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OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

COMPETENCES AND RESPONSIBILITY
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
FOR THE EUROPEAN SECURITY;
ROLE AND PLACE
OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE.
PARLIAMENTARY POINT OF VIEW

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WIDEN OR WITHER?: THE CHALLENGES OF NATO ENLARGEMENT*

"This paper focuses on the question of NATO enlargement, the implications for member countries, for would-be members, and more generally the possible impact of enlargement on the overall security situation in Europe.

But first a few words about the *raison d'être* of NATO and the rationale for its role in Central and Eastern European security. This is an old debate which has been rekindled as the question of enlargement has moved into the strategic limelight. And the voices which have argued for NATO's disappearance have not just been Russian. In late April, for example, on prime-time CNN, the editor of the American publication Harper's Bazaar asserted that while NATO had been one of the most successful alliances in history, it had outlived its usefulness, and should be replaced by other arrangements.

THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE

But what other arrangements? There are at least three tasks — in addition to the classical mission of **TERRITORIAL SELF-DEFENCE** — which no other body engaged in European security can contend with, or is likely to be able to contend with, for some time to come:

- **EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER:** One is to ensure that no European power can move into a position of hegemony over others. In the 1990s, this requires capacities for collective defence and collective security. Only NATO can deliver both.
- **CORE SUPPORT FOR PEACE-KEEPING:** A second is to provide the core support for larger peace-keeping and peace-making actions. Neither the WEU nor the OSCE has the experience or the fire-power to mount larger operations without NATO support.
- **DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY:** A third is to safeguard and develop the solidarity of the world's most advanced democracies. If the Western European and North American democracies fail to sustain their cooperation under post-Cold War circumstances, then what can be expected of other countries with little or no

* See Appendix 2 (Pros and Cons of Widening).

tradition of voluntary, multilateral cooperation? The bilateral treaties between the United States and Canada, on one hand, and the European Union, on the other, are important complements to the multilateral relationship which exists in the NATO context but cannot be substitutes for them. Similarly, the OSCE, with its "soft" security perspective and its non-existent military capabilities can complement, but not substitute for, NATO.

All these factors have been at work in the decisions to create the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the NAA's parallel initiatives at parliamentary level, to establish Partnership for Peace, and most recently to launch the study on NATO enlargement. In particular, Alliance outreach activities have been motivated by the belief that the 16 can demonstrate an extremely successful record in multilateral security cooperation, and by the expectation that this experience can be emulated elsewhere. The Allies operate under the assumption that multilateral security cooperation is in itself stabilising in that it has a pacifying effect on participating countries and can provide reassurance to third parties. They further assume that countries which cooperate closely with the Alliance can come to enjoy the same kind of benefits as NATO member countries have historically enjoyed. For example,

- the development of a tradition of fruitful and fair politico-military cooperation between countries of different strategic weight (e.g., on the model of the US and Luxembourg which have the same voting rights at NATO);
- the establishment of new relationships between former enemies (e.g., France-Germany);
- the containment of regional rivalries (e.g., Greece-Turkey);
- the encouragement of regional integration (EU), and
- the nurturing of a security environment conducive to the development of rule of law, prospering economies and democratic institutions.

To the extent that NATO remains capable of contributing in these ways in the post-Cold War security environment, its continuing existence is in the interest of democrats and democracy-builders throughout the OSCE area. For example, a Russian policy maker who wishes to spur the democratic evolution of his own country has a vital stake in the political and military presence of the North American democracies in Europe, for this remains the single most important external factor capable of checking forces in Moscow tempted to resort to foreign policy adventurism as an alternative to pursuing Russia's transformation.

That is the theory. But critics are on solid ground who maintain that transatlantic solidarity has taken a number of body blows in the last two to three years, and that in consequence the Alliance's credibility as an exporter of security to its Eastern neighbours has been sorely compromised. Manifestations of strains in transatlantic relations have ranged widely, from radically diverging approaches to ethnic conflict in Europe, to free trade, fishing quotas and financial management. However, the overarching problem has been the breakdown in leadership within the Alliance.

With the changes in strategic realities in post-Cold War Europe and the enhanced importance attached to domestic issues in the United States, there has been a fundamental change in the American approach to European security, without this having been as yet translated into leadership patterns within the Alliance. During the

Cold War, the United States was prepared to take the lead in European security. With the end of the Cold War, it looked to Europe to assume this responsibility, and to itself to support Europe as justified and as possible. This corresponded of course to the longstanding ambition of integrated Europe to play such a role, and was made additionally palatable by the assumption shared on both sides of the Atlantic that with the fall of the USSR the requisite circumstances had finally fallen into place.

In the meantime, however, and notwithstanding the great energy and hope which went into the Maastricht Treaty, Europe has not proven itself capable of providing effective leadership. This is as much a question of structure as of political will. Security decision-making remains in national hands. Control of available resources for defence remains splintered. Worse, the trend in European councils is towards inter-governmentalism and renationalisation at a time when the direction, certainly in the area of foreign and security policy, should be towards Europeanisation. In reaction, Washington's stance towards European security has vacillated from neo-leadership to neo-isolationism.

This has had a calamitous effect on Western crisis management efforts, as recent events in the former Yugoslavia, in particular, have underlined. There we are witness to

- an America which is essentially on the sidelines in the first shooting war in Europe for decades,
- a NATO which is crippled not only by its own divisions but which is hostage to the vagaries of Russia's transformation process, and
- a conflict which stubbornly continues with its ever-present, and growing, threat of spill-over and imitation in other theatres.

Unless decisions are forthcoming at the latest at the next intergovernmental conference of the EU which allow Europe to start taking an effective lead in its security*, then:

- there will be a heightened risk of war in Europe and in flanking areas on the FRY-model,
- the trend towards renationalisation within the EU will be reinforced, and
- in parallel, there will be decreasing support in North America for engagement in Europe.

* This is admittedly an extremely tall order but the current intergovernmentalist approach is a recipe for (even more) disaster. There is no prospect whatsoever of the EU being able to take the lead in dealing with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia on the basis of policies which represent the lowest common denominator agreed by its now 15 member governments. A radical change of course, one which reverses present trends towards renationalisation of security policy, is indispensable. In the security field, what is required is the transformation of the Eurocorps into a EUROLEGION, a volunteer, rapid-reaction force under a European command, responsible to a directly-elected European President, working alongside residual national forces with classical defence tasks. Only in this way can the limitations placed on the European nation-state by history and resources be overcome. This would allow the EU to develop a critical mass of capability for a range of contingencies. As European soldiers, German volunteers would have no constraints on their deployability. Similarly, the defence resources of several smaller states, now unusable except in the national theatre, could be more effectively brought to bear. The availability of a 50,000 man-strong at the outset of the violence in the former Yugoslavia and a level of European sovereignty capable of deciding on its deployment would have given the EU a conflict suffocation capability which was credible enough to secure US support, discourage Russia's temporising attitude to the conflict and pacify combatants. It might well have made all the difference.

Under such circumstances, of course, the prospects for an extension of security guarantees to states in Central and Eastern Europe would dim considerably. This may sound paradoxical at a time when in the US Congress, Republicans and Democrats have been competing for the high ground on the enlargement issue. But this is more a reflection of the realities of electoral politics and fund-raising imperatives than duly considered strategic calculation. It by no means prejudices how Congressional votes will be cast if and when a decision on enlargement has to be ratified.

THE POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR ENLARGEMENT

Against this background, it is instructive to look at the decision taken by NATO Foreign Ministers last December to launch the study on enlargement and the policy framework they developed for the further handling of the enlargement question. Their communiqué sets out the guidelines for enlargement as concerns conditionality, eligibility, modalities, as well as defining the mandate of the study.

On the question of *Conditionality*: Ministers said that they "... expect and would welcome NATO enlargement .."

This is at first sight a very upbeat statement. But note the contrast with the very tough conditions which are attached to it. Enlargement is to

- strengthen the effectiveness of the Alliance,
- contribute to the stability and security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area,
- support the objective of maintaining an undivided Europe,
- preserve the Alliance's ability to carry out both collective defence and collective security functions, and
- uphold the principles and objectives of the Washington Treaty.

On the question of *Eligibility*: the Alliance is said to be "open to all membership of other European states", as foreseen in Article X of the Washington Treaty. The only possible restriction which is mentioned in this connection is the suggested complementarity with EU enlargement.

As concerns *Modalities*, reference is made to

- full membership as the ultimate goal, i.e. not associate status of one sort or the other,
- decision-making on enlargement having to be on a "case-by-case" basis,
- the need for a concomitant intensification of relations with all Partners, and
- the unacceptability of any third-party veto over enlargement decisions

Lastly, as concerns the *Mandate*, the enlargement study is to be completed by the end of 1995, and is to focus on how enlargement is to proceed, the principles guiding the process and the implications of membership, not the question of which country or countries would be invited to join the Alliance or the time framework for possible enlargement. In other words, this is a whether-and-how, not a who-and-when, study.

THE CHALLENGES OF ENLARGEMENT

The enlargement debate is closer to its beginning than its end. The document to be presented to Ministers next December will provide no more than general in-

indications of how the Alliance plans to proceed. At this stage then, NATO is preparing a road map, but one without any place-names. Moreover, as suggested above, the debate seems likely to become more complicated as it evolves. There is a series of highly intricate problems — as much about sociology as about strategy — which will have to be resolved if NATO's own conditions for widening the Alliance are to be met. By this author's reckoning, the key issues are five in number:

- coming to a common understanding of the purpose of NATO enlargement;
- safeguarding Alliance cohesion;
- devising fair, consistent, and workable criteria for enlargement;
- choosing between a large or mini-enlargement & developing reassurance measures as necessary; and
- coping with Russia and related CIS issues.

THE PURPOSE OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

Successful enlargement necessitates, on the part of both current and prospective members of the Alliance, a common understanding of what NATO membership is all about, and a preparedness to accept the new responsibilities which would result from enlargement.

All the signs are that the Alliance is not very taken with the notion that membership is only about integration. This is understandable for two reasons. The first one resides in the concern that any undervaluing of the Article V commitment to collective defence in the enlargement process would erode the significance of the Washington treaty for the 16. The second problem is that if enlargement is deemed to be essentially about integration, then the question arises whether under prevailing circumstances this is not really the business of the European Union.

It is difficult to imagine that the Allies will not decide that enlargement is not about both. At any event, the collective defence dimension of enlargement raises questions affecting a number of highly sensitive matters such as

- levels of defence spending,
- restructuring in the international arms industry,
- the stationing of forces,
- the nuclear profile of the Alliance, and
- not only the benefit of the security guarantee embodied in Article V, but also the obligation to go to the defence of one's Allies.

Lively domestic debates can be expected in all countries concerned as the enlargement debate enters the province of parliaments and their publics.

SAFEGUARDING ALLIED COHESION

Protecting Allied cohesion is a second challenge. The concerns here are five-fold:

- How does one manage the further category of participation in NATO activities that enlargement will create? This will mean the additional status of new or prospective new members alongside the already complicated array of full members, NACC participants, and countries in various modes of involvement in Partnership for Peace activities.
- Enlargement has implications for the way NATO, NACC and PFP interact. Care will have to be taken to ensure that enlargement does not diminish the attractiveness of NACC and PFP, and perhaps even kill them off altogether.
- Enlargement to countries at odds bilaterally can work both ways. Joint NATO membership can have a containing effect. But too much of the inter-Alliance wrangling of the kind which NATO has known since Greece and Turkey became members in 1952 would be bad for cohesion. NATO's ability to act as a pacifier on behalf of its own members has noticeably waned since the end of the Cold War. There are doubtless limits here which should not be tested.
- Enlargement will in general be taxing for inter-allied consultations. Interests within an Alliance stretching from Alaska to Anatolia are by definition diverse. They have become even more subject to regional pressures since the end of the Cold War, and can be expected to be much on display in decision-making about enlargement.
- Enlargement will by definition be messy. Spain, the last new member of NATO, required roughly half a decade from its original decision to accede to the Alliance to the holding of a referendum to confirm the original decision as well as the terms of its confirmed membership. The process is likely to be similar in other countries.

FAIR, CONSISTENT AND WORKABLE CRITERIA

A third challenge is to devise criteria for deciding on new members which make good sense not only from the vantage point of old and new members but also from that of non- or not-yet members.

The terms of the Washington Treaty only stipulate that new members must be in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. Whether the Allies actually end up publishing a list of criteria or not, the reasoning behind specific invitations to join the Alliance will be subject to close scrutiny. Amongst the questions which NATO has to address in this connection are the following:

- Should it be the most advanced reformers which are the first to join NATO?
- Should it be those which most actively participate in NACC and PFP activities?
- Should it be the most likely first candidates for the next EU enlargement?
- Should contiguity to NATO territory and non-contiguity to Russian territory be a determinant?

The answers to these questions are less clear-cut than suggested in most expert commentary. For example, if NATO prioritises the leading would-be EU adherents for membership, then it signals that it is prepared to disadvantage those CEE countries which are poorer and less capable of financing their security. Similarly, by vir-

tue of the approach to contiguity formulated above, Armenia would qualify for inclusion but not Poland — nor for that matter would existing members, Norway and Turkey. Assuming that it will prove possible to devise a workable grid of criteria, there is the additional difficulty of measuring to what extent a country satisfies individual requirements and of weighting the importance of individual factors in enlargement decision-making.

LARGE OR MINI-ENLARGEMENT?

A fourth problem concerns whether enlargement should embrace several countries or whether it should be confined to just a few. A large enlargement would appoint fewer would-be adherents but exacerbate managerial problems for the Alliance and possibly appear more threatening to third parties. A mini-enlargement on the other hand would call for flanking measures to reassure those left out of the process — either temporarily until the next "cut", or altogether — and, as needs be, to ensure that non-inclusion would not be interpreted as a vote of non-confidence from abroad in the domestic reform process.

This concern may be exaggerated. It can be argued that the promise of later membership would provide a useful incentive to reform laggards. It seems more likely, however, that the most trying task of enlargement will be to ensure that the benefits of integrating certain countries are not outweighed by the disadvantages flowing to others, and in the process by any unintended, generalised destabilisation of security relationships in Europe.

A major problem in this regard is how enlargement will impact on the relationships between states with overlapping ethnic make-ups. There is hardly a state in the widening queue which does not, at least not potentially, fall into this category. Then there is the difficulty which could arise if a new adherent to NATO were to use the consensus rule to block the accession of a country with which it was bilaterally estranged. If NATO wants its own stringent conditions to be met, it will have to demonstrate that enlargement will not have an adverse effect on inter-state and inter-communal relations.

THE RUSSIA/CIS FACTOR

The Alliance has stated that Russia should have no veto in its decision-making which seems fully justified if only because NATO has none in Moscow or anywhere else in the CIS. At the same time, neither the 16 of NATO nor any other OSCE states can, or should, have a serious interest in a deterioration of NATO/Russian relations. As regards possible ways for handling Russia, there are three main schools of thought.

One is that the West cannot influence the situation in Russia one way or the other and that ineluctably, relations are bound to get worse, as indeed they have during the last months with Russia's prosecution of the Chechnya War. Moscow's mounting onslaught on CFE, the open doubting of Start II ratification, and so on. In this view, the West has been throwing its time, energy and money away in a futile

effort to change what is unchangeable, and now the only possible course is to enlarge to as many countries as possible, as expeditiously as possible.

Another view is that Russia's resistance to enlargement can be mitigated, and eventually overcome,

- by extending to it a privileged consultative status with NATO, the so-called strategic partnership,
- by strengthening the OSCE, and
- by more generally continuing to be prepared to bankroll the reform process, reinforce the Russian role in the G-7 context, etc.

This approach confronts the Allies with the following conundrum. If their relationship with Russia becomes overly privileged, then NATO risks giving it the "droit de regard" which it has consistently claimed is a non-starter, and betraying its own tradition whereby all countries have the same say, at least formally, in the consultative process. If, on the other hand, the special relationship with Russia is not special enough, then it is unlikely to have the desired effect in Moscow.

- According to a third approach, NATO has to accept that Russia is a country engulfed in a wrenching process of transformation, its political processes caught in a brittle balance between forces poised to move forward, sideways or backwards
- the population is overwhelmingly preoccupied with the dynamics of day-to-day survival,
- the country's collective mind-set is top heavy with its history of being invaded from western parts, a history which originated well before the creation of the USSR, and that therefore NATO enlargement could easily compromise those forces which have advocated close relations with the West and precipitate a dangerous shift in the domestic balance of power.

A related difficulty concerns Russia's relationship with other CIS states and, in particular, the impact of NATO enlargement on the ongoing debate within the elites of Russia and other Republics of the former Soviet Union concerning bilateral and multilateral relations, and especially security structures. The most critical case is the Russia-Ukraine relationship. What would be the impact of a NATO enlargement which excluded the Ukraine? Would it strengthen or weaken the forces in favour of strategic accommodation with Moscow? Would it be likely, in either case, to propel the Ukraine towards reconsideration of its nuclear stance? Would NATO enlargement go down in history as the development which triggered a reinforcement of the CIS, and perhaps even its westward expansion?

* * *

In summary, NATO has to win two major wagers in proceeding with enlargement.

The first wager is whether it will be able to devise an enlargement package which is good for Europe as a whole, in other words, one which ensures that the changed security situation of new members does not result in a worsening of the se-

curity of non-members, and thus ultimately in the deterioration of the security environment for new and old NATO members alike.

The second wager is whether the European members of the Alliance will succeed in effectively re-engineering European security cooperation at the level of the WEU and EU. Can the integrated European states bring about changes in the way these institutions go about their business, such that they become capable of assuming the leadership role in the transatlantic partnership, thereby safeguarding the relationship on which European security will continue to depend into the foreseeable future? If NATO's institutional expansion is arguably not essential to its survival, the successful re-engineering of the transatlantic partnership most certainly is. At the same time, it is the precondition for a successful extension of NATO's security culture to Central and Eastern Europe, whatever form that extension may take in fu-

DISCUSSION I

Mr Javier Ruperez (MP, Spain, OSCE PA) congratulated Mr Law on his excellent presentation. But wondered if the speaker had not drawn the wrong conclusion that NATO cannot be enlarged in view of the enormity of difficulties involved and the lack of readiness on the part of the present NATO members to face such difficulties. He did not think it was Mr Law's intention and what he said should be viewed in the context of the statement of the Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs on the goals sought by Poland in joining the Alliance. He thought that perhaps the matter could be approached from a more political rather than technical and logistical angle.

Obviously, NATO would expect Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic to be guided by democratic principles and market economy with civilian authority over the military. It was unacceptable to any member country the military to play a dominant role. Also, each new member should be able to make its own contribution to security and not be just a consumer of security guarantees. Moreover, the candidates should be able to have under control all bilateral problems or their own internal questions. It may not be expected that NATO would undertake to digest the individual problems of these countries. The Treaty Articles 4 and 5 refer to possibilities of extension of security guarantees through the necessity of modernization of armed forces. Such would be the expectations of both the Alliance and the candidates. This should be clearly perceived and identified. What should not be expected were miracles. Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic may not expect all their problems to be resolved by the accession to NATO alone. Also unthinkable was a substitution of national efforts of a specific state by NATO effort or action. Those countries might not assume that by joining NATO and WEU their own individual national efforts would cease.

On the other hand, it would be NATO's mistake to refuse membership to those countries. Once all the conditions contained in the Washington Treaty were met by a country in question, it would not be right to reject NATO enlargement for strictly technical, logistic considerations. Then NATO would not be faithful to the Washington Treaty spirit.

He thought it would also be wrong to refuse admission because of the Russian reaction. He regretted the absence of Russia's representatives in the room and the loss of opportunity to have a frank and open dialogue with them. Still, the capability

for influencing situation in Russia was very limited. He felt that no one from the outside could veto an accession of any new member to NATO.

When Spain was joining, it was not interested in security guarantees to the degree that Poland is now. Spain did not join for motives of security guarantees. That was also the position of the Polish Minister when he stated that Poland at the moment did not require immediate security guarantees. Spain joined guided by a sense of belonging to the world to which for so many years Spaniards had felt they should belong — that of democracy, justice, market economy. It would be wrong, he repeated, if those seeking to join were refused. He thought that the cases of Poland, Hungary, Romania, or other countries wishing to join, should be examined from a common point of view.

Russian reaction was determined. In 1991, when Spain first came out with the idea, Russian diplomacy reacted strongly, with threats. In the Spanish case, he recalled, there had also been threats. And nothing happened. He thought the same might apply to the present situation. Fortunately, Russia was no longer a Soviet Union, so the situation was different.

He corrected the statement that it had taken Spain half a decade to join after the internal doubts had been resolved. The process started in October 1981 and concluded in May 1982, after the debate in the Cortes Generales.

He concluded that enlargement of NATO was not impossible.

Mr Zmago Jelincic (MP, Slovenia), quoted the view of economists that not confrontation but polarization was necessary in a healthy economy. Neither, could football game be played with one team only. Economy was very important for NATO members and therefore the enlargement process would not be good for them. NATO, then, could be enlarged in a controlled way. NATO enlargement would mean limitations, in a sense. For instance, if the access was only to take care of Poland, the Czech Republic, or Baltic states — maybe a conflict would follow similar to that in former Yugoslavia. He said he distributed a text on the subject hoping that, although it was not an official opinion expressed on behalf of his government, the participants might find the paper to be of interest.

He asked Mr Law for comment.

Mr Lluís Maria de Puig (MP, Spain, WEU Assembly), spoke in his capacity of WEU representative from a viewpoint of constructing common defence, common defence policy or establishing a European defence structure. At the same time, he belonged among those believing NATO to be one of identity elements of European defence and one of principal elements of that identity as well as European defence structure. One should fully realize NATO role when organizing this structure. Sometimes, however — he noted — in trying to bring WEU and NATO closer to each other, there were certain factors on the part of NATO, with the United States seeming reluctant to exchange information and being careful about certain logistic aspects, to creating operational mechanisms towards bringing the two organizations closer.

He turned to Mr Law for comment on these matters constituting a difficulty in the dynamics of creating common European defence structure.

The Chair, seeing that most questions were addressed to Mr Law, gave him the floor.

Mr David M. Law stressed that indeed the process was full of challenges. He found it difficult to compare Spain — a stable country, with fixed borders, having no frontier with Russia or non-NATO member countries, in the time of the Cold War discipline — with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Also, the transition from communist rule in CEE countries was more difficult than the departure from fascist government. It would take, under the incomparably more difficult situation, more time before certain things were settled.

If there was, as Mr Puig said, a certain reticence, which the speaker did not see, the US hesitation was perhaps over.

If WEU still hesitated it was natural, because organizations headed by bureaucracies do. The US believed that it can support these security structures. Security guarantees, the matter that will have to be resolved when enlarging the NATO, were not yet raised by its members. A question emerged: who, in the worst scenario, would defend the new NATO members? He hoped that the question would never have to be answered. To achieve the critical mass of troops able to enter in a crisis situation in the CEE countries, the German soldiers were needed, and they, to be perceived as European soldiers, would have to be under a European commander. In this regard big steps and very important decisions were needed. It would be self-delusion trying to avoid the prospect.

Mr Anders C. Sjaastad (MP, Norway, NAA) said that the starting point of the discussion was that the post cold-war world was in chaos. NATO had a lot of problems to resolve, even without enlargement. But the point of no return had been reached, namely NATO should be enlarged. The only question about the first new members was when. It was illusory to think about a new member not being covered by guarantees under Article 5. It would be very, very dangerous to try to devise a half-membership.

When referring to a new NATO, one should remember that the candidates wanted to join the old Alliance — powerful and cohesive, not a weak, large and loosely-knit one. One must not underestimate NATO failures in the Yugoslav context. NATO took a litmus test there, a good lesson for the future, that it should not get involved in places where the UN can veto various operations in the field. But that was a subject for a prolonged debate.

Mr Janusz Prysztrom (Poland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), agreed with Mr Sjaastad and stressed that Poland would not accept any peculiar position in NATO; Poland either would become a full NATO member, with all rights and obligations, or not at all. No partial membership was provided for by the Washington Treaty, either.

Another problem, that of security guarantees for Poland and other CEE countries, arose several weeks ago not on Poland's but on Russia's initiative. It had seemed that finally Russia did accept Poland's NATO membership on certain conditions (non-stationing of either nuclear arms or foreign troops on Polish territory). Poland did not take up discussion not only because there was no reason to discuss

the subject with Russia but because it was premature. Poland's answer was that of acceptance of any model of military commitment in NATO, either German, or Norwegian, or any other. But the discussion on this would be in place, unavoidably, during taking the political decision on NATO membership. Again, he agreed with Mr Sjaastad that no partial NATO membership for Poland could be contemplated. Poland was going to be a full-rights and full obligations member under the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

As regards WEU, Poland did not approach membership in it as an alternative to joining NATO. The two are complementary structures. But in the treatment, by the USA and other NATO members, of WEU as the European pillar of Euro-Atlantic defence structures there was a lot of courtesy, since WEU, in terms of military structure was merely in its initial stage, lacking strategic transport, logistic support, satellite reconnaissance, etc.

Characteristically, there were difficulties on the joint command task forces. Here was the example where WEU states would wish to use the military NATO (i.e. American) installations for operations in which the USA would not be participating. That was the crux of the matter. The discussion of the concept was a litmus test for the development of WEU-NATO relations.

Mr Janusz Onyszkiewicz (MP, Poland), wished to re-emphasize that Poland's intention to join NATO was not motivated by any threat. Practically, the foreseeable threats could result from a breakdown in stability east of its borders. The threats would be primarily non-military. Should the military ones also emerge, they were not going to be those of a state-to-state conflict. They would be local and Poland would manage to face them on its own. Otherwise, for that matter, Poland would not be a useful partner in the Alliance. Clearly, then, Poland should continue to have the potential. If, in the future, a threat arose with which Poland alone would not be able to cope there was no guarantee that the threat would cease with, say, the loss of independence by Poland. Then a situation from 45 years ago would be re-created. In simple terms, it would be in NATO's interest not to permit such development to happen. One might already, informally, from the point of view of such scenarios, consider it but certain security guarantees Poland should have, anyhow. But, he repeated, that was the principal motive for Poland's aspiration to join the Alliance.

Neither was Poland interested, he confirmed, in any partial membership or membership with whatever limitations.

Regarding the modalities of Poland's integration into NATO structures - be it the German, Norwegian or any other model - that should be decided between NATO and Poland, by then already a member, and not simply result from outside conditioning. Clearly, there were no purely military reasons leading to a scenario whereby nuclear arms or foreign military bases should be deployed on the Polish territory. To be sure, with a radical change - in military terms - east of Poland's borders, then the above assessment would have to be reviewed. If, for example, the process of reduction of Russian military presence in the Kaliningrad Region should be reversed and should be a buildup of ever stronger Russian military presence there, or when strong Russian military units appeared in Belarus - then, perhaps, it would be worthwhile to revert to the matter, but for the moment there was no reason for that.

Therefore, it appeared that following Poland's entry into NATO there would be no need for deployment of foreign troops or nuclear arms in Poland.

He said that by joining NATO Poland's security problems would not be resolved unless the country entered the Alliance as its full-value partner. The Sejm decided recently that the defence budget was going to grow perceptibly to about 3 per cent of GNP, demonstrating Poland's financial commitment to membership in the Alliance.

Whether by its enlargement of accepting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic NATO would weaken or strengthen, it was, just as already said, that Poland and other countries were not interested in joining a weak Alliance. As to whether the Alliance were to grow stronger by their entry, he ventured, in all fairness, that initially there would be a weakening resulting from decrease in the Alliance's cohesiveness. Before the new members could be well-integrated, with the procedures falling into place, and adaptation to various requirements made - integration problems would have to be coped with. But that was the investment which could now be well-afforded. There was no need for NATO any more to be in its top strength and readiness to counter any very serious threat. Thus the moment was good to start the process and for the NATO to have the same cohesion and effectiveness as that of 45 years ago.

On the Russian reaction - he also regretted the absence of Russian representatives. He also deplored that the dialogue and discussion with the other part not always showed its right understanding and readiness. In point of fact, the dialogue was needed, just to hear, for that matter, the Russian view, for example, on the Tashkent Treaty because one sometimes referred to the CIS, but that was something other than the defence treaty signed in Tashkent, which was of a completely different nature. It resembled, in the speaker's view, that of the Brussels instrument establishing WEU, and even more so, since the Tashkent Treaty provided for the creation of common armed forces and common command, which - as a matter of fact - is absent from the Brussels Treaty. Neither, could explicit references be found in the Washington Treaty. And the structure was not purely theoretical, either, with strong action to inject real nature into it. There was also the common defence of airspace agreement. In final stages was the linkup of armed forces of Russia and Kazakhstan, there were Russian military bases already in place in Armenia, Georgia and several other countries. Therefore, when referring to the emergence of various security structures in Europe, one was also obliged to bear in mind all the aforesaid, since Belarus was its member; Ukraine was not a member and - he hoped - would continue not to be.

The question of how to ensure that Russia's participation in the discussion on European security was often answered by an idea of a NATO-Russia agreement. He wished to remark, first, that such agreement should not precede the NATO enlargement process so that a situation of first signing the agreement with the NATO of new members only to be finalized later could be avoided. He thought that to be a very natural and, besides, a generally accepted request. The result of such scenario of a simultaneous NATO enlargement and finalization of talks with Russia on an agreement would be that the agreement would be binding also for the new members. Thus it was extremely important that at a certain moment the countries wishing

to join NATO might be included into the process of discussions on the agreement to be concluded with Russia. Forms might vary but that would have a twin importance: the countries in question, by participation in discussions, would have an enhanced awareness that the agreement was also theirs and not one concluded above their heads; also, the transparency questions would be made easier. One should be mindful of the concern of the public opinion in Central European countries that there was an agreement being concluded above their heads with insufficient information available. Full transparency of the whole process, its final result, the transparency which would be in much greater degree ensured by participation of the new member states in a certain, be it, at least, the final stage of agreement, would be essential.

When on the Russia/NATO agreement, he said, a situation had to be avoided in which such an extremely important country in terms of European equilibrium as Ukraine should be left on the sidelines. Therefore, the agreement should, in a way, be doubled by another, obviously not an identical one, with Ukraine. Not identical, as there would certainly be no need to take care of the nuclear arms question since Ukraine was joining the Non Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state, while this aspect would be an important one in the agreement with Russia. Nevertheless, he felt, the agreement was an absolute necessity namely because the construction of European security, an equilibrium in Europe was impossible without Russia; neither was it possible without a free, sovereign and independent Ukraine.

Mr Anders C. Sjaastad (MP, Norway, NAA) cautioned on the things one can't foresee. He recalled that the favourite NATO scenario for the beginning of the Third World War was the falling apart of Yugoslavia on Tito's death. And 10 years had to pass, and the disintegration came virtually after the Cold War ended. When speaking about security he was always putting a big question-mark over the future. Poland should not let herself be drawn in the discussion on what model to adopt once in the Alliance. It was most important not to impose any model on Poland. It should be freely selected by Poland, possibly in consultation with NATO. The Norwegian model had always been unilateral, unilaterally defined by the Norwegian side. And Norway always rejected any attempts of the Soviet Union to interpret the model.

When referring to a temporary weakening of NATO by its enlargement, it had to be said that the new member, when being accepted, should be well-prepared, so that no essential weakening would result. It would be a good litmus test of acceptance.

On what Mr Onyszkiewicz said about Ukraine, the speaker fully supported the idea, but was not quite sure what kind of NATO/Ukraine agreement should be expected. Of course, it was very important not to forget about Ukraine.

Mr David M. Law agreed with what his predecessor said about models for Poland. But he submitted that the history of Alliance be remembered. It was a history of various memberships, various approaches to the nuclear element, to the stationing of foreign troops, etc. The tendency strengthened following the end of the Cold War. Now there were different countries with varying status around the EU, associated, observers, in the NACC, PFP. Following this debate on NATO enlargement he expected new options or views to be presented.

Mr Longin Pastusiak (MP, Poland), remarking that speaking after his Polish colleagues he did not wish the seminar to turn into a "Polish festival", said, pointing to statements that there was a far-reaching, left-to-extreme-right-spectrum consensus in Poland on the country's membership in European integration institutions.

Lacking, however, was an all-nation debate on NATO membership, although all opinion polls taken by independent centres unequivocally indicated that well over one half of the Polish people were in favour of joining the Alliance. The matter was under discussion in the political elites, in government and parliamentary structures.

He felt that there would follow a very concrete debate on the conditions of NATO accession, as various Alliance members — Denmark, Spain or France — enjoy their full membership on different conditions. He visualized that, according to Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, Poland when invited to NATO membership, would also set about discussing the conditions, even that, as stated by his colleagues, Poland was prepared to assume all obligations entailed by a full membership.

Absent also for the moment was an exact assessment of the cost of Poland's participation in NATO. A discussion on that would also have to follow — a question often asked the MPs by their electors. He was sure, that even with exact costs presented, the public would support Poland's membership.

On the position taken by Russia vis-a-vis Polish membership, he was concerned about the absence of dialogue between the two countries on security and, for that matter, any political dialogue. Not necessarily such absence could be blamed on Poland. He also regretted, that despite much effort to ensure parliamentary representation of the Russian Federation at the seminar, although a confirmation came, dated 3 May about arrival, finally nobody had come. Similar developments, unfortunately, also happened in bilateral relations, in government-to-government contacts.

Mr Józef Oleksy, Prime Minister, paid his first foreign visit in his new capacity namely in Brussels to symbolize the strategic goals of the Polish Government's foreign policy. At a press conference there, when asked about Russia's attitude towards Poland's NATO membership, he referred to a possibility of "shock-absorbers" being built in the membership, something intended to reduce Russian opposition to Poland and other CEE countries joining the Alliance. The Premier was not specific, but, Mr Pastusiak said, both MPs and members of government would soon be working on the concept of those "shock-absorbers", things new compared to what was discussed earlier, including a bilateral NATO/Russia treaty; the point for Poland was to find absorbers really convincing for Russia that Poland's membership in the Alliance was not directed against any country, and explicitly not against Russia.

PROS AND CONS OF WIDENING*

(by David M. Law)

PROS	CONS
1. enlargement is natural process: several countries are eager to join; Article X of the Washington Treaty allows for this	post-CW situation demands that NATO think in terms of strengthening pro-reform forces across frontiers, not differentiating countries by nature of security commitment
2. widening can be staggered to ensure no overloading of NATO circuits and to give an incentive to reform laggards	to take all new members in would render the Alliance dysfunctional
3. coherent phasing is possible, e.g., "first cut" would clearly include some or all of the Visegrad group, as they are the most advanced reformers, geographically contiguous to NATO, historically part of European mainstream	no clear criteria exist to phase entry; differences in reform performance are qualitative not quantitative in C&EE as a whole; Russia and Caucasus 3 also contiguous; Baltics, for example, also belong to European mainstream; moreover, to favour the Visegrad group is to reward the richer states and penalise the poorer, and to pursue NATO's CW preoccupation with the Central Front
4. promise of adhesion in second or third cut can counteract concerns about isolation	European security situation is too uncertain and too fast moving for such a promise to reassure sufficiently; those not in the first cut will feel isolated and interpret status as vote of non-confidence in their domestic reform process
5. strengthening of OSCE will suffice to counteract threat of deslabilisation of inter-state relations	bringing some in & leaving others out will exacerbate inter-state relations, especially where ethnic communities straddle borders (e.g., Estonia & Latvia/Rf, Lithuania/Rf, Cz/Slov, Slov/Hung, Hung/Rom, Bul/Turkey etc.)
6. in addition to strengthening OSCE, deslabilisation of inter-state relations can be counteracted by taking in as many willing C&EE states as possible	in addition to danger of overload, there is the dilemma that the more states east of the FSU are taken in, the greater the sense of isolation and dismissal in the FSU itself
7. strengthening relationship with Russia (strategic partnership) and of OSCE where RF has veto will allay Russian fears	widening can be misused in Russia by anti-reform and anti-Western forces; chauvinists in Russia may interpret enlargement as a signal of Western disinterest in CIS states, thus encouraging domestic reversals and foreign adventurism; in society at large, enlargement may be perceived as Western lack of confidence in reform process and an effort to exclude RF from Europe; significance of strategic partnership is unclear at a time of RF searching for post-Soviet sense of self: overemphasis on strategic partnership may foment imperial ambitions
8. Ukraine can join or stay out without serious complications as its relations with Russia are benign and its denuclearisation on track; a strategic partnership with the Ukraine would help stabilise the situation	Ukraine's relationship with Russia and strategic profile remain sensitive issues; if Ukraine is left out, while most C&EE come in, it could again go nuclear; the value of a strategic partnership for Ukraine and possible impact on its environment are unclear

* From the author's "NATO in a Nutshell" (January 1995); see also David Law, "The Problems of Widening NATO", Brasscy's Defence Yearbook 1994.

9. NATO enlargement must proceed in tandem with that of European institutions if there is not to be strategic confusion	process of EUWEO enlargement has become ever more complex; there is no longer light automaticity with NATO's; bottom-line issue of relative responsibilities between EU and US has to be settled as priority
10. FL, SW and AUS will have same security status in WEU as IRL and NATO member DK; this has not caused major difficulties in the past	precipitate NATO widening will complicate neutrals' moving closer to security institutions
11. expansion is facilitated by benign security environment: there is no need to address "hard" security issues	if the security environment is benign, there is no credible rationale for expansion
12. expansion is necessitated by the seriousness of the security situation	if the security situation is malign, enlargement requires resolution of hard security issues such as nuclear umbrella and Strategic Concept at a time when they do not lend themselves to NATO consensus; but failure to address hard issues effectively will deflate relevance of existing defence posture and guarantees among "16"
13. the conflict in the FRY is a unique development	FRY-like wars with unclear fronts, rationales and responsibilities are likely to be the norm in future; these do not require expansion of the integrated military structure as did the CW but flexible, loose arrangements such as can best be fostered by PIP
14. NACC and PFP help counteract difficulties of widening	widening will scuttle credibility and attraction of NACC and PFP
15. expected NACC/PIP amalgamation will ensure manageability of widening process	new membership will lead to an unmanageable array of different statuses vis-a-vis NATO
16. PFP does not meet C&EE requirements; necessary to go further	give PFP a chance, exploiting prime advantages that it is open equally to all and Partners play key role in defining relationship
17. enlargement is about states' right to freely associate with one another, something which WTO members were denied during the CW; Russia cannot be allowed to have a veto over this process	Russia should not have a veto, but the point is that there are several reasons for not widening which together are so significant as not to make an issue of a Russian veto
18. force the issue: all will fail in place	forcing the issue will result in very tricky geopolitical situations at a time when NATO is shaky owing to differences over FRY
19. the prospect of an early enlargement is a security plus	the prospect of an early enlargement is a security minus: there cannot be more security for those taken in, if thereby the security debate elsewhere in post-communist Europe and inter-state relations in the area are deslabilised
20. widening is being driven by an irresistible force: it is only a question of time before it happens	widening has to be decided by consensus; several governments and parliaments harbour doubts on several scores which are likely to become clearer as the enlargement study unfolds
21. widening is NATO's historical destiny: for it not to happen would deal a fatal blow to the Organisation	it is necessary to make a distinction between the expansion of NATO as an institution and the extension of its security culture to non-members; the latter will be facilitated if Spain remains NATO's last new member

Annex: PROS & CONS OF WIDENING ^{2 3}

PROS	CONS
1. enlargement is natural process: several countries are eager to join; Article X of the Washington Treaty allows for this	post-CW situation demands that NATO think in terms of strengthening pro-reform forces across frontiers, not differentiating countries by nature of security commitment
2. widening can be staggered to ensure no overloading of NATO circuits and to give an incentive to reform laggards	to take all new members in would render the Alliance dysfunctional
3. coherent phasing is possible, e.g., "first cut" would clearly include some or all of the Visegrad group, as they are the most advanced reformers, geographically contiguous to NATO, historically part of European mainstream	no clear criteria exist to phase entry: differences in reform performance are quantitative not qualitative in C&EE as a whole; Russia and Caucasus ³ also contiguous; Baltics, for example, also belong to European mainstream; moreover, to favour the Visegrad group is to reward the richer states and penalise the poorer, and to pursue NATO's CW preoccupation with the Central Front
4. promise of admission in second or third cut can counteract concerns about isolation	European security situation is too uncertain and too fast moving for such a promise to reassure sufficiently; those not in the first cut will feel isolated and interpret status as vote of non-confidence in their domestic reform process
5. strengthening of OSCE will suffice to counteract threat of destabilisation of inter-state relations	bringing some in & leaving others out will exacerbate inter-state relations, especially where ethnic communities straddle borders (e.g., Estonia & Latvia/RF, Lith/Pol/RF, Cz/Slov, Slov/Hung/, Hung/Rom, Bul/Turkey, etc.)
6. in addition to strengthening OSCE, destabilisation of inter-state relations can be counteracted by taking in as many willing C&EE states as possible	in addition to danger of overload, there is the dilemma that the more states east of the FSU are taken in, the greater the sense of isolation and dismissal in the FSU itself

² From the author's NATO in a Nutshell (January 1995).

³ See also David Law, "The Problems of Widening NATO", Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1994.

<p>7. strengthening relationship with Russia (strategic partnership) and of OSCE where RF has veto will allay Russian fears</p>	<p>widening can be misused in Russia by anti-reform and anti-Western forces; chauvinists in Russia may interpret enlargement as a signal of Western disinterest in CIS states, thus encouraging domestic reversals and foreign adventurism; in society at large, enlargement may be perceived as Western lack of confidence in reform process and an effort to exclude RF from Europe; significance of strategic partnership is unclear at a time of RF searching for post-Soviet sense of self: overemphasis on strategic partnership may foment imperial ambitions</p>
<p>8. Ukraine can join or stay out without serious complications as its relations with Russia are benign and its denuclearisation on track; a strategic partnership with the Ukraine would help stabilise the situation</p>	<p>Ukraine's relationship with Russia and strategic profile remain sensitive issues; if Ukraine is left out, while most C&EE come in, it could again go nuclear; the value of a strategic partnership for Ukraine and possible impact on its environment are unclear</p>
<p>9. NATO enlargement must proceed in tandem with that of European institutions if there is not to be strategic confusion</p>	<p>process of EU/WEU enlargement has become ever more complex: there is no longer tight automaticity with NATO's; bottom-line issue of relative responsibilities between EU and US has to be settled as priority</p>
<p>10. FL, SW and AUS will have same security status in WEU as IRL and NATO member DK; this has not caused major difficulties in the past</p>	<p>precipitate NATO widening will complicate neutrals' moving closer to security institutions</p>
<p>11. expansion is facilitated by benign security environment: there is no need to address "hard" security issues</p>	<p>if the security environment is benign, there is no credible rationale for expansion</p>
<p>12. expansion is necessitated by the seriousness of the security situation</p>	<p>if the security situation is malign, enlargement requires resolution of hard security issues such as nuclear umbrella and Strategic Concept at a time when they do not lend themselves to NATO consensus; but failure to address hard issues effectively will deflate relevance of existing defence posture and guarantees among "16"</p>
<p>13. the conflict in the FRY is a unique development</p>	<p>FRY-like wars with unclear fronts, rationales and responsibilities are likely to be the norm in future; these do not require expansion of the integrated military structure as did the CW but flexible, loose arrangements such as can best be fostered by PFP</p>
<p>14. NACC and PFP help counteract difficulties of widening</p>	<p>widening will scuttle credibility and attraction of NACC and PFP</p>
<p>15. expected NACC/PfP amalgamation will ensure manageability of widening process</p>	<p>new membership will lead to an unmanageable array of different statuses vis-à-vis NATO</p>
<p>16. PFP does not meet C&EE requirements; necessary to go further</p>	<p>give PFP a chance, exploiting prime advantages that it is open equally to all and Partners play key role in defining relationship</p>

<p>17. enlargement is about states' right to freely associate with one another, something which WTO members were denied during the CW; Russia cannot be allowed to have a veto over this process</p>	<p>Russia should not have a veto, but the point is that there are several reasons for not widening which together are so significant as not to make an issue of a Russian veto</p>
<p>18. force the issue: all will fall in place</p>	<p>forcing the issue will result in very tricky geopolitical situations at a time when NATO is shaky owing to differences over FRY</p>
<p>19. the prospect of an early enlargement is a security plus</p>	<p>the prospect of an early enlargement is a security minus: there cannot be more security for those taken in, if thereby the security debate elsewhere in post-communist Europe and inter-state relations in the area are destabilised</p>
<p>20. widening is being driven by an irresistible force: it is only a question of time before it happens</p>	<p>widening has to be decided by consensus; several governments and parliaments harbour doubts on several scores which are likely to become clearer as the enlargement study unfolds</p>
<p>21. widening is NATO's historical destiny: for it not to happen would deal a fatal blow to the Organisation</p>	<p>it is necessary to make a distinction between the expansion of NATO as an institution and the extension of its security culture to non-members; the latter will be facilitated if Spain remains NATO's last new member</p>