

THE FUTURE

of

EUROPE

IN THE

21ST

CENTURY

Enlargement,

Russia, and

European Security

Edited by Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque

© The Centre for Security and Foreign Policy
Studies and The Teleglobe-Raoul-Dandurand
Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies 1999

Pages 27-35 © Jane Sharpe 1999

ISBN 0-7735-1850-9 (cloth)

ISBN 0-7735-1872-X (paper)

Legal deposit second quarter 1999
Bibliothèque nationale du Québec

Printed in Canada on acid-free paper

McGill-Queen's University Press acknowledges
the financial support of the Government of
Canada through the Book Publishing Industry
Development Program for its activities. We also
acknowledge the support of the Canada Council
for the Arts for our publishing program.

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

The future of NATO: enlargement, Russia and
European security

(Foreign policy, security and strategic studies)
Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 0-7735-1850-9 (bound) -

ISBN 0-7735-1872-X (pbk.)

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

2. National security - Europe. 3. Russia
(Federation) - Foreign relations - Europe.

4. Europe - Foreign relations - Russia
(Federation). I. David, Charles-Philippe.

II. Lévesque, Jacques, 1940- . III. Teleglobe
Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and
Diplomatic Studies. IV. Université du Québec à
Montréal. Centre d'études des politiques
étrangères et de sécurité. V. Series.

JZ5910.F88 1999 355'.051'091821

C099-900354-2

Typeset in Sabon 10/12
by Caractera inc., Québec City

Contents

Acknowledgments vii

Contributors ix

Introduction 3

JACQUES LÉVESQUE

PART ONE CONCEPTUAL DEBATES OVER ENLARGEMENT

Fountain of Youth or Cure Worse Than Disease?
NATO Enlargement: A Conceptual Deadlock 9

CHARLES-PHILIPPE DAVID

The Case for Opening up NATO to the East 27

JANE M.O. SHARP

Why Spain Should Have Been NATO's Last Member 35

DAVID LAW

Will Enlargement Succeed? 51

RICHARD L. KUGLER

PART TWO NATIONAL DEBATES OVER ENLARGEMENT

NATO Enlargement and the United States:
A Deliberate and Necessary Decision? 79

GALE A. MATTOX

NATO Enlargement as an Obstacle to France's European Designs 95

MARIE-CLAUDE PLANTIN

success of NATO's PFP program, which prepared non-NATO partners for effective military action with the allies in joint task forces.²⁹ NATO could do much more to implement the Dayton Accords, but it deserves credit for ending the fighting in 1995 and for preventing the renewal of hostilities.

DEALING WITH THE HAVE-NOTS

The NATO operations in Bosnia also began to answer a basic question: what should NATO do about those states that aspire to membership but that will not be in the first tranche? One answer, obviously, is to build up NATO's PFP to maintain strong military and political links with non-NATO partners, to establish NATO missions in the capitals of partner states, and, where necessary, to take appropriate actions to prevent or contain conflict. NATO cannot do this alone, but with willing partners it can provide the backbone for peace operations throughout Europe. To give credence to NATO's proclaimed open-door policy, Alliance leaders must now pay at least as much attention to those not in the first tranche as they do to the successful new members.³⁰

It is also clear that those left out of the first intake, like the Baltic states, will be even more anxious to join the EU. The United States will surely pressure its NATO allies who are also major powers in the EU to accelerate the EU accession process. The EU summit in Amsterdam in June 1997 did not give cause for optimism on this score, being devoted to much navel gazing and arguments about monetary union. But the United States is right to apply pressure on the EU, not least to make the internal adjustments in the Common Agricultural Policy and the distribution of structural funds which are preconditions for EU enlargement.

CHAPTER THREE

Why Spain Should Have Been NATO's Last Member

David Law

Lest the title mislead, this chapter does not take the view that NATO should go out of business. On the contrary, notwithstanding the sea change that has taken place in the strategic environment that gave rise to its founding fifty years ago, the organization remains irreplaceable. NATO binds the two North American democracies to Europe in a way that none of its sister institutions can replicate, and in a way that brings benefits that none of them can provide. It is the only multilateral security institution capable of dealing with anything other than the most minor of military contingencies in Europe, and for that matter – and if it were so inclined – anywhere else in today's troubled world. It is the Western democracies' main instrument for their ongoing effort to shore up the security of the transition countries of post-Communist Europe. Beyond that, NATO remains indispensable as a pacifier of bilateral relationships among its traditional members. However, it does not follow, as the champions of NATO enlargement hold, that for others to partake of such benefits, the Atlantic Alliance needs to expand its membership. NATO enlargement, like so much else in life, is too much of a good thing.

As the author and many other observers have argued, NATO's projected expansion of membership does not make good strategic sense – and this for three reasons in particular.¹ First, enlargement is *not fair* because, as it has been conceived, it brings into the Alliance first those countries least needing a security umbrella and leaves to later – or leaves out altogether – those needing it most. One can, of course, argue that when it comes to decisions about security, fairness is neither here nor there. Such a standpoint ignores, however, how a sentiment of feeling ill done by can shape a community's security perceptions over the longer term. Second, enlargement is *not stabilizing*, for at the very least it complicates the delicate process of reordering security

relationships in post-Cold War Europe – and not just between the West and Russia. But it also runs the risk of engendering substantially more security problems – for new, non-, and old members alike – than the architects of enlargement claim it can resolve. Third, enlargement is in reality *not necessary*, because NATO has a more efficient and effective way of addressing the security problems of today's and tomorrow's Europe, namely, through further development of already quite impressive security arrangements organized under NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP).

With the invitations issued to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland at the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997 and the relative ease with which one NATO country after another has ratified the enlargement protocols, it now seems probable that the Alliance will celebrate its fiftieth birthday with three new members.² William Jefferson Clinton, if he is still in office, will preside over the first expansion of NATO membership since the end of the Cold War, and there will be a collective sigh of relief at NATO headquarters and in nineteen capitals. This chapter argues, however, that the most difficult part of the enlargement process could well lie ahead, after the anniversary summit scheduled for Washington in the spring of 1999.³

POLICY WITHOUT STRATEGY

If enlargement is so strategically flawed, how do we explain why the project got off the ground in the first place? In actual fact, the enlargement process was not launched within the Alliance as the result of any serious debate on the strategic imperatives of the times. The enlargement process was initiated because the United States and Germany thought it made political sense, and because they thought that if it made political sense to them, it would by definition make political sense to others – as had almost invariably been the case during the Cold War.

For the Clinton administration, but also for the Republican opposition in Congress, enlargement seems to have been driven initially by domestic politics. A first consideration was that enlargement could be electorally useful in strategically located electoral districts with a Central and Eastern European ethnic profile.⁴ A second consideration was that there was campaign money to be raised from a military/industrial complex seeing dollar signs in NATO expansion, estimated by the State Department to be worth as much as \$80 billion dollars in arms sales in the period running up to 2009.⁵ While the first issue has received some attention, the second issue has been afforded relatively little. It may have been decisive in launching the enlargement initiative.

Since the end of the Cold War, defence budgets have been downsized worldwide. In the United States, the amount spent on procurement in 1996 was only half as much as it was ten years earlier. Production lines have shrunk and there is increased competition for markets both at home and abroad. At the same time, weapons systems have become much more expensive to develop. This has led to far-reaching consolidation in the U.S. defence industry. The number of players has been significantly reduced and unemployment in the industry is down by almost half relative to the mid-1980s.

In an effort to keep costs manageable, the defence industry has attempted to maximize economies of scale. For example, to maintain the costs of the latest, state-of-the-art, joint fighter aircraft at the level of \$30 million per plane – roughly the cost of the F-16 developed in the 1970s – it is planned to have a production line of 2900 planes, and to this end, to customize models for several countries and services. The bottom line is basically this: the longer the production line, the lower the cost.⁶

In fact, Alliance membership does not really impose an obligation to purchase expensive weapons systems. Alliance members have widely varying defence profiles, as comparison of the extremely limited capabilities of Iceland and Luxembourg with those of most other NATO members readily demonstrates. Moreover, NATO has made repeatedly clear that it is not in the business of hedging against the kind of Cold War threat that would require new members to make major new procurement expenditures. In December 1997, for example, NATO foreign ministers issued a statement estimating the cost of its first enlargement to be a relatively modest \$1.5 billion (U.S.).⁷

Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine how certain interests within the American military-industrial complex may have concluded that NATO enlargement would be better for defence sales than the PfP. In the PfP there has been little peer pressure to modernize and standardize. NATO membership, on the other hand, has been associated with a high degree of interoperability of weapons systems. In its 1997 report to the Congress on NATO enlargement, the State Department provided a lengthy list of the kinds of military restructuring new members' militaries might be expected to undergo. This included training of various kinds, ground-force modernization, surface-to-air missile procurement, and air-force modernization, including the procurement of one squadron of refurbished Western combat aircraft per new member.⁸

It is this kind of numbers that may have convinced U.S. defence manufacturers in the run-up to the 1994 NATO summit to attempt to build support among Democrats and Republicans alike for membership expansion. This coincided with the approach of the U.S. mid-term

elections and the typically frantic efforts of both parties to raise funds for their campaigns. As it was, defence contractors gave, by conservative estimate, some \$7.5 million through Political Action Committees to congressional candidates in 1993-94. In an industry where production of a new fighter aircraft can cost over \$200 billion, this is a pittance; for U.S. legislators, contributions from the defence sector can be of decisive importance in running for office.⁹ And, despite NATO attempts to downplay cost concerns, reports coming out of Central and Eastern Europe in 1998 underlined that the push for arms sales by U.S. defence manufacturers was still going strong.¹⁰

The calculation in Bonn seems to have quite different. Indeed, Volker Rütbe, the former German defence minister and the first Alliance figure to call publicly for enlargement, is on record as describing the need for new members to acquire new weapons systems as "pure drive."¹¹ But in Germany as well there was initially no internal debate over the strategic impact of enlargement. Bonn had even less interest than Washington did in embarking on a policy that could lead to serious friction with Russia. Yet, from the perspective of 1993, it must have hardly seemed possible that enlargement would complicate relations with a Russia that only three years earlier had been prepared to swallow German unification.

In an absence of strategic concern about Russia, Bonn would be moved by other considerations. Germany, in an Alliance of only sixteen, was at the extreme western edge of post-Communist instability. By bringing its neighbours into the Alliance, Germany could seek to create a buffer zone between itself and Europe's most unstable stretches. The inclusion into NATO of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, all three of which had been primary targets of German capital investment from the early 1990s, could have the additional advantage of enhancing confidence about their economic future. Perhaps most important, by taking the lead on enlargement, Germany could help overcome memories of its past role in *Mittel Europa* and uneasiness about its possible intentions in the area. Beyond that, how could Germany, which had only recently celebrated its own reunification and the concomitant enlargement of NATO and the European Union (EU) to include the former East Germany, deny to its neighbours what it had gained for itself?¹²

If the Washington-Bonn consensus was a precondition for the launching of the enlargement project, the situation in other key capitals was favourable. Paris, for example, preferred to delay EU expansion, fearing the implications for its domestic politics of the serious reform that this would necessitate on the European level. It was therefore prepared to abandon its traditionally minimalist approach to the Alliance and

support NATO enlargement as a quick and easy fix that would reduce Central and Eastern European pressures for early EU enlargement. London, on the other hand, wanted to stave off efforts, primarily French-led, to build a European Security and Defence Identity; for Whitehall, enlargement was a way of thwarting plans to push for integration of the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU. Other EU governments would soon come round to similar conclusions. Some acted out of genuine enthusiasm for enlargement; others were simply reluctant to oppose the enlargement initiative once it had become clear that the Clinton White House had become wedded to its consummation.

Finally, the issue was driven by the strident demands for membership lodged by the Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles. They had, and continue to have, a strong case for inclusion. They have insisted that they are caught in a security vacuum, that they are natural extensions of the Western and Central European cultural, historical, and economic community, and that they have suffered more than once as a result of strategic neglect on the part of the leading Western democracies. In fact, a major argument in favour of enlargement that could be heard at NATO headquarters in the run-up to the Madrid summit was that the three countries had grown so accustomed to the notion that they would be included in the Alliance, that to disappoint them would have represented a strategic faux pas. This may have been one of the most important factors pushing the process.

NATO decision making on enlargement is a classic case of "part to whole" politics. Partial arguments and individual interests came to dominate reflection early on. There was no attempt to review whether and why enlargement might be advantageous from a pan-European standpoint. The issue soon took on a life of its own. At the 1994 NATO summit, the decision was taken "to open a perspective on enlargement." Even though it would take another three and a half years before NATO would actually extend membership invitations, it was already clear at that junction that any further debate among Alliance governments would be about "how, when, and who." Actually, even the "who" question was partially resolved by this time, however unofficially. Barring a major reversal in their internal reform process, the Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles could be more or less certain that they would be among the first invitees.¹³

From this point on, NATO policy - when not preoccupied with the conflict in Bosnia - was fixated on the question of how to adapt the European security situation to the pending mini-enlargement. This remained true, notwithstanding the emergence of a number of developments that suggested that the light might not be worth the candle. One was the rising opposition to enlargement in traditionally pro-

NATO policy circles in Alliance countries. A second was the increasing nervousness in Central and Eastern European capitals, other than Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw, as they realized that their prospects for inclusion in the first wave were weak, and that a second and/or third wave would be highly problematic. As an indication of such concerns in the Baltic states, it was quasi-officially rumoured that no enlargement would be preferable to an enlargement that excluded them. Additional difficulties emerged as the question of just how much enlargement was going to cost and who was going to pay for it heated up in the United States.¹⁴ Then, as NATO struggled to please and appease old, new, possible, and unlikely members, and address their widely conflicting interests, it was confronted with the full complexity of the enlargement project. Finally, NATO's biggest headache — and the catalyst for many of the other problems — was Russia's sharpening opposition. But for many observers, well before the Madrid summit, "the train had left the station." This chapter now looks at some of the more daunting challenges that the conductors of this train will have to contend with as it makes its journey through the Europe of the turning millennium.¹⁵

"EDUCATING RUSSIA"

NATO has consistently radiated optimism about its ability to bring the enlargement process to a successful conclusion. Its assumption has been, that with sound arguments, the occasional concession, and new institutional devices, it would prove possible to overcome the reservations and scepticism that have accompanied the project in some European capitals from the beginning. This hope has been particularly on display in NATO's attitude towards Russia.

One argument put forward by the proponents of enlargement has been that Russia needs NATO as a pole of stability for its own reform process. An example sometimes cited is the way Moscow took advantage of the Alliance's extended "hand of friendship" during the decisive days of August 1991, in particular when Boris Yeltsin made his famous phone call to then secretary general Manfred Wörner at NATO headquarters to appeal for the organization's continuing support for Russia's embryonic democracy. This argument finds its continuation in the idea that the charter on Russia-NATO relations and the NATO-Russia Council that have been agreed to as part of the enlargement process can be of similar utility.

A related notion is that enlargement will bring concrete benefits for Russian security, because it will have a stabilizing effect on European security in general and on Russia's western flank in particular. With

Central and Eastern European countries tidily tucked into the Alliance — so the argument goes — there will be much less risk of instability in their relations, and hence much less for Russia to worry about to its west.

A third aspect is the Alliance's stated determination to go the extra mile in meeting any Russian concerns that are in its view reasonable. NATO has, in fact, worked hard to make enlargement decision making fully transparent to Russia, keeping it informed of developments as necessary and as possible. "No surprises" has been the proviso as the process has unfolded. A further argument has been the slow pace with which NATO has pledged that its defence posture on new members' territory will be non-threatening. While not prepared to promise not to station nuclear weapons or troops on the territory of new members under any circumstances, Alliance officials have said that there is "no plan, no reason and no intention" to deploy either.¹⁶

The fourth part of the NATO's sales pitch is that it recognizes Russia's apprehension about exclusion and the need to include it as appropriate. Just as the Alliance wanted Russia to participate in the PfP, it now wants the relationship to develop further through the NATO-Russia Council. The view is that, if Russia is going to be excluded, it will be because of decisions in Moscow, not in Brussels. At the same time, NATO members have taken measures to open the door of other institutions. Russia was admitted the Council of Europe in 1996 and to the G7 at its 1997 meeting in Denver.¹⁷ Finally, there is the as yet very hazy idea of possible membership for Russia in the Alliance, an idea not necessarily excluded by the United States and some other NATO members but by no means uniformly accepted in the Alliance.¹⁸

In addition to this quasi-official view, a number of other perspectives on Russia are at work in NATO decision making. One is that Russia will ultimately overcome its objections to enlargement, even if it remains in disagreement in principle. While by no means an official line, this perspective figures strongly in Alliance thinking. It is underpinned by the notion that Russia has been brought around in the past when the price was right and there are no reasons to believe this cannot continue to be the norm in future. This view is fed by two assumptions about Russia's situation and interests. The first idea is that the country is financially "on the make" and can be bought with new injections of capital. Whether this kind of horse-trading actually exists is difficult to prove. It is worth noting, however, that after the Madrid summit, such Western-dominated institutions as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank took a number of initiatives designed to ease the Russian government's liquidity problems.¹⁹ The second

assumption idea is that Russia is strategically "on the make" and can be persuaded to fall into line through Western concessions on arms control, especially in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) context, and tacit Western agreement to treat the Commonwealth of Independent States (cis) as Russia's sphere of influence.²⁰ Again a direct connection is difficult to prove. Russia did, however, obtain de facto recognition of some of the adjustments it had demanded in the CFE treaty in an "agreement in principle" to revise certain clauses that was reached in July 1997.²¹

Another standpoint, thankfully much less widespread, is that it does not really matter an awful lot whether Russia accepts NATO enlargement or not. In this view, Russia's lowly post-Cold War status means that it is no longer a key consideration in Alliance decision making. Put another way, Russia can like NATO enlargement it or lump it — and if it lumps it, it is simply too weak or ineffectual for this to make much of a difference.

Still another view is that Russia is on its own trajectory and that, no matter what NATO does, it will again become the "bad guy" of European politics. It is, therefore, incumbent on NATO to act now while it still can and to use the available window of opportunity to build a strong anti-Russian alliance. Whether intended or not, this is the kind of thinking that seems likely to become self-fulfilling. A related view from Henry Kissinger, one of the patrons of the realist school of international relations, is that NATO has already given Moscow too much of *droit de regard* over its own decision making by virtue of the Russia-NATO Council.²²

WHY RUSSIA WON'T BUY

With the membership invitations extended, and ratification proceeding smoothly, the NATO-Russia debate over the pros and cons of enlargement has lost much of its earlier prominence. Nevertheless, fundamental differences persist, and the possibility of new tensions over the pending new memberships and any others that may follow should not be excluded.

There are several reasons for this. In the first place, opposition to enlargement has been shown to pay. NATO efforts to persuade Russia to accept enlargement have encouraged Russia to "play hard to get" on issues that it might otherwise have been more prone to resolving in cooperation with the West. The Yeltsin government cannot overplay this hand, particularly in view of its financial dependence on the West. Still, it would seem to enjoy a certain amount of room for manoeuvre, especially in the area of arms control and disarmament.²³ At the same

time, NATO efforts to placate Russia through the creation of the NATO-Russia Council can have the effect of fostering precisely those feelings of Russian superiority in European affairs that the Alliance should be encouraging it to shed. The organization has made a point of practising "one country, one vote," notwithstanding the huge disparities in the profiles of its members. It has been disconcerting to see it promoting a framework for consultation with Russia that de facto acknowledges in the NATO context the superior power position in Central and Eastern Europe and the cis to which part of the Russian elite continues to aspire.²⁴ The traditional allies of the United States would never have bestowed on it such a status within the Alliance, even in the unlikely event that they had been petitioned to this effect.

Second, a good case can be made for the probability that enlargement will lead to a deterioration of Russia's security situation. The main problems here are not in the area of CFE ceilings or NATO intentions, but concern the impact of enlargement on stability in Central and Eastern Europe and on the cohesion of the Russian Federation.²⁵ With regard to Central and Eastern Europe, there are reasons for being apprehensive about the impact of enlargement on relations between those states that are slated to join in the first wave of enlargement, and those hoping to be included in a later phase or doubting their future chances altogether.

Romania, for example, worked hard in the run-up to the Madrid summit to address issues that could stand in the way of its accession to the Alliance. It sought to resolve problems in its relations with its Ukrainian and Hungarian neighbours and to meet the concerns of its sizeable Hungarian minority. In acknowledgement of this, the Romanian candidacy received much support prior to the Madrid summit and was rewarded with a half-promise that it would be included in the next wave of enlargement. But, as doubts have grown about the likelihood of the second enlargement, extreme nationalist forces in Romanian politics have been strengthened at the expense of the moderate nationalists who have dominated the government in recent years. At the same time, Hungary's new government, elected in June 1998, has signalled its determination to do more for the two million Hungarians living in adjacent countries.²⁶ To bring one country in while leaving the other out could make it extremely difficult for the two countries to manage their bilateral security relationship. Similar problems can arise between other countries that share ethnic or religious communities and/or difficult pasts, and that find themselves on opposite sides of the enlargement divide.

A related concern is the evolution of new members' policies towards Russia. Will anti-Russian *revanchisme* in Central and Eastern Europe

be encouraged or checked by enlargement? In neither instance is the track record of security institutions encouraging. Joint Greek-Turkish membership in the Alliance certainly helped efforts to check bilateral friction during the Cold War, but it is questionable to what extent this can be relied to keep conflict at bay under current strategic circumstances. Nor has the experience of the WEU, where Greece enjoys full membership but Turkey only associate status, been encouraging in this regard.

Another set of strategic concerns relates to the cohesion of Russia and the viability of the CIS as a vehicle for addressing common problems in post-Soviet territory. Russia can be forgiven for being apprehensive about the impact of Central and Eastern European integration on post-Soviet space. This could strengthen centrifugal forces in the Russian Federation, for example, in Kaliningrad. NATO membership for the Baltic states, and perhaps in time for Ukraine, would lock sizeable Russian and Russian-speaking communities into a different security community, and position at Russia's doorstep the world's most powerful military alliance. It is unrealistic for the West to expect that Russia will not be alarmed by this prospect. Already, the enlargement process has encouraged Yeltsin's government to drop earlier reservations and move closer towards Lukashenka's unreforming Belarus.²⁷ The result – a Potemkin-like Union – is less important than the direction. The efforts of the Baltic countries to distance themselves from the near abroad have also raised concerns in Moscow. For example, then foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov warned after the Yeltsin-Clinton summit in Helsinki in March 1997 that inclusion of the Baltic states would irrevocably compromise the Russia-NATO relationship.²⁸

The third reason why Moscow will continue to resist enlargement is that from a Russian perspective, it symbolizes the West's lack of preparedness to seek Russia's integration into the post-Cold War Western-led community. The contrast with other post-Communist states – and particularly neighbouring Poland – is akin to a Western vote of non-confidence in Yeltsin's government and the prospects for the reform process. In the Russian domestic debate, this can be used as a dagger in the government's back. For example, Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov castigated the results of the Clinton-Yeltsin summit as a crushing defeat for the government's foreign policy. In the Duma two weeks prior to the summit, a vote opposing NATO enlargement was supported by 300 to 1.²⁹ Yeltsin's position is too weak, his relations with the West have been too close, and the resistance in the Duma is too strong for him to accept enlargement on any terms short of Russia receiving a veto over NATO decision making. For obvious reasons, this will not be forthcoming. His only option is to put on a

brave face and to argue that the NATO-Russia Council can be used to limit the damage to Russian interests.

Beyond that, for Russians in and outside the government committed to working for the normalization and modernization of their country, enlargement is a threatening diversion. For those in the Duma who wish to focus the country's energies on building a strong military in a strong state and who press for *Soviet Revision*, however, enlargement can be a welcome ally. In particular, it can serve as the centrepiece of future attempts to rally the masses around political programs featuring anti-Western policies.

A RISING RUSSIAN REVANCHIST STATE?

As yet there is little sign that Russia's beleaguered population is overly concerned about NATO enlargement and Russia's responses. However, in a community that has been invaded on four occasions from the West in as many centuries, this can change. In the 1990s, for the first time in its modern history, Russia has had an opportunity to devise a broadly based foreign policy that is not predicated on the country being challenged by an imminently menacing national or a class enemy. Enlargement seems set to narrow the opportunities for Russia escaping from this historical pattern. In its reaction, Russia can prove strategically bothersome to the West over the short term. The really crucial issue, however, is what impact it will have on post-Yeltsin governments, on those who are now learning their political trade, trying to win a public profile for themselves and reflecting on political platforms for the first decade of the next millennium.

History never repeats itself exactly, but there are some disconcerting parallels between Germany's development after the First World War and that of Russia after the Cold War. Yeltsin's Russia now, like pre-Hitler Germany then, is locked in an economic hypercrisis. Yeltsin's Russia faces the prospect of exclusion, just as pre-Hitler Germany was excluded from the post-First World War order. After 1918, Germany's exclusion had a major impact on the debate between those in the country who wanted to seek accommodation with the winners of the war and the traditionalists who sought to keep Germany anchored in the East. Exclusion from the Versailles order decided the debate in favour of the latter and paved the way for the Rapallo Treaty of 1922. This in turn set the stage for the strategic cooperation that was the stuff of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. Russia's modern-day exclusion increases the likelihood of Russian participation in the anti-Western coalitions of the next decade.

While this parallel should not be taken too far, the possibility of developments such as a Sino-Russian Rapallo cannot be entirely dismissed.³⁰ The crisis-management systems of post-First World War and post-Cold War are similarly weak. The League of Nations failed because Germany and Russia were excluded, and the United States excluded itself. The European security architecture of the 1990s can yet fail because of a combination of factors, including Russia's exclusion, exaggerated expectations of the role the United States is prepared to play in European security in the post-Cold War era, and the inadequate contribution of the developed European states to their own security affairs. We will return to the issue in the concluding section. For the time being, the point to be stressed is that, from a Russian perspective, NATO enlargement can constitute a bifurcation point in the country's development. NATO-Russia strategic partnerships, charters, and councils are well meaning, but these are diplomatic constructs that fail to seize the deeper-lying issues shaping Russia's future.

THE SOLANA SCHEDULE

Symptomatic of this approach is NATO Secretary General Javier Solana's view of how the enlargement process will unfold, as related to a group of Russia experts visiting the Alliance in the spring of 1997.³¹ For the secretary general, enlargement is a process of security "socialization" that will do for the new Central and Eastern European members what it did for his own country when it emerged from Franquist dictatorship two decades ago. Moreover, it is for him an ongoing process that, in the ten-year period stretching from the Alliance's fiftieth to its sixtieth anniversary, will see, in three or four additional waves of enlargement, all the (current) twelve would-be members of NATO joining the Alliance.

The deadlines laid out by the secretary general – the signing of the Russia-NATO Charter in May 1997, the invitations issued at the Madrid summit in July 1997, the preparation of the protocols of accession by the end of 1997 – have so far all been met with ease. But schedules for playing out political agendas can be notoriously inexact. Take that of the Spanish accession to the Alliance. If there had not been a change in government in Madrid in 1982, Spain's process of accession would have been simple and straightforward. As it was, the assumption of power of the Spanish Socialists – Solana's party – led to a freezing of Spain's status in the Alliance. Four years then transpired before a referendum could be organized on the principle and on the terms of Spanish membership. While a majority of the electorate supported NATO membership, the referendum text stipulated *inter alia*

that Spain would stay out of NATO's integrated military structure. It was to be the next decade before negotiations could be completed on the "coordination" agreements required to govern the relationship between Spain's national forces and the integrated forces of the Alliance. Then, in 1996, following another change in government, Madrid announced that it wished Spain to participate fully in the integrated military structure. At the July 1997 summit, it was confirmed that Spain would reintegrate once NATO had completed its review of its command structure. With the completion of this process in the lead-up to the December 1997 NATO foreign ministers' meeting, the way was free for Spain to become a full member of the Alliance – no less than fifteen years after the country's original accession.

This does not need to be the way of NATO's next new members. It could, however, well be. The domestic political circumstances of the three invited states are rather more complicated than those of NATO's last new member, as are their relations with neighbouring states, large and small. The then Soviet Union was hardly a major consideration in Spanish decision making in the 1980s. By the end of 1997, two referenda on enlargement had already taken place in Central and Eastern Europe: in Slovakia, whose membership bid was rejected at the Madrid summit, and in successful Hungary.

The Solana schedule will also encounter obstacles if, as we have suggested, an overall worsening of security relations in Europe accompanies the first wave of enlargement. Just how far this could go is clearly difficult to assess. While a return to Cold War politics can be safely excluded, we could witness a resurrection of some of the more disconcerting strategic realities of the Cold War. If there is growing apprehension over the security situation, NATO could find itself addressing the issue of how new members interests are to be defended in more detail and under more pressure than appeared likely when new memberships were first embraced as a policy option. This could mean new debates about the high cost of enlargement. More seriously, it could give enhanced prominence to questions of nuclear defence and nuclear roles.³² This could prove particularly problematic if the Alliance fails to wrap up rapidly the review of the Strategic Concept that was announced at the December 1997 foreign ministerial meeting.³³

Against this background, NATO may begin its second half-century with more new problems than new members, and in several respects a more fragile institutional framework, much less capable of playing a stabilizing role. Already in the lead-up to enlargement, institutional arrangements seem to have become hopelessly complex. Post-Madrid, NATO consultations on political issues are configured at sixteen (the existing members), at 16 + 1 (the existing members with both Russia

and Ukraine), at 16 + 3 (with the three invitees), at 16 + 28 (in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), and at another version of 16 + 1 (with each of NATO's six Mediterranean partners). It remains to be seen what will be the impact on this institutional hydra when the NATO core group passes from sixteen to nineteen.

In the wake of enlargement, the structure for European security may be weakened on a number of fronts. The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the only all-inclusive security institution in Europe and the only one in which all European states enjoy equal status. It may find its effectiveness undercut once countries, for which it was the sole institutional home when the Warsaw Pact folded, join the Alliance. Similarly, Alliance enlargement raises questions about the future memberships of the WEU and the EU, and about the congruity of their rosters with those of both NATO and one another. For the time being, all ten full members of the WEU are members of both the Alliance and the EU. The next phase of EU enlargement is to make members of not only the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, but also Cyprus, Slovenia, and Estonia. Theoretically, this should be manageable as long as the latter three countries opt for a status similar to that of the four members that are not members of the EU - Ireland, Finland, Sweden, and Austria. But the security traditions of these states are as different as night from day. It seems unlikely that the newcomers will bend their identities to meet the requirements of European institutional coherence.

All this promises to discourage the Alliance from undertaking a second round of enlargement. Should the Alliance limit itself to nine-teen members, this would put the countries that have wanted to join NATO but have not been invited for the first round of enlargement in an even more difficult situation than if there had been no enlargement at all. The air in their security vacuum will become correspondingly lighter. For some of the second-round hopefuls, the process of adjusting to non-inclusion may have already started. For example, the Romanian prime minister has acknowledged that it is "unlikely" that his country will be invited to join NATO in 1999 and "more realistic" to view membership as "possible" between 2000 and 2003. He has also warned that there should be no repeat of the "hysteria" that accompanied Romania's membership bid in 1997.³⁴ Any number of Eastern capitals, including Moscow, would welcome a successful effort to downplay the urgency and importance of the membership issue. But this will not be easy. NATO's fiftieth anniversary will not be a quiet affair, and enlargement fortunes and failures easily lend themselves to domestic political infighting. This points to the fundamental dilemma that has underlain the enlargement project from its very inception.

While any enlargement at all is anathema to Moscow, too much enlargement is worse still; too little enlargement, on the other hand, can mean a deterioration in the security situation of the non-included Central and Eastern European states.

THE ALLIANCE THAT IS NO LONGER

There is a twofold irony about NATO enlargement that has thus far received little attention. One part of this irony is that the NATO that Central and Eastern European countries have been lining up to join no longer exists. The second part is that, for the reasons outlined above, enlargement may well end up calling into question the NATO that still does, with unfortunate consequences for European security as a whole.

NATO is no longer the NATO it was during the Cold War in several respects. One relates to the security guarantee embodied in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This foresees that "an armed attack against one or more of [the member nations] in Europe or North America shall be considered as an attack against them all." Actually, there was never anything automatic about this guarantee; a decision to go to war as an Alliance, as with any other NATO decision, requires a consensus decision. In practice, however, this article became associated with "automaticity" owing to the strategic circumstances of the Cold War, the existence of the nuclear threat, and the likelihood that any shooting war pitting NATO and Warsaw Pact countries against one another would invariably involve a nuclear exchange. This perspective assumed that members would have very little leeway, if any at all, in deciding whether or not to defend an ally. In the strategic circumstances of post-Cold War, not only have Article 5 contingencies become highly unlikely but the prospect that mutual guarantees would actually be acted upon in such contingencies is extremely questionable. This change in the quality of Article 5 was already signalled in the fall of 1990 when there was considerable hesitation within the Alliance about taking measures to reinforce Turkey, at that time facing a menacing Saddam Hussein.³⁵ In the meantime, it has become clear that, whether NATO countries are prepared to do battle for a just cause has little to do with membership considerations. Bosnia is not a member, nor of course is Kosovo; membership is not currently an issue for either.

As argued above, today's NATO remains the most effective multilateral security organization in Europe, perhaps anywhere. But this is a NATO that is far removed from the organization that enjoyed a virtual monopoly over Western security affairs during the Cold War. In the 1990s, the pattern is for NATO to share, and sometimes contest,

responsibility with other institutions. Similarly, NATO countries can find themselves, as in Bosnia, participating in coalitions whose non-NATO member countries outnumber them. This underscores that NATO membership is no longer the badge of exclusivity that it once was. But it also says that it makes little sense to approach the issues of interoperability and joint training from any context other than that of the *prf*.

A third feature of "the Alliance that no longer exists" concerns the American role. One of the most compelling attractions of NATO has been the link it provides with the North American democracies, and particularly the United States. But the nature of this link has evolved considerably. During the Cold War, NATO was associated with unflinching U.S. leadership, and U.S. leadership was associated with NATO. This has changed. Post-Cold War, the United States has reduced its involvement. It has also signalled that it will no longer always wish to take the lead in the continent's security. Washington will follow a credible Euro-lead, but short of that, the best Europe can expect is the kind of temperamental shifting between neo-leadership and neo-isolationism that the White House has put on display in the Yugoslav saga. As U.S. attitudes about American involvement in European security have evolved, so have their institutional manifestations. The transatlantic link is no longer the exclusive property of NATO. In the Europe of the 1990s, it has more diverse but also more modest dimensions: the bilateral arrangement with the EU, the Concert-like function in the OSCE and the Contact Group, and the pivotal pan-European role in *prf*.

To conclude, NATO membership offers little that could not have been better provided for elsewhere, without the negative repercussions for European security generated by Alliance politics of inclusion and exclusion. The *prf*, now five years old, offers a flexible self-differentiating framework for security cooperation. It has an impressive track record as a school for preparing multilateral security cooperation. It offers participating countries the opportunity to request consultations when faced with serious security challenges.³⁶ Working in tandem with the *prf* is the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. With its forty-four members, it constitutes a framework for political consultation that is even more inclusive than its predecessor, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. These two institutions provide all European countries that are so inclined with a post-Cold War version of the transatlantic link – downsized, more diffuse, and less dependable. That is about as much America as can be hoped for in today's Europe. But it is already quite a lot. The challenge now for those who have the Alliance's best interests at heart will be to ensure that enlargement does not end up putting all of this at irreparable risk.³⁷

CHAPTER FOUR

Will Enlargement Succeed?

Richard L. Kugler

When the controversial idea of enlarging NATO burst upon the public scene in 1994, it gave rise to an impassioned debate over a single burning issue: Is NATO enlargement a good idea and should it become U.S. policy? Although this debate continues with undiminished fervour in many places today, the past few months have brought important policy changes that are altering the terms of reference for thinking about enlargement, and for quarrelling about it. The issue of whether NATO will enlarge is now all but settled. Like it or not, NATO is going to enlarge, and soon. As a result, a new issue is likely to come to the forefront: Will enlargement succeed? Will it be carried out in ways that actually bring about the powerful strategic benefits it is intended to produce? Or will it fall on its face and produce a disaster – or a mess and a dud?

These important questions are only in the kindling stage today, but soon they may start burning, for their answers are not obvious. With these questions foremost in mind, this chapter addresses the benefits, costs, and risks of NATO enlargement. In particular, it analyses how these critical performance indicators are likely to be affected by the political-military strategy chosen by NATO for implementing enlargement. There are many different strategies for enlargement, and NATO has not yet determined which one to pursue. The strategy chosen by NATO will be key to determining whether enlargement evolves into a success or a failure. Consequently, this chapter offers some insights on how the benefits, costs, and risks are likely to play out as a function of how the United States and NATO grapple with the challenges and dilemmas of implementing enlargement.

This chapter flows in a straightforward fashion. It begins with general observations that set the stage. It then describes the potential benefits of NATO enlargement. Next, it discusses the importance of