Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1994

Edited by

The Centre for Defence Studies,
King's College London

104th Year of Publication

BRASSEY'S (UK)
London • New York

Contents

Introduction

1 European Security and the New World Disorder 3
LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

British Defence Policy

2 The Role of Nuclear Weapons in UK Defence Policy 21
MALCOLM RIFKIND

3 Britain's New Defence Planning Framework 36
PHILIP SABIN

4 Air Power – Future Challenges and the Application of Technology 49
N E TAYLOR

5 Western Interests in the Balkan Wars 66
ANDREW COTTEY

European Security

6 The Post-Soviet Strategic Space: Trends and Problems 83
STEPHEN SHENFIELD

7 The Georgian Crisis 94
JONATHAN AVES

8 NATO in Evolution: The Challenges for 1994 115
SIMON LUNN

9 The Problems of Widening NATO 135
DAVID LAW

10 US Defence Policy and Forces in Europe 149
COLIN MCINNES

11 The Lessons of Yugoslavia 167
CEDRIC THORNBERRY

CONCLUSION

The simple answer to the question of Nato's future is that the Alliance will continue to exist for as long as governments and parliaments believe that it provides the most effective forum upon which to base their individual and collective security. The absence for the moment of serious contenders to fulfil this function confirms Nato's continued relevance. However, there is no room for complacency. Public support is, as always, an important element – governments can only go so far without the endorsement of their electorates. And in this respect, an Alliance incapable of influencing European crises and conflicts is bound to suffer a slow erosion of public support. Rightly or wrongly, Bosnia has already had a negative impact. Until now, Nato members have shunned more direct involvement for various reasons: that their national interests were not sufficiently directly engaged; that little could be achieved except an endless quagmire; and their publics would not support the loss of soldiers' lives. These assumptions are untested and will probably remain so. However, a repetition of Bosnian-type inactivity will inevitably drain the Alliance of its meaning.

Likewise, a failure now to develop a new set of relationships with CEE which are qualitatively different from those existing today, and which demonstrate clearly the path to eventual membership, will also see the Alliance accused of missing a strategic opportunity to contribute to a safer more secure Europe. Balancing CEE aspirations and Russian sensitivities is no easy task.

The principal challenge for the Alliance is to persuade the Russians that expansion of the Alliance is consistent with, rather than detrimental to, their own security.

The uncomfortable paradox is that developments in Russia will remain central to NATO's future – however they turn out.

9

The Problems of Widening NATO

DAVID LAW

Programme Director at the European Centre for International Security at Starnberg, Germany. Formerly Head of the Policy Planning Unit at NATO

How to shape the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe? This question has been central to the Alliance's efforts to realign its roles and responsibilities to meet the requirements of a new strategic era. The ongoing process began at the London Summit of July 1990 when the 16 nations established a bilateral régime of diplomatic liaison with their erstwhile adversaries in the Warsaw Pact. The next step was taken at the Rome Summit of the following year when Heads of State and Government launched a multilateral framework for consultations and cooperation called the North Atlantic Cooperation council (NACC)

With the scheduling for January 1994 of the third Alliance Summit in four years, the issue of a possible extension of membership was placed squarely on the NATO agenda. No longer was the debate mainly focussed on the question of whether the organisation would ever expand its membership. Rather, the accent shifted from 'whether to when', and even the naysayers found themselves saying not 'not' but 'if not, what?'

Over the short-term, a decision to expand NATO membership can be all but excluded. At most, what can be expected is an undertaking by the 16 nations – as Secretary General Woerner has been widely quoted as favouring – 'to open a perspective on membership'. This would still be a significant step, as it would tilt the subsequent debate towards such questions as to which countries would be enlarged and under what

circumstances. At the same time, while enlargement may become rather more likely as the current decade progresses, this is by no means a certain prospect. Indeed, there are reasons for believing that with Spain the Alliance may have taken in its last new member. Whatever the case, there can be little doubt that a possible widening of NATO membership will remain a subject of debate for some time to come.

THE CASE FOR ENLARGEMENT

On one level, expanding NATO's membership might seem the most natural thing in the world. The three countries most widely seen as leading candidates – the Visegrad Three; Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland – have made the greatest progress in the former East towards market economy, political pluralism and popular control over foreign and security policy. They border on Alliance territory. Theirs is a Central European tradition, brutally interrupted by forty-odd years of totalitarianism but unflinchingly reasserted at the first opportunity. These countries' élites, mindful of the Western–Eastern choice that their peoples faced on the morrow of the Second World War, project apprehension about the evolution of the new Russia, a concern which is shared (but considerably less vocally) by their Western counterparts. Inclusion of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland would increase stability, as NATO would have greater opportunity for shaping developments, rather than just reacting to them.

Budapest, Prague and Warsaw want membership and they have been anything but shy in articulating their desire. For an Alliance which many thought was destined to go the way of the Warsaw Pact, their interest is not only flattering, it is almost compelling. Why not reward those which have made the most progress in the right direction? Why not, in the process, reward the achievers, and send a signal of encouragement to the laggards?

To be sure, as the case for enlargement goes, it would not be possible to extend the Alliance to all would-be members in one go, for this would simply overload NATO's consultative circuits and overburden its decision-making. Possible feelings of

exclusion could, however, be assuaged with the promise of integration in subsequent waves of expansion. As for Russia, which may never be seriously considered for membership and which has made no secret of its apprehension about, and even opposition to, an eastwards extension of the Alliance, the solution put forward is a 'strategic partnership' with NATO.

A phased enlargement of the Alliance, it is argued, would also ensure a certain symmetry in membership with regard to the EC and the WEU as they proceed with their own expansion in the 1990s. This is deemed essential because, with European Union assuming increased responsibilities in the security domain, discrepancies in membership could generate strategic confusion.

Finally, expansion of Alliance membership would help underscore the fact that the relationship between the democracies of North America and Europe has a relevance which transcends the military and political imperatives of the East-West conflict. It would underline that the Alliance continues to be a repository of democratic values and an indispensable force for their propagation. Extending membership to the newly democratising countries of Central and Eastern Europe would constitute a logical next step in the Alliance's evolution. In short, to enlarge its membership is the Alliance's historical destiny.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF ENLARGEMENT

It is difficult not to sympathise with the intentions of the enlargers. But the methodology they propose for integrating the developing democracies of the East is questionable. Indeed, integration through institutional expansion raises several serious challenges to traditional and would-be NATO members alike, which could on balance generate less security for all concerned.

The Sociology of Enlargement

During the Cold War, the main criteria for Alliance membership were ideology and geography. Post-Cold War, with all NATO members or would-be members democracies or committed to

becoming democracies, ideology cannot be the criterion it once was. Nor can geography, as economics, communications and technology conspire to shape the new neighbourhoods of a new strategic era. In the revolutionary, and, by definition, ambiguous political and socio-economic, environment of the 1990s, the Alliance can no longer rely on the criteria of its formative years. Instead, sociology must be its guide. In terms of the enlargement debate, this is given expression by the fact that people have embraced new political realities throughout Central and Eastern Europe. How then can the Alliance discriminate by country between those who deserve privileged protection and those who do not?

Against this background, it is difficult to make a case for bringing in the Visegrad Three, while leaving others out. The three countries are ahead in the reform sweepstakes. But a look at the socio-economic and political situation in Central and Eastern Europe reveals no clear dividing line. As the victory of communist and pro-communist forces in the recent Polish parliamentary elections underline, the differences in the region are more quantitative than qualitative.

Another argument sometimes advanced on behalf of membership for the Visegrad Three is that they are contiguous to Alliance countries in the heart of Europe. But in a continent in which there are no longer fronts but challenges, an enlargement confined first to the Visegrad group could be misinterpreted as NATO perpetuating its Cold War preoccupation with the Central Region. The frictions this would generate would not be confined to the East.

Furthermore, to take the Visegrad Three in while leaving others out would give an advantage to the richer Central and Eastern European countries while denying one to the poorer countries of the area. It would mean that the latter would be obliged to spend relatively more on national defence, as they would not be able to profit from NATO infrastructure and other commonly funded programmes, and would continue to have to secure all their borders.

In an orderly world, the prospect of a staged expansion of the Alliance to all would-be adherents might well be sufficient to counteract the risks of the 'in-out' syndrome. But in the Europe of the 1990s, it is a climate of uncertainty which reigns. Thus,

promises of inclusion in a second or a third phase would be taken at considerably less than face value. For the publics in countries not making the first cut, if not for their leaderships, partial enlargement would be akin to abandonment. Such an approach would therefore be likely to lead to resentment in other countries of the former East, whether they were would-be members or not.

First and foremost, there is Russia, and Moscow's much-vaunted charge that a widening of the Alliance would lead to the isolation of Russia or even constitute an aggressive act at its expense. But the feelings of rejection and hostility towards the West which a limited enlargement could provoke are by no means limited to Russia.

Non-inclusion would prove particularly difficult for the newly independent Baltic states. For example, for NATO to bring Poland on board but not Lithuania would likely be perceived as an affront among the latter's population. In addition, it would confront the Polish minority in Lithuania with a further psychological barrier to normal cross-border interaction with the larger Polish community. NATO in this event would be viewed as helping to inflate rather than to diminish the importance of borders. Lithuania's energies would be deflected from the exigencies of reform to the esoterics of identity. Domestic forces in the Baltics which feel closer to the old order than the new would feel emboldened. Neo-imperialists in Russia would probably interpret the exclusion of the Baltic states as signalling that Western countries, which for five decades after their seizure by the USSR continued to recognise their independence, had finally turned their backs on them.

Non-entrance of other non-FSU states participating in the NACC – Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia – would produce similar phenomena there. For example, with Hungary in a first wave of widening, some two million Hungarians in Romania would feel more cut off from their brethren in Hungary and more exposed to extreme nationalist currents than they do today. At the same time, Romania's sense of geographical and political isolation from Europe would be reinforced and its already weaker reform movement jeopardised.

There is no shortage of nationality issues which could be

adversely affected by a limited enlargement. NATO enlargement which did not incorporate Albania, Bulgaria and Slovakia would probably not be helpful in fostering cooperative approaches to ethnic communities which reside in more than one country and in encouraging improved Albania-Greek, Bulgarian-Turkish, Slovak-Czech and Slovak-Hungarian relations.

NATO can have a pacifying effect on relations among member countries, as its experience with the Greek-Turkish relationship underlines. But this is due to the fact that Greece and Turkey have enjoyed equal status in the consultative process. Without the disciplining effect of the East-West conflict, it is doubtful whether the NATO environment can have the same effect in future. Still, the Alliance's ability to have a positive impact will be greater if real or potential rivals find themselves on an equal institutional footing.

The FSU Factor

How do Russia and other Former Soviet Union (FSU) states fit into the sociology of enlargement? The Baltics are a special case and have been addressed above. As for the Slavic successor states, they are so involved in coping with economic survival and coming to grips with their post-Soviet sense of self that institutional integration is a non-starter, certainly under anything even remotely resembling prevailing conditions. But precisely because of this, it is unwise to suggest to such societies that they 'do not belong'.

The Caucasian and Central Asian states represent a different category. Most are experiencing little or no reform and great instability. Their leaderships tend to favour a perpetuation of close ties with, and heavy dependence on, Moscow, whereby their mid-term policy intentions are at best unclear. Here the issue is not now membership sooner or later but how the West can keep lines of communication and of influence open, even if it may only be under the next generation of leaders that these can be utilised in a meaningful way. To draw a line which suggests that the Caucasians and Central Asians do not belong to the Euro-Atlantic zone is to encourage them to feel that they must choose between Russia and isolation, and to encourage

Russian neo-imperialist forces to believe that they can perpetuate with impunity their traditional, hegemonic role in the area.

NATO policy on enlargement must be based on an assessment of what is preferable for the former East as a whole. It cannot afford to take its cue from the understandably ambiguous statements of an amorphous political caste still searching for a compass in a situation of great societal stress.

Consider, for example, the following contradiction. In August 1993, while in Poland, President Yeltsin was deemed to have given a green light on enlargement when he agreed with President Walesa the following:

> The Presidents discussed the issue of Poland's intention to join NATO. President Lech Walesa explained Poland's well-known position on this issue and this met with President Boris Yeltsin's understanding. In perspective such a decision on the part of sovereign Poland, aimed at all-European integration, is not in conflict with the interests of other states, including Russia.[1]

Some six weeks later, in a letter, the contents of which were not made public, the same President Yeltsin is alleged to have stressed Russian concerns that NATO, however non-threatening for Russian security, seemed poised to take a formal position in favour of widening at the January 1994 Summit. Subsequently, there was a flood of statements from Russia characterising enlargement in terms which ranged from the mildly concerned to the massively critical. In October, for example, Defence Minister Grachev while on a visit to Hungary only warned that enlargement would be 'unfortunate'.[2] A month later, Russian intelligence chief (and erstwhile CPSU pointman on the Middle East) Yevgeny Primakov admonished that NATO's expansion options would position '. . . the biggest military grouping in the world, with colossal offensive potential, directly at the borders of Russia . . .', a development which could result in a '. . . fundamental reappraisal of Russian defence concepts . . .'.[3]

Such signals underline that the objectives of the architects of Russian security policy remain uncertain at best. Leaders can disappear and, as President Yeltsin's change of emphasis has underlined, even the views of an individual leader can undergo significant variation. Enlargement has therefore to be assessed

for its impact on the outcome of the debate in Russia between those who favour continuing to work in the direction of a some-day democratic society, and those who advocate moving backwards or sideways to one or the other form of malevolent authoritarianism. To open the Alliance to the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians would be interpreted by forces in Russia, favourable to the Alliance, that the West was turning its back on their country at a time when Western engagement was primordially important to the reform process. It could be decisive in settling the debate between Slavophiles, *grosso modo* the proponents of a Russia left to its own devices, and Westerners, those predisposed to building a society which seeks to integrate itself into the world. In short, widening would weaken the cause of the 'open society' and strengthen that of the closed.

The notion of a strategic partnership with Russia, implicitly proposed as possible 'compensation' for enlargement, is neither realistic nor helpful. Russia is too preoccupied with the challenges of transition to make such a partnership meaningful. This great country needs to be encouraged to think of its limitations, rather than to aspire to a *primus inter pares* status in the former East – not despite, but precisely because of, its history, size and military might. As a case in point, it would be counterproductive for all concerned, if it came to be believed that Russia enjoyed a veto over enlargement. NATO has justifiably denied that such a veto can, or should, exist. Unfortunately, Western reactions to the various signals Mr Yeltsin has emitted on this question – enthusiasm regarding his green light in August, caution following the October letter – may have already led to the wrong conclusions being drawn in Moscow.

Defending an Enlarged Alliance

NATO membership means Article V, mutual security guarantees, and the preparedness to exercise collective defence in the event of aggression. This is by no means a remote contingency, as the experience of the Gulf War underlines. In addressing their countries' involvement in that conflict, parliamentarians in several member states initially showed considerable reluctance to take measures to reinforce Turkey's defences. Newcomers to

the Alliance would have considerably more difficulty with such a decision in similar situations. For example, Poland – whatever its security status – will remain geographically exposed to Russia and understandably especially mindful of Moscow's sensitivities. Think then how Poland might react, say in a future phase of the Yugoslav conflict, if the fighting there were to spill over into adjacent countries including those of the Alliance.

Furthermore, it would take years for new members to develop the same sense of solidarity with their Eastern neighbours which the Alliance has become accustomed to in, say, the French-German relationship, let alone identify with the security concerns of a far-off Spain. This is completely understandable. But this implies that expansion of membership would incur substantial new burdens which the 16 nations would largely have to shoulder alone.

Reservations within the Alliance about assuming additional responsibilities have been clearly on display as the 16 have tried to come to grips with the situation in the former Yugoslavia. The question of whose material and personal resources would be on the line has proved to be a major obstacle to elaborating an Alliance effort to suffocate the conflict, as it may also be in the implementation of an agreed peace plan. Substantial US involvement is essential in either event. But is it likely to be approved by a Congress which sees key American allies in Europe as being unprepared to commit the necessary resources? The Yugoslav episode is instructive for it suggests to an American audience that the United States would have to take on more than its share of responsibility for enlargement – and this at a time when Washington has been reducing its military presence on the European continent.

A possible disclaimer is that with the Visegrad Three integrated into the Alliance, there would no longer be any constitutional shackles preventing Germany from playing a major role in conventional defence and deterrence in Central Europe. This too seems questionable, however, in view of continuing touchiness about a German military presence in countries once occupied by Hitler's armies. By way of example, there is the controversy which surfaced in Poland last year following German Defence Minister Ruehe's proposal that German and Polish troops should participate in joint exercises on Polish soil.

The difficulties involved in organising the conventional defence of new members could open the way to a much more demanding controversy, namely whether defence and deterrence in Central and Eastern Europe could only be secured with a nuclear option. NATO has succeeded in significantly de-emphasising the notion of nuclear deterrence on the European security landscape in recent years. It still needs its nuclear weapons, but does it really need a new debate on the relevance of nuclear deterrence? What would be the impact on the internal party debate in the countries to be defended? Would a resuscitated NATO nuclear dimension not be used to argue the legitimisation of residual nuclear forces in non-member countries?

Just how credible a NATO security guarantee would be perceived in Central and Eastern Europe, whether or not the nuclear possibility was posited, is unclear. The very least which can be stated is that the West has not shown great resolve and surefootedness in the former Yugoslavia. Who is to say that there will not be confusing Yugoslavia-like conflicts rather than clear and manageable aggressions *à la* Kuwait dominating the Central and Eastern Europe scene in future? To be sure, NATO security commitments towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are ambiguous. They have, however, the advantage of not promising more than NATO can deliver.

A further consideration is that, whether intended or not, extension of Alliance membership could be used as a pretext to torpedo the treaty on limitations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE). By virtue of this agreement, the ceiling for treaty-limited-equipment was fixed NATO to Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO), not country to country. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the bloc-to-bloc relationship has disappeared but the ceilings remain. Were the Visegrad Three to become NATO members, it could be argued they would have to do without the military apparel allotted to them by virtue of the CFE agreement. Alternatively, there could be pressure for a reopening of the treaty. Already there are some forces in Russia which have championed a redefinition of the treaty to take into account the new strategic realities stemming from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Whatever the motivations at work here, it is important to bear in mind that it is the limitations foreseen

under CFE which have furnished the basis for the ongoing massive withdrawal from Europe of US forces.

Synchronising NATO/EU and WEU Membership

It is surely preferable for NATO and European bodies with a security role to have similar memberships. Symmetry is, however, unlikely to be achieved. Other ways will have to be found to ensure that different kinds of membership do not lead to unmanageable imbalances between security rights and responsibilities.

The reasons for this assertion are essentially threefold. First, an asymmetry already exists with the NATO non-membership of European Community member Ireland, a situation which has prevailed since 1973. Second, the trend has been towards increasing diversity in the engagements undertaken by new entrants into the institutions of European security architecture. With the Western European Union (WEU) enlargement of 1992, the number of relationships entertained by NATO members towards this body went from two to four, as observer and associate status were added to the categories of full and non-membership. Third, this pattern is likely to be reinforced in future as countries from outside the West European mainstream join the WEU and the EC. Some newcomers will want to opt out of what they see to be debilitating, lowest common denominator, EU decision-making. Others may decide that the NATO environment can provide more or just as much security with fewer constraints on national freedom of action.

Limited enlargement will affect European neutrals in similar ways. There can be no doubt that the neutrals are shedding their neutrality in response to new strategic realities. But this is a process which needs time, and for most neutrals the maximum which can be expected over the short-term is cooperation in peacekeeping, perhaps through the consultations of the North Atlantic Co-operation Ad Hoc Group of the same name. To promise NATO membership to Central and Eastern European states in the near future would place unwelcome pressure on the neutrals and complicate their efforts to move towards practical cooperation with NATO countries, as a possible prelude to closer structural ties.

Organisational Aspects

Ever since the idea of the NACC was first floated, there has been concern at NATO that this new body would dilute the security relationship which now exists in the sixteen nations and perhaps even render the organisation inoperative. Managing the political and physical co-existence of NATO and NACC has been anything but easy. But on balance, it has not proved as difficult as many feared. Entry into NATO of even smaller groups of countries in stages would be another matter. It would create several different statuses – old members, new members, those in the queue and those probably never to join it – where there is now only the distinction between NATO members and cooperation partners. Each grouping would require its own customised approach to such matters as meetings and documents. In comparison, the current situation would seem an administrative picnic.

At the same time, extension of the Alliance to the Visegrad Three could have a diverse effect on NACC's political development, at a time when there remains a great interest in the former East in working together in a transatlantic security context. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are among NACC's most active members. For NATO to enlarge to include them would detract from NACC, reverse its dynamic and possibly kill it off altogether.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

If enlargement encompassing all these countries interested in NATO membership is a non-starter, a partial extension of the organisation eastward is no less problematical. As we have already seen, there is no logical line which can be drawn if NATO proceeds with a limited enlargement. For this and other reasons, an effort to force the issue of partial extension would be a security minus, not a security plus. It would destabilise the bilateral relations between states brought in and those left out, destabilise the domestic debate in new member countries and, because of its perceived arbitrariness, lead to a destabilising debate among NATO countries. Indeed, it is highly questionable

whether consensus on a limited enlargement of NATO could in fact be reached at all.

How then to satisfy the requirement for a deeper security relationship with the countries of the former East? All things considered, the best approach would seem to be the one which NATO embarked upon at the end of 1991, albeit with a number of innovations.

The NACC has several advantages over a widened Alliance. It includes all the NATO states and those which have emerged in the political space formerly occupied by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. It helps preserve the core security relationship around NATO's original members. It avoids the difficult question of security guarantees, which probably neither NATO nor new members can credibly be expected to face in the foreseeable future. It offers a flexible framework for political and military cooperation, unlike the tightly disciplined framework into which NATO evolved under the particular, and probably unique, conditions of the Cold War.

NACC has its flaws but these can be corrected. First, for the contacts and consultation dimensions of NACC activity to be effective, opportunities for concrete cooperation must be bolstered. Second, there needs to be more scope for individual Cooperation Partner countries to decide on the modalities and extent of their cooperation with the 16 Nations. Third, the NACC needs to become at least as important a household word in the former East and West as NATO became in the West during the Cold War. A dynamic information policy is essential. If NACC succeeds in moving in these directions, it will be able to address many of the issues which enlargers believe can only be accomplished through institutional widening.

What happens, however, if Europe does not enjoy a more or less uninterrupted period of stability, as looks increasingly likely as this decade matures? What sort of impact would this be likely to have on the membership issue? To judge by past experience, a large-scale showdown in Europe, say between Russia and the West, would probably be unlikely to promote a breakthrough on the membership issue. Allies' reactions to the Eastern crises of 1956, 1968 and 1981 underscore an extreme reluctance to undertake any action which might be deemed provocative in a situation of tension. Faced with a more direct threat, there

would be little time or interest in the formalities of membership terms.

The Alliance can best contribute to the avoidance of such worst-case scenarios by seeking to enlarge its influence rather than its membership. For this purpose, concrete cooperation rather than institutionalism is the best way forward.

Notes

1 Joint Polish-Russian Declaration, issued by the Presidents of Poland and Russia, Warsaw, 25 August 1993.

2 'NATO/East: Russia objects to any enlargement of NATO', *Atlantic News*, No. 2559, 6 October 1993.

3 For Primakov's press conference in Moscow, see Reuters Wire Service, 25 November 1993.

10

US Defence Policy and Forces in Europe

COLIN MCINNES*

Defence Lecturer in the Department of International Politics, University of Wales and Visiting Research Fellow, Centre for Defence Studies.

The question of force levels in Europe has been a regular feature in US debates about defence policy. Traditionally the question has been linked to the issue of burden-sharing, and in particular Congressional concerns that the European partners in NATO were failing to pull their full weight. With the end of the Cold War, the question of force levels in Europe has re-emerged. Although the debate remains largely one of force levels rather than whether such a commitment is still required – one of 'how low can we go?'[1] rather than 'to stay or not to stay?' – nevertheless there has been some debate over the role of US forces in Europe, particularly once the Soviet threat has collapsed. This chapter examines the post-Cold War defence policies of the Bush and Clinton Administrations and in particular their policies towards force levels in Europe. It notes that the commitment to Europe remains strong in the White House, but that Congressional pressure has already forced deeper cuts in force levels than the Bush Administration had planned, and further cuts cannot be ruled out under the Clinton Administration. The chapter also examines the justifications offered for a continued US presence in Europe, and notes the increasing scepticism with which these are received in Congress.

* I would like to thank all those who spared the time to talk to me, both in Washington and London. In particular I would like to thank Ian Butterfield, Job L Dittberner, Paul Gallis and Josh Spero. I would also like to thank all those in public office who agreed to be interviewed but who cannot be named.