


The Afghanistan Challenge

Hard Realities and
Strategic Choices

Edited by
Hans-Georg Ehrhart and
Charles C. Pentland



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Contents

Acknowledgements	v
1. Introduction <i>Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Charles C. Pentland</i>	1
PART I	
2. Assessing the Afghanistan Compact: Is the International Community Defaulting on the Compact or Is the Compact the Wrong Approach? <i>Citha D. Maass</i>	13
3. The Changing Face of Warlordism in Afghanistan <i>Conrad Schetter and Rainer Glassner</i>	37
4. Supporting the State, Depleting the State: Estranged State-Society Relations in Afghanistan <i>Florian P. Kühn</i>	57
5. NGO Myths, Realities, and Advocacy on the International Strategy in Afghanistan <i>Lara Olson and Andrea Charron</i>	77
6. Building Stability in Afghanistan <i>Mihai P. Carp</i>	103
7. Pakistan's Afghanistan Policy in the Shadow of India <i>Christian Wagner</i>	113
8. Iran's Influence in Afghanistan <i>Janet Kursawe</i>	129
9. The International Commitment in Afghanistan: Failure or Strategy Change? A Strategic Assessment <i>Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Roland Kaestner</i>	141

PART II

10. No Exit: Canada and the "War without End" in Afghanistan <i>Kim Richard Nossal</i>	157
11. Afghanistan and the Limits of "Unlimited Solidarity": A Farewell to <i>Schicksalsgemeinschaft</i> <i>David G. Haglund</i>	175
12. Canada in Afghanistan: Strategic Perspectives <i>M.D. (Mike) Capstick</i>	189
13. The Construction of a War <i>Christoph Reuter</i>	199
14. Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The Canadian Approach <i>David M. Law</i>	211
15. Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The German Approach <i>Michael Brzoska</i>	243
The Contributors	259

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Chapter 14

Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The Canadian Approach

DAVID M. LAW

Introduction

The involvement in Afghanistan has been of seminal importance for Canada in several respects. The Afghan campaign has been Canada's first foray into a war-fighting environment since the Korean War. It signals the country's coming out as a nation that is ready to engage in heavy conflict if necessary after decades of proudly wearing a peacekeeping mantle. This process has been accompanied by an effort on the part of Canada to return to the ranks of leading military nations after a sustained period of governmental neglect of national defence capabilities. It has also been tragically marked by the proportionally highest casualty rate of any national actor in the post-2001 phase of conflict in Afghanistan, save Afghanistan itself.

If Canada's involvement in Afghanistan was sparked by a need to show military solidarity with a traumatized post-9/11 America, it has also brought in its wake conceptual and organizational changes in the way the country goes about its activities on behalf of development and reconstruction abroad. Afghanistan has initiated a long overdue debate about the nature and needs of effective development assistance, and about the overall relationship between development, security, and justice. At the same time, 9/11 has had a significant impact on the country's understanding of governance, obliging politicians and bureaucrats in Ottawa to rethink the way the various federal departments of government engage in war zones and troubled states, and what this means for their interface in Ottawa. These trends have evolved in parallel with

Canada's efforts at home to protect its population, infrastructure, and land mass from terrorist attack and deny use of its territory for actions against its allies.

A number of conceptual innovations have accompanied these processes: the 3D approach, the "whole of government" approach and, in particular, Security Sector Reform (SSR)—the focus of this chapter. We will look at these conceptual developments in the second section. But first, we examine the factors that have driven and shaped change in Canadian thinking about security, development, and governance in third-world countries, including the strategic shift that occurred with 9/11. The third section addresses the main features of Canada's SSR role in Afghanistan: what Canada has been doing in this theatre, how it has been pursuing its activities there, how its approach compares with that of other countries, and how Canada's efforts have been conditioned by those of the international community in Afghanistan. The final section puts forward some recommendations for Canadian policy-makers that may also be relevant for other countries facing similar circumstances.

Drivers of Change

In the Canadian context, several factors have conspired to reshape the way that the country approaches security and sees its relationship with development, justice, and governance. This is a process that began in the early 1990s but has received several new impulses since.

With the end of the Cold War, Canada, like many other countries, began to reconceptualize its approach to security. This process meant that Canada put a new emphasis on the security of populations and the role of public security forces in this regard, and downplayed the bloc-to-bloc, state-focused security concerns and military issues that had dominated during the East-West conflict. At the same time, security perspectives, which had previously been segregated into external and internal components, began to collapse into a seamless continuum.

A second factor was the enhanced globalization of the security environment post-Cold War. Where previously the East-West standoff had tended to marginalize third-world conflict, in the changed strategic circumstances it rapidly became clear that a strategic problem virtually anywhere on the globe could have serious repercussions for a country's security. Canada, as a country traditionally open to trade and immigration, would increasingly find itself trying to cope with the impact of international information systems, global transport links, and ethnic and religious communities dispersed across countries and continents. Security globalization engendered a growing concern about the ability of fragile and conflicted states to control their security forces and their borders, and to ensure that they would not become vehicles for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

A third factor shaping changes in Canada's world development view was the country's experience with the failed states of the 1990s, in particular Haiti and Somalia where Canadian troops were stationed in the largely failed international interventions of the early part of the decade. These deployments spotlighted the necessity of a secure environment to effectively convey resources for development. This led to the emergence of what has come to be called the security-development nexus: the notion that development is not possible without security, and that security can be neither provided nor sustained without development. Canada has been an enthusiastic participant in the consultations undertaken by donors in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) from roughly 1995 onward, with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of donor assistance.

A fourth factor also emerged at mid-decade when Canada, together with its NATO allies, began thinking seriously about the prospects of the organization enlarging to include democratizing states of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization. As this process gathered strength, it became clear that it was not enough for the military of these countries to be efficient, effective, and professional; they also had to be democratically controlled and overseen if they were going to be capable of making a positive contribution to alliance security, let alone not act as spoilers of democratization. At the same time, it was understood that NATO had to be similarly concerned with candidates' other security forces—the police, paramilitary agencies, intelligence services and so on, which had traditionally represented a security threat to the populations in communist countries.¹ It was this realization that encouraged Canada to work with other member states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), under European Union leadership, to elaborate the OSCE Code of Conduct on Political-Military Relations, which came into effect in 1995.²

The fifth driver of change came with the complex peace support operations in which Canada was involved as of the second half of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia. The deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina sent a number of very important messages. One message was that the traditional Canadian paradigm of peacekeeping, observing the peace between formerly belligerent parties, was a thing of the past. Another was that fundamental reform of a post-conflict country's security sector was essential if a return to large-scale violence was to be prevented. Bosnia-Herzegovina, a new state emerging out of the ashes of the Yugoslav wars, was a particularly daunting challenge in view of the ethnic cleansing that had occurred during the war, the fragmentation along ethnic lines of the political structures prevailing in the country postwar, and the reflection of this in the organization of its security sector. An additional message emanating from the Bosnian experience was the need for viable systems to coordinate the policies and activities of the kaleidoscope

of actors that tend to be active in post-conflict settings—in addition to national and regional governments, foreign donors, intergovernmental organizations, private military and security companies, and an army of non-governmental organizations, both local and international. These were not entirely new phenomena for Canada to have to deal with, but this was probably the first time that these factors had all come together so dramatically.

The sixth factor shaping Canada's approach was the shift in strategic thinking provoked by the events of 11 September 2001, and the vulnerabilities in the US security posture that these attacks exposed. As the US National Security Council admitted, a superpower's strategic self-understanding was taken down for the price of a tank.³ Canada lost over thirty civilians in the 9/11 attacks but it was, of course, less concerned by the strategic implications than was the United States. On the other hand, Canada quickly understood that its vital trading relationship with America—and the long, at that time relatively unprotected, border over which goods, services, and people had to pass if Canada was to remain economically viable—called for a series of measures to reinforce security at the border and internally. The subtext was as follows: Canada's security forces needed to be retooled to deal with new strategic challenges, in particular those emanating from the confluence of such phenomena as failed states, weapons of mass destruction, and strategic terrorism; they needed more resources than they had had at their disposal through much of the previous half century; and they needed to be able to work together as synergistically as possible.

Thus, Canada took measures to reinforce control of its border with the United States, including the arming of its previously unarmed custom officials. The immigration regime was reviewed to reduce the threat of foreign terrorists securing access to the country. There was a noticeable rapprochement with the United States on security issues under the Liberal government, one that was reinforced by its traditionally more pro-US Conservative successors when they formed a minority government in 2006 after thirteen years in opposition. Resources for defence were massively increased, rising by more than a quarter in 2007–08 compared with pre-9/11 levels and placing Canada as the sixth-highest military spender in NATO, well surpassing Canada's performance during the post-Korean phase of the Cold War.⁴ Relations among key ministries were reorganized. A new Department of Public Safety was created, a kind of Canadian version of the Department of Homeland Security. Overall, security issues were re-mainstreamed in public and campus life,⁵ after spending the better part of four decades out in the cold.⁶

Finally, the Canadian approach has also been shaped by the emergence in this decade of SSR as a policy framework for a growing number of its national development partners as well as for key international organizations (IGOs) of which Canada is a member and with which it cooperates,

such as the OECD Development Assistance Committee, the European Union, and the United Nations. For example, Canada was involved in the OECD DAC consultations that led to the elaboration of its guidelines in *Security System Reform and Governance* in 2005 and its *Handbook on Security Sector Reform: Supporting Security and Justice* in 2007.⁷ Canada also played a key role in efforts underway at the United Nations as of 2005 to mainstream SSR in post-conflict settings.⁸ And, of course, as Canada has participated in these activities, its own thinking on SSR has evolved.

These drivers of change are summarized in Table 1. As we shall see, the Canadian deployments to Afghanistan have tended to bring these factors together and, in several respects, to accentuate them.

TABLE 1
Drivers of Change in the Canadian Approach to Security and Development

-
1. Reconceptualization of link between external and internal security
 2. Security globalization
 3. Security-development nexus
 4. NATO enlargement
 5. Third-generation peacekeeping
 6. Strategic terrorism
 7. Changes in partners' approaches
-

Source: Author's compilation.

Conceptual Frameworks

Since the end of the Cold War, Canada has adopted four overarching frameworks for conceptualizing and orienting its activities on behalf of development and, in particular, on behalf of troubled states: human security, the 3D approach, the whole of government approach, and security sector reform. While these concepts have entered the policy discourse at different intervals, they are not mutually exclusive; they tend to enjoy simultaneously a certain currency, and they all figure to varying degrees as mobilizing constructs for Canada's involvement in Afghanistan.

Human Security

Human security (HS) was mainstreamed in Canadian foreign policy practice after 1993, when the Liberal party returned to government looking for a concept to order its actions abroad in the post-Cold War era. Under the leadership of a dynamic foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, the government adopted a human security agenda as a way of underscoring that the purpose of its efforts abroad was to support populations in their strivings to live in security and under improving material and

social conditions. In the Canadian vision, human security was not a substitute for state security; rather, state security was a precondition for the state's meeting its responsibility to help populations live in freedom from both want and fear. As a manifestation of the attractiveness of this idea, a Human Security Network was established in 1999 with a dozen like-minded states from around the world.⁹ The HS star began to fade after the departure of Lloyd Axworthy from government in 2000, but the Department of Foreign Affairs continues to fund projects under this heading. The weak point of human security has revolved around the question of how to operationalize the concept with robust programs in the field.¹⁰

The 3D Approach

The 3D approach of defence, diplomacy, and development was adopted by the Liberal minority government in 2004 and mainstreamed in Canadian policy practice in 2005 with the publication of the country's new national security policy.¹¹ This document sought to integrate external and public security issues, traditionally handled as separate and largely unconnected domains. Likewise, it called for the main Canadian departments that had traditionally been active in crisis settings—the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade (DFAIT), and the Department of National Defence—to work closely together in the field, the implication being that traditionally this had not always been the case.

The concept of 3D has its limitations, however. To quote from a speech delivered in 2007 by David Mulroney (the Canadian deputy minister currently responsible for coordinating government policy on Afghanistan), defence, diplomacy, and development are not parts that "equal the whole"; there needs to be "an overall policy construct that sits above 3D" to motivate, validate, and connect everything that Canada does.¹² These departments need, moreover, to be approached not as distinct domains but as entirely interrelated ones, "as are (their) objectives and expertise."

Beyond this, while 3D rests on an expanded vision of security, the actors given centre stage by this approach are not capable of dealing with all the issues that need to be addressed in the field. Which of the 3D departments, for example, is to deal with policing, a crucial issue determining the success or failure of the international community's commitments to fragile and post-conflict states (the latest being Afghanistan)? Who is to deal with prisons? Who, with debt reduction? Who, with gender? And who would deal with all those other issues that are essential to putting a troubled or conflicted country back on its feet? Clearly, 3D falls short as a vehicle for mobilizing all the actors that matter in the Canadian development and security context—for example, the Department of

Finance, the Department of Public Safety, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the Correctional Service of Canada.

The 3D approach has also been criticized in the Canadian context as a vehicle that attempts to camouflage the fact that funding for Afghanistan has been heavily weighted in favour of the military. A 2006 report by a Canadian NGO claimed that defence expenditure has outpaced development funding by a factor of ten to one, while noting that the exact figures are difficult to come by. The numbers have prompted Canada's former minister of foreign affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, to assert that 3D has become one big D—for defence.¹³

The Whole of Government Approach

The whole of government approach, sometimes also referred to as the joined-up government approach, was introduced in the Canadian discourse by the Conservative government as an alternative of sorts to the 3D approach. The concept is, however, rather different in nature. The whole of government approach revolves around the issue of what mechanisms can be devised to ensure that the various governmental actors involved in a particular issue area work together synergistically. This is a challenge for governments around the world, and certainly not just in security and development but also in areas as diverse as health care, gender, and climate change. But the core problem is the same. The purposes for which a particular ministry has been established—sometimes very early on in the Westphalian epoch—can be outlived in part or whole by changing realities. When this happens, what do governments do in response? In the post-9/11 environment, does one create a new ministry, say, a ministry for security, writ large? Does one establish a new framework for traditional actors to consult about new realities while preserving their individual prerogatives and structures? Or does one end up somewhere in between?

Canada, like the United States, has embraced all three approaches to varying degrees. It has created a new ministry (Public Safety), it has created new structures for interdepartmental consultation, and it has recently established a coordinating mechanism for Afghanistan in the prime minister's office in an effort to ensure coherence and effectiveness on the part of the various governmental actors involved. But as we shall see, the whole of government concept is still much more an ambition than a norm: whole of government can easily descend into Hell of Government, with energies and resources being dissipated under the impact of "coordinationitis" and "cooperationism."¹⁴ Much more thinking is needed on how to enhance the efficiency of mechanisms and methodologies for coordination and cooperation in environments at home and abroad where multiple governmental actors are active.

Security Sector Reform

SSR, as with the other concepts under review here, is relatively new. The term was coined a decade ago by the British minister of development, Claire Short, and it figured in the Canadian *International Policy Statement* of 2005. This concept too has emerged in response to the need to take a broader view of development and security, and of the interrelationships among different policy communities.

The OECD Development Assistance Committee uses the term *security system reform* to highlight the notion that security needs to be approached from a broad perspective, and the term *security and justice system reform* to stress that justice is not to be considered as being subordinate to security, nor is justice to be subordinated to security considerations—to be “securitized,” as the discourse would have it. The more widely used term is *security sector reform*, which both the European Union and the United Nations have adopted when developing their SSR programs in response to the groundbreaking work of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, as have many donors in developing their national SSR agendas. We shall use SSR to denote both approaches as their core propositions are virtually identical.

SSR has many manifestations and variants, but its key propositions can be reduced to three. One is the need to take a holistic approach toward the understanding of the actors and factors involved in security, justice, development, and governance. Another is that security must be delivered professionally, efficiently, and at a reasonable cost, one that is commensurate with a country’s resources. The third proposition is that the security forces as well as the ministries that manage and direct them need to be subject to democratic control and oversight. This is essential if these security forces are to be accountable, transparent, representative, and responsive—and in consequence to enjoy the confidence of the population, whose security should be their foremost concern. For an interpretation of the key norms pertinent to SSR, see Table 2.

SSR is versatile. It offers a framework for thinking about which actors play central or supporting roles in a country’s security. It proposes a methodological dimension, for it insists on the need to take a comprehensive approach to the challenges of security, justice, development, and governance, and for security resources to be used for the public good. It says, for example, that police reform should not proceed without the implications for justice and correctional institutions also being addressed or that it can be deleterious for the population’s security to build the capacity of security forces without ensuring that they are subject to democratic oversight and control. At the same time, it acts as a connector of a plethora of traditionally disparate policy strands: those of the security and development communities; the external actors supporting SSR and

TABLE 2
Decalogue of Key SSR Norms

1. The security forces are capable of delivering security professionally, at a reasonable cost, and in a way that helps to ensure that justice for all individuals and groups in society is served.
2. The security sector is representative of the population as a whole. It is inclusive, adequately reflecting a country’s various communities and fairly providing opportunities to both genders.
3. The security forces operate transparently. Information about their activities is accessible to the public, save where legitimate national security concerns justify keeping information classified.
4. A country’s security objectives and policies are set out in a national security strategy and in supporting documents that define the respective tasks and responsibilities of the various components of the security sector.
5. The executive and civil management authorities in charge of the security forces are capable of giving the security forces proper direction and management.
6. The security forces are overseen by and accountable to civilian, democratically constituted authorities. In particular, the legislature is empowered and able to oversee the policies and activities of the security forces as well as the executive and civil management authorities in charge of their activities.
7. The security sector is subject to a robust judicial and legal framework.
8. Civil society and non-governmental actors with a role in monitoring the governance of the security sector are active and can operate independently.
9. Domestic security sector actors are capable of interfacing smoothly with one another.
10. Domestic security sector actors are well integrated into regional and international security frameworks.

Source: This material first appeared in David M. Law, “Taking Stock, Moving Forward,” in *Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector Reform*, ed. David M. Law (Berlin: Litverlag, 2007), 248.

the implementing national governments; programs focusing on different actors or dimensions of security and development (for example, police and military, security forces’ performance and oversight issues); regional, national, and local initiatives, and so on.¹⁵


Thus, SSR goes substantially further than either the 3D or whole of government approaches. It takes a much broader approach to the question of which actors—external or domestic—should be involved in questions of security and development than does the 3D approach. It goes much further than does the notion of whole of government; for

example, SSR says that it is important not only for government departments to be joined up but for a wide gamut of other actors as well, and that how different actors interface with one another is a decisive factor in their overall effectiveness. Unlike the 3D and whole of government approaches, SSR lays out key objectives for government action.

While the Canadian take on SSR has been largely inspired by the OECD Development Assistance Committee, Ottawa has tended to emphasize certain aspects that, while not at odds with OECD orthodoxy, set different accents. For example, DFAIT twins SSR with rule of law in the description it provides on its website, explaining that a security sector cannot be functional unless rule of law prevails.¹⁶

The four conceptual frameworks described above are often perceived as contrasting or even opposing elements. If we look at the core ideas behind them, however, we see that they are largely complementary. Figure 1 attempts to capture this.

FIGURE 1
Human Security, 3D, Whole of Government, and SSR



Source: Created by author.

Canada in Afghanistan

The Context

Afghanistan, as is now widely acknowledged, represents an extremely challenging environment for outside efforts to help bring stability and development to the country. The country is dirt poor, ranked 174 on the list of 178 nations in the United Nations Human Development Index.¹⁷ The median age in this country of 33 million souls is 17.6 years. Literacy is low, pegged at 43.1 percent for males and only 12.6 percent for females. The last figure available for unemployment, from 2005, is 40 percent. The country has no history of central government control over its territory and borders. It is ethnically diverse: its largest group, the Pashtuns, making up some 42 percent of the population, are the second-largest group in bordering Pakistan. Officially approved political parties number over eighty.¹⁸

Afghanistan has known internal strife and conflict for over three decades now, provoked and /or exacerbated by a series of external interventions and involvements across its largely porous borders—notably the Soviet invasion of 1979 and their ten-year presence before a humiliating withdrawal that helped spark systemic change in the USSR, and now Taliban elements from Pakistan supporting home-grown Taliban as well as al Qaeda militants from around the Muslim world. The largely subdued violence of 2001–2005 has since reappeared with a vengeance, as the overall situation in Afghanistan's region has deteriorated. It is against this background that countries like Canada and Germany have found themselves struggling to make a significant improvement to the circumstances in which the Afghan people live and to help rebuild their state, a process that has involved nurturing a culture of governance that is largely new in the Afghan experience.¹⁹

Canada's Objectives

Canada's objectives in Afghanistan have varied little since the initial engagements in 2001–2002 and the three changes of government that have taken place throughout this period. Canada has essentially four objectives:

- to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a sanctuary for strategic terrorism;
- to support the UN peace enforcement mission for Afghanistan in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter;
- to act in solidarity with Canada's allies in NATO, which represent twenty-six of the thirty-nine countries in the ISAF coalition; and

- to foster stability and development in Afghanistan, in keeping with Canada's general commitment to promoting human security in fragile states.²⁰

A fifth objective, that of strengthening Canada's relationship with the United States, has also been apparent during this period, particularly under the Conservative government in power after January 2006.²¹

Since 2001, Canadian governments have made five major decisions on Afghanistan. All decisions have been dominated by the security situation in the country, and by the need to secure a safe environment for reconstruction and governance capacity-building initiatives to proceed. The first decision was made in October 2001 under a Liberal majority government when Canada deployed a special forces unit and 750 troops to Afghanistan to support the US campaign there. At the same time, naval and air surveillance units were deployed to the Arabian Sea. The second decision came in February 2003 when 1,700 ground troops were deployed to Kabul as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In March 2005, the third step—this time under a Liberal minority government—was taken when it was announced that the troops in Kabul would be redeployed to Kandahar in February 2006. After the Conservative Party came to power in January 2006, two more situation-shaping decisions were made. In May 2006, parliament approved a two-year extension of the Canadian deployment. In January 2008, parliament approved another extension—this time to 2011—on the condition that an ally would provide an additional 1,000 soldiers to support Canada's role in Kandahar. This followed the recommendations of a study commissioned by the government in October 2007 on Canada's future role in Afghanistan which, while critical, was supportive of the continuation of the mission.²²

Table 3 tracks the evolution of the Canadian presence in Afghanistan as a function of the government in power in Ottawa, the command to which the deployment has been subordinated, the number of Canadian personnel deployed, and the lethality of the deployment environment.

Public Opinion

Opposition to Canada's involvement covers a broad swathe of concerns: the prospect of defeat, Canadian policy being subordinated to US interests, burden-sharing, "Canada first" inclinations, and the need for Canada's involvement to be first and foremost about development and peacekeeping, not about war-fighting. These arguments are, however, not necessarily representative. The Canadian public has, until recently, tended to be more or less evenly divided in its attitudes toward Canada's role in Afghanistan—even into 2006 when Canadians began to suffer

TABLE 3
Overview of Canadian Military Involvement in Afghanistan

<i>Government</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Command</i>	<i>Forces Deployed</i>	<i>Theatre of Deployment</i>	<i>Lethality of Environment</i>
Liberal majority	As of October 2001	Canadian Operation Apollo; Canadian Naval Task Group under US Command (OEF)	(at peak) 6 warships, 1,500 Navy, long-range transport aircraft, two surveillance and maritime patrol aircraft	Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea	Relatively benign (0 casualties)
Liberal majority	January–August 2002	US Command (OEF)	850	Kandahar	Still benign but less so (4 casualties)
Liberal majority and Liberal minority as of June 2004	August 2002–August 2005	Operation Athena; NATO Command (ISAF)	1,700	Kabul	Relatively benign (3 casualties)
Liberal minority	August 2005–January 2006	US Command; Canada assumes command of K-PRT	1,000	Kabul to Kandahar	Relatively benign (1 casualty)
Conservative minority as of January 2006	February 2006–August 2008	Operation Archer (OEF) and ISAF Operation Medusa; NATO command (ISAF)	2,000; increased to 2,500 between 2006 and 2007	Kandahar	Increasingly malign (85 casualties)

Note: Casualties current as of 25 August 2008. For the most up-to-date list of Canadian casualties, see CBC News, "In the Line of Duty: Canada's Casualties," *cbc.ca*, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/afghanistan/casualties/list.html>.

Source: Duane Bratt, "Mr Harper Goes to War: Canada, Afghanistan and the Return of High Politics in Canadian Foreign Policy" (2007), www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2007/Bratt.pdf; Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Final Report* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008), http://dsp-psd.tpsgc.gc.ca/collection_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf.

dramatically higher casualties. While Canada has been in Afghanistan since late 2001, eighty-five of its total of ninety-three casualties as of August 2008 have occurred in the last two years, essentially corresponding to its second deployment to Kandahar. Not surprisingly, the last couple of years have seen a corresponding drop in support for the Canadian mission (see Table 4).

TABLE 4
Opinion Polls on Afghanistan

Regarding Canada's military involvement in Afghanistan, do you... (%)

	2002		2004		2006 Mar		2006 Jun		2006 Oct		2006 Nov	
Strongly approve	38	75	26	61	21	49	25	56	23	48	19	50
Somewhat approve	37		35		28		31		25		31	
Somewhat disapprove	11	33	15	35	16	48	15	40	18	50	18	48
Strongly disapprove	12		20		32		25		32		30	

Do you think in the end the Canadian mission in Afghanistan is likely to be successful or not successful? (%)

Successful	34
Not successful	58
Don't know/No answer	7

Source: "CBC-Enviro-nics Public Issues Poll," *cbc.ca*, November 2006, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/afghanistan/afghanistan-survey2006.html>.

Skepticism as to whether the Canadian mission would be successful was already quite pronounced in 2006, with almost 60 percent of Canadians polled doubting that the engagement would be successful. More recent polls show dwindling support. In a July 2008 poll conducted by Angus Reid Strategies, only 36 percent of Canadians agreed with the decision to extend Canada's military mission in Afghanistan through 2011. This represents a sharp drop from 41 percent in a similar poll done in May 2008.²³

Actors

Canada's involvement in Afghanistan has been played out through the actions and interactions of a bewilderingly complicated landscape of actors.²⁴

Canadian Government Departments in Ottawa. As mentioned above, these include Defence, Foreign Affairs, CIDA, Public Safety, Justice and Finance, as well as other actors such as the Canadian parliament and its recently established Special Committee on Afghanistan, and coordinating mechanisms in Ottawa both on the political and the working level. Their interactions can be outlined as follows:

- All the main departments of government involved in Afghanistan have an Afghanistan Task Force. These, until recently, were coordinated through the Department of Foreign Affairs; in response to the *Manley Report*, the coordination function has been relocated to the Privy Council, which supports a newly created Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan.²⁵
- START, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force, is an across-departmental structure located in the Department of Foreign Affairs. START is a major funder of Canadian activities in Afghanistan that are not clearly developmental (financed through CIDA) or military (financed through the Department of Defence) in nature. START primarily supports activities in the area of rule of law: police reform, judicial reform, and prisons reform.²⁶
- The SSR Working Group is another whole of government mechanism embedded in the DFAIT, which since March 2006 has brought together functionaries from across government to ensure coherence in SSR policy, coordinate SSR deployments, and ensure that those deployed on SSR missions have the requisite training.

Intergovernmental Organizations. Canadian government departments deliver many of their policies and programs for Afghanistan through intergovernmental organizations, including NATO, the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the G7, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Programs are delivered at the headquarters of these organizations and in some instances through in-country offices and structures, for example, NATO's International Security Assistance Force, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), and the World Bank's Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.²⁷

In-Country Multilateral Coordination Mechanisms. These mechanisms include

- the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board set up in 2006 to oversee the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact, the road map for the country's further efforts in the areas of security, development, and governance, with seven representatives from the Afghan government and twenty-one from the international community, including Canada;²⁸
- the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, created to finance priority policing activities;²⁹
- the Policy Action Group, established by President Karzai in 2006 to manage four working groups addressing such issues as intelligence, security, strategic communication, and reconstruction and development. Representation includes the Afghan president (the chair), the Afghan ministers of Defence, Internal Communications, and Education, representatives of UNAMA, ISAF, and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), as well as the ambassadors of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada;
- US-led structures of which Canada is a part, such as the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) that works with the Afghan government and the international community to help the Afghanistan National Security Forces to carry out organizational reforms.³⁰

Canadian Representation in Afghanistan. Canada is represented by its ambassador, the highest-ranking Canadian official in the country; by the Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (JTF-AFG), now under NATO command in the ISAF and stationed in Kandahar; as well as by a number of special bodies with multidepartmental representation subordinated to them, such as the following:

- the Kandahar Province Reconstruction Team, one of twenty-five PRTs operating in Afghanistan. The Kandahar PRT has roughly 350 personnel from various departments of government, protected by a dedicated Canadian Forces infantry company. Their task is to deliver reconstruction and development aid in Kandahar province, supported by a variety of international donors and contractors including representatives of the United States Agency for International Aid (USAID) and Afghan central ministries;³¹
- the Canadian Operational Mentor Liaison Team (OMLT or informally, “omelette”), which works with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (APA) to build capacity to a level where

these national institutions can assume responsibility for security in Kandahar province;³²

- the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A), which from 2005 to late 2008 worked to support capacity-building for Afghan central ministries. While SAT-A was a military unit, it worked closely with the Canadian ambassador, the CIDA representative in Kabul, and a senior representative of the Afghan government;³³ and
- the Canadian Afghan National Training Centre Detachment in Kabul, which provides some fifteen trainers for Afghan army personnel.³⁴

Clearly, a major challenge to Canada has been to ensure certain coherence in the objectives, programs, and actions of this army of actors. We will return to the subject in the concluding section.

SSR and SSR-Related Program Activities

Canada's combat mission in Afghanistan has been the precondition for a range of SSR and SSR-related activities. The overarching framework for these activities is laid out in the Afghanistan Compact and in the more detailed Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), which set out a five-year program of cooperation between the Government of Afghanistan and the international community in three areas: security; governance, rule of law, and human rights; and economic and social development (with counter-narcotics as a cross-cutting fourth program area).³⁵ The activities of the main Canadian governmental departments engaged in Afghanistan have dovetailed closely with the first of these program areas.

Thus, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces have led on cantonnement of heavy weapons, demining, and training of the Afghan National Army. CIDA has led on infrastructure repair, rural development, education, and local governance. Public Safety has led on police training, through the RCMP, and on prisons regime improvement, through the Correctional Service of Canada.³⁶ The Department of Finance has been involved in many of these activities through World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and G7 funding mechanisms as well as in other initiatives such as providing advice to the Government of Afghanistan on trade and investment, private sector development, economic governance, DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs), and anti-narcotics actions.

The jewel in the crown in Afghanistan as concerns SSR has, however, been the work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. PRTs are civil-military partnerships designed to facilitate the development of a secure environment and reconstruction in the Afghan regions. Only the military elements of PRTs are integrated in the ISAF chain of

that it has military and civilian pillars, the Norwegian model is distinct because it does not engage directly in development work in its province but channels development funds through the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul, working in cooperation with two civilian employees from the embassy stationed at the PRT. In this way, the Norwegian PRT model is more centralized than others.³⁹

Budgets

Canada gives more money to Afghanistan than to any other country.⁴⁰ Other countries identified as priorities for Canadian policy such as Haiti and Sudan lag well behind. According to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the military costs for the mission in Afghanistan reached \$2.6 billion in March 2007, or nearly \$1.3 million per day of the mission.⁴¹ As in the case of US spending for Iraq, assessments of the costs of military action vary widely. For example, one Canadian research organization puts the cost to date at three times as much.⁴²

Canada is a leading donor to Afghanistan for civilian activity, with over \$1 billion pledged to 2011.⁴³ Generally, estimates of the relationship of military to civilian costs run about ten to one. This proportion was criticized by the *Manley Report*, as was the fact that much of Canadian spending goes through multilateral aid agencies (35 percent) and the central government (50 percent), leaving little for "locally managed quick action projects that bring immediate improvement to everyday life for Afghans" or for "signature projects readily identified as supported by Canada."⁴⁴

There has also been criticism of the high proportion of contract budgets that stay with Canadian contractors as opposed to local Afghan actors, as well as the fact that the Afghan government has apparently been incapable of accounting for money put at its disposal. A recent article in the *Globe and Mail* claimed that the Afghan government had not been able to substantiate roughly one-third of the \$15 billion entrusted to it since 2001.⁴⁵

Policy Reorientation

In follow-up to the *Manley Report* of January 2008, Ottawa has published a report entitled *Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan: Setting a Course to 2011* (hereafter, *Engagement in Afghanistan*).⁴⁶ The report offers a candid assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. As concerns security, it notes that the situation deteriorated through 2007 and into 2008. As concerns governance, it decries persistent shortcomings owing to the weak capacity of Afghan government institutions and waning public trust because of continuing widespread corruption. As concerns development, the

report acknowledges that while the economy has been expanding at a remarkable rate, it will take many years of "sustained growth to reach reasonable levels." *Engagement in Afghanistan* lays out a number of initiatives that have been taken in response to the *Manley Report* recommendations and others that go beyond it. These initiatives are summarized below.

First, *Engagement in Afghanistan* revamps Canada's governance approach to Afghanistan at home. As mentioned above and as recommended in the *Manley Report*, a cabinet committee on Afghanistan has been created, and interdepartmental coordination of Canadian policy has been moved to the Privy Council from Foreign Affairs, with a dedicated full-time staff headed by deputy ministers from Foreign Affairs, Defence, Public Safety, and CIDA.

Second, Ottawa has committed itself to making quarterly reports to parliament and its newly created Special Committee on Afghanistan, and to ensuring a better flow of information on policy to the Canadian media and public. Ottawa has also promised to develop a system of benchmarks for measuring progress on the security, governance, and development fronts in Afghanistan and Canadian efforts in these areas.

Third, the Canadian approach within Afghanistan has been recalibrated in the direction of "Kandaharization" and "civilianization" of the Canadian involvement. The process of concentrating energies on Kandahar, initiated by the Liberal Party in 2005, is to be reinforced. More resources will be allocated to the province, with the amount it is to receive rising from 17 percent to 50 percent of all Canadian aid to Afghanistan. Canada is attempting to showcase three "signature" development projects in the province. Training of Afghan police and military is to be pursued, the objective being that these forces will be able to sustain a secure environment and rule of law by 2011, the date when the Afghanistan Compact governing cooperation between the Afghan government and the international community is due to conclude, and when the Canadian presence will presumably wind down. A senior-level civilian representative is to be appointed to the PRT in Kandahar, the number of civilians involved is set to increase significantly, and Canadian actors are to be given more discretion in the making of policy to address local conditions. Canada is committed to pursue its efforts to advance Afghanistan's capacity for democratic governance and effective government decision-making, as well as to help bring about national political reconciliation.

Fourth, Canada has put its NATO allies on notice that it expects them to field an additional 1,000 combat troops if Canada is to maintain its own presence. This appeal is in part conditioned by the high number of Canadian casualties, but also by the growing criticism levelled by the Afghan government toward coalition governments regarding civilian casualties owing to mistargeting from high-level bombing operations. Everything points to the fact that insufficient soldiers on the ground

necessitates greater use of air-power which, while having greatly improved in accuracy in recent years, still remains a blunt instrument, often incapable of discriminating between Taliban and civilian targets.⁴⁷

Fifth, *Engagement in Afghanistan* calls for a changed leadership paradigm for international efforts in Afghanistan, coming out strongly for the United Nations to assume a much more important coordinating role in Afghanistan and enthusiastically supporting the appointment of the Norwegian Kai Eide as the UN Secretary General's Special Representative in the country.

While much of what is proposed appears to be very sound, the *Engagement in Afghanistan* report raises more questions than it answers. The reorganization in Ottawa makes sense in theoretical terms, but it remains to be seen whether the now centrally located task force will have the necessary clout to make coherent policy and to implement it effectively. There still remains a considerable degree of stove-piping in the Canadian departmental system (and in that of most other countries), despite 3D and whole of government efforts. The situation in and around Afghanistan, and in particular in such southern provinces as Kandahar, will have to contend with formidable political challenges in 2008–2009: in particular, the instability and uncertainty engendered by elections in Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States, and Canada itself. The call for additional support from NATO allies comes none too soon. But just how the allies will respond, in view of reservations in public opinion and the material constraints they face when it comes to putting soldiers in the field, remains to be seen. Still, allied countries deployed in more secure parts of the country and under restrictions to be active elsewhere are now under notice from Ottawa that this must change. Finally, there is definitely a need for enhanced coordination of the various initiatives underway in Afghanistan. On the other hand, a UN umbrella under existing international circumstances may not be the ideal framework for organizing the leadership of such a complex endeavour as Afghanistan.

Assessment

The Canadian approach to SSR in Afghanistan is now seven years old. What kind of balance sheet can now be established? Basically, the Canadians have attempted to take a comprehensive and integrated approach in their efforts and to encourage other governments—donor countries as well as the Government of Afghanistan—to do likewise. A balance has been sought between governance initiatives and those seeking to enhance the ability of the Afghan national security forces to assume responsibility for security delivery on the behalf of their population. These positive elements form an integral part of the current Canadian government's new approach to Afghanistan and should be accentuated

as they are implemented. This being said, there is much that the Canadian government needs to do in order to fully operationalize its approach to SSR, both in Afghanistan and more generally.

First, Canada should develop its own concept of SSR. This is not to suggest that Canada should try to reinvent the wheel in this regard. However, the country has a long tradition of involvement abroad that has been articulated and implemented through a variety of departmental policy portals with different operational cultures, objectives, procedures, and the like. These now need to be brought together in an overarching Canadian concept that is elaborated by the various Canadian government departments involved in SSR. More likely than not, such a concept will end up closely resembling the OECD Development Assistance Committee concept described above. But Canadians need to take ownership of their own national approach and use this process to support efforts to encourage national actors to work together as part of a common endeavour.

Second, to this end, Canada should redouble its efforts to build the capacity of government representatives working both in Ottawa and abroad to operate in an SSR mode. Canada has been one of the first member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to engage in the capacity-building consultations on SSR offered by the OECD Development Assistance Committee. The Canadian experience in Afghanistan underscores the importance of having staff capable of supporting and spearheading, as the situation may demand, the rebuilding and creation of ministries, security forces, and systems for managing government departments and their personnel and finances, not to mention the all-important structures for overseeing and controlling the security forces and their masters.

Third, Canada needs to think about how to create incentives for its staff to coordinate and cooperate more effectively at home and in the field. The stance taken by ministers, including the prime minister, is crucial in this regard. Beyond this, there is much that can be done to encourage symmetries among different departments at the staff level. Involving staff in the elaboration of interdepartmental memoranda of understanding MOUs would be a step in the right direction. Another would be the insertion of incentives in staff-promotion packages that would reward efforts to enhance coordination and cooperation. Canada might also use its world-class International Development Research Centre to explore new avenues for improving effective coordination and cooperation among the multiple actors who typically find themselves working shoulder to shoulder in such environments as Afghanistan.

Fourth, in view of the challenges discussed above, it may be worthwhile to think about creating dedicated international departments in those ministries that are called upon to provide capacity for programs, together with a policy framework for coordinating and integrating their

efforts. As part of this process, Canada might review whether START, the centralized funding mechanism located in Foreign Affairs, might not be more effective as a central fund of government subordinated to a central policy framework along the lines of the Afghanistan Task Force located in the Privy Council Office. Similarly, there should be a review of whether SSR and SSR-related funds now dispensed through CIDA and the Department of National Defence should be reallocated to such a repositioned START. Centralization of funding is a device to which other governments, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, have resorted with success. A related step in this area will be to rethink the way that international service is rewarded in the career paths of civil servants. The current system sometimes fails to take into account experience won in the field relative to experience gained in the corridors of powers in Ottawa.

Fifth, Canada should redouble its efforts to encourage its allies to step up to the plate. Already, the appeal for more troops has resulted in the French government deciding to deploy another seven hundred troops to Afghanistan. Canada has earned the credibility to demand more of its allies.

At the same time, Canada needs to pursue its efforts to be able to field military forces that can create a secure environment, carry out reconstruction efforts with and for local populations, and work together with other actors—military and others—in the field. If the experience of Western countries in Afghanistan since 2001 has shown nothing else, it has underscored the importance of being able to bring sufficient military forces to bear to create an environment in which development can proceed. It has also shown that the norm for third parties is to have to deal with environments that are both post-conflict and conflictual in nature, and often the borderlines between the two are ill-defined and subject to rapid change.

Conclusions

Canada has been an important player in Afghanistan, punching above its weight, certainly if one considers the development resources it has brought to the table and the military responsibilities it has assumed in the conflict in view of its traditional peacekeeping role. But Canada is only one actor in an army of other countries and their peace-support forces, as well as NGOs, IGOs, private military and security companies, and local and international media, not to mention the Government of Afghanistan itself. The fortunes of Afghanistan do not depend on the Canadian effort alone, just as Canada's successes and failures are in large part conditioned by those of other actors.

Much has been written about the trials and tribulations of the international community in Afghanistan, and there is no need to revisit these debates in detail.⁴⁸ But in conclusion it may be useful to highlight the main shortcomings of the external actors' efforts.


A first observation is that while the international community's involvement has not been tainted with the brush of illegitimacy as it has in Iraq, this bonus has been losing relevance as the number of civilian casualties from aerial bombings has soared. There is a straight line between insufficient firepower to create a secure environment and overreliance on airpower to defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda.

Second, the approach of the international community in Afghanistan has suffered from the beginning from the lack of a coherent strategy. Any effort in this direction was skewered from the outset by two things: the preponderance of the US-led GWOT (Global War on Terror) agenda in determining the policies of the international community, and the unintegrated approach to Afghan security that was institutionalized by the decisions taken at the Bonn donors conference in 2002. The strategic malaise goes, however, well beyond this. It has included an abject failure to think creatively about how to give the Pashtuns—Afghanistan's largest ethnic group—a stake in the country's stabilization and development. If the Sunnis of Iraq can be brought back into the fold, why cannot the Pashtuns of Afghanistan? A related strategic issue concerns how the international community has approached other players in Afghanistan's region—obviously, Pakistan, but also others such as Iran, India, and the Central Asian republics.

A third major fault line has concerned the ability of the many actors involved in Afghanistan to work together. Examples of this dysfunction are legend. To take just a few, there are the efforts of the international community to promote rule of law in Afghanistan. It is clear that programs in the related areas of policing, courts, and corrections are uncoordinated. It is clear that approaches to these policy areas differ from province to province and from district to district as a function of which external donor is in the lead. These donors tend to propagate the norms and objectives that they are most familiar with from national practice. There are, as yet, no common international reference points for reform efforts. What happens at district and provincial levels tends to be disconnected from what happens at the national level, and in turn there is little interface between programs concerning policing and those that address the military, notwithstanding the interdependence of these two subsectors of the security sector in providing for the public's security in Afghanistan.⁴⁹

Last but not least, there is the issue of resources. Afghanistan is Iraq's poor sister in this regard, with the latter profiting from substantially greater resource inputs from abroad and, more recently, also from internally generated resources such as oil. The comparison of Iraq and Afghanistan in Figure 3 drives this message home.

FIGURE 3
Battlespace Comparison



Source: Adapted from a similar version presented by Brigadier General Richard E. Nugee, Chief Joint Fires and Influence Branch, Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (Brussels, 1 April 2007).

Afghanistan has proven to be a major testing ground for a number of opposing approaches championed by different stakeholders in the Canadian context. One has revolved around the best use of the Canadian Forces, in particular, the issue of whether they should uphold their traditional post-Korean War role as peacekeepers or whether they need to be capable of participating in combat operations, as they have been required to do in Afghanistan. This deployment has also seen Canada struggling with a choice between its more traditional stance as an ally that fell into line and one that is now prepared, when pressed, to set conditions for other allies to fulfil. A third area of challenge has involved the government's public information policy, whereby the choice has lain between the continuation of long-standing efforts to control the public debate by attempting to seal issues off from public scrutiny, to a more recent attempt to engage parliament and the public through regular reporting on developments and the accompanying implicit invitation for them to exercise greater oversight.

Alongside such general public policy issues, debates that are more specific to the SSR agenda have raged as well. In particular, there is the question of the proper mix between long-term development programs such as those sponsored by CIDA, and shorter-term, quick-fix projects advocated by the Department of Defence and the Canadian Forces. The response for the time being appears to be that both are needed and that, if the latter are particularly required, they should be embedded in a long-term development perspective. Also dear to the SSR agenda has been the question of intergovernmental coordination and cooperation, where much progress has been made, even if much more needs to be done. Finally, in recent years, Canada has moved toward a comprehensive, integrated approach to security and development, justice and governance. The movement has been slow, incomplete, and imperfect, but it has definitively taken place. This is a promising trajectory that warrants continuing support on the part of both the Canadian public and Canada's partners.

Notes

This chapter was prepared with the help of my research assistant, Gabriel Real de Azúa, who did much of the research and advised me on successive drafts. His contribution is greatly appreciated.

1. Saša Janković, "The Status of Serbia's Intelligence Reform and Its Challenges," in *Security Sector Reform in South East Europe – From a Necessary Remedy to a Global Concept*, ed. Anja H. Ebnöther, Ernst M. Felberbauer, and Mladen Staničić (National Defence Academy and Bureau for Security Policy, 2007), 150-56, http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/10_wg13_global-concept_200_jankovic.pdf.
2. David M. Law, "Rethinking the Code of Conduct in the Light of Security Sector Reform," in *Consolidating the OSCE*, PSIO Occasional Paper 4, ed. Daniel Warner (Geneva: Program for the Study of International Organizations, HEI, and Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2006), 83-105, http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/iheid/shared/iheid/514/OP4_2006_EDITED_FINAL.pdf.
3. National Security Council, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" (September 2002), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.
4. Steven Staples and Bill Robinson, "More Than the Cold War: Canada's Military Spending 2007-08," *Foreign Policy Series 2*, no. 3 (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, October 2007), http://www.policyalternatives.ca/documents/National_Office_Pubs/2007/More_Than_the_Cold_War.pdf.
5. The author was involved in the efforts of the Department of National Defence to reintroduce lecturers from the military into university campuses in 2001-02. The response of students, many of whom were first- or second-generation

- Canadians whose families had come from fragile, conflict, or post-conflict countries, was particularly enthusiastic.
6. Despite efforts to re-establish a credible security role for Canada at home and abroad, the process is still in its infancy and will likely take several years. For example, an article entitled "Between the Lines of the Manley Report" by *Globe and Mail* journalist Jeffrey Simpson (Toronto, 29 January 2008) claimed that the most soldiers that Canada—a G8 member and 33 million people strong—was able to field at any one time was 1,000.
 7. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2005), <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf>; OECD, *The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice* (Paris: OECD, 2005), <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf>.
 8. See, for example, Geneva Centre for the Control of Armed Forces, "The UN Approach to SSR in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding" (Factsheet, n.d.), www.dcaf.ch/un_ssr_pcpb/_index.cfm?navsub1=31&nav1=3.
 9. Human Security Network, "The Vision of the Human Security Network" (20 May 1999), <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/menu-e.php>.
 10. It has been argued that human security was sidelined after 9/11 as Canada moved toward the US approach in the War on Terror, which prioritized national security considerations as opposed to concerns about the security of individuals and their communities. See Stefan Gänzle, "The Impact of 9/11 on Human Security in Canada's Foreign Policy" (draft paper presented at a Canadian Political Sciences Association conference in Saskatoon, 1 June 2007), <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2007/Ganzle.pdf>. For an examination of the relationship between human security and SSR, see David M. Law, "Human Security and Security Sector Reform: Contrasts and Commonalities," *Sicherheit und Frieden* 1 (2005).
 11. Department of National Defence, "Canada's International Policy Statement. A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence" (Cat. No. D2-168/2005, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, 2005), http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Canada_Defence_2005.pdf.
 12. The quotes are taken from a speech by David Mulroney entitled "Canada in Afghanistan: From Collaboration to Integration," delivered 2 May 2007 when he was Canadian associate deputy minister of Foreign Affairs and interdepartmental coordinator for Afghanistan. He has since become a deputy minister in the Privy Council Office, roughly the prime minister's dedicated civil service, with similar responsibilities.
 13. Taylor Owen and Patrick Travers, "3D Vision," *The Walrus*, 8 August 2008, <http://www.walrusmagazine.ca/articles/2007.07.Afghanistan-and-Canada/>.
 14. David M. Law, "Cooperation among SSR-Relevant IGOs," in *Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector Reform*, ed. David M. Law (Berlin:

- Litverlag, 2007), 43-62; and David M. Law, "Taking Stock, Moving Forward," in *Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector Reform*, 239-52.
15. As a developing concept, SSR has a number of dimensions that need further conceptual work, ideally supported by empirical experience from the field. For example, the borders between what qualifies as SSR and what does not remain weakly defined. Is a *train and equip* program for the military SSR if it does not have a dimension designed to ensure that those who are trained and equipped are subject to effective democratic control? Or is this consideration moot if other actors are involved in governance issues that are designed to promote democratic governance? Likewise, the costs and benefits of SSR have not yet been subject to a rigorous comparative analysis. Furthermore, methodologies for assessing security sector performance or the effectiveness of SSR programs are yet in their infancy, and so on.
 16. See "Security System Reform and Rule of Law" at <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/securitysystemreform-en.aspx> and the statement of the Canadian Ambassador to the UN Security Council on 20 February 2007 at www.canadaninternational.gc.ca/prmny-mponu/canada.un-canada/statement.
 17. See Center for Policy and Human Development, *Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007. Bridging Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and the Search for Justice* (Islamabad: Army Press, 2007), <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/asiathepacific/afghanistan/nhdr2007.pdf>.
 18. For a complete list of these parties refer to the Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook*, "South Asia: Afghanistan," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html#Govt>.
 19. Ibid.
 20. See Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Final Report* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008), http://dsp-psd.tpsgc.gc.ca/collection_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf, especially pp. 20-22. This document is hereafter referred to as the *Manley Report*.
 21. These objectives have been challenged by the Canadian public with essentially the following arguments:
 - The money that goes to Afghanistan should go instead to poor and disadvantaged Canadians;
 - The Canadian involvement costs too much;
 - Canadian money is being spent on the Canadian military, not on the Afghan military;
 - Canadian resources should be invested in development, not in counter-insurgency actions;
 - Canada needs to revert to a traditional peacekeeping role (i.e., acting neutrally between opposing parties);
 - In Afghanistan, Canada acts as a lackey of the United States: Canada has been duped into a Global War on Terror (GWOT) that is based on false premises and is being ineffectively implemented;

- If Afghanistan is such an important issue, why are US/NATO allies contributing so few troops to the ISAF and imposing constraints ("caveats") that make it difficult or impossible for the ISAF commander to deploy them flexibly to deal with security threats as they arise in various parts of Afghanistan?
 - If Canada were not involved, the Afghans would have to do the job themselves;
 - It would be better to spend Canadian money on other places (i.e., Darfur); Afghanistan is a lost cause—there is no point in pursuing the Canadian involvement there.
22. This material is based on Duane Bratt, "Mr Harper Goes to War: Canada, Afghanistan and the Return of High Politics in Canadian Foreign Policy" (2007), www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2007/Bratt.pdf, as well as on the *Manley Report*. According to Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, the initial deployment to Afghanistan was also conditioned by reluctance on the part of the Canadian (Liberal) government in the years following 9/11 to participate in the modernization of NORAD, the US-Canada system for monitoring aerial threats to North America, into the US-led Ballistic Missile Defence program. With the United States wanting to focus more of its hard power on Iraq, Canada was happy to fill the void in Kandahar. For a detailed account, see Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 181. Some observers, such as Duane Bratt in "Mr Harper Goes to War," 7, have argued that the third deployment to Kabul in 2003 was, in part, a means for Canada to avoid a deployment to Iraq. Bratt also quotes the Canadian Ambassador to Washington explaining that the fourth deployment decision, in favour of Kandahar in 2005, was "linked to the failure to send troops to Iraq in 2003."
 23. CBC News, "36 Percent Support Keeping Troops in Afghanistan through 2011: Poll," [cbc.ca](http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/07/07/afghanistan-poll.html), <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/07/07/afghanistan-poll.html>.
 24. The author is indebted to Jim Cox for his succinct rendering of this alphabet soup in "Afghanistan: The Canadian Military Mission," InfoSeries (Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Publication PRB 07-19E, 6 November 2007).
 25. Prime Minister Harper announced the creation of the cabinet committee on Afghanistan and the Afghanistan Task Force within the Privy Council Office on 8 February 2008.
 26. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "START – Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force" (3 December 2008), <http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/index.aspx>.
 27. See World Bank, "Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: The Benefit of Working Together" (World Bank Group, 2009), <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21698820~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html>.

28. *Manley Report*, 48.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, 47.
31. Cox, "Afghanistan: The Canadian Military Mission."
32. *Ibid.*
33. According to recent reports, the SAT-A unit is in the process of being disbanded and a new body, led by CIDA, is being constituted. This was one of the recommendations of the *Manley Report*.
34. Not to be forgotten in this picture are the non-state actors that design programs and/or support their delivery: first, the Canadian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in both Canada and Afghanistan, as well the international non-governmental organizations and networks of which they are a part. For more information, see Canada's Coalition to End Global Poverty, "Canadian NGOs in Afghanistan (Briefing note, n.d.), <http://www.devp.org/devpme/eng/pressroom/documents/pdf/NGOProfiles.pdf>. Second, private military and security companies (PMSCs). While to our knowledge Canada has no such companies operating in or for the Afghan theatre, the United States does—and such companies can have an impact on both civilian and military activities carried out by Canadians. Ongoing research at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces indicates that some ninety PMSCs are active in the Afghan theatre.
35. See "The Afghanistan Compact, Building on Success; The London Conference on Afghanistan," 31 January–1 February 2006, http://www.ands.gov.af/admin/ands/ands_docs/upload/UploadFolder/Afghanistan%20Compact.pdf; Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, "Afghanistan National Development Strategy Summary Report: An Interim Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction," [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2006.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/KHII-6LK3R2-unama-afg-30jan1.pdf/\\$File/unama-afg-30jan1.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2006.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/KHII-6LK3R2-unama-afg-30jan1.pdf/$File/unama-afg-30jan1.pdf).
36. See *Manley Report*, 25, and "Canada in Afghanistan. CBC News in Depth: Where the Mission Is and Where It Might Go Next," 22 January 2008.
37. This description is based on information from a NATO web page, "NATO in Afghanistan" (Factsheet, 5 July 2005), <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm>.
38. *Manley Report*, 23.
39. For more information on the Norwegian model, see Norway – The Official Site in Afghanistan, "Norwegian Led PRT in Faryab" (2007), <http://www.norway.org.af/prt/faryab/>.
40. Afghanistan is the single largest recipient of Canadian bilateral aid. Since 2002, Canada has contributed US\$412.2 million (18.8 percent of the total) through CIDA to the World Bank-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, making it the second-largest contributor after the United Kingdom. See World Bank, "Canada and the World Bank: Working Towards a Better Future for Afghanistan" (World Bank Group, 2009), <http://go.worldbank.org/OZ869X45T0>.

41. CBC News, "Afghanistan, by the Numbers," *cbc.ca*, 17 January 2008, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/afghanistan/bythenumbers.html>.
42. Scott Taylor, "Iraq and Afghanistan: Maybe We Should Admit Mistake" (Centre for Research on Globalization, 8 April 2008), <http://www.global-research.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8590>.
43. CBC News, "Afghanistan, by the Numbers."
44. *Manley Report*, 26.
45. Editorial, *Globe and Mail*, 25 March 2008.
46. Government of Canada, *Report to Parliament: Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan – Setting a Course to 2011* (June 2008), <http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/documents/q108/index.aspx?lang=en>.
47. See, for example, "Afghan Civilians: Caught in the Crossfire," *International Herald Tribune*, 7 September 2008, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/07/opinion/edafghan.php>.
48. See Daniel Korski, "Afghanistan: Europe's Forgotten War" (European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2008), http://ecfr.3cdn.net/fcdc73b-8da7af85936_q8m6b5o4j.pdf; Paul Gallis and Vincent Morelli, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance" (CRS Report for Congress, 18 July 2008), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf>; International Crisis Group, "Reports by Region: Afghanistan," <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1266&l=1>.
49. Such shortcomings were at the core of a workshop on policing and justice issues organized by the Canadian Mission to the European Union in Brussels on 1 April 2008.

Chapter 15

Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The German Approach

MICHAEL BRZOSKA

Introduction

This chapter assesses the largest security sector reform (SSR) support project the German government has ever been involved in: police reform in Afghanistan. After an introductory section outlining the German approach to SSR in general, the German effort to help establish a central police force in Afghanistan is sketched. The following section reviews successes and failures of the police program on a number of dimensions of SSR. Finally, the future prospects for police reform in Afghanistan are briefly discussed.

German SSR – An Overview

Germany has not published an official SSR policy statement or doctrine. The most authoritative statement is the "Interministerial Framework for the Support of Reforms in the Security Sector of Developing and Transition Countries," published in 2006 but available only in German.¹ This document has primarily internal functions—to serve as a guide for working units within the relevant ministries—but it is a good indication of the "German approach" to the extent that there is one.

The Interministerial Framework begins by referencing a diverse set of key international documents, most of which were elaborated with German contributions, such as the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of October 2000, the European Security Strategy of 2004, the European Union Council's SSR concept of November 2005, and the EU Commission's SSR