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I would like to congratulate the speakers on their presentations and papers, and on the many useful observations that they have made about governance in Southeastern Europe.

I will not attempt a summary. What I will do is to focus on an aspect of governance that I believe is germane to many of the presentations that we have heard during the last two days, namely how donor countries and recipient countries work together in the reform process. I will address this issue in two areas: security sector reform and the larger question of good governance.

Security sector reform, which grew out of efforts to restructure civil-military relations in the first post-Cold War decade, has begun to encompass a much broader area of concern. Security sector reform has several different dimensions.

- The reform of all institutions having a security function, from the armed forces to customs police and immigration authorities.
- The transformation of the way these different bodies work together in the national theatre.
- The restructuring of the way security intuitions operating under different national jurisdictions work together – in not only bilateral but also multilateral frameworks such as the UN, NATO, the OSCE and the European Union.
- The need for a general overhaul of the way that we attempt to ensure that these institutions, operating at home and abroad are sufficiently transparent, accountable and responsive to the people and communities that they are meant to serve.

Security Sector reform is being driven by four processes: devolution, enlargement, globalization and transformation of the threat environment.

- By devolution, I mean the mounting pressures to devolve a range of security responsibilities in and for Europe, and for its immediate periphery, from NATO to the European Union.
- Enlargement means of course the substantial widening of both institutions that is now on the agenda. Its likely result is that during the course of this decade a clear majority of the Euro-Atlantic states should be able to count themselves among the members of the Alliance and the Union.
- Globalization in the security context means that more and more states from different regions of the world find themselves having or wanting to develop joint approaches with other states outside their immediate region to deal with one or the other issue or contingency. This requires the development of new forms of cooperation and interaction between and among states not accustomed to working with one another.
- The fourth major development that will preoccupy us this decade is how to respond to the new challenges laid down by catastrophic terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This will require nothing less than a far-reaching transformation of prevailing security concepts and the way that security resources are organized and deployed.

These are central issues for not only the transition countries but also for the developed western democracies that have acted as their mentors over the last decade. Agendas are by no means identical but there are several areas where both the developed and the transition democracies face common challenges. As a result, there will be more

opportunity, as well as more need, for programs and activities that place the onus on co-learning and the two-way exchange of the best evolving practice.

A co-learning approach is also relevant to the larger question of governance that has been at the centre of our discussions at this conference. Let me elaborate. The two central themes that have emerged at our meeting – and neither are surprising - are

- the overriding importance of good governance in determining a country's fortunes in the transition process, and .
- the overriding importance of external influences in shaping governance behaviour:the politics of imitation mentioned by one speaker, the importance of political conditionality mentioned by another.

It also needs to be noted, however, that over the past ten years or so, with changes in communications in our globalizing world, the external factor has become much more transparent, and more subject to scrutiny. And as it has, so has the credibility of the western countries that support the reform process in transition countries.

At that the same time that democratization has made its way in SEE - in fits and starts, but overall positively - western democracy has shown increasing signs of dysfunctionality and even crisis.

A few examples.

- The campaign-finance scandals that have rocked virtually all major western democracies during the past decade.
- The electoral joke that we witnessed in Florida in the last presidential elections.
- Falling turnouts in elections, not necessarily across the board, but we see even in countries like Canada, with traditionally high voter turnouts, growing voter apathy.

- A dramatic fall in the number of members of political parties in virtually all western countries, which is important because if political parties are not in a position to effectively integrate the various interests at work in society into a coherent platform, who is?
- A fundamental distrust in the democratic politician. To give you a random example, there was a report in yesterday's *Ottawa Citizen* on an opinion poll carried in Canada on the most and least trustworthy of professions. Guess who placed last, after even the used car salesman, in a list of 26? You're right: the professional politician. Actually, it was the federal politician that placed last, while his municipal counterpart placed just ahead the used car salesman. Frankly, I would have thought that the Canadian politician would fare better than that, but there it was in black and white.

Then, in the wake of 9/11, there have been a number of setbacks for governance in both formative and mature democracies, and in the way they work together in addressing common problems. Three developments stand out.

- First, the weakening commitment of the western democracies to democratization in such transition countries as Central Asia. Some decisionmakers have apparently decided that the exigencies of the war against terrorism mean that one has to be prepared to turn a blind eye to the state of political freedoms and human rights in countries that are "on your side". This is fundamentally at odds with our discourse of the last two decades or so where more democracy was meant to mean more security – and not less.
- Second, the tendency in a number of mature democracies to suspend or sidestep certain civil liberties with the argument this is justified by the struggle against terrorism. We are far from a situation as in WW II when over 100,000 North Americans were

deprived of their civil liberties owing to their ethnic background. But some of the trends, less than a year and a half after 9/11, are worrisome.

- Third, the narrowing of the opportunities for multilateral decisionmaking as key international institutions – not only the UN and its Security Council, but also the EU and NATO – have found their memberships increasingly at odds over questions of war and peace. This is a great setback when one considers that the expansion of opportunities for multilateral decisionmaking was one of the great accomplishments of the 1990s, enhancing as it did the ability of several countries, and many transition countries among them, to have a greater impact on international decisions affecting them.

All this adds up to a situation whereby the western model of governance is looking pretty shabby, and it may even bode ill for what Samuel Huntington described in the early 1990s as the third wave of democratisation. In any event, with the fact that so much has been accomplished on the governance front in SEE, perhaps one has to question some of our assumptions about the impact of external influence. At the very least, I would argue that the shortcomings of western democracy have limited the effectiveness of what western countries have been doing to support the transition in SEE and in other transition countries, and in turn, have made more difficult the efforts of the domestic proponents of democratisation and good governance. But my conclusion is really that as in the area of security sector reform, there will be a great deal of potential for co-learning activities on the part of developed and transition countries during what promises to be another challenging decade of reform. All Euro-Atlantic countries need to enhance their democratic standards and performance, and they can be mutually supportive as this process unfolds.