THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE USSR AND THE KURDS: A CASE-STUDY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

By

DAVID MURRAY LAW

Norman, Oklahoma

1980

PART I

THE KURDS AND KURDISTAN

THE USSR AND THE KURDS: A CASE-STUDY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

The decision to write a case study of Soviet foreign policy in the area of national liberation movements grew out of two fundamental preoccupations. One concerns the role of the USSR on the world scene. The other concerns the impact of struggles for national rights by the oppressed, and most often minority, nations on the stability of national-states and indeed the international balance of power. If the existence of a strong affinity between Soviet power and national liberation movements is common knowledge, the nature of the linkage between these two phenomena is in many cases relatively unresearched. The more general task of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of this linkage.

The case chosen for study in this paper could have been any one of a myriad of national liberation movements. The aspirations of such nations as the Irish Catholics, the Basques, the Palestinians, and Sudanese Christians, the Molukkans, the Québecois (of the author's native province), and so many more, all have produced conflict situations which have involved, in one way or another, the USSR and have had international repercussions.

In this sense, the Kurds represent an especially interesting topic of study. With a population estimated as varying between fifteen and twenty million, they form one of the most numerous of the oppressed minorities in the world today. Their struggle has also proved to be one of the most dynamic in modern times, the Kurds having regularly mounted armed challenges to existing state structures in one or the other parts of the territory known as Kurdistan during this century. This territory is distributed among the USSR and four national-states of the Middle East --Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. All of these states play an important role in the politics of this region, which has to be considered one of the most politically explosive and economically important in the world today. In short, the Kurds could be considered as the most politically exotic, if not the most politically important, of the minorities engaged in a national struggle.

I first came into contact with the Kurdish problem when working with refugees in the Middle East in 1969. A course in Soviet nationality problems taken at the Munich Center of the University of Oklahoma in 1970 gave me the opportunity to read about the Kurds as well as to do some initial writing on their national struggle. This was later to form the basis of part 1 of the present thesis. Entitled "The Kurds and Kurdistan," part one is broken down into seven chapters. The first chapter attempts to give the reader some basic data on modern Kurdistan. In the second chapter, a brief look at the development of Kurdistan, from its origins to its division among five states in the aftermath of World War I, is provided. The following four chapters describe the course of Kurdish nationalism from the 1920s to 1975 when the last major phase of the

Kurdish-Iraqi war came to a conclusion. The seventh chapter focuses on the evolution of the Kurdish community of the USSR.

With the exception of the last chapter which draws mainly on Soviet Russian-language material, part one generally uses sources which are western and (non-Soviet) Kurdish in origin. It is not meant to be exhaustive and can in no way replace the many fascinating accounts provided elsewhere on various phases of the Kurdish struggle. I felt it indispensable, however, to include sufficient descriptive material on Kurdish developments before proceeding to the analytical part of the thesis.

Part two, entitled "A Framework for Soviet Kurdish Policy," departs considerably from Kurdish developments to propose a framework for analyzing the interplay that has existed between the USSR and the non-Soviet Kurds since 1917. The necessity of proceeding from "the whole to the part," not only analytically but also thematically, was confirmed as my research progressed. Explanations for the great fluctuations of Soviet interest in the Kurdish question, the frequent occasions upon which it assumed a seemingly contradictory stand towards the Kurds and their antagonists, were as much, and oftentimes more, to be found beyond the complex of Soviet interplay with the non-Soviet Kurds as within it.

Soviet Kurdish policy must be seen as a function of Soviet policy towards the national-states in which the Kurds reside. This in turn is a function of the way the Kremlin has perceived its global concerns during the different periods of development the USSR has undergone since 1917. Finally, there are what one might call dynamics of Soviet policy in general. Do Soviet apparatchiks and their counterparts outside the USSR share the basic goal of world revolution? Do they understand the necessity

of following a policy of peaceful co-existence vis-a-vis the non-communist world as a means of achieving this goal? How one answers these two questions again has a great impact on how one perceives Soviet attitudes and initiatives in even the most minor of geopolitical theaters where the USSR manifests an interest. These considerations take form in part II as follows: chapter 9 deals with the relationship between the goal of world revolution and the policy of peaceful co-existence, and explains how they are given expression and pursued through what we have called the two levels of communist foreign policy. The "global" concerns of the Soviet leadership are identified and described in chapter 10. The years between 1917 and 1975 are broken down into a defensive phase consisting of three periods (1917-20, 1921-27 and 1928-42), and an offensive phase consisting of two periods (1943-45 and 1952-75). It should be explained that 1942-43, and not 1945 or even later, is taken as the major dividing line in Soviet foreign policy because it was already as of this date that the USSR found itself in a position to start taking serious advantage of the possibilities for expansion which arose out of World War II. The starting point of the fifth, and continuing, period coincides approximately with the Soviet announcement that a negotiated settlement to the Korean conflict could be envisaged and the unveiling of Stalin's plan for expansion by means of "a peace offensive on all fronts," as opposed to international war. Of course, different breakdowns could be envisaged as far as this period (or the others) is concerned. I believe, however, that since 1952 there have been no qualitative modifications in the global approach taken by the USSR.

The input for chapters 8 and 9 owes substantially to the books and lectures of Herman F. Achminow, former Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma Munich Center. The author is of

course solely responsible for the way this part of the analytical framework has been elaborated.

In the last two chapters of part 2, the main lines and turning points of Soviet foreign policy are described vis-à-vis the main antagonists of the Kurdish nationalist movement, the national-states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, during first, the defensive phase and second, the offensive phase. Again, my purpose is not to present a comprehensive exposé of Soviet-Turkish or Soviet-Iraqi relations. Rather, it is to examine the factors which on the regional and national levels have conditioned Soviet policy towards the Kurds. Here our material has been drawn either from studies on the Middle East by specialists (e.g., Lenczkowski and Laqueur), or from compilations of historical events or world encyclopediae (e.g., Keesing's Archiv der Gegenwart, Ploetsch's Weltgeschehnisse der Gegenwart and Langer's Encyclopedia of World History).

Using the framework elaborated in part 2, I focus in part 3 on the objectives the USSR has pursued since 1917 towards the non-Soviet Kurds, the various initiatives it has taken and the tactics thereby applied. Lack of availability of information on the Soviet involvement poses considerable problems here. There exist no basic works on Soviet foreign policy vis-à-vis the Kurds. Studies which do take up the Soviet role tend to do so only fleetingly and to be limited to one particular phase of the Kurdish struggle. This especially presents a problem in chapter 8 concerning the defensive phase of 1917-42. Here it is more often than not necessary to speculate on the possibility of the USSR being engaged in one or the other Kurdish revolt. The Soviet press of these years is however helpful in detecting the nature of communist policy towards the Kurds

abroad. Other scholars with a better access to such materials will no doubt be able to shed more light on the first quarter century of Soviet Kurdish policy. With respect to the offensive phase, handled in chapter 13, the more recent the event the greater the amount of useful information. Here I am very fortunate to have had access to the archives of Radio Liberty (Munich). Its collection of Soviet and western newspaper clippings dates from the late 1950s when Kurdish nationalism and Soviet interest in the phenomenon entered their most dynamic phase to date.

Chapter 14 surveys the events interceding after the defeat of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq in 1975, when the bulk of the research for this paper was completed. The chapter concludes with a brief look at the repercussions of the fall of the Shah. As the reader will have noted, the recent developments in Iran have redirected the attention of the international media to the Kurdish problem after some five years of waning interest.

In the concluding chapter, the overall effectiveness of Soviet Kurdish policy is evaluated. Referring again to the framework constructed in part 2, I examine whether in general this policy has aided or impeded the USSR's pursuit of objectives in the larger theaters of concern to it.

CHAPTER VIII

WORLD REVOLUTION AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: THE TWO-LEVEL POLICY

The Communist World Revolution: An Empty Slogan?

> A spectre is haunting Europe--the spectre of Communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcize this spectre: Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French radicals and German police-spies. . . . The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be obtained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.
> WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE![1]

With these words of the "Manifesto of the Communist Party," Karl Marx and Friedrich Engles heralded, in the tumultuous year of 1848, the beginning of a proletarian revolution which, to their minds, would lead with the inevitability of a natural event to the victory of communism in the entire world and to a classless communist society. In doing so, they unveiled a political movement which differed qualitatively in a number of respects from all those hitherto in existence. First, there was the claim of internationalism as expressed in the slogan "WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!," a slogan which can still be found on the title

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[1] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Marx Engels Werke, 1st ed. (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1959), vol. IV, pp. 467 and 493.

page of all communist party newspapers. This underlined that the aim of the movement was not the establishment of a state or an empire based on the supremacy of the nation but the creation of a world-wide system based on a common ideology. Second, to this end, it urged the overthrow, not of a particular state or states, but of "all existing social conditions." Correspondingly, Marx and Engels addressed their appeal, not to existing or forthcoming governments, but to the "working men of all countries." And while one might discuss whom they meant by "working men," there is no doubt that their call to action was directed, not at the leaders of countries, but at revolutionary forces coming from below.

More than a century has passed since the publication of the Manifesto. The prediction of Marx and Engels has seen, while not complete fulfillment, considerable realization. Some ninety community parties with roughly 65 million members are their heirs.[2] Moreover, what was once only a movement has become the architect of a distinct social and governing order in fifteen states. Notwithstanding regular fluctuations in party lines and frequent divergences in policy from party to party, all recognize, as did Marx and Engels, the abolition of private property to be the essence of the communist program.

One might ask, of course, whether the communists are still interested in consummating the prophecy of Marx and Engels. To answer this question, three points must be clarified: first, whether the communists still represent a force of revolution, that is, a force which strives to replace an existing leading strata with a new one; second,

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[2]These estimates for 1973-76 are provided in a publication of the Bundesinstitut fuer ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien (Cologne), The Soviet Union, 1975-76 (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1979), p. 297.

whether this revolutionary activity is still specifically communist in nature, in the sense that its socio-economic content is the abolition of private property; third, whether the communists still essay to carry out communist revolution on a world-wide scale.

The first two points can be elucidated rather easily. All communist takeovers hitherto have involved a more or less complete deposition of the "old" leading strata (in the broad sense of the word) and there is no reason to assume that in the case of future takeovers the communists will maintain reigning rulers in power. With respect to the second point, a common feature of all communist states is, as we have pointed out, their acceptance of the program of the abolition of private property or at least their condemnation of the right to possess private property. As a rule, communist leaders have endeavored to restrict the accumulation of private property or to press towards its eradication. To be sure, there have been exceptions, such as during the NEP period in Russia (1921-27) or in Yugoslavia since its expulsion from the Soviet bloc. However, both Lenin and Tito considered these to be temporary concessions and not lasting situations.[2]

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[2]Approximately a year after the introduction of NEP, Lenin spoke of the approaching "end of the retreat": "We have retreated in the direction of state capitalism. But our retreat is moderate . . . [and] in the not too distant future we can anticipate the possibility of halting this retreat." V. I. Lenin, Werke (according to the 4th Russian Edition; Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1955), vol. XXXIII, p. 98.

In 1963, Tito renamed the Yugoslav People's Republic the Yugoslav Socialist Federative Republic, although the collectivization normally required before a country can consider itself to be communist was far from completed. This gives one good reason to believe that Tito wanted to commit his successors to a definite line, namely, further socialization and abandonment of the present policy of toleration of the accumulation of private property. Weltgeschehnisse der Nachkriegszeit (Wurzburg: Ploetz, 1969), vol. III, p. 59.

The third point is more complex. The propagation of a policy of peaceful coexistence by the socialist camp and the appearance of "national" and "liberalizing" communisms have contributed to the popularization of an outlook which would have communist states' relating to the outside world in the same way as non-communist states do; namely, that the determinant criterion of their foreign policy is what best serves the national interest. Such an outlook assumes that world communist revolution does not serve, or even contradicts, the national interests of the communist states. This is a supposition which can by no means be accepted a priori and which, on closer examination, proves to be erroneous.

Throughout history rulers have generally preferred to align themselves with powers having the same or similar political, social or religious orders. Naturally, there have been numerous exceptions: democracies have made alliances with dictatorships, the Tsar had to tolerate the tune of the Marseillaise when practicing entente with France, and Christian kings did not hesitate to cooperate with Moslem leaders when this was to their geopolitical advantage. On the other hand, history has produced more than enough examples of international alliances brought into being by established rulers to combat revolutionary movements--the Holy Alliance and the Triple Entente of the nineteenth century, to mention only a few.

As for the communists, it would seem that in general the parties of the Soviet Union and of other countries, whether in power or in opposition, form a loose international alliance against those forces, which in contrast to them are interested in propagating rather than abolishing private property. The heavy strains which have existed in the relations between certain communist parties make it problematical to assume an allegiance to this alliance on the part of all communist parties. This

being said, the serious rifts which have existed between various communist countries do not appear to have endangered any communist party's hold on power.

Take, for example, Yugoslavia's departure from the Comintern in 1948. However much Stalin was opposed to Tito--and whatever the reasons for this attitude may have been--the measures he undertook were limited to the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc. As far as appears to be known, there have been no serious attempts to replace Tito, and certainly none to replace his regime with a capitalist one.

Perhaps the heaviest blow ever delivered to one communist party by another occurred in 1938 when Stalin engineered the dissolution of the Polish Communist Party. This action by no means prevented a communist takeover in Poland, however. In 1939, Poland disappeared from the map, so to speak, but when it reappeared six years later, its borders having undergone considerable change, Poland was under communist control. The communist takeover which was simply beyond the capacities of the communist movement in the late 1930s had become possible owing to the Soviet role in the subsequent conflicts between the capitalist nations.[3]

Soviet-Chinese relations are more difficult to comment on. The split between the two communist giants has been a fixture in international relations since the early 1960s. It has been characterized by a heated ongoing polemic and on one occasion resulted in a military altercation (the incident on the Ussuri River on 2 March 1969). As of 1972, the conflict between Moscow and Peking began to be accompanied by a warming in

[3]See Georg von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia, 5th rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 245.

Chinese-US relations.[4] More recently, this split has been expressed in China and the USSR allying themselves with opposing communist forces in Indo-china: China with the Red Khmer of Pol Pot, and the latter with the rival Cambodian party of Heng Samrin, also supported by Vietnam.[5]

It is possible, of course, that these developments indicate that a basic unity of interests between the USSR, Red China and their respective communist allies must be definitively dismissed. We hesitate to conclude, however, that this is the case, for several reasons. First, it is perhaps natural that the contradictions between the USSR and China, in view of their size and geographical proximity, are more grave than those at work in the relations between other communist states. Second, their rivalry has not placed in jeopardy the rule of either the Soviet or the Chinese parties, nor has it appeared to favor non-communist interests in Southeast Asia--or for that matter anywhere else on the globe.

In this connection, it should be noted that during the Vietnam War, Peking and Moscow were cooperating in the provision of military supplies to the Vietnamese communists. The extent of this cooperation went so far as to include the passage of Soviet aid through the People's Republic.[6]

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[4] Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart, p. 101.

[5] In 1979, differences over the future of Cambodia and the treatment of the large Chinege colony in Vietnam provoked a limited border war between the latter and Communist China. (See Archives XXV, 1979, 2948A, and XXVI, 1980, 30037A.)

[6] Ibid.

Another consideration is that communist parties have demonstrated a propensity to bury their differences with one another in rather dramatic fashion. The reconciliation between Belgrade and Moscow some seven years after the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform is a case in point.[7]

If the role of the communist antagonists of Moscow in the international communist alliance remains unclear, it would seem at least that the vast majority of communist parties would prefer more, and not fewer, communist regimes--even if there are uncooperative or hostile ones among them. Moreover, it would appear they have hitherto done their utmost to install communist regimes wherever possible, although this has meant risking serious international tensions and even the outbreak of war.

Such was the situation after the Allied victory over Nazi Germany. Stalin was offered the opportunity to have friendly relationships with non-communist governments throughout Eastern Europe. Stalin's acceptance of this offer would have been tantamount to the securing of good relations with the other members of the anti-Hitler coalition. Nevertheless, he elected to establish communist governments in Eastern Europe, although he realized that this would start the Cold War. Khrushchev demonstrated a similar attitude when the communist regime in Cuba appeared. The "partisan of peaceful coexistence" was prepared to undergo considerable risk to maintain the local communists in power.

Peaceful Coexistence and the Revolution of 1848-50

In this light, whether the communists still adhere to the idea of a world communist revolution appears to be beyond doubt. The question

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[7] Weltgeschichte der Nachkriegszeit, I, p. 102.

remains, however, as to how this aim is pursued in any one geopolitical framework at any one time. While this can be clarified from case to case, since the first communist takeover in 1917 the struggle for the world communist revolution has seen the development of a number of techniques which nowadays find culmination in the concept of peaceful coexistence. Often understood as a negation of the idea of world communist revolution, this concept is probably better understood within the framework of what can be called the two-level policy. On one level, that which we have designated as the state level, the communists conduct foreign policy in the same way as non-communists do. What we refer to as the non-state level is particular to the foreign policy of communist states. On this level, we observe the deployment of the communists by the various institutions they control to establish relations with certain groups of population, on the basis of common or similar ideological and political interests, in order to influence developments in the social and governmental reality of other states.

To use, in this connection, the term party level might be misleading. Although cooperation between different communist parties is an essential element of the second level of communist foreign policy, it is not its only aspect. We observe as well the use of communist-controlled non-party institutions--the government, the press, the diplomatic service, the secret service and so on--to affect the attitudes and behavior of non-communist groups and institutions. It is the utilization of these two levels which makes possible the simultaneous pursuit of such seemingly contradictory lines as world revolution and peaceful coexistence.

An explanation of the necessity for this duality in the communist approach to their relations with non-communists can be found in the early

writings of Marx. While Marx did not write a great deal about the possibility of peaceful coexistence between communist and non-communist states, he presupposed their simultaneous existence for a period of up to fifty years. In the article, "Enthuellungen ueber den Kommunisten-Prozess zu Koeln" (The Cologne Trial of the Communists Unmasked--1853), Marx wrote:

> Communists must survive ten, twenty, fifty years of civil war and international battles [author's italics] not just to alter existing relations, but also so that they themselves will change and be capable of political rule.[8]

Marx did not think, then, that communism would be victorious immediately and on a world-wide scale. Rather, he envisaged the following half-century as being characterized by both civil wars and international conflicts between communists and non-communists. Here, Marx must have been thinking in terms of the concurrent, and probably more or less peaceful, existence of communist and non-communist states, since uninterrupted war for such a long period is unthinkable. Thus, as far as Marx was concerned, peaceful coexistence with non-communists would not exclude world revolution but it would be a tactical necessity within the larger strategy for a communist victory in all countries.

The trial which Marx set about to "unmask" in the above-mentioned article was that of a number of members of the Bund der Kommunisten (League of Communists) founded in 1847. The League's life was brief but certainly of great importance in the history of communism. It was for the League that the Communist Manifesto was originally written and its members were the first communists to see action in a revolutionary situation. With

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[8] Marx and Engels, Marx Engels Werke, vol. VIII, 1960, p. 412.

the outbreak of the bourgeois revolution of February 1848 in France, members of the League left their London exile to join in the events in Paris and to attempt to spur their spread to other parts. This led to revolutionary activity on the part of League members, in particular in Hessia, Saxony and Prussia--activity which the ruling monarchs of the time handily suppressed--and a return to exile for some of the revolutionaries and to arrest and trial for others.[9]

The key evidence used against Marx's comrades was the propaganda they had distributed during the revolutionary events. On the basis of this material, the prosecutors of the League members concluded that the latter had conspired to overthrow the Prussian government. Marx's comments in defense of the League members are of interest for the insight they provide into relations between communists and non-communists on the non-state level:

> The pronouncements seized by the central authorities are exclusively concerned with the relationship of the communists to the future democratic government and thus not with the government of Friedrich Wilhelm IX. . . . The ultimate tendency of this propaganda is declared to be the destruction of the existing society, but the Prussian state has already fallen once and can fall another ten times and fall for once and for all without the existing society losing a single hair. The communists can accelerate the dissolution of bourgeois society and nevertheless leave the dissolution of the Prussian state to bourgeois society. . . . But if the ultimate goal of the League [of communists] is the overthrow of society, then its means are necessarily political revolution. This implies the overthrow of the Prussian state, as an earthquake implies the overturn of a chicken coup. But the accused proceeded from the outrageous opinion that the present Prussian government can also fall without it. They did therefore not establish a League for the overthrow of the present Prussian government; they were not guilty of any conspiracy of high treason.[10]

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[9]See Gunther Nollau, Die Internationale, 2nd rev. ed. (Cologne: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1961), pp. 24-27.

[10]Marx and Engels, Marx Engels Werke, 1st ed. (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1960), vol. VIII, p. 414.

We can see then that the League's strategy was not to launch a frontal attack against the Prussian state, for which it was too weak, but to exploit the conflict between the Prussian ruling class and the Prussian bourgeoisie. The communists, calculating that the monarchic order would be overthrown by the rising middle classes, decided to concentrate on strengthening itself ideologically and numerically for the subsequent struggle with the latter for the succession. Thus, in pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence with the Prussian state, the League neither sanctioned it nor suspended the revolutionary struggle. Rather, peaceful coexistence gave the communists the opportunity to further their aims in a way consistent with their means.

World Revolution and the Brest-Litovsk Peace

In predicting that the communists would have to endure as much as fifty years of struggle before being capable of ruling, Marx erred as concerned the time factor. But the essence of his statement--that communists would not be simultaneously victorious throughout the world--was confirmed by the Bolsheviks' independent seizure of power in 1917. It fell upon Lenin, as head of the first and, at that time, only communist-governed state, to expand the experience of Marx's League into a comprehensive program for communsits to follow in their relations with non-communists.

In a speech on the third anniversary of the takover, Lenin declared: "We undertook our cause only because we counted on a world revolution."[11] In other words, it had been hoped that internal developments in other countries would lead to world revolution and that this

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[11] V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, 4th ed. [Moscow: Gosudarstvennoye Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literaturi (hereafter abbreviated G.I.P.L.), 1952], vol. XXVII, p. 369.

would help the Bolsheviks to survive. Lenin "needed" world revolution and not merely "wanted" it out of ideological considerations. He needed it to preserve a particular system in Russia, not to maintain Russia as a national state. With Lenin we observe for the first time the difference between the way a communist politician and a non-communist one interprets "national interest." Being the leader of Russia, Lenin was, of course, interested in securing it as an independent state and in making it as strong as possible. However, if Lenin, as leader of communist Russia, had been made the offer of an independent and strong Russia in exchange for the renunciation of communist rule in Russia, he would most certainly have turned it down. His statement that "We undertook our cause [a communist revolution] . . . because we counted on a world revolution," that is, despite the fact that it had not yet broken out, is thus a reprise of Marx's idea that the proletariat was facing a long period of class wars and international conflicts.

While the Bolsheviks were united in their dedication to the goal of world revolution, they were beset with disagreemnt concerning the best way of promoting it. The opposing positions emerged clearly in the inter-party debate on one of the first major diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the Soviet state, the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed with Germany in March, 1918.[12]

Lenin, who defended the conclusion of peace with Germany, encountered stiff resistance on the part of the "left-wing" communists. The latter believed that the irreconciability of international class

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[12] Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), p. 323.

conflicts would bring uninterrupted progress towards a communist world order until full victory had been achieved. This standpoint was more or less the result of wishful thinking. In retrospect, one may say it was basically due to the left-wing's immaturity in political and ideological matters. This was particularly manifest in their interpretation of Marx and Engels's "Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League of March 1850," which concluded with the statement: "[Our] battle cry must be: Revolution in Permanence."[13] The call for a permanent revolution referred to communist tactics in a revolutionary situation; that is, during a period in which the existing order was directly threatened. A half-year later, Marx clearly indicated that the revolutionary situation of 1848-50 had passed and that a new one attended the outbreak of a new crisis.[14] In short, as far as Marx was concerned, there was no point in sustaining the revolutionary tide once the forces driving it--and of these, the communists were, and always have been, only a small part--had been suppressed or had lost their revolutionary momentum.

It is difficult to say whether the "left-wing" communists were at all aware of this limitation upon the call for revolution in permanence. The fact remains that to them the very signing of a peace treaty, let alone the harsh terms exacted by the Germans, amounted to a betrayal of the world revolution, as it would delay, they presumed, the expected uprising in Western Europe. They reasoned that negotiation with the imperialists was in any case futile, since it was thought that the latter intended to unite and move against the Soviet republic. In their view the only

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[13] Marx and Engels, Marx Engels Werke, vol. VII (1960), p. 254.

[14] Ibid., p. 440.

justifiable policy was consequently unrelenting revolutionary war, regardless of the damage it might inflict on Soviet Russia.

Lenin did not doubt the revolutionary ardor of these communists. However, he pointed out that such a characteristic was insufficient as a criterion for deciding how to proceed toward the world revolution. He demanded instead a macrosociological analysis, an examination of the behavior of all of the large social groups pertinent to the process in question:

> But when it is a question of practical action by the masses, of the deployment, if one may so express it, of vast armies, of the alignment of all the class forces of a given society for the final and decisive battle, then propaganda habits alone, the mere repetition of the truths of "pure communism," are of no avail. In these circumstances one must not count in thousands, as the propagandist does who belongs to a small group that has not yet given leadership to the masses; in these circumstances one must count in millions and tens of millions. In these circumstances we must not only ask ourselves whether we have convinced the vanguard of the revolutionary class but also whether the historically effective forces of all classes--positively all classes in the given society without exception--are aligned in such a way that everything has matured for the decisive battle.[15]

Lenin's analysis yielded the following considerations. First, that despite the fact that ". . . Nearly all the workers and the vast majority of the peasants undoubtedly side with Soviet power . . ." one had to consider . . . the numerous petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers of the socialist proletariat, and the latter's low cultural level. . . ."[16] To paraphrase Lenin's words, the weakness of the party in view of the immense and difficult organizational problems of the socialist transformation was not only qualitative. In 1917-18 the Bolsheviks made up only an

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[15]V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, 2nd rev. ed. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), vol. II, pp. 527-28.

[16]Ibid., p. 528.

insignificant portion of the population of Russia. According to Soviet data, in January 1917 Party members numbered only 23,000, increasing from 260,000 to 270,000 at the end of the year, out of a total population of 150,000,000.[17] Second, he observed that "peoples utterly exhausted by years of butchery cannot go on without a respite."[18] This applied in particular to the army which Lenin described as ". . . fleeing in panic, abandonning artillery and [having] no time to blow up the bridges . . . and needing an orderly retreat to save [its] remnants."[19] And third, he pointed out that ". . . the German revolution in which the Bolsheviks placed their greatest hopes and expected above all to be ignited by their victory in Russia . . . is ripening but it has obviously not reached the stage of an explosion in Germany or of a civil war in Germany."[20]

In an article entitled "The Revolutionary Phrase," Lenin argued that under these conditions:

> The slogan of revolutionary war in 1981 . . . is an empty phrase; there is nothing real or objective behind it. Emotion, desires, indignation, and rebellion--these are the sole content of this slogan at this given moment. (author's italics)[21]

In his article "Strange and Monstrous," written in the spring of 1918 he again repudiated the theory of exporting revolution:

> Such a "theory" would be completely at variance with Marxism, which had always been opposed to "exporting" revolutions, which develop with the growing acuteness of the class antagonisms which engender them. Such a theory would be tantamount to the view that armed uprising is a form of struggle which is obligatory always and under all conditions.[22]

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[17] Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia, 1st ed., vol. XI (Moscow: 1930), pp. 531-32.

[18] Lenin, Selected Works, vol. II, p. 465.

[19] Lenin, Sochineniya, vol. XXVII (1952), p. 57.

[20] Ibid., p. 20.

[21] Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[22] Ibid., pp. 49-50.

Lenin formulated his alternative in "Leftism in Communism, an Infantile Disorder":

> The most powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skillful, indispensable use of every "rift," even the smallest, among enemies, every antagonism of interests among the bourgeoisie of various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within different countries, and also by taking advantage of every opportunity, however small, of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional.[23]

In referring to "antagonism of interests among the bourgeoisie of various countries," Lenin was, of course, thinking of the hostilities between the Entente and the Central Powers, and the "mass ally" he had in mind was the German people. To be sure, Lenin realized that the conclusion of peace with Germany would give the latter a chance to concentrate its efforts on the Western front. From his standpoint, however, this would mean that the "imperialists" would become embroiled in more extensive conflict with one another and thus contribute to their mutual enfeeblement. The peace would also be to the direct advantage of Russia. In terminating the state of war with Germany, the new regime would be afforded a desperately needed "breathing space." Not only would the threat of further German penetration of Russian territory be at least temporarily suspended, but the pending intervention of the Western Allies, when confronted with strengthened German resistance, would be delayed and dilluted.

Moreover, the "breathing space" would give the Bolsheviks the opportunity to consolidate their position and prepare for the inevitable challenge by counter-revolutionary elements. This was a task which Lenin considered to be primary in working for the cause of socialism. In

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[23] Ibid., p. 52.

"Strange and Monstrous" he decried a resolution passed by the left-wing of the Moscow party leadership which read in part: "In the interests of the world revolution, it is expedient to accept the possibility of losing Soviet power, [which] is becoming merely formal."[24] Calling this idea "strange and monstrous," Lenin declared:

> Today the cause of socialism could suffer no heavier blow than the collapse of Soviet power in Russia. . . . By [merely] preserving Soviet power, we are rendering the best, the most powerful support to the proletariat of all countries in their incredibly hard struggle against their own bourgeoisie.[25]

The Leninist approach in the field of diplomacy may not, at first glance, appear to have been a radical departure. After all, diplomats had been gathering around conference tables to reach agreement on measures aimed at strengthening the states they were representing ever since the appearance of the state as a form of social organization. But if we compare, for example, the policy of the Tsarist government with that of its successors vis-à-vis Germany and the Entente Powers during the Great War, a remarkable difference becomes apparent. Tsarist diplomacy was geared to the principle that "the neighbor [the West] of my neighbour [Germany] is my friend because this will weaken my enemy," a principle which was practiced in the formation of the alliance between autocratic Tsarist Russia and the democratic West. Bolshevik diplomacy, on the other hand, operated according to the principle that "the enemy [the German imperialists] of my enemy [the Western imperialists] is my friend." This represented a direct reversal of the Tsarist tactic. Moreover, if the military situation dictated the necessity of making peace with Germany,

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[24] Ibid., p. 47.

[25] Ibid., p. 49.

it did not oblige the communist party to take advantage of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty to further world revolution. For Lenin to argue that it do so again underlined that fundamentally new criteria had become operative in the conduct of the foreign policy of Russia.

If peaceful coexistence with Germany served to fan the contradictions between various members of the non-communist camp, how would it aid the realization of the other aspect of Lenin's alternative, the utilization of intra-national conflicts? Lenin argued that peaceful coexistence did not at all prevent the communists from interfering in developments within foreign countries and from offering not unlimited, but nevertheless genuine, support to foreign communists. This question arose at the VIIth Party Congress when Lenin was commenting on Soviet policy vis-à-vis newly-independent Finland. Formerly a protectorate of Tsarist Empire, Finland had been recognized as a sovereign state by the Bolsheviks shortly after seizing power in 1917. Following independence, the country was plunged into an internal power struggle in which Finnish communists took part.[26] Lenin pointed out that the decision to peacefully coexist with the Finnish state by no means excluded the offering of aid to the local communists. Rather, he saw the provision of such aid by the Soviet state as both an obligation and a necessity. The only limitation he imposed was that the form of support fall within the capabilities of the Soviet state:

> . . . by signing this peace treaty [Brest-Litovsk is meant] we do not put a stop to our worker's revolution; everyone understands that by concluding peace with the Germans we do not stop rendering military aid; we are sending arms to the Finns, but not military units which are unfit.

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[26]Von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia, pp. 83-84.

> In fact, the interests of the international revolution demand that Soviet power, having deposed the bourgeoisie, should help that revolution, but that it should choose a form of help which is commensurate with its own strength.[27]

Another example of how the world revolution could be advanced by following a policy of peaceful coexistence was provided by the activities of Adolf Joffe, a top figure in the Soviet delegation to the Brest-Litovsk talks and after the ensuing establishment of diplomatic relations, Soviet ambassador to Germany. In the latter capacity, Joffe's assignment included the distribution of financial aid to German communists, an activity for which he was eventually expelled from the country.[28] Thus the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in making possible the exchange of ambassadors with Germany, gave the Bolsheviks better opportunities of exploiting the class conflicts within Germany.

Soviet interference in the internal German situation was not limited to what was, strictly speaking, clandestine activity of a direct nature. Lenin's contribution to the debate on the treaty demonstrated that he did not consider the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk to be only a conversation between Soviet and German diplomats. Rather, he viewed them to be an opportunity to influence the attitude of various social groups in Germany vis-à-vis Soviet Russia, and corollarily, their attitudes towards one another. In explaining the consequences of not making peace with Germany, he stated:

> By accepting the possibility of losing Soviet power, we certainly would not be helping the German revolution to reach maturity but would be hindering it. We would be helping German reaction, playing into its hands, hampering the

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[27] Lenin, Sochineniya, vol. XXVII (1952), pp. 49-50.

[28] von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia, p. 96.

> socialist movement in Germany and frightening away from socialism large masses of German proletarians and semi-proletarians who have not yet come over to socialism and would be scared away by the defeat of Soviet Russia, just as the British workers were scared by the defeat of the Paris Commune in 1871.[29]

Lenin's calculation was the following. Brest-Litovsk, in freeing German forces on the eastern front for combat against the West and thereby prolonging the war, would serve to accentuate German bitterness in defeat and to sharpen the masses' disenchantment with their leadership. Furthermore, the treaty would be a declaration to German soldiers and civilians alike that Soviet Russia, in contrast to the members of the Entente, was prepared to offer them peace. This would transform the previous hostility of many Germans to the former enemy on the eastern front into pro-Russian, pro-Soviet or pro-communist--or any combination of these--attitudes. This in turn would have a positive influence on the standing of the German communists within their country. Finally, in successfully defending the results of the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks could help convince doubters and waverers among both pro-communist and communist elements in Germany that a German October Revolution could be a viable alternative to continued suppression under the existing governmental and social order.

Lenin won both the inner-party confrontation and the test of history. Some two and a half years after the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, he was able to claim unchallenged that the treaty had

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[29] Lenin, Sochineniya, vol. XXVII (1952), p1 50. This principle had already seen elaboration by Lenin in October 1917. In his "Report on Peace" at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets he emphasized: "our appeal [for peace] must be addressed to the governments and to the peoples. . . . Everywhere there are differences between the governments and the peoples, and we must therefore help the peoples to intervene in questions of war and peace."

given the Bolsheviks the necessary "breathing space" to deal successfully with the counter-revolution and that it had effectively reduced the role of the imperialists in the Civil War:

> We correctly exploited the differences between German and American imperialism. We made a tremendous concession to German imperialism and by making a concession to one we fenced ourselves off from the attacks of both of them. Germany was neither able to smother Soviet Russia economically or politically; she had not the strength. . . . Anglo-Franco-American imperialism could not fall upon us because we offered it peace from the first. . . . Even though they helped the Czechoslovaks and induced them to intervene, they were pre-occupied with their own war and were unable to interfere.[30]

Nor did the policy of peaceful coexistence decelerate the revolutionary tide in Germany as many comrades had feared. A naval mutiny in Kiel in October 1918 was the starting point for an eighteen-month period of open revolutionary activity by various communist groupings. In Berlin and other cities Workers' Councils were set up and in the rear of the front Soldiers' Councils were formed in army units. A Soviet Republic of Bavaria was proclaimed in April 1919. While the successes of the German communists were sporadic and short-lived, the post-war situation induced the more important groups among them to combine into the Communist Party of Germany (K.P.D.) which remained a force to be reckoned with until Hitler came to power in 1933.[31]

The significance of the Brest-Litovsk treaty extends, of course, well beyond its role in securing the first milestone on the road towards the world communist revolution. It provided the communists with their "basic experience" in foreign relations and the theses Lenin introduced

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[30]Lenin, Sochineniya, vol. XXXI (1952), p. 411.

[31]See Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev (New York: Praeger, 1960), pp. 51-58.

in defense of the treaty represent a full-fledged program for communists to follow in their relations with non-communists.

Perhaps the most imporant lesson of Brest-Litovsk is that a dialectical unity exists between the practicing of peaceful coexistence and the progressing towards world revolution. To prove this point, it was necessary for Lenin to show that there were two levels along which Bolshevik policy was channeled. One was the traditional diplomatic level: Soviet diplomats negotiated peace with the aim of strengthening the Soviet state. The very same peace, however, was an appeal "over the heads" of the representatives of the German state to German society, an appeal which was designed to improve the prospects for an extension of the world revolution. Peaceful coexistence also better enabled the Bolsheviks to undertake illegal measures on the non-state level to the same end. In short, the full impact of Soviet foreign policy in the Brest-Litovsk initiative was effected on two separate but integrally-coordinated levels.

The Two-Level Policy Under and After Stalin: Some Examples

The period of Stalin's leadership of the Soviet Union is identified with everything from collectivization, industrialization and the Great Purge, on one hand, to the Sovietization of Eastern Europe and the Cold War, on the other. But it is important to note that even during the first decade and a half of his rule, when the building of "socialism in one country" was the main domestic preoccupation of the regime and Lenin's peace policy was still the cornerstone of state level policy, Stalin considered activity on this level alone to be insufficient. In "Principles of Leninism," which formed part of the larger Questions in Leninism, a handbook of

instructions for communists to follow in constructing socialism, he expounded this point at length:

> The importance of the October Revolution in world history consists not only in that it resulted from the great initiative of a single country in breaking through the imperialist system and becoming the first homestead of socialism in the ocean of imperialist countries, but also in that it forms the first stage of the world revolution and a powerful basis for its further development.
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> For this reason not only those who forget the international character of the world revolution and represent the victory of the revolution in one country as a purely national and exclusively national phenomenon are wrong but also those who, while bearing in mind the international character of the October Revolution, tend to consider this revolution to be something passive, something which has been merely proclaimed to obtain support from outside. In reality the October Revolution not only needs the support of revolution in other countries but the revolution in these countries also needs the support of the October Revolution in order to accelerate and push ahead the cause of overthrowing world imperialism.[32]

Stalin's speech some eighteen years later, at the Nineteenth Party Congress, the first since the victories in Eastern Europe and Asia and on the eve of the end of the Korean War, contained statements which could have been a paraphrase of the above:

> It would be a mistake to think that, having become a mighty force, our party is no longer in need of support. That is not true. Our Party and our country have always needed, and will need, the confidence, the sympathy and the support of fraternal peoples abroad. . . . Naturally our Party cannot remain indebted to the fraternal parties and it must in its turn render support to them. . . .[33]

Stalin continued:

> Those communist, democratic, and workers' and peasants' parties which have not yet come to power and are still working under the heel of bourgeois laws are particularly deserving of attention. For them, of course, the work is harder. But it is not as hard as it was for us, the Russian communists, in the period

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[32] J. V. Stalin, Voprosy Leninizma, 10th ed. (Moscow: G.I.P.L., 1938), p. 101.

[33] J. V. Stalin, Rechna XIX s'ezde (pamphlet) (Moscow: G.I.P.L., 1952), pp. 6-8.

> of Tsarism, when the slightest movement forward was declared a severe crime. However, the Russian communists stood their ground, were not daunted by difficulties, and achieved victories. So it will be with these parties.[34]

As far as Stalin was concerned, then, the goal of world revolution was still primary for the communists. Moreover, both in a period of peace with imperialist countries and in one of conflict, he maintained that the world revolution would be advanced not only through the diplomatic activity of the Soviet state but also through assistance provided by the Soviet communists to fraternal parties striving for victory in their own countries.

To take a living example of the two levels of Soviet foreign policy, we refer to the person of Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. Gromyko has had quite an action-packed career: in 1939 Stalin made him head of American affairs in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and in 1942 Ambassador to the United States; he belonged to the Soviet delegation at the conferences in Teheran, Yalta, Berlin, and San Francisco; in 1947 Stalin appointed him to the post of assistant Foreign Minister, which meant that he was involved in the building up of the People's Democracies, conducted Soviet policy during the Cold War, helped break off relations with Nazi Germany and assisted in the founding of the United Nations Nations: all this before rising to the top of the Soviet Foreign Ministry where he directed its policy of peaceful coexistence after 1957, and was rewarded for his accomplishments via appointment to the Politburo in 1973.[35]

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[34] Ibid., p. 10.

[35] E. Crowley, A Lebed and H. Schulz, eds., Prominent Personalities in the USSR (Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1968), p. 203; and Yezhegodnik 1977 (Moscow: Izdatyelstvo, "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1977), p. 592.

In the West, Gromyko is often looked upon as a successful career diplomat, as a type of a political consular official who has known how to make his way under dangerous political circumstances. But on occasion he has betrayed this assumed identity. In 1966, at a time when the efforts to induce France out of NATO had just been completed and the mission to steer West Germany onto the path of independent development had not yet begun, Gromyko felt free at the Twenty-third Party Congress to express himself in a way that was "out of character." At the end of his speech, sounding more like a propagandist on the local level, than a top-level diplomat, he said:

> Communism expresses the interests of the great majority of humanity. This, our unshakeable belief, is expressed by Lenin's words which are carved on the monument standing in the center of Moscow, the monument to the founder of scientific communism: "The teaching of Marx is all-powerful, because it is right."[36]

Gromyko's speech at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress, delivered as his efforts to explore the new West German Ostpolitik were under way, provide an interesting amplification of the above remarks. Towards the conclusion of his intervention, he remarked:

> We communists, as the entire Soviet nation, express deep confidence as regards the influence of our successes, of our peace-policy, of our eternal communist ideas, which we carry to the world with our tasks and our examples.[37]

It is clear from the above passages that Gromyko understands himself as both a state-level functionary and a non-state-level revolutionary, and that he finds his double role-playing to be completely coherent.

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[36] 23" S'ezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Stenograficheskiy Otchyet (Moscow: G.I.P.L., 1966), p. 457.

[37] yyS'ezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetikogo Soyuza: Stenograficheskiy Otchyet (Moscow: G.I.P.L., 1969), p. 489.

It stands to reason that if Lenin, Stalin and Gromyko, as key figures in the history of the strongest communist country, have had to pursue a two-level policy owing to the Soviet position of relative weakness, then their counterparts in the essentially weaker, communist states have had to take a similar approach. Further, we have only to refer to statements issued at international meetings of communist parties which reaffirm allegiance to Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence. A case in point is the November 1960 "Declaration" issued by eighty-one parties in Moscow:

> Coexistence of states with different social systems is a form of class warfare between socialism and capitalism. Peaceful capitalism creates favorable opportunities for the development of class warfare in capitalist countries, and of the national liberation movement among peoples in colonial and dependent countries. Peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems does not mean reconciliation of socialist and bourgeois ideology. On the contrary, it presupposes an intensification of the struggle by the working class and by all communist parties for the triumph of socialist ideas.[38]

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[38] Kommunist (Moscow), 1960, no. 17, p. 17.

CHAPTER IX

THE MAIN LINES AND TURNING POINTS OF SOVIET GLOBAL POLICY

In the previous chapter we dealt with the principal features characterizing the relationship of the USSR, and communist states in general, with the non-communist world. We established that the communists aspire to world revolution but, except for a minority in their ranks, reject a frontal attack on non-communist forces, owing to their essential weakness relative to the combined forces of their opponents. Rather, they are obliged to follow a policy of, on one hand, pursuing peaceful coexistence with non-communist states, and on the other, promoting world revolution by supporting fellow communists in their struggle for power.

While these two elements have represented a constant in communist foreign policy since 1917, at different times they have come to the fore in varying degrees. Factors such as the level of a country's socialist development and the balance of power between communists and non-communists across and within national borders naturally give rise to intermediate policy priorities. Thereby differences of perception and approach by individual communist movements with respect to short- and medium-term problems are generated. The result is oftentimes a concealment of the basic dynamics of communist foreign policy.

In terms of the USSR's immediate concerns and objectives, two main phases in its foreign policy can be discerned. The first twenty-five years of Soviet power can be characterized as defensive; beginning with the Red Army victory over the Germans at Stalingrad in World War II, it can best be qualified as offensive. This division can be further broken down into five, more or less distinct, periods:

1. 1917-20: the struggle for the assertion of Soviet power in Russia;
2. 1921-27: the struggle for international recognition of the Soviet state;
3. 1928-42: the struggle for the survival of the Soviet state in view of internal and external dangers;
4. 1943-51: the struggle to exploit the victory and secure the spoils;
5. 1952-75: expansionist offensive on a broad front.

The Defensive Phase (1917-42)

During the quarter century separating the Bolshevik takeover and the Red Army victory over the Germans at Stalingrad, Soviet power was almost continually on the defensive. Except for a brief period when there was no serious menace from beyond Soviet borders, a double threat to the Bolsheviks' position on the part of domestic and foreign forces pervaded.

The latter is true of the first period of Soviet foreign policy, which we have called "the struggle for the assertion of Soviet power in Russia." As emerged in the previous chapter, during the Civil War of 1917-20, the decisive question from the standpoint of the Bolsheviks was whether they would be able to withstand the opposition presented by the White Armies and the capitalist powers which had intervened on their behalf. Thus, in the interest of maintaining power, Lenin had no choice but to

conclude the Brest-Litovsk peace with Imperial Germany, agree upon a treaty of equals with the King of Afghanistan and recognize the independence of Finland, in Tsarist times part of the Russian Empire.[1] Non-state policy, on the other hand, focused on the founding of the Comintern and the issuing of flaming appeals to the oppressed to rise up against their exploiters.[2]

While such appeals could not be followed up with any significant material assistance on the part of the Soviets, they were by no means a misinvestment. They contributed both to the disappearance of a number of European monarchies after the Great War and the establishment of communist parties in many countries. And Germany, where both these phenomena were manifest, not only saw its war effort checked by communist-led internal disorder, but was also incapable of realizing the territorial advantages which were to have accrued to it by virtue of the Brest-Litovsk peace.[3]

In addition to the elaboration of the two-level policy, this initial period brought important reflection on the main lines to be followed in Soviet foreign policy initiatives. Four main conflicts on the global level were identified and their exploitation by the communists were seen as having great potential value in the struggle for world revolution.

One conflict concerned the relationship between the "imperialist" nations and those people and countries subordinated to them. While during the first years of Soviet power the question of national liberation

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[1] Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 323-24.

[2] See Nollau, Die Internationale, pp. 53-71, for background on this phase of the Comintern's development.

[3] See Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev, pp. 50-77.

was above all important with respect to Bolshevik endeavors to place as much of the former Tsarist Empire as possible under their authority, it also had its relevance to countries under the influence or control of Western powers, and in particular to Moslem populations living in the periphery of Greater Russia. This was underlined in the "Message to all the Working Moslems of Russia and the East," issued by Lenin and Stalin less than a month after the Bolshevik seizure of power. The "Message" stated, first, that the Russian revolution had brought "liberation to the oppressed peoples of the world"; second, that the revolution needed the "sympathy and support" of the suppressed peoples; and third, that the revolution and the oppressed peoples shared a common enemy to be commonly combatted.[4]

Within the imperialist camp itself three conflicts were deemed as warranting special attention from the communists. For the scintillating analysis, we are indebted to Lenin:

> Are there fundamental conflicts in the modern capitalist world which must be exploited? There are three I would like to name. The first and closest to use are Japanese-American relations. There is going to be a war between these countries. They cannot live peacefully together on the shores of the capitalist world. . . . America is strong, all are in debt to her, everything depends on her, everyone hates her more and more; she plunders everyone and does it in a most original way [since] she has no colonies. . . . All bourgeois literature testifies to the growth of hatred towards America, and in America demands are growing for an understanding with Russia.[5]

The third conflict Lenin referred to was naturally that of the Entente Powers and Germany, which he had so successfully exploited during the war:

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[4] Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 33-35.

[5] V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, vol. XXVII (1952), pp. 501, 505-6.

> Germany is one of the strongest, most advanced capitalist countries; she cannot comply with the Treaty of Versailles and she must seek an ally against world imperialism, being herself imperialist, but at the same time crushed.[6]

Of these four conflicts, it was above all the latter which offered the greatest opportunities for manipulation. Although, as we shall see, the Bolsheviks were active in supporting national liberation movements throughout this phase and especially in the 1920s, Soviet assistance was too limited and the non-Soviet parties were too weak to establish another communist power. Nonetheless, communist parties were founded in most major countries and important experience could be gained in dealing with the new possibilities the takeover of 1917 had created.

As for the America-Japan and America-"all the rest of the capitalist world" relationships, the Bolsheviks had great difficulty in playing a dynamic role. Diplomatic relations were not opened with Japan until 1925 and even thereafter they continued to be strained owing to territorial and other disputes.[7] Ambassadors were not exchanged with the United States until much later, 1934--an indication of the strong anti-communist sentiment of most Americans.[8] Nonetheless the Bolsheviks did possess approaches within their peaceful coexistence concept which could be used to influence governmental and public opinion in these countries and to encourage rifts between them. One such approach was the taking advantage of economic conditions on a world scale and the capitalists' ingrained interest in expending markets to increase profits. Lenin illustrated how this phenomenon could be utilized to Bolshevik advantage:

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[6]Ibid., 3rd ed., vol. XXV, p. 507.

[7]von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia, pp. 210-13.

[8]Ibid., pp. 213-15.

> For the restoration of the world economy raw materials are needed. . . . And now Russia goes out into the whole world and declares: we are undertaking the restoration of the world economy--this is our plan. With our plan we will draw the sympathy not only of all the workers but of the wise capitalists too. . . .[9]

Another ploy which was worked out in this period was that of making concessions, even on the Bolsheviks' own initiative. In 1920 Lenin indicated how this could be done to influence the course of American-Japanese relations in connection with the two countries' interests in the Kamchatka peninsula:

> Vanderlipp, a distant relative of the famous millionaire, came to us. . . . Vanderlipp brought with him a letter to the Council of People's Commissars. The letter was very interesting, because with extraordinary frankness and with the cynicism and crudeness of the American kulak he said: "We are very strong . . . however, our strength bothers Japan and we will have to fight her, but we cannot fight without kerosene and oil. If you sell us Kamchatka, then I will give you my hand on it, the enthusiasm of the American people will be so great that we shall recognize you. . . .[10]

Lenin commented on the proposed concession no less cynically:

> The matter of an agreement does not commit us to anything; we can cry off at any time. In that case we will only lose the time spent on discussions with Vanderlipp and a small stack of documents, but we will have already won something. There is not a single report coming out of Japan which does not testify to the greatest agitation there because of the expected concessions. Japan declares: "We will not stand for this, this violates our interests." Go ahead, defeat America, we will raise no objection to that. To put it bluntly, we have already set Japan and America at each other's throats, and by doing so we have gained an advantage. We have also won with respect to the Americans.[11]

Such methods as these contributed to America's participating in the Allied camp against Japan during World War I.

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[9] Lenin, Sochineniya, vol. XXV (1949), pp. 507-8.

[10] Ibid., p. 503.

[11] Ibid., pp. 503-4.

The struggle for international recognition of the Soviet state, the second period of Soviet foreign policy according to our scheme, runs more or less parallel to the New Economic Policy, the name given to the series of liberal measures introduced in 1921 to put the revolution- and war-torn Soviet economy back on its feet. The importance of this program to the Bolsheviks can be seen in the light of the Kronstadt Uprising of February of the same year. It marked the first major incidence of popula- resistance to the Bolsheviks on the part of those who had supported them during the Civil War. Provoked by the disastrous economic situation, the Kronstadt Uprising threatened to spark a countrywide rally to its slogan, "Soviets without communists."[12]

In view of this, the drive to obtain recognition of the Soviet state was important in that it contributed to the internal legitimization of the regime. Moreover, the exchange of diplomatic relations with other countries was oftentimes a first step in enlisting their aid in reconstruction. Considerable success in this respect was realized, especially as regards the former interventionist powers.[13]

The campaign for recognition brought the exchange of ambassadors with all border states by the end of 1921 and with fourteen other states by 1926.[14] This process was accompanied by the Soviets' initial participation in meetings on the international level. In the discussions on disarmament and the prevention of aggression, Moscow took positions which were designed to endear itself to countries such as itself which lay far

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[12] von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia, pp. 126-28; and V. I. Lenin, Selected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), vol. III, p. 608.

[13] von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia, pp. 151-54 and 191-218.

[14] Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 325-26.

behind in the arms race of the times and thus felt menaced, and which aimed at fostering the impression that communist Russia was indeed a factor for peace.[15]

The interplay of the two standing components of Soviet foreign policy were very much in evidence during this period. This was in particular the case with respect to Germany, which true to Lenin's prognostication, was seeking "an ally against world imperialism." In 1922 the Rapallo Treaty was signed between the two countries. It called for inter alia extensive economic cooperation and included an accord on secret military collaboration. The Soviets were promised the aid of German experts in constructing modern weaponry while the Germans were to be given the opportunity to train their personnel on Soviet territory. The circumvention of the Versailles Treaty represented a first major effort on the part of the Soviets to exploit the contradictions between the victors of the Great War and Germany.[16]

Comintern activity directed at fanning social conflicts within countries was also manifest in this period, notably in Germany (1921 and 1923), Bulgaria (1923), Great Britain (1926), India (1926-27), Java (1926-27) and China (1927). It should be stressed that in this, as in other periods of Soviet foreign policy, the initiation of diplomatic relations with a country gave the Soviets increased opportunities to carry out activities against its established order. the extension of diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union usually had a positive impact on the numbers and popularity of the local communist party. Moreover, it made

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[15]Ibid., passim.

[16]Von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia, pp. 151-54.

available a local center for clandestine activity, the Soviet Embassy itself--as in the case of the Soviet diplomat Joffe, cited above.[17]

It was also during this period that Stalin made his basic contribution to the communists' understanding of the national question. In his "Principles of Leninism," presented in lecture form at Sverdlov University in 1924, he dealt with this problem at length. Reiterating the communality of interests existing between the communist movement and national liberation movements, he called upon the communists not to underestimate the importance of the national question in their overall struggle and to act accordingly:

> . . . the national liberation movement of the suppressed countries is pregnant with revolutionary potential and it is possible to make use of this in overthrowing the common enemy, in overthrowing imperialism. . . . Hence the necessity that the proletariat supports the national liberation movement of suppressed and dependent peoples, and that it does so in a determined and active way.[18]

Stalin opposed, however, an undifferentiated handling of national struggles. He cautioned that communists had to distinbuish between movements of a reactionary and a revolutionary nature, and that in this connection the decisive criterion for the communists was the extent to which a national movement weakened imperialist forces, and not the class identity of its rank and file:

> That [the necessity to support national liberation movements] of course does not mean that the proletariat must support national movements, always and everywhere and in every concrete and individual case. It is a question of supporting national movements which are directed at the weakening and overthrow of imperialism, and not at its consolidation and maintenance. There are cases in which the national movements of certain suppressed countries

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[17] See Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev, chapter V and VII.

[18] Stalin, Voprosy Leninizma, p. 47.

> come into conflict with the interests of the proletarian movement. It is clear that in such cases there can be no question of support.[19]

Stalin thus provided an explanation of what is often interpreted as inconsistency in the communists' treatment of the national liberation question. This clear subordination of assistance to national struggles to the global struggle of the communists has remained a constant in Soviet foreign policy.

In 1928 there was a radical turnabout in Soviet domestic policy. The market measures introduced in 1921 to restore the economy having produced the intended results, the party directed its energies to the construction of socialism, which in this period meant the collectivization of agriculture and the completion of the primary industrialization of the country. This program spanned roughly the first two Soviet five-year plans of 1928-32 and 1933-37. In laying the groundwork for Soviet heavy industry it was a resounding success. The human cost of the first industrialization carried out under communist leadership was however expressed in such accompanying phenomena as forced collectivization, the extermination of the well-to-do peasantry, large-scale famine, the creation of a vast army of cheap labor for industry, and so on. The result was acute discontent throughout the country and as Stalin himself was to acknowledge in 1937, a desire for turning away from socialism even on the part of those who held rank in the party and had made their careers as a result of the push to industrialize.[20] To prevent discontent from passing to organized resistance, Stalin resorted

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[19] Ibid.

[20] For an explanation of this phenomenon, see Herman F. Achminow, Die Totengraeber des Kommunismus (Stuttgart: Steingrueben Verlag, 1964), especially chapter X.

to the imprisonment and physical elimination of his enemies in the party and among the masses. The purges were launched as early as 1933 and by the time they had reached their zenith in 1937-38, only fifteen of the one hundred forty members of the Central Committee of the CPSU elected in 1934 still enjoyed their liberty.[21]

As indicated by our designation for this third period of Soviet foreign policy, the struggle for the survival of the Soviet state in view of internal and external dangers, the years 1928-42 were also marked by a foreign challenge to the regime. While during the struggle for international recognition, the Soviet leadership could make policy in the assumption that there was no imminent threat to it from outside the country, after 1927 this was not the case. As Stalin ably recognized in this same year:

> The conditions for a new war are ripening. It is unavoidable--of course, not tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, but in a few years. . . .[22]

The threat of war in Europe had, to be sure, its impact on the Bolsheviks' domestic actions. In 1931, speaking before a conference of functionaries of socialist industry, Stalin urged a redoubling of efforts in the industrialization campaign with a reference to the necessity of being ready for war within a decade:

> We lag from fifty to a hundred years behind the most advanced countries, We must make up this distance within ten years . . . or we will be crushed.[23]

The danger from abroad was thus perceived to be very real indeed and if one considers the possibility, as Stalin surely did, that an

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[21] von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia, pp. 243-44.

[22] J. V. Stalin, Sochineniya (Moscow: G.I.P.L., 1946), vol. VII, p. 13.

[23] Stalin, Voprosy Leninizma, p. 13.

anti-communist alliance between foreign and domestic forces might ensue, we can understand the decisions taken by Stalin during this period.

Foreign political measures had to be subordinated to two main considerations. The first was how to ensure that the capitalist nations would neutralize one another in the pending conflict. The second was how to ensure that the Soviet entry into the war would be delayed until "the distance had been made up." Preferably, as Stalin pointed out in 1927, the USSR should be the last country to take up arms:

> . . . when the war comes, we will not sit there with our hands clasped and look on. We will take position, but we will be the last to do so . . . and we will throw our influence into the balance.[24]

As it turned out, Stalin did win the race with time, even if it was in fact America which was to be the last country to enter the war. The German surprise attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 wrought great human and material losses but it did not render impossible a successful Soviet counter-offensive two years later. The road to the victory of 1943 was, however, a jagged one and it involved making compromises with the enemies of the Soviet state and taking punitive action against domestic and foreign communists who for one or the other, often understandable, reason could not identify with certain sacrifices necessitated along the way.

One important line of Soviet policy during the third period had been initiated, as we have seen, as early as 1922 in the signing of the Rapallo Treaty with Germany. The process of strengthening the latter at the expense of the World War I victors continued unabated until the mid-1930s. From 1932-35 it was reinforced by Soviet moves to put relations

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[24]Stalin, Sochineniya, p. 329.

with Italy and Japan, Germany's future partners in the Axis, on a better footing. In the same year, however, we observe the USSR beginning to conclude non-aggression pacts with a series of countries which felt threatened by Germany. After 1935 efforts to offset Germany's growing might became more pronounced in Soviet diplomacy and relations with the Axis's future enemies became noticeably warmer. Nonetheless, relations with Germany were never allowed to deteriorate to such an extent that the rapprochement of 1939 in the form of the Ribbentrop-Molotov non-aggression pact would have been excluded.[25]

Soviet held to foreign communist parties was under the circumstances meager and totally subordinated to the machinations described above. In 1935 the Comintern line of opposition to both Social Democracy and Fascism was replaced by a call for a popular front against social democrats and communists against Fascism. In addition to counteracting the growing strength of Fascist forces outside Axis countries, this could prepare communists for the period after 1941 when they would cooperate with democratic forces in the resistance. During this period of seesaw fluctuations in Soviet foreign policy, the Comintern called upon foreign communist parties to explain in their countries the changing positions taken by the Kremlin. From 1938-41 in particular this was a difficult, if not impossible, task.[26]

The only significant material aid given to foreign communists during this period was occasioned by the Spanish Civil War from 1936-38.

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[25]Background information is taken from von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia, pp. 215-18 and 261-308.

[26]See Nollau, Die Internationale, pp. 207-20.

The Soviet Union had only limited room for maneuver in face of the conflict. It did not have the resources to influence the outcome of the conflict decisively in favor of the anti-Franco forces. Solidarity had to be shown with the anti-Franco forces, however, if the reputation of the communists internationally were not to suffer. On the other hand, there were advantages for the USSR in a fascist victory in Spain. This would strengthen the Axis powers and exacerbate their differences with the Western democracies, thus easing the pressure on the USSR.

As a result of, first, the zig-zags in the Kremlin's foreign line, and second, the fighting in Europe, the Comintern became less and less active. This did not bring a halt, however, to Soviet activities designed to help the spread of communism. Entry into the war in 1941 on the Allied side presented new opportunities, which even before the Stalingrad victory, warranted and received Soviet attention. A case in point was the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in 1941 which gave Moscow the possibility of direct state-level interference in Iranian affairs.[27]

The Offensive Phase (1943-1975)

Although the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-43 did not end the war for the USSR, it did relieve the Soviet leadership of the threat of being overthrown by a foreign power. Hereafter an invasion of the socialist motherland on the part of one or more capitalist powers became improbable--except in the highly unlikely case of a *quid pro quo* response to a Soviet frontal attack.

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[27]Langer, *World History*, p. 1137.

The victory over Germany in the decisive battle of Stalingrad was the first in a series of developments that pointed to the increasing strength of Soviet power and the adoption of an essentially offensive policy in place of the defensive approach of the first Soviet quarter century.

In dealing with the first period of this offensive phase which we have called the struggle to exploit the victory and secure the spoils, let us first clarify why the period has been demarcated with the years 1943-51 and not 1945-51.

The first date seems to be both historically and politically more appropriate at it was the Stalingrad victory, and not the official end of the war, which brought a decisive change. From the Soviet adhesion to the Western alliance to the winter of 1942-43, the USSR's attitude vis-a-vis the West was in the main one of honest cooperation and reflected a forthright desire on the part of the Kremlin to bolster those countries fighting on the Western front. But with Stalingrad, the paramount question became how to exploit the alliance with the Allies.

However great were the opportunities for the expansion of communism during this period, they were not limitless and they had to be carefully exploited. As much as possible it was necessary to convince Western governments and in particular Western public opinion that as the Red Army rolled westwards its only function was to help end the war. To this end the announcement of the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943 was highly effective. The Soviets lost nothing by disbanding the Third International and gained a great deal. Stalin, in reply to a question of a British journalist, explained that the dissolution:

> . . . facilitates the organization of the common front of all peace-loving nations against the common enemy--Hitlerism [in that it] . . . unmasks the Hitlerist lie that "Moscow" is supposedly intent on interfering in the life of other states and on bolshevizing them. Henceforth an end has been put to this lie.[28]

Franz Borkenau later termed the Comintern dissolution as "one of the greatest Russian propaganda successes" and rightly so.[29] Soviet behavior until 1949 shows consistent efforts to "interfere in the life of other states and bolshevize them." The presence of the Red Army was decisive in most of the successful communist takeovers of this period. In those countries where the USSR could not influence the situation directly owing to its military presence, it provided considerable assistance wherever possible. Communist parties, which in many cases played a leading role in the resistance against the Axis, profited substantially from the enhanced prestige which accrued to the Soviet Union in view of its war effort. The latter's endeavors to maintain the fiction of solidarity with the Allies as long as possible provided cover against a Western reaction to Eastern communists at work in consolidating their power.

In September 1947, before the last takeovers in Eastern Europe had occurred, the Cominform, a new organ to coordinate the activities of the communist parties in Europe, was created.[30] This followed the launching of the Marshall Plan and was a direct response to the West's newly-found preparedness to offer European states an alternative to bolshevization.[31]

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[28] J. Stalin, O velikoy otechestvennoye voyne Sovetskogo Souza, 5th ed. (Moscow: G.I.P.L., 1951), pp. 107-8.

[29] Quoted in Nollau, Die Internationale, p. 225.

[30] Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart.

[31] Ibid., p. 30.

The rest of the period under examination falls firmly into what is commonly known as the Cold War. It should be noted however that at no time did the Soviet Union pose a direct armed challenge to its former allies. Even in the case of the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49 this was neither its practice nor its intention. While the aim of this maneuver was to include the Western controlled sector of the city into the Soviet eastern zone, Moscow was not prepared to go to war with the West on this account. The manner in which the entire operation was conducted--the blocking-off of land avenues to the western aprt of the city under the guise of carrying out necessary road repairs--made it possible for either side to back down as circumstances demanded.[32]

After the settling of the Berlin episode in mid-1949, only South Korea remained as a possible candidate for bolshevization. Following American and Soviet withdrawal from the northern and southern parts of the country, communist-controlled North Korea invaded the South. While communist China sent 200,000 "volunteers" into the fighting, the Soviet Union maintained a low profile in the conflict, restricting its contribution to the communist side to the provision of arms and materials.[33] Meanwhile in Europe, the USSR's main preoccupation was the consolidation of the communist victories emanating from World War II. Certain processes which had already been in evidence became more pronounced. Party control in the different countries became noticeably tighter. Social forces which had rallied to the party during the war and in the initial takeover phase out of patriotism, opportunism, and appreciation for the Soviet war effort--not to mention gullibility as regarded communist aims--were weeded out of

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[32] Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart, p. 48.

[33] Ibid., pp. 411-12.

party ranks. Communist functionaries, such as Czechoslovak Communist Party General Secretary Rudolf Slansky, who were identified with promises to respect private property, democratic freedoms, Israeli sovereignty and so on, were removed when their holding of public office became incompatible with the new party line.[34]

Hostility towards the West from 1949-51 was essentially only vocal in nature. Characteristics of the communist side of the relationship were two aspects. First, an enormous effort was made to seal off communist societies from any form of influence from the West. Second, a peace campaign was launched. Party members and sympathizers in communist and non-communist countries alike were active in explaining to all who would listen that the Soviet Union and the new People's Democracies were factors for world peace--and not for war, as was being suggested in Western capitals. In essence this represented an attempt to deflect the increasing tendency in Western quarters to take a hard line against the Soviet bloc.[35]

The transition to the last period we have isolated in Soviet foreign policy, that of the expansionist offensive on a wide front, was heralded in June 1951 in a speech over American radio by the Soviet representative to the United Nations, Malik. The latter's call for a cease-fire in Korea eventually opened the way to the conference table and, what is more, represented a tacit recognition on the part of the USSR that the prevailing climate of East-West relations was not conducive to any further communist expansion and that a new approach was needed.[36]

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[34]See Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 84-103.

[35]See J. M. MacKintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 64-65.

[36]Archives, 1951, vol. III, 11557A.

The USSR emerged from the 1940s significantly stronger, as did non-Soviet communist parties, whether or not they had gained power. Coordination of the policies of the different power centers brought of course new difficulties to the communist movement; on the other hand, it enjoyed a decisive advantage in that state and non-state level policy could be pursued not from a sole communist capital, but from many.

All this being considered, the communist camp was still not a match for the collective strength of the Western community. Looking back at these peak years of the Cold War, we can distinguish twelve groupings among non-communist countries together with their colonies and former colonies which had been formed in the late 1940s or early 1950s, or were to be created by the middle of the latter decade. Even such groupings as the Union Française or the Arab League which were not explicitly anti-communist organizations had, nevertheless, a leadership structure which at this point in time guaranteed an anti-communist course. Altogether, the twelve defense pacts and interest groups brought together some 1,023,240,000 people as opposed to the population living under communism of approximately 750,000,000. A lower limit estimate would give a western camp consisting of the OAS, NATO, ANZUS, SEATO, CENTO, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Spain, a population of 900,000,000, triple that of an eastern side comprising the communist states of Europe.[37]

On the western side, the USA played by far the leading role. In 1952 it became the world's first hydrogen power. Around the same time, as an indication of the anti-communist fabric of the America of the early 1950s, the McCarthy Investigation Committee on Un-American Activities

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[37] See in this connection Achminow, Auf dem weg zum Dritten Weltkrieg, pp. 10-12.

found wide support in its efforts to remove communist influences from American life.[38] Within the framework of the UN, but essentially on American initiative, fifteen states had intervened to help South Korea repel the invasion from the communist North.[39] And in Europe, the catastrophe of World War II had urged individual states to make serious efforts towards European unity, in the economic, political and military sphere.[40]

Notwithstanding the West's preparedness to prevent any further communist takeovers, the Soviet leadership was faced with a social dynamic which made the pursuit of the world revolution an ideological imperative, namely the dissatisfaction of the vast majority of Soviet citizenry with the communist system. In the modern Soviet state of the post-World War II era the only way to control this has been by further communist expansion. More than two decades later, Andre Amalrik, a prominent dissident leader, qualified this dilemma with the lapidary sentence: "Angola compensated for the bad harvest of 1975."[41] The key challenge then for the communists has been in the fifth period how to produce many Angolas, for in one or another area of Soviet reality, "bad harvests" have been commonplace.

The response of the Kremlin to this challenge was formulated by Stalin in the year before his death, in a work entitled On the Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (Feburary 1952) and in his closing address at the nineteenth Party Congress of the CPSU (October 1952). As

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[38] Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart, pp. 165-66.

[39] Ibid., pp. 411-12.

[40] Ibid., pp. 30-31.

[41] Press conference at the Deutsche Welle, Cologne, on 24 February 1977.

was his practice, the Soviet dictator set out his directives for his successors in the form of theoretical postulates and prophecies. In all, seven theses can be distinguished. The first of Stalin's theses concerned the relations between East and West:

> Some comrades hold that owing to the development of new international conditions the contradictions between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp are more acute than the contradictions among the capitalist countries. These comrades are mistaken. They see the outward phenomena that come and go on the surface, but they do not see these profound forces which althought they are so far operating imperceptibly, will nevertheless determine the course of developments.[42]

With this very bold statement, Stalin instructed his brothers-in-arms to see to it that in the West, the East-West conflict would be perceived as a "phenomenon which comes and goes on the surface": they were to support the "profound forces."

In admonishing the comrades to conduct communist relations with the West in a way which would reduce conflicts, Stalin was in effect calling for a renewed and reinforced campaign of peaceful coexistence. In his speech at the nineteenth Party Congress, Stalin said:

> Previously the bourgeoisie allowed itself liberalism, it defended bourgeois-democratic liberties and in this way won popularity among the people. Today the flag of bourgeois-democratic liberties has been thrown overboard. I believe that you, the representatives of the communist and democratic parties, should raise this flag and carry it forward if you want to assemble a majority of the people around you.[43]

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[42] Bolshevik (Moscow), no. 18, 1952, pp. 17-18. To the author's knowledge, this analysis of Stalin's testament was first developed in H. A. Achminow, Die Totergraeber des Kommunismus. See especially chapter XVII. See also Auf dem weg zum III weltkrieg, pp. 19-26, by the same author.

[43] Pravda (Moscow), 14 October 1952.

This was the order to the communists to create the image of "democratic" communism. In the same speech Stalin said:

> Previously the bourgeoisie was held to be the head of the nation. . . . The flag of national independence and national sovereignty has been thrown overboard. There is no doubt that you, the representatives of the communist and democratic parties must raise the flag and carry it forward if you . . . want to become the leading force in the nation.[44]

Here Stalin instructed the communists to create the image of "national" communism. In On the Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Stalin wrote further:

> Outwardly, everything would seem to be "going well". . . Germany [Western], Britain, France, Italy and Japan have fallen into the clutches of the USA and are meekly obeying its commands. But one would be mistaken in thinking that things can continue to "go well" for "all eternity," that these countries will tolerate the domination and oppression of the United States indefinitely, that they will not endeavor to tear loose from American bondage and take the path of independent development.[45]

In other words, Stalin was saying that the communists should see that the unity of the West was destroyed and that America lost its leading role. Stalin also was clear on the sequence that should be followed.

> Take first of all, Britain and France. . . . Can it be assumed that they will endlessly tolerate the present situation. Would it not be truer to say that Capitalist Britain, and after it Capitalist France, will be compelled in the end to break from the embrace of the USA and enter into conflict with it in order to secure an independent position. . . ?[46]

Here Stalin called upon the communists to concentrate first on England and France as they would be the easiest of the Western countries to "break." Then he took up Germany and Japan:

> After the first World War, one had also assumed that Germany was finished for once and for all, in the same way that some comrades think Japan and Germany are finished for once and for

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[44] Ibid.

[45] Bolshevik (Moscow), no. 18, 1952, p. 18.

[46] Ibid.

> all now. Nevertheless, Germany rose again after its defeat in roughly 15-20 years and reestablished itself as a great Power, having broken out of its servitude and gone the way of independent development. The question arises what guarantees are there that Germany and Japan will not get back on their feet again, that they will not try to throw off the American yoke and to pursue an independent policy. I think that there are no such guarantees.[47]

In other words, the communists were advised not to concern themselves at first with Germany and Japan as they would only be able to bring them onto the road of an independent, i.e. anti-American, development in fifteen or twenty years.

Stalin's final thesis dealt with the relations between the various communist parties and with suppressed nations:

> These communist parties which have not yet come to power deserve special attention. . . . It is self evident that our party must not remain indebted to the sister parties and that for its part must provide assistance to them and also to the nations which are fighting for liberation. And, as it is known, this is exactly how our party acts.[48]

This was none other than the proviso to hold high the banner of world revolution by supporting the sister parties struggling for power and by lending assistance to national liberation movements.

In their essence, Stalin's theses were a reprise of policy directions we have encountered before: the two main components of peaceful coexistence and world revolution, the exploitation of national and transnational conflicts, whereby particular emphasis was put on the relationships between the United States, Germany and Japan, Great Britain and France, and on the role of national emancipation struggles.

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[47] Ibid.

[48] Pravda (Moscow), 14 October 1952.

If, however, we take a further look at the Generalissimo's 1952 pronouncements on peace and compare them with those of 1927, we see that the content of the new campaign was significantly different. In 1952 Stalin said, "As to the Soviet Union, its interests are altogether inseparable from the cause of world-wide peace."[49] A quarter of a century previously, he had said that it was ". . . not the duty of the USSR in the situation [that of the neighboring countries of Europe is meant] which had resulted to intervene actively against anyone. . . ."[50] In other words, he favored restraint in the case of international conflicts, a line to which he remained true as much as possible.

In 1952, the situation and the pronouncement were of a different nature as reflected in the thesis which established a parallel between "The cause of peace in the entire world" and "the interests of the Soviet Union." On one hand, it meant that the Soviet Union was justified and duty-bound to occupy itself with "the cause of peace in the entire world"; on the other hand, it made clear that peace would only be fought for in the entire world if this contributed to the defense of the interests of the Soviet Union.

Soviet leaders were then no more to emphasize a defensive stance: rather they were to go over to expansion on the world level--but of course, behind the veil of the policy of peaceful coexistence. As for the "friends of the Soviet Union" beyond its sphere of influence, they were not to defend the Soviet Union (in the meantime it could take care of itself) but rather to attend to the interests of the Soviet Union--to play an active role in extending Soviet influence.

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[49] Pravda (Moscow), 14 October 1952.

[50] J. V. Stalin, Sochineniya, vol. VII, p. 13.

Since the unveiling of Stalin's plan a quarter century has passed, time enough to draw a balance. All seven points have seen considerable fulfillment, or are at least in the process of being realized.

First, Stalin intended that the East-West conflict should appear as a superficial phenomenon and broad strata of Western public opinion see it as such, assigning to the relationship between North and South, between the Soviet Union and China, and between certain capitalist nations greater potential for world conflict.

Second, Stalin intended that the USA should lose its leading position in the non-communist world and since the fall of South Vietnam in 1975 at the latest, the least one can say is that the American leadership role has been severely compromised. Noteworthy here is the fact that the peace campaign supported by communists and non-communists alike was decisive in assuring the American political defeat in Southeast Asia.

Third, Stalin intended that communism should take on a democratic image and in certain non-communist countries (Italy, France, Spain) communist participation in the government is no longer dismissed out of hand by a significant part of the electorate.

Fourth, Stalin intended that communism should appear as a national phenomenon and many people have come to consider that the stand taken by many communist parties in Europe and on other continents on national questions is of greater relevance than the fundamental communist program of abolition of property.

Fifth, Stalin assumed that England and France would be the first of the main Western nations to assume an independent path of development. While France, and especially, Britain have remained closely allied to the

United States in the intervening years, it should be noted that four year after the making of this pronouncement, the two countries initiated military actions in the Suez crisis of 1956 against the will of America.[51] This underlined that there would be no automatic subordination of French and British foreign policy to that of the major western power.

Sixth, Stalin assumed that Germany would follow an independent course within fifteen to twenty years and it was precisely in the period of 1967 to 1972 that Willy Brandt launched and pursued his "neue deutsche Ostpolitik."[52] But although by Brandt's own admission, his "Ostpolitik" represented a "more independent" German policy, it no doubt only in part corresponded to what Stalin had envisaged. It seems unlikely that he had thought that two decades later Germany would still be occupied by troops of Nato countries. Furthermore, for reasons which Stalin could not have foreseen, Germany's allies did not object to its opening of a dialogue with the communist countries of Europe. The spirit of "Ostpolitik" was, however, in line with Stalin's expectations. We might not forget that the slogan which was used in connection with the Ostpolitik was "Wandel durch Annaeherung" or "change via rapprochement." This presupposed that with time, political, social and economic interaction between the Federal Republic and its Eastern neighbors would bring them, and their governments, closer together.[53]

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[51] Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart, p. 14.

[52] Ibid., pp. 53-54.

[53] See Willy Brandt, Friedenspolitik in Europe (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1972), p. 10, and the chapter "Perspektiven unserer Ostpolitik," pp. 173-90.

Seventh, Stalin intended that more communist parties should obtain power. After his death, and owing to the policies he sketched out, the communists came to power in Cuba (1959), Vietnam (1954 and 1975), Cambodia (1975) and Angola (1975), whereby characteristic for all take-overs was the communists' success in turning a struggle for national liberation into one for communist dominance.

Lastly, let it be remarked that the principal concerns of Western European policy in the early 1950s, political unification and, in particular, the efforts to establish the European Defense Union, have recently been overshadowed by the prospect of Eurocommunist elements gaining the upper hand over those pressing for European unity.

It would of course be erroneous to assume that Stalin's successors in the Kremlin have blindly executed his directives. They have remained true, however, to the plan he elaborated in 1952 and in doing so, they have done no more than react to a class and institutional heritage which, formed under Stalin, has outlived him. The setbacks they have suffered in their peace offensive since 1952 have been numerous: the unsuccessful takeover attempts in Indonesia (1965) and in Portugal (1975) and the reversal of promising situations in Egypt (1972) and Chile (1973); the partial setbacks encountered by their policing actions in a number of Eastern European states; the relative reluctance of the island states--Great Britain and Japan--to distance themselves from American foreign policy to the same extent as have Germany and, in particular, France; the seemingly unexpected reinforcement given by the Conference on European Security and Cooperation to dissident activity in the communist bloc, and so on.[54]

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[54]Ibid., pp. 349, 299, 269, 229, 147-48, 13-14.

On balance, however, Stalin's heirs have shown amazing dexterity in formulating and executing policy in the post-Stalin era. They were after all responsible for the destalinizations of 1956 and 1961 which fuelled the phenomena of national communism, the military withdrawal from Austria in 1955 which gave content to their new professions of peaceful coexistence, the wooing of French nationalism which led to that country's withdrawal from NATO in 1966, the exploitation of the Prague Spring in the interests of world communism, and so on.

Special attention should be given to two post-Stalin developments, in particular. The first was the disbanding in 1956 of the Cominform, created only nine years before.[55] This move was significant as it gave a great boost to the idea that communism was in the process of disintegrating as a world movement and that henceforth the centrifugal forces of nationalism would hold sway among the communists. The reality has been otherwise.[56]

Another facet of developments has been the growing importance to international communism of the national liberation struggle of third world countries and peoples. Although support for national liberation has long been a cornerstone of Soviet policy, clear manifestations of communist successes in this area were infrequent in the first four periods of foreign policy we have outlined. In the wake of World War II, however, new opportunities were created when the grip of the established colonialist powers, such as Great Britain and France, on colonies and on their

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[55] Ibid., p. 39.

[56] Since 1956 there have been more than one hundred meetings of a multinational, regional and global character for communist leaders on the highest level. Herman F. Achminow, "Der Eurokommunismus begann mit Stalin," Rheinischer Merkur (Cologne), no. 12, 25 March 1977.

traditional spheres of influence was weakened. Since the 1950s, the institution of the national state per se has been shown to be increasingly vulnerable, with respect not only to the more important countries of North America and Europe and middle-range established states, but also the former colonies. The history of the last two decades has been largely imprinted by their difficulty and often inability in validating their interests in the world community or allowing for adequate expression of the national minorities in their midst. As a result, there have been several openings for the practiced communist tactic of exploiting trans-national and national conflicts. Stalin's call for the communists to raise the flag of national independence and sovereignty and to support the national liberation struggle has thus been in keeping with the times.

We must remember, however, that according to Stalin's plan, Europe was to be the main target for the expansion of international communism. Revolutionary activity in the third world, while not solely to be a function of revolutionary designs in Europe, was to play a secondary role: a takeover outside Europe could be aspired to in so far as it increased possibilities for expansion in Europe--by no means was a takeover attempt to be made in a way which would counteract prospects for expansion in the Old World. By and large, this strategy paralleled that elaborated by Stalin in his work on the national question in the 1920s. It may well be that writing in the period of the Cold War and at a time when the world was perceived as consisting of two camps, one under Soviet and the other under American leadership, Stalin underestimated, if not qualitatively, then perhaps quantitatively, the importance of the third world in the relationships between the East and West. At any rate it was up to his successors to develop a more elaborate concept for communist

policy vis-a-vis the struggle for national independence and national liberation which, starting with the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy in 1953, the year of Stalin's death, has snowballed into one of the major geopolitical phenomena of our times.

In 1960 at a meeting of eighty-one communist parties in Moscow, such a concept was unveiled under the rubric "national democracy." A national democracy, as defined by the "Moscow Declaration," had four key characteristics:

1. absence of any political association with Western powers;
2. non-participation in military blocs;
3. increasing economic ties with the Soviet Union;
4. freedom of activity for Communist Parties.[47]

As we shall see when we deal with Soviet relations with Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq in the offensive phase, it has been a function of the extent to which a government or country has had the potential of meeting these criteria that Soviet foreign policy initiatives towards it have been taken.

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[57] Herbert Ritvo, The New Soviet Society (New York: The New Leader, 1962), p. 90.