perceptions as well as considering statistical data.

- Experience has shown that SSR programmes tend to exclude certain institutions such as justice - undermining the adoption of a comprehensive approach. Donors tend to focus their engagement on one or two sectors, with limited attempts to support partner countries to take an integrated or comprehensive approach to security and justice reforms. The fragmentation of the system can prevent the establishment of a cohesive national policy framework. Similarly, fiscal sustainability issues tend to be ignored, and standard Public Finance Management approaches are rarely included in SSR programmes. Security and justice institutions are seen as separate from the public sector with different pay scales applied to different sectors, undermining core principles of civil service reform. In addition, the notion of good governance has only just started to filter through, and more work is required to make civilian oversight mechanisms more effective.

### **III. Who constitutes the main audience for the IF-SSR, and what do they need to do their job?**

#### Headquarters staff

- Need to know the political as well as technical aspects of SSR, understand process issues and have a reasonable understanding of the needs of each sector and the importance of developing linkages across the system.
- Need enough understanding of the field-level challenges and the policy issues to help support the development of strategic frameworks for SSR support both in HQ and in the field.
- Need documented examples/case studies of experience throughout the programme cycle.

#### Field staff

Need the above, as well as:

- Practical tools to assist them in applying their technical experience in a developmental approach that considers the overall outcomes/objectives.
- A full understanding of and appreciation for the political nature of reforms and the need for these to be locally led wherever possible. Guidance is also required to help recognise and build linkages across the system(s) that enhance basic security and justice delivery.
- Simple checklists of questions to promote a comprehensive approach in undertaking assessment, and a check-list of issues for sector work and examples of good and poor practice regarding SSR planning and implementation. These checklists should provide a supporting framework for considering key issues and underline the primacy of understanding the context in undertaking assessments and designing programmes.

### **IV. In what settings/contexts is the IF-SSR most useful?**

6. While SSR is most challenging in crisis or post-conflict contexts, it is clear that the reform of the security system is relevant not only for fragile state contexts but also for other

low-income country situations or countries in transition, where unreformed security institutions can have an adverse effect on the investment climate, democratisation processes and the sense of security felt by the public. As such, the IF-SSR – used in conjunction with the principles in the 2004 DAC Guidelines - has wide applicability beyond conflict and post-conflict contexts as a tool for prevention in more stable countries and as part of a normal process of public sector reform. The IF-SSR does not intend to create a blue-print for SSR; there is no ‘one-size fits all’ formula. Opportunities for SSR are strongly conditioned by different contexts, and the IF-SSR aims to provide assistance to donors on how navigate or tailor their assistance to these different contexts.

7. There are a number of contextual factors that make SSR more or less likely to occur. If the level of economic development, the nature of the political system and the specific security situation are used as points of departure, a number of potential SSR contexts, or rather ‘context clusters’, emerge as typical – each reflecting a different rationale for reform:

- The development context in relatively stable developing countries.
- The post-authoritarian – primarily post-communist – context in transition countries.
- The “post-conflict” context in countries engaged in rebuilding the state after conflict, though it should be recognised that violent conflict is not linear, and countries may transition in and out of this situation over time<sup>14</sup>.

8. Relatively good opportunities for externally-assisted SSR activities tend to exist in developing countries which have embarked on a process of democratisation after elections or other forms of peaceful change. The same applies in post-authoritarian transition states which aim at joining regional organisations that have democracy or respect of justice and rule of law as a goal for membership (for example the EU), and in those post-conflict states in which international peace support operations offer a basis for reconstruction and local actors show a certain capacity and readiness for reform.

9. In many other cases, however, prospects for externally-assisted SSR are rather difficult. In particular, this applies to countries in armed conflict, to fragile and ‘post-conflict’ states at early stages of conflict transformation, as well as to authoritarian regimes and so-called illiberal democracies where the will to reform is lacking. This does not necessarily mean that SSR should not be promoted in these countries, but that this task will be even more challenging with higher political risks attached than is the case in more conducive environments. The focus in these countries would be less of a technical nature and more focused on providing support to non-state actors to enhance their scrutiny of security affairs and preparing the political terrain and understanding of SSR.

## **V. Main Messages**

### **Ensuring a developmental approach to SSR**

10. Security System Reform is about taking a development approach to the provision of security to support partner countries in building open and responsive states that ensure livelihoods and safety of their people. A development approach to SSR views security, not only, in state or military terms but takes a more people-centred understanding of security and

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<sup>14</sup> These three different contexts are drawn from A. Bryden & H. Hänggi, ‘Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector’, in Bryden/Hänggi, *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, Münster: LIT, 2005

justice based on democratic norms, human rights principles and the rule of law. A development approach to SSR enables countries to address diverse security challenges through integrating development and security policies and enhanced governance practices.

11. The "Implementation Framework for Security System Reform" is being designed by and for international actors working to prevent violent conflict and build peace. It includes ground-breaking evidence that international support to SSR – the integrated reform of the security system in a manner consistent with the democratic norms, sound governance principles and the rule of law – is most effective when:

12. Technical inputs to SSR are delivered and coordinated with a clear understanding of the political nature of SSR and institutional opportunities and constraints. This is the basis on which different policy communities – development, governance, diplomacy and security – can work effectively and coherently together.

13. **The political terrain is prepared and early investments are made in appropriate analysis.** A balance must be struck between support to provide “quick wins” and confidence-building measures with taking time to undertake assessments. Tools such as Power and Drivers of Change Analysis and Strategic Conflict Analysis can expose root causes of violent conflict and specifically security system problems, and multi-stakeholder working-level dialogue can inform programme design.

14. **Local ownership can be particularly complex in conflict-affected situations** or in contexts where there is a transitional government. Programmes need to be designed to help identify local drivers of reform and be flexible to respond to local ownership as it emerges. This will impact how SSR support programmes are designed, implemented and evaluated. Focusing on local ownership means *valuing process over product*. Donors need to avoid the temptation of supporting supply driven initiatives. The bottom line is that reforms that are not shaped and driven by local actors are unlikely to be implemented properly and sustained.

15. **Donors support partner countries to lead SSR processes** as the starting point for sustainable reforms. But because ownership and leadership are never monolithic and not always easy to determine, opportunities to foster multi-stakeholder coalitions for change should be prioritised. Flexibility is needed to respond to trajectories and trends of ownership, differentiated across security system organisations, both state and non-state, and over time.

16. **SSR programmes should take a multi-layered or multi-stakeholder approach.** This helps target donor assistance to those providers – state and non-state actors simultaneously – at the multiple points at which actual day-to-day service delivery occurs. A multi-layered strategy helps respond to the short-term needs of enhanced security and justice service delivery while also building the medium term needs of state capacity.

17. **Whole-of-government approaches are built on shared understanding of and respect for the different mandates,** skills and competencies of security, development and diplomatic communities. Transparency about objectives, allocations and operations promotes coherent strategies.

18. **Donors strive to develop specific whole-of-government capacity** to support SSR. Integrated teams that bring together technical expertise with the necessary political, change management, programme management and communications skills are critical. Cross

government training is required that will enable those involved in supporting SSR to have a strategic, political and technical understanding of SSR.

19. **SSR objectives are focused on the ultimate outcomes of basic security and justice services.** Evidence suggesting that up to 80% of security and justice services are delivered by non state providers should guide donors to take a balanced approach to supporting state and non-state security and justice service provision. Programmes that are locked into either state or non-state institutions, to the exclusion of the other, are unlikely to be effective.

20. **A range of partners** engage in SSR with three major overarching objectives: i) the improvement in basic security and justice service delivery, ii) the establishment of an effective governance, and system of oversight and accountability security system; and ii) the development and local leadership of a reform process to review the capacity and technical needs of the security system.

## **VI. Programmatic Recommendations: assessing, designing and supporting SSR processes**

### **Getting Started**

21. It is important for donors to consider how SSR gets onto a partner government's agenda or how a request for assistance is received by donor governments. SSR may become important on the political agenda of partner countries in a number of ways, and donors can support this process through informal contact between senior political figures, discrete activities that highlight SSR as a public policy issue or through bi-lateral cooperation between security actors. In many cases, a request for SSR assistance will first come to a donor country through their security actors. It is, therefore, important for donor government to think through how such request are dealt with internally and to ensure that a developmental approach to SSR is taken by all actors who provide SSR support to partner countries.

### **Develop an inception phase**

22. ***Incorporating an inception phase*** into programmes allows better understanding of the core problems and needs related to different contexts. The inception period allows programmes to focus on building credibility and relationships through confidence-building measures with national interlocutors. The time spent developing local constituencies for SSR is a prerequisite for engaging on a technical level. The ***process*** of SSR is crucial, so time spent preparing the political terrain is time well spent. The inception phase will also allow development agencies to gain an in-depth understanding of politics/security/local situation, which will facilitate the identification of the major issues and reform needs. It will also allow an opportunity to: assess possible strategies for supporting change initiatives; identify potential change agents; and seek out and understand any constituencies that may not favour reforms and their reasons, through, for example, undertaking a "Power and Drivers of Change Analysis", and Conflict Analysis. The IF-SSR provides a quick assessment tool to help with such analysis that should be supplemented with mapping of other donor activities and, most importantly, local initiatives. See assessment section for more detailed analysis.

23. Much of the engagement of the international community in this phase will be to identify opportunities on which to support partner countries to build a broader SSR

programme, for example, mapping experiences/programmes in-country, and setting and managing expectations. This phase is also a time to set standards (baseline data) for monitoring and evaluation. Other areas of focus include:

- Ownership: identifying, supporting and building upon local initiatives; building local capacity to lead any reform programme into the future.
- Partnership: involve local networks, for example the Africa Security Sector Network (ASSN) which has local expertise, knowledge and research capacity.
- Building political will, dialogue and popular support to encourage, where possible, national dialogues which bring government, security and justice institutions and civil society actors together to discuss relevant issues.
- Understanding incentives and disincentives for reform which can be facilitated through promoting broader discussion and engagement.
- Underlining the importance of viewing SSR as a public policy issue.

24. An inception phase allows donors to develop ‘quick win/do no harm’ activities that build confidence between partners and helps donors understand the challenges and needs of the reform process. Some ‘quick win’ activities may include:

- South-South Dialogue.
- Roundtables on security and justice service delivery, parliamentary oversight, community policing, etc.
- Training programmes: it is important to balance training on capacity with issues of accountability and governance, as there is a risk that security actors will latch on to capacity training and justify a narrow focus on certain specific issues. Stand alone technical training programmes for security actors do not constitute a SSR programme. However, they can make a significant contribution if delivered in support of a broader longer-term strategic engagement which addresses both governance and capacity issues in pursuit of improved delivery of security and justice for all.
- Exchanges: both South-South and North-South exchanges their own particular benefits that should be considered along with programme objectives.

25. The inception phase helps create the space for a broader dialogue on issues of security and justice. It is important to be aware that the inception phase does not necessarily mean that a full scale SSR process will emerge. It may become evident that there is no added value from the engagement of the international community on the issue at a given time.

### **Conducting an SSR Assessment**

26. As the **international community moves from *ad hoc, often short-term* projects to a more strategic engagement**, a more sophisticated and comprehensive approach to undertaking assessments is required. Such an assessment tool should inform the design of realistic, focused programmes which can make significant contributions to supporting partner countries to address the security and justice needs of all citizens.

27. An SSR assessment should cover:

- Political analysis, the security context, capacity and governance, and the needs of the poor, marginalised groups and all citizens. Contextual analysis conducted in the inception phase will help to identify constraints and opportunities for security system reform.
- Ensuring a balance between building capacity (technical competence) and integrity (quality of governance) within security institutions is vital.

28. SSR assessments can occur in tandem with, and be facilitated by, the inception phase. Unless an assessment is carried out in partnership with national authorities or is driven by local processes, the impact of the process will be limited and in the long term it is highly unlikely that programmes will prove effective or sustainable. Assessment should also identify how donors' engagement can add value. It is, however, important to note that there are two types of assessment that involve similar questions but may have different outputs and processes: analysis conducted by the donor – or jointly among donors – of the context in which they are engaging; and an assessment conducted by the partner country and supported by donor(s) with a view to developing an SSR strategy or programme(s). The IF-SSR provides an analytical framework of questions that can inform both types of assessment. As women and men can experience insecurity differently, ensuring gender perspective in assessments is essential.

29. How the reform process can be monitored and evaluated should be kept in mind throughout the assessment phase. For instance, baseline data collection, and other assessment activities need to ensure that basic standards are recorded that will facilitate future evaluations. Building local capacity and using local expertise is important when developing baseline data, though this may be more complex when conducting the political analysis component of the assessment.

30. Donors need to be realistic about what can be achieved in the short, medium and long term, and carefully match resources and policies to realistic programmes and strategies. These include issues such as the risks of not engaging in SSR and, if engaging, what kinds of expectations and needs exist.

### **Programme Design and Implementation**

31. Taking a *multi-layered, multi-stakeholder approach to SSR* helps target donor assistance to those providers – state and non-state actors simultaneously – at the multiple points at which actual day-to-day service delivery occurs. A multi-layered strategy helps respond to the short term needs of enhanced security and justice service delivery while also building the medium term needs of state capacity. This approach helps donors to understand better that engagement in SSR involves work at different levels with regard to service delivery: (1) state service delivery; (2) the contours of state (regulation, licensing, minimum standards, partnerships); (3) non-state service delivery; and (4) civil society.

32. *Donors need to support partner countries to lead SSR processes* in this politically sensitive area: local ownership, or better yet, leadership, where possible, is the starting point. Donors should not do the thinking and strategising for national counterparts. In some cases, donors may support partner country-led assessments/reviews of the system, designed with a view to developing reform programmes.

33. The design of SSR strategies and programmes may be best undertaken when the international community matches the right instruments and funding mechanisms to the particular country context. There are different approaches to designing an SSR programme or overarching strategy. A comprehensive understanding should inform a focussed approach. Some options derived from practitioners and examples of current experience include taking or developing the following examples of approaches, frameworks or instruments:

- An **issues-based/problem-solving approach** involves focusing on one security issue as an entry-point to the wider security system. This approach may enable linkages to develop more naturally. Focusing on ‘problem solving’ can make the outputs of the reform process more visible and increase buy-in. Such an approach also results in the development of programmes that are designed to address key needs, as was the case in developing the Multi-Ethnic Policing Element in south Serbia in 2001 as part of the need to ensure basic security in a multi-ethnic, and conflict prone, environment.
- An **institutional approach** can be taken where there are existing pro-reform initiatives at an institutional level which can be supported, as was the case with prison reform in Nigeria in the 1990s. There is also a need to support and strengthen linkages between security and justice institutions with this approach, as lessons from many donor assistance programmes stress the failure of projects targeted at single institutions – for example strengthening the police in emergency post-conflict situations, such as Haiti or Solomon Island, led to overcrowded prisons and the need to work with the judiciary and the prison service.
- **Government-initiated reviews** that facilitate a National Assessment process, as was the case in Jamaica in 2002 which led to the development of a national strategy for SSR.
- SSR should be an integral part of the planning process for **immediate ‘post-conflict stabilisation’ and peace support operations**, to prevent a disjointed to post-conflict engagement and to take a more strategic approach from the outset that includes a comprehensive strategy for sustainable peace. The inclusion of SSR in the strategic planning for peace support operations is crucial, even if much of the substantive operational elements, particularly related to institutional development and mechanisms for civilian oversight, cannot be set in motion in the early phases of the process. Moreover, decisions and activities undertaken in the early phases – from the provisions of peace agreements, to DDR, to PCNAs – will impact the security system and, in turn, subsequent SSR
- **Thematic-based engagement** involves focusing on thematic issues such as juveniles, public order or election security. The latter has been used effectively as an entry-point for broader SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
- An approach that helps create a dialogue on security issues and the demand for reform can be achieved by **working through civil society**. This approach to taken successfully in both in Ghana and Guatemala.

34. *Donors also have a range of funding instruments for SSR at their disposal.* The applicability of each instrument, from project aid to programmes support to sector-wide approaches, will depend on the reform needs and phase of the reform process. Project support may be useful in the inception phase, to limit the risk of partner country expectation and as a means of providing incentives for reform. As local ownership and leadership increases other financing instruments such as SWAs can be useful as a mean of supporting planning and policy development.

35. It is important to aligning support to the **dominant incentive frameworks** and drivers for change. This will ideally mean **national development plans** (e.g., Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) or National Development Strategies). Though this approach is under-utilised, where it is used, it has been effective in putting the issue of security and justice reforms on the national political agenda. SSR should be included in other frameworks such as Transitional Results Matrices (TRMs), Post-conflict Needs Assessments (PCNA), and any UN Integrated Mission Planning Framework.

36. Programmes need to be designed to be attuned to political realities (both donor and partner country realities). This requires:
- Realism (achievable objectives, timescales, funding levels, political complexities);
  - Flexibility (knowledge management, encouraging innovation, rewarding lessons identified and acted upon); and
  - Sustainability (primacy of local ownership, building capacity, on-going affordability, institutional absorption reflected in management processes, etc.).

### **Implementation and Managing an SSR programme**

37. The IF-SSR outlines some common challenges faced when implementing SSR and provides practical advice on how these can be overcome, including:
- **Develop an SSR Strategy:** a framework is required to guide the reform process, set benchmarks and highlight where development agency engagement is required and adds value.
  - **Implement whole-of-government approaches:** coordinating the interventions of different departments in donor governments is sometimes as challenging as inter-donor coordination. The involvement of a myriad of actors, often with different agendas and objectives (e.g. counter terrorism vs. poverty reduction) could lead to different actors working at cross purposes. The IF-SSR provides a framework for whole-of-government and cross agency coordination.
  - **Develop a communications strategy:** failures in communication have undermined many SSR programmes. Communication needs to happen at many levels, including between international actors, between international actors and national partner country governments, between government departments in the partner country, and between partner country governments and the public.
  - **Regulate private SSR contractors:** many donor-funded SSR programmes are now being implemented by private sector companies and NGOs. This trend towards contracting out has potentially significant implications for accountability and quality control.
  - Staff continuity, having the right staff in the right place at the right time is a serious challenge:
    - **Understand the different personnel needs** between crisis management (stabilisation) and stability (more development-oriented) missions to ensure the right expertise and technical skills are available for an SSR programme. Integrated teams that bring together technical expertise with the necessary political, management and communications skills are critical.
    - **Don't weaken local institutions by poaching staff:** Experienced local staff are often in high demand in fragile states. International organisations are often tempted to poach local staff from partner governments and NGOs, but this can weaken the capacity of important local institutions.
  - **Focus on capacity development:** International actors often get frustrated with the slow progress of programmes and begin to implement themselves, leaving local actors behind. While this may speed up the process, and sometimes lead to short-term outputs, it undermines long-term impact by alienating local stakeholders.
  - **Recognise that oversight is often overlooked:** Development agencies tend to focus on short-term, high visibility projects such as training; there is reluctance to engage in what can be difficult and challenging programmes that include accountability and



management reform. Without balancing capacity development and governance, the impact of SSR programmes will be limited.

### **Sector-specific guidance: key objectives**

38. Recognising that donors often use support for reform in specific sectors as an entry-point for broader reform programmes, the *IF-SSR also provides guidance on reform sector by sector*. While engagement in a particular sector might be used as an entry-point, it is essential to maintain a strategic view of the reform process and to develop links between reform across the justice and security system. The sector guidance covers: how to link reforms to the broader system; how to sequence reforms; potential starting points for reform; particular programme design issues; and some common challenges and particular features of post-conflict SSR in each sector. The sectors include: i) civilian oversight and accountability; ii) defence reform; iii) intelligence and security services reform; iv) border management; v) policing; vi) justice and rule of law reform; vii) private security and military companies; and viii) civil society.

39. While it is important to provide some guidance to donors by sector, there are many crucial cross-cutting issues that are highlighted as relevant across the security system. Such issues include: how security policy/strategy is developed; and oversight/accountability and how to ensure development of an adequate regulatory framework. Policy development; planning and budgeting; gender and working with civil society organisations are also covered. These issues – as well as clear indications of the importance of making the linkages to other parts of the security system and ways in which this can be achieved – should be part of any sector-specific support. The developmental goal of supporting partner countries in realising security and justice for all citizens – in particular poor and marginalised groups – should be a central point in all sector-specific work.

### **Monitoring and evaluating SSR programmes**

40. The IF-SSR provides an assessment tool that focuses on impact and outcomes. Monitoring and evaluation issues tend to be under-developed for programming in conflict prevention and peace building in general and specifically for security system reform work. Not only is establishing a system of monitoring and evaluation a part of good programming, but it can also help to understand or identify issues including:

- What impact it has had on improving the safety, security and access to justice of local people.
- Indicators of sustainability (local ownership, development of local capacity, long-term affordability, process indicators, etc.).
- Opportunities to support broader programme objectives (e.g., partnering with local organisations and/or government institutions, capacity development, engagement with local communities, etc.)
- Incentives to undertake M&E and ways to develop national capacity.

41. This section will evolve as CPDC work on the evaluation of conflict prevention and peace building develops and sharpens approaches to guidance in this challenging field and draw in any specific lessons for M&E for SSR and related issues.

## Issues of donor co-ordination/harmonisation and future pilot testing

42. As with all development activities, donor coordination is a key but challenging endeavour. The political nature and cross-government interest in security issues, however, makes coordination of SSR all the more difficult. There is broad agreement on the purposes of aid co-ordination: resources should be delivered efficiently and effectively; the contributions of the many donors involved should be complementary and allocated in line with local priorities and policies.

43. When considering coordination mechanisms at field level, it is important to retain the key starting point of local ownership and ensure that the partner country government leads on co-ordination, where possible. External assistance must build on, and not substitute for national capacities, resources and initiatives. Donor coordination should be based, wherever possible, on the principles of the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* (2005). The donor/development agency supporting the coordination process should engage for the medium to long-term, as that is the required timeline for SSR and indeed any conflict prevention and peace building activity.

44. Given that co-ordination is voluntary, its success depends upon the extent to which it adds value to the operations of individual donors and agencies. Such value-added results might include independent needs assessment, and access to information or the conduct of negotiations with partner institutions on behalf of all donors, in order to better define where donor support is required. The voluntary character of aid co-ordination also makes it fundamentally different from the concept of "management", which implies substantial control of the various elements present<sup>15</sup>. Good co-ordination should not be construed as forcing all activities into a single mould. Diversity of approaches, including experimentation with new methods, can contribute to co-ordination.

45. In addition, there needs to be a clear discussion on the division of roles and responsibilities within the international community: contradictory roles will hamper implementation and undermine the legitimacy of engagement. Experience suggests that the co-ordination of technical and financial assistance benefits from the leadership of a bilateral or multilateral agency or donor that is recognised as credible by donors and aid recipients. Different agencies and donors have performed this role and it seems appropriate that flexibility in assuming leadership be retained. The lead agency is responsible for the proper dissemination of information in the otherwise disorderly environment which is likely to exist during or in the aftermath of the crisis.

46. Efforts at co-ordination should concentrate on promoting coherent approaches to critical objectives. Whatever the mechanisms established, care must be taken that co-ordination does not inhibit rapid responses and innovation by individual donors. What is essential is that donors agree a strategic framework within which they conduct their operations according to their own comparative advantages, while working together. The IF-SSR provides such a framework for improved donor co-ordination in SSR; by providing:

- An agreed understanding of the political nature of SSR; which makes it imperative for donors and development agencies to speak with one voice on such sensitive issues.
- An agreed process on SSR programming and the main facets of a development approach to supporting SSR processes.

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<sup>15</sup> OECD DAC Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violence Conflict (2001).

- An agreed assessment framework to which donors [have] signed up and which is comprehensive both in terms of governance, context and capacity development issues.
- A process for developing a common strategy agreed among donors and recipients.

47. The SSR Task Team is currently developing a plan to pilot the IF-SSR as a coordination mechanism in 2007-08.



# **ANNEX**



Expert Workshop on  
**Developing a Security Sector Reform (SSR) Concept for the  
United Nations**

**Friday, 7 July 2006, 09.00–18.00  
Bratislava, Slovakia**

**PROGRAMME**

*08.30–09.00 Registration and Coffee*

**09.00–09.45 Opening Remarks**

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- *Chair:* **Marcel Peško**, Director, UN Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia
- **Ján Kubiš**, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic
- **Tomáš Valášek**, Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic (on behalf of the Minister of Defence of the Slovak Republic)

**09.45–11.00 Session 1: International Approaches to Security Sector Reform**

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- *Chair:* **Theodor H. Winkler**, Ambassador, Director DCAF
- **David Law**, Senior Fellow, Coordinator of SSR Working Group, DCAF
- **Graham Thomson**, Head of OECD Task Team on SSR for DAC CPDC Network
- **Christophe Deherre**, Civ-Mil Cell of the EU Military Staff

*11.00–11.30 Coffee Break*

**11.30–13.00 Session 2: UN Approaches to SSR: Conceptual Considerations**

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- *Chair:* **Peter Burian**, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations in New York
- **Heiner Hänggi**, Assistant Director and Head of Research, DCAF
- **David Harland**, Director Change Management, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UN Secretariat
- **Kelvin Ong**, JSSR Team Leader, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

*13.00–14.30 Buffet-Lunch*

### **14.30–16.00 Session 3: Approaches to SSR: Lessons Learned from the Field**

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- *Chair:* **Ben Slay**, Director, Bratislava Regional Centre of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- **Frode Muring**, UNDP Resident Representative in Kosovo
- **Susan Pond**, Head Partnership for Peace & Cooperation Programmes, Political Affairs & Security Policy Division International Staff, NATO
- **Lamberto Zannier**, Director, OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre
- **André Nikwigize**, UNOWA, Dakar

*16.00–16.30 Coffee Break*

### **16.30–17.30 Session 4: Developing a UN SSR Concept – What Role for the UNSC?**

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- *Chair:* **Tomáš Valášek**, Director, Security & Defence Policy Division, Ministry of Defence of Slovakia
- **Adedeji Ebo**, Senior Fellow, Coordinator of Africa Working Group, DCAF
- **Sessions Chairs' Comments and Remarks**

### **17.30–18.00 Conclusions**

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- **Theodor H. Winkler**, DCAF
- **Marcel Pesko**, Director, UN Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia